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Abstract 
 
This study of six lower altitude Eastern Arc forest and miombo woodland reserves 
around the Uluguru Mountains in Tanzania investigates the impacts of Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) on forest quality, household livelihoods and forest governance.  
 
In terms of forest quality, comparative analysis of 659 forest plots showed significant 
signs of improved forest quality in the three forests jointly managed between 
communities and state, compared to the three forests under sole state management 
(control group). This was measured through an increased frequency of trees, poles and 
withies, as well as seedling coverage and canopy density. There were significantly less 
incidences of fire in the JFM forests compared to the control group.  
 
In terms of livelihoods and resource access, JFM essentially provides preferential forest 
access to village leaders and forestry committee members, at the expense of the rest of 
the community. For village families who own land, this causes a greater reliance on 
their home gardens and farms, as well as diversion in the extraction of forest products to 
areas not covered by the JFM regime. For poor families with limited land, forest closure 
due to JFM limits their ability to maintain diversified livelihoods. 
 
The local forest committees do not follow good governance principles in regard to 
record keeping and information sharing with villagers. The disjuncture between 
externally created village forest committees and established village governance bodies 
prevents accountability and transparency with regard to forestry matters, allowing those 
who benefit to reinforce a regime that keeps them in control and avoids them being 
questioned. In summary JFM has led neither to improved livelihood opportunities for 
the majority of villagers nor improved forest governance.  
  
ii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables..................................................................................................................... v 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. vii 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................. viii 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... ix 
 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background and context of the study ................................................................. 1 
1.2. Study objectives and research questions ............................................................ 3 
1.3. Choice of the Morogoro research site ................................................................ 4 
1.4. Structure of the dissertation ................................................................................ 5 
 
2. PFM – emergence and theory ........................................................................ 6 
2.1. The emergence of PFM ...................................................................................... 6 
2.2. The rationale for PFM ........................................................................................ 9 
2.3. Concepts entailed in PFM ................................................................................ 13 
2.3.1. Forest condition ......................................................................................... 13 
2.3.2. Livelihoods and poverty ............................................................................ 14 
2.3.3. Community ................................................................................................ 19 
2.3.4. Gender ....................................................................................................... 21 
2.3.5. Governance ............................................................................................... 24 
2.3.6. Participation .............................................................................................. 30 
2.4. Common property regimes ............................................................................... 33 
2.4.1. Categories of property rights ..................................................................... 36 
2.4.2. Attributes of successful common property institutions ............................. 37 
 
3. Lessons of PFM ............................................................................................. 41 
3.1. Experiences in Asia .......................................................................................... 41 
3.1.1. Background ............................................................................................... 41 
3.1.2. Impacts on forest quality ........................................................................... 42 
3.1.3. Impacts on livelihoods and poverty .......................................................... 44 
3.1.4. Impacts on governance and decentralization ............................................ 47 
3.1.5. State managed forests ................................................................................ 52 
3.2. Experiences in Africa ....................................................................................... 54 
3.2.1. Background and overview......................................................................... 54 
3.2.2. Impact on forest quality ............................................................................ 57 
3.2.3. Impact on livelihoods and poverty ............................................................ 58 
3.2.4. Impact on governance and decentralization .............................................. 61 
3.2.5. Emerging issues ........................................................................................ 65 
 
4. History and political context of PFM in Tanzania .................................... 72 
4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 72 
4.2. History of Tanzanian Forestry .......................................................................... 73 
4.2.1. Pre-colonial era ......................................................................................... 73 
4.2.2. Colonial era ............................................................................................... 74 
4.2.3. The post-independence years .................................................................... 77 
4.2.4. The participatory era ................................................................................. 79 
4.3. The post-independence political framework .................................................... 81 
4.3.1. African socialism and villagization ........................................................... 81 
iii 
 
4.3.2. Village governance.................................................................................... 83 
4.3.3. Decentralization of local government ....................................................... 85 
4.3.4. The politics of JFM ................................................................................... 87 
4.4. History and politics of the Uluguru mountains ................................................ 89 
 
5. Research design, methods and study sites .................................................. 94 
5.1. Research design ................................................................................................ 94 
5.2. Research methods ............................................................................................. 99 
5.2.1. Mixed method approach ............................................................................ 99 
5.2.2. PRA study ............................................................................................... 103 
5.2.3. Household survey .................................................................................... 109 
5.2.4. Forest transects ........................................................................................ 116 
5.2.5. Data analysis and interpretation .............................................................. 121 
5.3. The study sites ................................................................................................ 124 
5.4. Livelihood patterns in the study villages ........................................................ 134 
5.4.1. Land ownership ....................................................................................... 134 
5.4.2. Housing condition ................................................................................... 135 
5.4.3. Education and social services.................................................................. 136 
5.4.4. Sources of livelihood............................................................................... 138 
5.4.5. Household asset wealth ........................................................................... 140 
5.4.6. Gender and relative wealth...................................................................... 142 
5.4.7. Leadership and relative wealth ............................................................... 143 
 
6. Impacts on forest condition ....................................................................... 146 
6.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 146 
6.2. Overall forest quality in the study area .......................................................... 148 
6.2.1. Timber resources, poles and withies remaining ...................................... 148 
6.2.2. Naturally dead trees and poles ................................................................ 150 
6.2.3. Canopy cover and liana density .............................................................. 150 
6.2.4. Species richness ...................................................................................... 151 
6.2.5. Leaf litter, seedlings and grass coverage................................................. 152 
6.3. Spatial patterns of forest quality across the sites ............................................ 153 
6.4. Human forest use in the study area................................................................. 156 
6.4.1. Types and extent of human forest use found .......................................... 156 
6.4.2. Cutting of trees, poles and withies .......................................................... 156 
6.4.3. Other forms of human forest use ............................................................. 161 
6.5. Spatial patterns of human forest use across sites ........................................... 162 
6.6. Predictors of human forest use ....................................................................... 163 
6.6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................. 163 
6.6.2. Predictors for the intensity of timber logging ......................................... 164 
6.6.3. Predictors for the intensity of pole and withies cutting .......................... 165 
6.6.4. Predictors for the occurrence of charcoal pits and burnings ................... 167 
6.7. Villagers‟ perception of forest condition ........................................................ 169 
6.8. Summary and discussion of results ................................................................ 171 
 
7. Impacts on livelihoods and equity ............................................................. 177 
7.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 177 
7.2. Livelihoods effects of JFM ............................................................................. 177 
7.2.1. Forest access and forest resource use ...................................................... 178 
7.2.2. Forest resource use, cash income and wealth.......................................... 181 
iv 
 
7.2.3. Information access and participation ...................................................... 184 
7.3. Unequal access and outcomes ........................................................................ 186 
7.3.1. Committee membership and leadership .................................................. 186 
7.3.2. Gender ..................................................................................................... 190 
7.3.3. Poverty .................................................................................................... 192 
7.4. Displacement of forest resource collection .................................................... 197 
7.5. Summary and discussion of results ................................................................ 199 
7.5.1. Impacts of JFM on livelihoods ................................................................ 199 
7.5.2. Impacts of JFM on equity ....................................................................... 201 
7.5.3. Impacts of JFM on displacement of resource use ................................... 203 
 
8. Impacts on forest governance .................................................................... 204 
8.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 204 
8.2. The JFM process in the study sites ................................................................. 205 
8.2.1. Stage 1: Getting started ........................................................................... 205 
8.2.2. Stage 2: Assessment and management planning ..................................... 207 
8.2.3. Stage 3: Formalizing and legalizing ........................................................ 209 
8.2.4. Stage 4: Implementing ............................................................................ 211 
8.2.5. Stages 5 and 6: Revising and expanding ................................................. 215 
8.3. Sustainability of village forest committees .................................................... 217 
8.3.1. Institutional set up ................................................................................... 217 
8.3.2. Transfer of power .................................................................................... 219 
8.3.3. Misuse of power ...................................................................................... 226 
8.3.4. Type of participation ............................................................................... 228 
8.3.5. Criteria for successful common property institutions ............................. 229 
8.4. Summary and discussion of results ................................................................ 230 
 
9. Summary and conclusions for forest management  policy ..................... 233 
 
 
Appendices   ..............................................................................................................250 
Appendix 1: Criteria to evaluate decentralization ................................................251 
Appendix 2: Household survey questionnaire ......................................................253 
Appendix 3: Transect maps ..................................................................................270 
Appendix 4: Spatial patterns of forest quality ......................................................274 
Appendix 5: Livelihood patterns data tables ........................................................283 
Appendix 6: Species list .......................................................................................302 
Appendix 7: Wealth Class Indicators....................................................................... 310 
 
List of references ......................................................................................................314 
v 
 
List of Tables  
Table 5.1 PRA techniques used in sample villages....................................................... 106 
Table 5.2 Village study sites and sample sizes ............................................................. 112 
Table 5.3 Wealth distribution of household survey sample .......................................... 113 
Table 5.4 Comparison PRA wealth grouping and asset quartile groups ...................... 116 
Table 5.5 Forest study sites and samples drawn ........................................................... 117 
Table 5.6 Liana density score........................................................................................ 120 
Table 5.7 Accessibility scores ....................................................................................... 120 
Table 5.8 Study sites: Forest reserves and villages selected for the study .................... 124 
Table 5.9 Key data of the study villages ....................................................................... 128 
Table 5.10 Key data of the forest study sites  ............................................................... 131 
Table 5.11 Main activity of head of household (in % of respondents) ......................... 139 
Table 5.12 Relative wealth in the study villages (% of households in asset groups) ... 140 
Table 5.13 Value of assets in TSH by household, mean values ................................... 141 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics, forest quality variables, JFM versus non JFM plots .. 149 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics, ground cover variables, JFM versus non JFM plots .. 153 
Table 6.3  Human forest use in the study area and extent across all the sample plots . 157 
Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics, cuttings, JFM versus non JFM ................................... 159 
Table 6.5 Incidences of other human uses recorded, mean values per plot .................. 161 
Table 6.6 Regression: y =„percentage of cuts to remaining trees per plot‟ .................. 166 
Table 6.7 Regression: „y = percentage of cuts to remaining trees per plot‟.................. 166 
Table 6.8 Regression: „y = percentage of cuts to remaining poles per plot‟ ................. 166 
Table 6.9 Regression: „y = percentage of cuts to remaining withies per plot‟.............. 168 
Table 6.10 Regression: „y = occurrence of charcoal pits‟ ............................................. 168 
Table 6.11 Regression: „y = signs of burning‟ .............................................................. 168 
Table 6.12 Villagers‟ description of the overall condition of the forest reserve........... 169 
Table 7.1 Sources of forest product collection, JFM versus non JFM villages  ........... 179 
Table 7.2 Frequency of forest product collection, JFM versus non JFM villages  .......179 
Table 7.3 Cash forest income ranges, by JFM and non JFM villages .......................... 182 
Table 7.4 Crosstabulation: Forest product type & forest resource cash income group 183 
Table 7.5 Satisfaction with amount of information about forest reserve ...................... 184 
Table 7.6 Participation in decision making on forest management .............................. 185 
Table 7.7 Parties taking decisions about access and use of forest reserve .................... 185 
Table 7.8 Primary access to the government forest reserve .......................................... 187 
Table 7.9 Ways in which forest committee members are perceived to benefit (JFM) . 189 
Table 7.10 Ways in which male villagers & village leaders are perceived to benefit ..189 
Table 7.11 Vilagers‟ perceptions about groups excluded from the forest reserve ........ 190 
Table 7.12 Source of forest resources by gender .......................................................... 191 
Table 7.13 Sources of forest product collection (in % of respondents) ........................ 193 
Table 7.14 Fuelwood sources, by wealth group (in % of respondents) ........................ 193 
Table 7.15 Distance to fuelwood source in minutes walking, by wealth group ........... 194 
Table 7.16 Use of forest products by wealth group (% of respondents) ....................... 196 
Table 7.17 Average forest resource cash income by wealth group............................... 196 
Table 7.18 Mean cash forest income p.a. (TSH) by wealth group................................ 197 
Table 7.19 Coping strategies of villagers who went less often to forest reserve than    
5 years ago .................................................................................................... 198 
Table 8.1 Summary Table: The JFM process in the study sites ................................... 216 
Table 8.2 Villagers‟ opinion on how forest committee informs the village assembly . 218 
vi 
 
Table 8.3 Frequency of village assembly meetings ...................................................... 219 
Table 8.4 Body perceived to be responsible for rules about forest access and use....... 221 
Table 8.5 Respondents‟ perceptions regarding patrol of government forest reserve .... 222 
Table 8.6 Body perceived to be responsible (%) for dealing with offenders ................ 222 
Table 8.7 Effect of reporting of offenders (in percent of respondents) ........................ 223 
 
vii 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 5.1 Study Design .................................................................................................. 97 
Figure 5.2 Map of Eastern Arc Mountains, including Ulugurus and Morogoro........... 125 
Figure 5.3 Study sites, six forest and six villages ......................................................... 127 
Figure 5.4 Asset nets, types of assets compared across wealth percentile groups ........ 142 
Figure 5.5 Asset nets (mean values in TSH) by gender of household head ................. 143 
Figure 5.6 Representation of leaders in the asset quartile groups ................................. 144 
Figure 5.7 Asset nets (mean values in TSH) by leadership status ................................ 144 
Figure 6.1 Remaining trees, poles and withies: JFM versus non JFM ......................... 150 
Figure 6.2 Timber classes, JFM versus non JFM plots ................................................. 152 
Figure 6.3 Remaining trees, poles, withies, spatial comparison across the six forests . 154 
Figure 6.4 Intensity of cutting as percentage of resources, JFM versus non JFM ........ 160 
Figure 6.5 Villagers perception, change of forest condition compared to 5 years ago . 170 
Figure 7.1 Perceived livelihood impact due to change in forest condition ................... 178 
Figure 7.2 Type of land where fuelwood is collected (% of respondents) ................... 180 
Figure 7.3 Primary motivation of preferential access group to enter forest reserve ..... 187 
Figure 7.4 Who benefits most from the forest reserve? ................................................ 188 
Figure 7.5 Wood based forest resource use by wealth group (% of respondents) ........ 195 
Figure 7.6 Non Timber Forest Product use by wealth group (in % of respondents) .... 195 
Figure 8.1 Approximate number of forest patrols per year in Kitulang‟halo ............... 212 
Figure 8.2 Perceived management responsibility of the forest reserves ....................... 221 
  
viii 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms  
 
CBFM Community Based Forest Management 
CBNRM Community Based Natural Resources Management 
CF Community Forestry 
CFM Community Forest Management 
CPR Common Property Regimes 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization 
FBD Forestry and Beekeeping Division 
FD Forest Department 
FUG Forest User Group 
GPS Global Positioning System 
JFM Joint Forest Management 
LAFR Local Authority Forest Reserve 
LGRP Local Government Reform Programme 
NFR National Forest Reserves 
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
NTFP Non Timber Forest Product 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PFM Participatory Forest Management 
PRA  Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PMO-RALG Prime Minister‟s Office, Regional Administration and Local 
Government 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
REED Reducing Emissions through Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme 
SUA Sokoine University of Agriculture 
SSA Sub Saharan Africa 
UNFCCC United National Framework for Climate Change Convention 
URT United Republic of Tanzania 
VEO  Village Executive Officer 
VFC Village Forest Committee 
VNRC Village Natural Resources Committee 
 
ix 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis, completed on a part-time basis, has accompanied me and my family through 
a significant period in our lives. As a working mother of two children, I would have not 
completed this thesis without the support of a number of people. I would like to 
acknowledge their contribution here without implying importance through the order of 
my list.   
 
My parents, Erika and Eckhard, for their love, for giving me direction in life and a 
strong commitment to achieve my goals, without which I would have neither begun nor 
completed this journey. I thank them for looking after their grandchildren during my 
study periods in Norwich and the final writing up phase.  
 
My sons, Zyl-Marko and Dennis-Kvin, I thank with my deepest love for all their 
patience with their studying mom, who often had to say no when asked to play. I want 
to thank Zyl and Kvin for travelling this path with me, and showing both curiosity and a 
spirit of adventure when dropped in Uluguru villages and forest camps while mom 
disappeared for the day doing research.  
 
To John Stavropolis, the father of my children, I am grateful for assisting me with the 
species list, during difficult phases of fieldwork in Ruvu forest, and with childcare.  
 
Neil Burgess, my PhD advisor, who became a friend for life, I thank for always 
believing in me, for lifting my spirits in difficult times and for being pragmatic when 
there was need for it, for teaching me to do transects, for campfire discussions and for 
reviewing drafts, for leading my sons through the forest with a conservationist‟s eye 
when all other childcare failed, and for rescuing us with fuel and food when stuck in the 
bush.  
 
Manfred Bertelmann, I thank for his kindness, spiritual and practical support during the 
final writing up phase.  
 
x 
 
The late Alan Rodgers I want to acknowledge for sparking the initial idea for this PhD 
during discussions over cold beers at the Courtyard Hotel in Dar es Salaam.  
 
Tom Blomley and Nike Doggart deserve my thanks for commenting on earlier drafts, 
their professional interest and their friendship, Antje Ahrends for her tips in fieldwork 
preparation, and Martina Regulin, at Technical University Berlin, for assistance with 
learning SPPS.  
 
I express my gratitude to Frank Ellis, my supervisor, for his thoughtful guidance 
throughout the process, his wise comments, and for being patient and showing 
understanding for my life circumstances. I would also like to thank Frank and his wife 
Jane together for hosting my stays in Norwich, and reminding me not to forget to enjoy 
life during intense working periods.  
 
To Lota Melamari, Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania and the Critical 
Ecosystem Partnership Fund in Washington I am grateful for providing the necessary 
funding, without which the fieldwork would have not been possible.  
 
Last but not least, I am extremely thankful to Dixon Peter Banda and my Tanzanian 
research team (Felister Nombo and Kizito K. Mwajombe from Sokoine University of 
Agriculture in Morogoro, Fadhili Njilima, Leonard Barnaba, Selemani Omari Libui, 
Oswald Mukuta, Kauzeni K. Naomi and Boniface Mhoro) for their field support and 
sense of humour, and to all the villagers of Maseyu, Fulwe, Lubungo, Mwalazi, 
Milawilila, Ngong‟olo and Logo villages for sharing information with me and for 
reminding me and my children that happiness and joy come from within and do not 
need material abundance.  
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to assess whether and to what extent Participatory Forest 
Management (PFM) fulfils its own policy goals of improving the condition of forests 
and the livelihoods of forest adjacent communities. It is with these two assumptions that 
PFM has been promoted by the Tanzanian Forest Administration over the past 15 years 
as a major strategy for managing natural forests for sustainable use and conservation. 
The relationships between management regime, forests and people were examined 
through a social-ecological study, comparing forests under joint management by 
communities and the state with forests solely managed by the state. The comparative 
study focused on Joint Forest Management (JFM) in National Forest Reserves (NFRs) 
and Local Authority Forest Reserves (LAFRs) in and around the Uluguru Mountains in 
Tanzania. All forests are of high biodiversity value and are protected as Catchment 
Forest Reserves, which provide Tanzania with a source of water supply. This protection 
status means no productive use or harvesting of wood-based forest products for 
subsistence use is legally allowed.  
1.1. Background and context of the study  
PFM has been introduced in many areas of Asia, Latin America and more recently 
Africa as a form of Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM), 
devolving resource management responsibilities from the state to rural communities 
under the assumption that its impacts on forest conservation and household livelihoods 
are positive. However, in Africa in particular, scientific data to test this assumption is 
only slowly emerging, and it is an open question as to which of the different PFM 
approaches currently being applied achieve the best results. Strong opinions and 
propagation of PFM do not automatically mean that PFM is good for forests and good 
for people under all circumstances.  
 
Reform of Tanzania‟s forest policy in the late 1990s introduced PFM as a key element, 
now implemented nationwide. PFM is currently either operational or in the process of 
being established in 3.6 million ha of forest land and in 1,800 villages (Blomley et al. 
2008), and includes two approaches: Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community-
Based Forest Management (CBFM). Thus, PFM has become the favoured method of 
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forest policy implementation in the country, and the most recent policy debate focuses 
heavily on how PFM can be used as the main vehicle for REED (Reducing Emissions 
through Deforestation and Forest Degradation) in Tanzania under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
 
According to Tanzanian Forest Policy, PFM is meant to achieve three objectives: i) 
improved forest quality through sustainable management practices; ii) improved 
livelihoods through increased forest revenues and secure supply of subsistence forest 
products; and iii) improved forest governance at village and district levels through 
effective and accountable natural resource management institutions (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2003). Despite millions of dollars being invested in the development of PFM 
across Tanzania, there have so far been few attempts to evaluate whether PFM is 
achieving these objectives.   
 
Several authors have pointed to the emerging distinction between CBFM and JFM in 
terms of their equity, costs and benefits when seen from a community perspective 
(Blomley and Ramadhani 2006, Lund and Nielsen 2006). While CBFM includes legal 
transfer of rights, responsibilities for management and returns to the villagers, JFM 
divides responsibility and returns between the forest owner (usually central or local 
government) and forest adjacent communities without a legal transfer of property rights. 
JFM has been criticized for its lack of „jointness‟ due to the unequal power relationships 
between the forest administration and the forest communities. It allows government to 
shed its responsibilities in forest management by co-opting communities for minimal 
tangible returns. The protection status of the concerned forests severely restricts local 
use beyond a few non-wood forest products. It has therefore been suggested that JFM is 
not viable in the long term, and declining interest from communities will inevitably lead 
to its collapse (Koppers et al. 2004). Nevertheless PFM, including JFM, remains a 
popular policy promoted by state forest and international development agents.  
Another important question is whether and to what extent villagers resort to alternative 
forests if access to one forest is restricted through JFM. Although some variables that 
may influence decisions about forest resource use exist, this question seems to have 
been ignored in much of the existing research. In order to understand the impact of 
changes in forest policy on the rural population, it is first critical to understand the 
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decision processes that villagers undertake when they extract from a nearby forest. 
Changes in forest access will have different effects on people and resources depending 
on which decision rules villagers are using. For example, to what extent do (de facto or 
de jure) property rights, wealth or gender affect extraction decisions? The introduction 
of JFM may well increase poverty and inequality between the villagers. This is 
influenced by a loss of access compared to a formerly open access regime and unequal 
distribution of JFM benefits and costs. This research study will therefore investigate the 
impacts of the introduction of joint management on villagers‟ decision making about 
forest access and use. The study will investigate the wealth and gender disaggregated 
effect of JFM, and whether the introduced local institutional changes provide incentives 
for sustainable management so that household livelihoods can be secured for all 
villagers.  
1.2. Study objectives and research questions  
The objective of the research study is to investigate to what extent the implementation 
of JFM makes a difference to the physical condition of the forests, the livelihoods of 
forest adjacent communities and local forest governance, when compared to protection 
forests under exclusive state control.  
 
Through experimental study design, three forests under JFM and three forests under 
exclusive state management („non JFM‟ in this study) were compared in matched pairs 
across three different sites in Morogoro Region. A total of six villages and 401 
households were included in the study. One village adjacent to each forest was selected 
to compare outcomes for households and communities engaged in a JFM process with 
communities not engaged in a JFM process. The study used a combination of methods, 
comprising forest disturbance transects, household surveys, personal observation and 
participatory methods of rural appraisal, to answer the following three main research 
questions:  
1. Does JFM influence the physical condition of the forest and forest use patterns?  
2. How does JFM impact on households‟ forest access, forest related livelihoods and 
equity? 
3. Has JFM created sustainable forest governance institutions at the village level?  
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More specific hypotheses were developed to examine each of the three broader 
questions in more detail. These hypotheses are elaborated in the respective data chapters 
(Chapters 6 to 8). 
 
A multidisciplinary approach was adopted, combining social science and natural 
sciences research methods. In-depth ecological fieldwork was beyond the scope of this 
study. Hence, the ecological implications of human activities in the forest reserves 
focused on the analysis of forest disturbance transects. The combination of disciplines 
and methods allowed the author to triangulate data and examine different aspects of 
forest access and resource use in a scenario where entry into and use of forest reserves is 
largely illegal. This combination of methods is elaborated further in Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.1, below.  
1.3. Choice of the Morogoro research site  
Morogoro Region was chosen for this study because it was among the first regions in 
which JFM was piloted in Tanzania by the Central Forest Administration in the 1990s. 
Morogoro Region hosts the Uluguru Mountains of the Eastern Arc Mountain Range, an 
arc of ancient mountains that dates back at least 30 million years and hosts forests of 
unique biodiversity and high water catchment value. The greater Ulugurus include a 
number of isolated massifs and outlying hillocks. This research on the impacts of JFM 
deliberately chose these smaller forest reserves on the foothills and outlying hills of the 
main Uluguru Mountain Ridge, as this is where JFM was first introduced in the late 
1990s by the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD). They were considered as „test 
sites‟ of PFM prior to developing the new Forest Policy. Due to their smaller size and 
perceived lower catchment and biodiversity values they were regarded by the FBD to 
present a lower risk for the introduction of this new form of management than the main 
mountain block reserves.  
 
Comparable conditions in these outlying forests to the main mountain reserves were 
expected to generate transferable experiences (Moshi et al. 2001). The introduction of 
JFM in these sites provided for a time period of 4 to 5 years of implementation 
compared to the time of study (2005–2006), which enabled assessing the process and 
sustainability of the local forest management institutions created in the late 1990s. The 
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particular forest reserves included in this study were also chosen due to the similar 
ecological and socio-economic conditions in the surrounding communities. Human 
population pressure around these reserves is high and the forests are surrounded by 
areas of intensive cultivation
1
.  All six forest reserves are used to varying degrees for 
charcoal making, timber cutting, the supply of poles and whities as building materials, 
mining and the use of non-timber forest products. Hence, the daily interaction between 
local communities and forests and dependence on forest resources for livelihoods is 
evident in all six fieldwork locations.  
1.4. Structure of the dissertation 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 describes the theoretical context of PFM 
and Chapter 3 provides an overview of the lessons learned about PFM based on a 
literature review. Chapter 4 describes briefly the historical background of forest 
management in Tanzania. Chapter 5 explains the study design, the methods used and the 
sites selected for this study. Chapter 6 assesses the impact of JFM on forest condition, 
while Chapter 7 focuses on the impact on household livelihoods and equity. Chapter 8 
investigates the question of sustainability and effectiveness of local forest management 
institutions. A summary of the main findings and conclusions is presented in Chapter 9.  
  
                                                 
1
 Contextual information about the study sites is available at the website: www.york.ac.uk/res/celp.  
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2. PFM – emergence and theory 
2.1. The emergence of PFM 
Early forest policies in many developing countries date back to colonial administration. 
They emphasized technical knowledge, focused on the commercial utilization of forests 
and ignored forest interests of rural people. This is believed to have exacerbated two 
major problems of developing nations: deforestation and rural poverty. The protected 
areas approach of the 1970s and 1980s intended to halt deforestation and conserve 
biodiversity by creating closed reserves, but ignored local people‟s needs and thus 
became controversial due to arising conflicts of interests (e.g. Wells et al. 1992). These 
experiences triggered a new, more socially responsible, approach to forest management 
called Participatory Forest Management (PFM), with simultaneous focus on rural 
livelihoods and biodiversity conservation through participation of local communities.  
 
A wide variety of approaches in different countries is encompassed under the term PFM 
(Poffenberger 1990; Hobley 1996). The main distinction is made between forms of co- 
or joint forest management (JFM), in which communities engage in a partnership with 
the state forest administration or the private sector, and community forestry (CF, e.g. in 
Nepal), community forest management (CFM, e.g. in India) or community based forest 
management (CBFM, e.g. in Tanzania). These latter forms describe single-handed 
management by forested communities (Vyamana 2009; Blomley et al. 2007; Blomley 
and Ramadhani 2006a). A further distinction can be made as PFM initiatives are either 
product or protection oriented, and thus centred around either use or conservation 
management issues. In the former case, the management agreement is more like a 
license to use the forest, as with CF in Nepal (Adhikari et al. 2004; Acharya 2002; Wily 
2002).  
 
In Africa, where PFM implementation started during the 1990s, it is a much younger 
and still evolving process compared to India and Nepal, where it emerged during the 
70s and from where the African process drew lessons (Wily 2002). In Tanzania, PFM 
gained momentum between the endorsement of the Forest Policy in 1998 and the Forest 
Act of 2002 as a forest management strategy to address the ongoing degradation 
problem on a national scale (Blomley and Rhamadhani 2006). The policy shift in the 
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forest sector was influenced by a broader discourse about decentralization of natural 
resources management during the sustainable development debate in the 1970s and 
1980s. Recognition emerged that communities need to be enabled to care for their own 
environments, which was manifested in Principle 22 of Agenda 21 (Hobley 1996). 
Subsequently, Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) was 
perceived as a panacea for developing countries (Agrawal et al. 1999). Decentralized 
forms of natural resources governance since then were increasingly being encouraged 
across the world – at least on paper (Ribot 2004). The adoption of Poverty Reduction 
Strategies (PRSPs) in the 1990s as major national development agendas, in particular 
throughout Africa, once again shifted focus in the forest sector on demonstrating its 
contribution to poverty reduction. Many PRSPs are silent about forestry (Sunderlin et al. 
2005) and they have been considered as failures in creating institutional environments 
that support people‟s self-initiative to reduce poverty (Ellis and Freeman 2005). 
Nevertheless, in Tanzania the PRSP process has further increased the momentum for 
PFM and led to the inclusion of forestry into the National Poverty Monitoring System
2
. 
Achieving local social situations that can ensure both ecological sustainability of the 
forest as well as improved livelihoods has become a key challenge of forest 
management.  
 
PFM is currently promoted by governments and development partners in many 
countries as it seems a perfect fit with strategies aiming at poverty alleviation, 
livelihood improvement, conservation, participation and decentralization. So far there is 
no consistent view on whether the „win-win‟ scenario claimed for PFM is realistic or 
just promotional rhetoric. Described by some as a „global paradigm shift‟ (Chambers 
and Leach 1989, Sundar et al. 2001) or a „new orthodoxy‟ or „philosophy‟ (Hobley 
1996), other, more critical voices question if the shift to PFM is just a marginal addition 
to existing practice or “another development bandwagon” with limited impacts beyond 
the life of projects and programmes (Hobley and Wollenberg 1996). Again others argue 
that PFM is not at all a new feature of forest policy given that community management 
has historically been as much a part of state management of resources as centralization 
(Sundar 2000). The popularity of PFM hints at a recognition of past traditions of local 
                                                 
2 For example the link between PFM and poverty reduction was a core topic during the 2002 African 
PFM workshop in Arusha, Tanzania, 18–22 February 2003, 2nd International Workshop on PFM in Africa, 
Arusha.  
8 
 
management of forests as common property. Although sometimes presented as recent 
innovation, a history of community resource management existed in many developing 
countries from pre-colonial times, including Tanzania (see Chapter 3 below). 
 
As experience with PFM schemes throughout the world is growing, critical voices are 
increasing, doubting that the multiple goals of PFM are being met. At the heart of PFM 
lies a fight over property rights of forest land. The extent to which state forest 
departments (FDs) are prepared to give up their monopoly on forest ownership and 
control is emerging as a critical factor in determining the success of PFM. Criticism is 
often raised against JFM in particular, due to the inherent imbalance of power between 
the two management partners; state (or private sector) and community. Sundar et al. 
summarize the experience of JFM in India as follows:  
“JFM was perceived by a variety of actors, international agencies, FDs, NGOs and 
activists, academics, and villagers, as some sort of solution, however partial, to forest 
problems as they defined them. However, the problems that JFM is set out to address 
and the objectives it was meant to fulfil have been deeply contested.” (Sundar et al. 
2001:235) 
 
As Lele (2000) notes, participatory management involves devolution of powers but the 
state is by nature interested in maintaining control and accumulating power. He 
concludes that JFM must be a „sleight of hand‟ carried out by the state to co-opt 
activities and placate donors while retaining control and even expanding it in new ways. 
Ribot et al. (2006) describe various strategies used by central government to obstruct 
democratic decentralization of natural resources management to retain central control. It 
is argued that participation may be promoted by forest departments based on pragmatic 
reasons, using it as a vehicle to attain forest closure and regeneration with the least 
possible investment. Kajembe and Monela describe how Tanzanian government 
officials have mixed feelings about community actions, but have increasingly realized 
that it can substitute for the expensive need to put government officials into the field 
(Kajembe and Monela 2000: 151). Blaikie describes PFM as a “negotiation process to 
pass on the cost of policing forests to local communities, which the state finds 
impossible to meet” (Blaikie 2005:307).  
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This critique is not unique to PFM but applies also to the broader CBNRM approach. 
The main flaws are considered to be its hypothesis of homogeneous communities, the 
ambivalent motivations of donor support (i.e. reducing central government regulatory 
cost), the trend to impose external institutional models that do not fit with the pre-
existing social mechanisms, norms and behaviours for managing communal resources 
and resolving conflict (Freeman and Ellis 2005, Blaikie 2005, Cleaver 2000). Thus, its 
outcomes – influenced by patronage and politics – may exclude the intended 
beneficiaries of the process (poor, women) rather than include them (Freeman and Ellis 
2005, Homewood 2005). 
 
Notwithstanding this critique there is empirical evidence of the potential for 
communities to successfully manage forests and to encourage protection and 
regeneration when provided with suitable conditions (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008, 
Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005, Blomley et al. 2008). Thus, before condemning PFM and 
without having a better solution, it is important to learn from both successful and 
unsuccessful cases what factors tend to account for successful development of local 
institutions that enhance both forest condition and livelihoods (Gibson et al. 2000). 
 
This chapter reviews the assumptions behind the objectives of PFM (Section 2.2.), 
clarifies key concepts behind them (Section 2.3.) and reflects on the debate about 
property regimes (Section 2.4.) as a theoretical background for PFM analysis in later 
chapters. Subsequently, the key impacts emerging from the current application of PFM 
in Southeast Asia and Africa are summarized, and crucial emerging issues identified in 
Chapter 3.    
2.2. The rationale for PFM  
The expected outcomes of PFM strategies that are perceived to make them superior over 
conventional, non-participatory forest management relate to improvements in three 
areas: Forest resource management, livelihoods and governance.
 
These expectations are 
mirrored in the three stated policy objectives of PFM in Tanzania (see Section 1.1 
above). The assumptions or claims behind these expected outcomes of PFM (which are 
then turned into policy objectives) are explained below.  
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The first expected outcome of PFM is to instil more sustainable forest resource 
management practices leading to improved forest quality. This is based on the 
assumption that village residents have more interest in conserving a natural resource 
that is near them, than central government or private institutions (Uphoff 1993, Nugent 
1990, Ostrom 1990, Tsing et al. 1999, Bardhan 1993, Brown et al. 2002). Since, so it is 
argued, forest adjacent people are primary users of forest products, and create rules that 
significantly affect forest quality, their inclusion in forestry management schemes is 
essential (Arnold 1992 quoted in Gibson et al. 2000:3). It is further assumed that 
villagers have a greater understanding of the prevailing conditions in their area that 
affect the forests and can thus adapt their management procedures more effectively than 
a centrally controlled management plan (Agrawal 2001, Twyman 2000, Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999).  
 
The blending of traditional indigenous knowledge of forest dependent people with 
technical scientific knowledge of state foresters, in particular under JFM, is considered 
an ideal and pragmatic approach to sustainable forest management (Wily 2002, Appiah 
2001). Furthermore, it is argued that multiple purpose management of forests by 
communities is expected to lead to better conservation of biodiversity than the single 
interests of industrial consumers and forest departments (Brown et al. 2002). Hence, 
providing local people with tenure rights and entitlements in the forest will provide an 
incentive to manage the resource sustainably, as they are more likely to receive the 
benefits in the future from restraint in the present. Another line of argument is that local 
management may be a way of cutting cost to the state (Brown et al. 2002). Lastly, wider 
environmental benefits are expected, such as improved soil conservation and watershed 
protection. Field activities of sustainable forest development under PFM usually 
encompass the identification and surveying of the productive potentials and biodiversity, 
boundary verification, drafting of a specific (joint) management plan and agreement 
where necessary, management inputs such as planting and thinning, as well as patrol 
and regulation of product extraction where applicable.   
 
The second objective is for PFM to improve the livelihoods of local forest dependent 
people, in particular the poor. This is based on empirical research showing that: i) the 
income portfolio of poorer segments in rural villages depends disproportionately on 
forest products (Cavendish 1999); ii) trees provide a source of savings and security for 
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the poor (Chambers and Leach 1989); iii) forests offer opportunities for livelihood 
diversification (Ellis 2000); and iv) even apparently unproductive village wastelands are 
an important source of livelihood for poor people in rural communities (Jodha 1986). 
PFM, it is argued, can by turn of improving the forest resource, be expected to increase 
the sustainable (regulated) flows of forest products to the local people and thus increase 
incomes and decrease poverty (Brown et al. 2002). Commercially oriented single-
purpose forest management damages local forest-dependent livelihoods by reducing the 
availability of diverse non-timber forest products (NTFPs), reducing the benefits to the 
poor (Brown et al. 2002). Community involvement in forest management on the other 
hand can safeguard and enhance multiple livelihood benefits from the forest, and 
enhance their role as a safety net. PFM interventions in practice often include direct 
efforts to improve people‟s livelihood from forests, e.g. through micro-enterprise 
development or income-generating activities such as eco-tourism, honey or butterfly 
farming, establishing tree nurseries or fish ponds. They are introduced through PFM 
projects with the aim to make local communities less dependent on forest resources 
while at the same time attempting to engage them in active forest protection. However 
often these activities are not forest based and it is not clear why people if they are 
supported in establishing fish ponds should become more interested in patrolling a 
forest under PFM and stop hunting for bush meat.    
 
The third expected outcome of PFM relates to improved governance “by promoting 
transparency, accountability and the representation of a diversity of interests” (Dfid 
1999). In theory, under PFM, local institutions managing forests as common pool 
resources fit within renegotiated power-sharing arrangements, whereby the FD retains a 
monitoring, support and supervisory role, rather than formal control. Implied in PFM is 
the broader principle of subsidiarity entailed in decentralization reforms, that PFM is a 
“power sharing paradigm” intended to “relocate management as near to the resource as 
possible and to place jurisdiction in the hands of those perceived as having the most 
lasting vested interest in the forests survival” (Wily 2002). Furthermore, community 
involvement is perceived to introduce important checks and balances in relation to state 
services, which tend to be mismanaged (Brown et al. 2002), assuming a countervailing 
influence against the power of state forest departments, arbitrary exercise of authority, 
and corrupt practices. Local participation, decentralization and subsidiarity may in 
themselves be considered as important ends of development (Brown et al. 2002). At the 
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local level of governance, the institution managing common property needs to 
harmonize both management inputs and product extraction in a transparent and 
equitable manner. Local collective action is perceived as instrumental in finding rules 
for allocation of the resource between different users in a way that is seen as equitable 
by the users themselves (Adhikari et al. 2007). Capacity building exercises on record 
keeping and accounting are thus often included in PFM projects in the field (Lund and 
Nielsen 2006).   
 
These three objectives of PFM are interdependent, which gives the forest-people nexus 
a certain complexity: institutional aspects influence the level of human forest use, which 
impacts on the forest condition, which in turn can influence patterns of participation in 
forest management, and benefit flows to the community. Whether simultaneous 
improvements in forest quality and livelihoods are divergent or convergent goals is 
debated. Forest conservation which serves to protect forest functions and services to 
benefit nearby or far away people (e.g. water supply, climate regulation), or to protect 
biodiversity is controversial in the context of livelihood improvement because of 
diverging interests of forest stakeholders (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). In such cases 
PFM may not be a viable management option due to the lack of economic benefits to 
local forest managers (Ostrom and Nagendra, Lund and Nielsen 2006, Topp-Jørgensen 
et al. 2005). However, the involvement of forested communities in deriving protection 
rules has led to more efficient outcomes than the creation of closed reserves (Ostrom 
and Nagendra 2006). The claim of convergent outcomes of improved forest quality and 
livelihoods simplifies intricate land use choices implied by PFM, i.e. agriculture versus 
forestry, conservation versus timber production (Chakraborty 2001). The allocation of 
forest area to particular uses has to strike a compromise between the basic needs of the 
rural poor and other objectives and the objective to increase the availability of forest 
products to the poor may compromise conservation goals (Chakraborty 2001). 
 
PFM programmes across the world, geared to meet the above objectives, apply a three-
tiered approach more or less, including activities that focus at the sustainable 
development of: i) the forest itself; ii) rural livelihoods; and iii) local institutions that 
balance resource and livelihood development. In order to review the practical results of 
PFM and if it is meeting its intended objectives, impacts need to be assessed at all three 
levels: forest, livelihoods and institutions. In Chapter 3 below the existing empirical 
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evidence regarding these three impacts levels will be reviewed for Southeast Asia and 
Africa. However, there is first a need to take a closer look at some of the theoretical 
concepts underlying the claims of PFM, which will be beneficial for the subsequent 
review of empirical literature. 
2.3. Concepts entailed in PFM 
2.3.1. Forest condition    
Forest quality or the condition of a particular forest is described through vegetation 
ecology, which comprises a variety of techniques and methods to study plant 
communities (Mueller-Dombois and Ellenberg 1974, Frey and Lösch 2004, Tremp 
2005). Key bio-physical indicators appearing in PFM relevant literature include, among 
others, the number and density of trees, diameter of trees at breast height (DBH), basal 
area, canopy density and species variety. Disturbance is measured through the number 
of cuttings of trees found in the forest. This dimension has been given attention in this 
research study by adding variables that measure other forms of human forest use, e.g. 
traps, fire, debarking, mining etc. (see Chapter 4). I prefer the term „human use‟ over 
„disturbance‟ since the latter implies a conservation focus and a perception of people 
primarily as a threat to the forest.  
 
Obviously, the definition of forest quality depends on the perspective that one takes. 
From the perspective of a local forest user, it may entail a variety of characteristics 
comprising besides the trees and the forest canopy elements of the forest floor and 
NTFPs as well as environmental service, ritual and spiritual functions. A woman may 
respond differently from a man, and an old person concerned about collecting medicines 
may respond differently from a young person with interest in the forest as a source of 
mining resources. In her book „The Social Life of Trees‟, Rival (2001) presents a 
variety of symbolic and morphological classifications of trees and woods from around 
the world which are not usually included in forest scientific perspectives but show the 
magnitude of meanings that forests have to people‟s lives.  
 
In conservation sciences, the explanatory variables for variations in forest quality are 
often based on assumptions about causes of deforestation. Evidence on these 
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assumptions is contradictory, which is partly attributed to disparate definitions and 
measurements in deforestation studies (Gibson et al 2000). Some of the most frequently 
mentioned causes are: population growth (Rudel 1994, Agrawal 1995), population 
density (Burgess 1992), forest accessibility (Kummer 1992), distance to markets 
(Becker and Leon 2000), government policy (Repetto and Gillis 1988) and individual 
wealth (Shafik 1994). Slope steepness and elevation can determine the location of 
valuable tree species (Schweik 2000). This is consistent with the optimal foraging 
theory, which argues that individuals seek the easiest source for their resources: 
climbing hills to gather trees makes them more difficult to acquire, and thus fewer trees 
are taken at higher elevation. Optimal foraging is influenced by the effectiveness of 
monitoring, highlighting the importance of local institutions (Schweik 2000). 
 
The assumption that local population increase drives deforestation is challenged by a 
number of studies (Abbot 2005, Varughese 2000, Hampshire and Randall 2005). 
Varughese (2000) found no supporting evidence for population factors in the variation 
of forest condition in case studies in Nepal; however, the communities with a higher 
level of organization regarding the forest tended to have forests in better conditions. 
This is consistent with other studies and the guiding assumption of the common 
property literature that at the core of the explanation of forest condition are the 
institutions at the local level, together with the incentives and behaviours they generate 
(Chhatre and Agrawal 2008, Ostrom 2005, Gibson et al. 2000). Empirical evidence 
from social sciences shows that even within relatively small, ecologically similar areas 
under the same set of national laws, numerous non-physical and non-biological factors 
help to explain variations in forest condition. Different systems of property rights can 
produce particular patterns of forest use and forest condition, which is at the core of the 
debate on common property management (see Section 2.4.).  
2.3.2. Livelihoods and poverty    
There are many definitions of poverty, with either a narrow focus on income or a wider 
focus on well-being composed of income or consumption, education or health, 
vulnerability and risk exposure, lack of opportunity to be heard and powerlessness 
(World Bank 2001). Poverty alleviation is the reduction of these depriving factors. 
Forest based poverty alleviation is then the “use of forest resources for the purpose of 
lessening deprivation of well-being on either a temporary or lasting basis” (Sunderlin et 
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al. 2005:1386). Forest based poverty alleviation can be achieved, among others, by 
ensuring access to forest resources and protecting the existing forest benefits to rural 
people, by redistributing access to and benefits from forest resources, or by making 
transfer payments to villagers protecting forest functions (Sunderlin et al. 2005).   
 
According to Chakraborty (2004), poverty reduction through PFM requires expansion 
of the per capita quantity or the range of forest products accessible to the poor compared 
to a historic point of reference or to an alternative forest management institution. It may 
also be achieved through rising economic opportunities for the poor due to PFM, e.g. 
employment for the poor if labour demand from the non-poor is increased (Chakraborty 
2004). Poverty mitigation requires use of forest resources to meet household subsistence 
needs, to fulfil a safety net function or to serve as a gap filler in seasonal periods of low 
income. Forest based poverty alleviation would require asset building and lasting 
increase in income and well being through forestry (Sunderlin et al. 2005). Sunderlin et 
al. 2005 stress that forest based poverty alleviation is never a stand-alone process, but 
arises from a fusion of livelihood activities, such as forest resource use, non-farm 
employment, agriculture, pastoralism and so on. The safety net function of forests has 
been acknowledged to include seasonal employment in the agricultural off season, food 
supply, consumption to reduce needs for cash, sources of emergency cash incomes for 
households and at community level, and savings for old age (Chambers and Leach 
1989).  
 
While poverty is an outcome based measure of livelihood performance (e.g. income-
poverty, food-poverty, wealth and well-being), the livelihoods approach stresses both 
the means and the outcomes (Sunderlin et al. 2005). The livelihoods approach was 
developed to provide a comprehensive framework of analysis of how people make a 
living under changing socio-economic, institutional, political and environmental 
circumstances (Ellis 2000). Livelihood systems at the local level are complex and 
dynamic and are shaped by wider political and economic factors occurring at a broader 
scale (Ellis 2000), such as a change in national forest policies and the resulting 
introduction of PFM. As Blaikie et al. (1998) state “the only way to trace the impact of 
wider socio-economic changes upon specific groups is to look at the way in which 
livelihood strategies are negotiated at the micro-level” (Blaikie et al. 1998: 9). 
 
16 
 
This study adopts the definition of livelihoods according to Ellis and Freeman (2005) as 
“encompassing the resources that provide people with the capability to build a 
satisfactory living, the risk factors that they must consider in managing their resources, 
and the institutional and policy context that either helps or hinders them in their pursuit 
of a viable or improved living” (Ellis and Freeman 2005:4). The resources, also referred 
to as assets or capitals, are categorized into: Human capital (skills, education, and 
health), physical capital (produced investment goods), financial capital (money, savings, 
and loans), natural capital (land, water, trees, etc.) and social capital (networks and 
associations) (Ellis 2000, Ellis and Freeman 2005). The activities are things that people 
do to make a living and include nearby (e.g. crop production) as well as remotely (e.g. 
remittances) from the household executed activities.  
 
Livelihoods can entail three income categories: off-farm income, which can be obtained 
from local natural resources, e.g. firewood, charcoal etc., farm income and non-farm 
income (Ellis 2000). Livelihood analysis includes the vulnerability, the institutional and 
policy context of the household as well as social relations which mediate access to the 
assets and activities (Ellis 2000). The livelihoods framework focuses on outcomes of 
people‟s efforts to have a satisfactory livelihood, e.g. their material wealth, their extent 
of vulnerability, or the impact of their livelihood activities on environmental resources. 
A sustainable livelihood is one “that can cope with stress and shocks, and displays 
resilience when faced with adverse effects” (Ellis 2000:128). Ellis and Freeman (2005a) 
conclude from comparative livelihoods analysis that excessive reliance on subsistence 
food products coupled with low wage seasonal work on other farms is the most 
vulnerable position for a rural family to be in – a reality for many of the households in 
the villages of this study.  
 
The basic approach to poverty reduction assumed by the livelihoods framework is to 
increase asset levels, substitute assets, or to diversify assets and activities to reduce 
vulnerability (Lynam 2005, Bird and Shinyekwa 2005). On the other hand, a reduction 
in assets can also cause or aggravate poverty. Ellis (2000) notes that rural livelihoods 
depend on access to natural resources as well as on the management regimes that 
regulate such access. Changes in livelihoods outcomes resulting from specific 
mechanisms of access (i.e. PFM) may result in increased or decreased access to existing 
resources and/or access to new resources. Asset substitution is important as access to “a 
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renewable natural resource, e.g. firewood, could be converted via the market into land 
or education, and then reliance on the first asset would reduce over time. If no such 
conversion opportunity exists, reliance on the original asset will be intensified over 
time” (Ellis 2000:122). The empirical evidence in Chapters 7 and 8 below will show 
that PFM often leads to restricted forest access, thus reducing opportunities for 
acquiring natural assets (i.e. forest products, grazing or farming in the forest) or 
substituting assets.   
 
A core feature of the livelihoods framework is the diversity of strategies to maintain 
household welfare. These strategies consist of a mix of agricultural, home processing, 
marketing and off-farm labour activities together with reciprocity relations with other 
households (Lynam 2005). Diversification is considered a key element of people‟s own 
initiatives to reduce poverty (Ellis 2000). Ellis (2000:15) defines rural livelihoods 
diversification as the “process by which rural households construct an increasingly 
diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order to survive and to improve their 
standard of living”. Diversification provides an interim solution to poverty and 
vulnerability. Diversification away from subsistence crop production into non-farm 
activities that can generate cash is considered to play an important role as an exit 
strategy from poverty (Freeman and Ellis 2005). Seppälä (1998a) describes economic 
diversification as a reaction to structural change, undertaken by the poor as a matter of 
survival, by middle-class households for risk minimization and often by wealthy 
households to capture niches with profit potential. Diversification provides flexibility to 
adjust for catastrophes and shocks (Seppälä 1998a), which in the recent debate about 
adaptation to climate change gains new importance. Against this background forest-
based off-farm activities, such as charcoal making, should be seen as positive ways of 
allowing rural households to adapt.  
 
Several authors stress the „extraordinary‟ diversity of rural livelihood strategies in 
African rural economies (Lynam 2005, Bryceson 2005). Rural households in Africa 
must have the flexibility to source multiple income streams virtually to survive. 
Bryceson (2005) describes the trend of diminishing reliance on agriculture and 
increasing dependency on non-farm earnings as „deagrarianization‟. Forest based off-
farm activities are important in the villages of the present study.  
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There can be barriers in the transition process out of poverty that people must 
overcome. These include, for example, asset deficits (e.g. lack of land, no education), 
social exclusion (e.g. disability, widowhood) or institutional factors (Barrett and 
Swallow 2005). The better off can more easily influence such barriers than the poor. 
Land, or the lack thereof, is considered a key asset explaining poverty induced resource 
degradation. Ellis (2000) argues that lack of land forces poorer people to rely more 
strongly on gathering things from the environment (e.g. forests), and they tend to move 
more into areas with open access resources. The collective effect of each individual 
effort to survive then results in overall unsustainable use of the resource in question. 
The lack of land without legal title or tenancy reinforces the prioritization of a short-
term extractive rather than long-term investment viewpoint. The lack of clarity around 
land tenure in most African rural settings works against the poor (Freeman and Ellis 
2005, Cross and Kutengule 2005) and is a key concern in PFM practice.  
 
The institutional framework is considered to play a key role in opening up opportunities 
or hampering people‟s own efforts to move out of poverty. As Freeman and Ellis (2005) 
state, in Sub-Saharan Africa holders of power or authority tend to interpret their roles as 
“blockers and gatekeepers rather than facilitators”, so that aiding individuals and 
families to improve their restraining life conditions is an uncommon occurrence 
(Freeman and Ellis 2005: 369). This is consistent with other scholars who claim that 
African states often operate to turn development inputs to the advantage of the elite few 
and to further dispossess rural populations (Bayart 1993, De Waal 1997, Schatzberg 
1988). This is in agreement with the political theory of the neo-patrimonial state.    
 
Social capital is perceived as having a beneficial effect on the capacity of individuals to 
organise themselves effectively. Social capital is a more elusive category than the other 
asset types, because, in addition to formal manifestations of community organization, 
(e.g. committees, cooperatives etc.), it also refers to informal and less visible norms, 
rights, traditions, personal networks and kinship ties (Ellis 2000, Ellis 2005). Together 
with leadership social capital is considered a key aspect for management at community 
level (Pretty and Smith 2004, Ostrom 2005, Bodin and Crona 2008). Bodin and Crona 
(2008) found a correlation between high level of social capital and low willingness to 
report rule breaking, which may hint at community cohesion. Communities with low 
social capital, on the other hand, are predicted to experience weak management of 
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common property resources (Ellis 2000). In a study of social capital and agency in 
Kenyan rural fishing communities, Bodin and Crona (2008) show that structural 
characteristics of the social network can reduce the communities‟ ability to access 
information and to adapt to change. 
 
The central unit of analysis of the livelihoods approach is the household, while the entry 
point of PFM interventions is usually the „community‟. In order to understand the 
outcomes of PFM processes and how institutional changes introduced at communal 
level impact upon the livelihoods of forest dependent households, it is important to keep 
in mind that the community may enable or hinder households in their efforts to improve 
livelihoods and well-being. The following section takes a look at the term community 
and how it is conceptualized in the PFM approach and the literature.  
2.3.3. Community    
The term community and its conceptualization in CBNRM in general is contested and 
poses methodological problems. Scholars argue that the „myth of community‟ 
underlying participatory institution building as being a homogeneous, static and 
harmonious group with common interests is a simplistic understanding that conceals 
power relations and masks biases in interests and needs (Guijt and Shah 1998, Cooke 
and Kothari 2001, Blaikie 2005,  Homewood 2005). As Lasch (1988:178) notes, “a 
community of shared values does not equal a community of conformity”. Thus, 
alternative definitions of the term community may better reflect the complex reality, 
such as, for example, communities are an “inherited network of social obligations” 
(Chatterjee 1998:278), or “members in a community are engaged in the same argument, 
the same discourse, in which alternative strategies, misunderstandings, conflicting goals 
and values are thrashed out” (Sabean 1988: 28). PFM approaches usually define 
communities based on a territorial dimension in relation to the forest – e.g. forest 
adjacent community, forest-dependent community – or in relation to administrative 
boundaries, like, for example,  the village in Tanzania. Therefore in this study, the term 
community refers to a forest adjacent village. 
 
There are definitions of community in the literature which include both relational and 
territorial dimensions (Gusfield 1975, Selznick 1992, Hillery 1955, Kusel 2001). The 
relational dimension describes the quality and character of human relationships 
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(Gusfield 1975), which includes a sense of belonging created through shared beliefs, 
interests, and commitments that unite diverse groups and activities (Selznick 1992). The 
territorial dimension includes what people have in common at their location, these can 
be institutional elements (governments, laws, schools, districts, churches) or natural 
resources (a forest, a river, grazing land) (Selznick 1992). Cleaver takes a wider 
perspective of communities with emphasis on social identities and norms that frame 
collective behaviour (Cleaver 2002).  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that institutional and social relationships extend 
beyond the boundaries of a community (Strathern 1984).  The livelihoods framework 
embraces this wider context by including labour or income related ties outside the 
community of residence (e.g. through remittances, off-farm labour) and institutions at 
the micro- and macro level. This perspective broadens the concept of resource 
dependence, which is important for the analysis of PFM outcomes. Households do not 
necessarily make forest resource use decisions based on community bound geographical 
or administrative boundaries, and households outside the territorial boundary of the 
forest adjacent community may utilize a particular forest but may be excluded from the 
PFM institutions if community is narrowly defined.  
 
Forest dependence is often defined by economic measures, such as percentage of total 
income derived from forest products, non-timber forest products collected and sold, and 
so on. However, besides economic importance, forest dependence is characterized by a 
social structure that permits and demands particular uses of the forest resource (Kusel 
2001). Forest dependence can be based on symbolic and locality based meanings. Relph 
notes that the forest in forest-dependent communities “represents an expression of 
communally held beliefs and values and of interpersonal involvements” (Relph 
1986:34). In African rural settings such values are often of religious, ritual or spiritual 
nature. As such, forests are places that reinforce and help define the community living 
tradition. A meaningful tradition is considered to be an important part of life in a stable 
community and portrays the relationship of forest and people (Kaufman and Kaufman 
1946 quoted in Kusel 2001).  
 
Communities are composed of and sustained by individuals, and individuals are shaped 
by their community (McIntyre 1984). Thus, there is an interdependent relationship 
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between the forest related behaviour of individuals and the community they reside in. 
Kusel notes that people are constituted by social relationships found in their community, 
which implies that a collective good exists and “well-being may be improved by 
residents working on community projects when, narrowly conceived, are of no benefit 
to them personally” (Kusel 2001:373). This may explain why people participate in 
communal activities such as PFM even though they may not carry direct economic 
gains. Selznick defines a „flourishing community‟ as one with a high level of 
participation: “people are appropriately present, and expected to be present, on many 
different occasions and in many different roles and aspects” (Selznick 1992:360, 364). 
Kusel further argues that the sense of being part of a community generates a category of 
individual behaviour termed „commitments‟ which is derived from „relatedness‟, or also 
termed „civic responsiveness‟ (Kusel 2001:373). The political theory of neo-
patrimonialism provides explanation of why and how such „civic responsiveness‟ and 
commitments to collective good can be constrained in African rural communities. In the 
Tanzanian context the history of disempowerment of the rural population still influences 
civic responsiveness and commitment to current state initiatives such as PFM (see 
Chapter 4 below).  
2.3.4. Gender     
There is recognition that the burden of rural poverty falls more heavily on women than 
on men (Agrawal 1986) and that the quality of female life may not have the same 
constituents as the quality of male life (Nussbaum and Sen 1993). Lack of access to 
natural resources and land is considered a strong contributing factor to female poverty. 
As Agrawal concludes from her analysis of gender and land ownership in India, “the 
gender gap in the ownership and control of property is the single most critical 
contributor to the gender gap in economic well-being, social status and empowerment” 
(Agrawal 1994:1455). Increased focus on formalization and privatization in land tenure 
legislation in Sub-Saharan African countries is more exclusive than inclusive for 
women and poorer people who are in a better position when land negotiation is taking 
place based on customary rules (Cross 2005, Odgaard 2002). Formalization of title 
deeds is biasing the ability to create freehold land registration towards better-off and 
men (Cross 2005, Odgaard 2002). Women‟s land rights are inadequately addressed in 
new laws (e.g. 1999 Land Acts in Tanzania), so that previous customary rights are 
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eroded rather than strengthened. Keeping weaker forms of customary tenure under a 
framework of state ownership maintains the power and patronage of state authorities.  
 
Scholars argue that gender also influences the capacity to exercise agency, women are 
not able to develop the same level of political voice in local institutions, despite quotas 
on village committees (Kabeer 2000, Odgaard 2002). Furthermore, opportunities for 
livelihoods diversification are strongly gender differentiated (Dolan 2005). In their 
study in Cameroon, Brown and Layuyade (2001) found that men have been better able 
than women to diversify their sources of livelihood following changes in forest access 
and availability of forest products. Women had fewer opportunities for diversification 
and depended more on Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) than men for cash and in 
order to meet livelihoods needs (Brown and Lapuyade 2001). Men have broader options 
than women, which as Freeman and Ellis (2005) argue may be particularly so in Sub-
Saharan Africa where no manufacturing growth has occurred to generate labour markets 
for women such as in Southeast Asia.  
 
The PFM literature, similar to conceiving community as a uniform entity, often 
categorized segments of the community as bound units with similar interests, i.e. the 
women, the poor, the landless etc. (Cornwall 2008, Sundar et al. 2001). However, these 
are not homogenous groups (Sundar et al. 2001) which do not exist in social isolation 
(Cornwall 2008). Treating them as discrete social groups can undermine economically 
significant relationships that exist between men and women (or the poor and the better 
off). This calls for a “dynamic understanding of people‟s social networks and the 
institutions and dimensions of difference that matter in the pursuit of their livelihoods, 
as naive efforts to bring about inclusive development may simply make things worse” 
(Cornwall 2008: 278).  
 
There is a gendered pattern to forest access and participation in forest governance 
institutions (2007, Franks and Cleaver 2007, Ravindranath et al. 2004, Brown and 
Layuyade 2001). Narrow focus on one household member that pertains to natural 
resources committees often leads to the exclusion of women (Alderman et al. 1997). 
The extent to which PFM literature is investigating gender aspects is usually limited to a 
focus on inequity situations generated by local forest management institutions. Such 
institutions arguably reinforce existing gender hierarchies (Cleaver 2007, Franks and 
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Cleaver 2007). However, social science research on gender relations shows that for 
women to gain effective rights on resources will involve contestation and struggle at 
every level – the household, the community and the state – and on both economic and 
noneconomic fronts (Agrawal 1994:1469). It is assumed that a gender related situation 
of inequality arises because the local forest institutions are dominated by elite groups. 
However, an engendered analysis of inequality with regard to forest resources access 
and use must go beyond the level of forest users groups and committees. As Brown and 
Lapuyade 2001 note “economic, political and ecological changes are mediated through 
intra-household negotiations and a complex set of social rules and values which shape 
access to livelihood options”. Adaptation strategies to external change differ between 
men and women and do depend on many factors, such as the local political economy 
and the power relations within the household (Brown and Layuyade 2001). Odgaard 
(2002) argues that while women may be marginalized in the local institutions, they may 
have more voice on negotiating resource allocation at the family level. For example, 
Cleaver (2002) found evidence of complexity of authority, articulation and participation 
of women in natural resource management in Usangu in Tanzania. In cattle production 
women were significant managers in practice and both men and women felt that 
decisions over natural resource use were made properly by all adult members of the 
family (Cleaver 2002).  
 
The question of gender equity in PFM points to the importance of intra-household 
resource allocation and power, and the wider social networks in the generation of norms 
and practices over forest resource use. However, the PFM process neglects the 
importance of intra-household resource allocations; i.e. what norms govern the 
functioning of family units? How are these rules revised as circumstances change? 
(Alderman et al. 1997). In addition to agricultural research showing that in localized 
settings certain crops emerge as being „male‟ crops and others „female‟ crops 
(Alderman et al. 1997), this study shows that access to reserved forests and extraction 
of certain forest resources such as charcoal and timber are regarded as „male‟ and not 
„female‟. This might have arisen out of intra-household level negotiations and deeply 
rooted norms and traditions in a village.  
 
Sundar (2000) argues that the selection of tree species to be planted under PFM is not 
just a question of local knowledge but is a gendered question. Commercially valuable 
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timber species are often associated with male elites whereas fruit and fodder bearing 
trees are associated with women and lower classes. For poor women sale of NTFPs or 
firewood is part of subsistence. Unless this is acknowledged, PFM aimed at helping 
women may actually harm them by controlling access to NTFPs. What is represented as 
local knowledge to outsiders or what is adopted from outside involves aspects of control, 
authority and power that are embedded in social relationships (Sundar 2000). Even 
though PFM committees may try to engage women through formal quotas and the 
establishment of a project may lead to re-negotiation, this may not change the prevailing 
gendered pattern of forest resource use. Cleaver (2002) points out that there are limits to 
negotiation, some norms being so deeply embedded that people would find it almost 
impossible to be discursively critical about them. The outcome of PFM in terms of 
impacts on women and their livelihoods does not only depend on their voice in the local 
forest institutions. It is a factor of power relations within the household and the society.  
2.3.5. Governance    
The third claim of PFM is to achieve improved forest governance through effective and 
accountable institutions. This section makes an attempt at defining the two concepts: 
„forest governance‟ and „effective institutions‟.  
 
Governance is becoming increasingly important in debates about forest management 
with many different interpretations of what the concept entails. Woodhouse (1997) 
defines governance in environmental management as “the structures and processes of 
power and authority, cooperation and conflict that govern decision-making and dispute 
resolution concerning resource allocation and use, through the interaction of 
organizations and social institutions”. Forest governance is then pertaining to ”how 
decisions related to forests and forest dependent people are made, who is responsible, 
how they wield their power, and how they are held accountable. It encompasses 
decision-making processes and institutions at local, national, regional and global level” 
(CIFOR, 2008). Good governance encompasses a set of principles such as participation, 
transparency, accountability, responsiveness, equity, efficiency and integrity (see, for 
example, UN-OHRLLS and UNDP, 2006).  
 
25 
 
Cleaver (2007; Franks and Cleaver 2007) in her definition of governance
3
 avoids the 
dichotomous classification of formal or informal institutions, which she regards as false 
polarizations. Instead she differentiates between „bureaucratic‟ and „socially embedded‟ 
institutions. The former are formalized arrangements based on explicit organizational 
structures, while the latter are based on social organization and daily practice. She 
rejects the view of advocates of the institutional perspective that assumes active design 
and crafting of local institutions by outsiders.  Local institutions are rather constructed 
through a process of „bricolage‟, which is the “gathering and applying of analogies and 
styles of thought already part of existing institutions” (Cleaver 2002:15). Cleaver argues 
that without this moulding and melting of newly introduced bureaucratic resource 
management structures into the existing socially embedded institutions for collective 
action, forest resources governance cannot be effective.  
 
PFM includes two domains of governance, the local dimension of structures and 
decision-making processes as well as the local-central dimension, where communities 
share forest management responsibilities with state forest departments. Governance in 
the local context for PFM further needs to encompass ways in which social relationships, 
norms and daily practices interact with forest management systems and shared access to 
forests. Transferring Franks and Cleaver‟s (2007) governance definition to forestry, 
forest governance is “conducted through bureaucratic and socially-embedded 
institutions, social relationships and through the rules in practice of everyday forest use”. 
Franks and Cleaver (2007) suggest that actors construct mechanisms of (forest) 
governance both consciously and non-consciously; through the processes of 
management and through the practices of their daily lives. Hence, forest governance and 
its outcomes occur through both purposive action resulting from collective behaviour 
articulated through processes of forest management, e.g. forest user groups or village 
forest committees, and non-conscious everyday practice. Daily practices are not easily 
defined but are equally important for PFM impacts. The design of forest governance 
systems through bureaucratic institutions may lead to unintended outcomes as the daily 
practices of agents‟ lives may shape forest access around different principles and 
priorities (Cleaver 2002). Similarly as Cleaver points out for the water sector, socially 
                                                 
3
  „Governance is a way of conceptualizing how society orders its affairs, encompassing the range of relationships 
between the different stakeholders: government, public and private sectors, NGOs and community groups, and 
individual citizens‟ (Cleaver 2007, Franks and Cleaver 2007). 
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embedded mechanisms of forest access and governance can appear to have little to do 
with forests.  
 
Outcomes of the system of forest governance occur at the sphere of access, livelihoods, 
social cohesion and political voice. They cover basic access to forests and forest 
products, and livelihoods, and how the poor can use forest products to support and 
improve their status. The mechanisms which are put in place to mediate forest access 
have a strong influence on social structures and institutions as groups form and 
negotiate to protect or increase access. Outcomes also evolve in the political domain, as 
structures of power and influence are changed through the working out of these 
processes, and poor people can gain political voice (Cleaver 2007). Outcomes with 
regard to political voice must include not only the ability to speak but also to be heard in 
public. As Cornwall (2008) points out voice includes that “people feel able to express 
themselves without fear of reprisals or the expectation of not being listened to or taken 
seriously” (Cornwall 2008: 278). Improved forest governance would then mean that the 
network of relationships between different actors and institutions involved in PFM leads 
to outcomes that bring improvements in access, livelihoods, social cohesion and 
political voice in particular for poorer people compared to the status quo.  
 
While effective and accountable institutions are considered important to rural poverty 
alleviation in Africa (Lynam 2005), transparency and accountability are at the same 
time key challenges of CBNRM in most of the developing world (Blair 2000, Ellis and 
Mdoe 2003, Petersen and Sandhövel 2001). Effective and accountable institutions for 
PFM are closely linked to decentralization, which in turn has to do with the local-central 
dimension of governance and devolution of power and control. 
 
Ribot (1999) defines decentralization as the devolution of central state assets and 
powers to local or private decision-making bodies (Ribot 1999). Under the heading of 
decentralization the terms deconcentration and devolution are differentiated. While 
deconcentration simply involves the transfer of selected functions through the shifting 
of workload from central ministries to field agencies that are part of central government, 
devolution must involve the transfer of discretionary authority to legally constituted 
local governments (OECD 1997). Following this definition, the formation of forest user 
groups or village forest committees under PFM schemes cannot be called 
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decentralization unless these bodies have legal constitution. This is consistent with 
Blaikie‟s view that there is a “confusing variability in CBNRM and related 
administrative and legal reforms, such as decentralization” (Blaikie 2005: 307). As 
Smoke (2003) states, definitions of the term decentralization are often blurred and it is 
difficult to measure. However, the level of autonomy and degree of accountability are 
key aspects of decentralization.  
 
Common goals of decentralization are improvements in the areas of efficiency, 
governance, equity, development and poverty reduction (Smoke 2003). Ribot (2005) 
argues that local institutions chosen for PFM are often not accountable to the local 
populations. Even where elected local governments exist, central government and 
donors avoid them in favour of other local groups that are empowered in the name of 
PFM, e.g. forest user groups, forest management committees etc. These single-purpose, 
non-elected committees are empowered as if they are themselves representative or 
democratic, which they are often not, which Ribot considers „anti- democratic‟ (Ribot 
2005:91). For democratic decentralization to be achieved, accountability should run 
from these groups managing public resources such as forests through elected local 
bodies to the people (Blair 2000). Even though local governments may not always be 
democratic, these alternative institutions have even less systematic accountability to the 
public at large. Choosing non-democratic authorities may subject local people to 
arbitrary authority without representation and is comparable to „indirect rule under 
colonial policies‟. Selecting alternative representative bodies instead of giving public 
decision-making powers to elected bodies diminishes the role and authority of elected 
local government. Similarly, transferring powers to NGOs who are not accountable to 
or representative of local people, cannot be considered more democratic or 
representative than privatization, which is not a form of decentralization (Ribot 2005).  
 
Effective decentralization requires representative local institutions that are downwardly 
accountable and responsive (Ribot 2005). Accountability requires that the local 
population can sanction the local authorities via systematic and effective mechanisms to 
avoid rise of self-interest and power concentration. Responsiveness means that local 
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authorities respond to local demands. Elite capture described in the PFM literature4 is 
explained by Ribot with a lack of representation without which local institutions may 
only serve the hierarchical interests of the best organized and most powerful (Ribot 
2002a). Thus, a key question is whether the selected PFM institutions are accountable to 
the populations for whom they are making decisions. This conforms with Nygren 
(2005), who notes that political accountability and institutional democratization of 
forest authorities and community representatives to local populations are essential if 
decentralized forest governance is to succeed in achieving more equitable distribution of 
powers and benefits.  
 
As Cross and Kutengule (2005) show through a case study in Malawi, decentralization 
can exacerbate predatory behaviour of local officials. In the typical patrimonial state 
where authority, power and wealth originate from loyalty and patronage rather than 
effectiveness at achieving state government goals, decentralization merely serves to 
recreate patronage politics at local level. Ribot (2005) defends the view that in the case 
of public resources, such as forests, the chain of accountability is from the committee to 
the elected local government and from the local government to the people. Where local 
forest committees must present themselves to the elected authorities for recognition and 
the latter in turn allocate management use and powers to the committees, local 
authorities are strengthened and equipped with the role of balancing interests among 
users. Notwithstanding the fact that elected local authorities appear to function as 
implementing agents for central authorities rather than local independent discretionary 
decision makers, working with them is a first step towards supporting local democracy 
and strengthening them a second step (Ribot 2005). 
 
With regard to the local-central dimension of forest governance, the principle of 
subsidiarity calls for decisions to be made at the lowest possible political administrative 
level. However, this principle is not followed in most environmental decentralizations 
(Ribot 2005). Forestry agencies transfer use rights with no commercial value while 
retaining central control over the lucrative aspects of the sector (Ribot 2001, 2002a). 
Ribot (2005) claims that there are few cases where democratically accountable local 
institutions are being chosen and given discretionary powers, although the transfer of 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Kaimowitz et al 1998, Topp-Jorgensen 2004, Lund and Nielsen 2006, Larson and 
Ribot 2004, Ribot 1999.  
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the latter is critical to enable local authorities to respond flexibly to local needs. Ribot 
(2005) notes that “whereas power transfers without accountable representation can be 
dangerous, representation without powers is empty”. Ribot (2002a) calls PFM policies a 
„masquerade‟ of political decentralization since they are controlling and administering 
the local population as subjects to be managed and used, rather than empowering or 
enabling. Meaningful power transfer to local institutions requires that   
 
 Mandates are matched with sufficient fiscal resources and technical support and 
should not be the only powers transferred to local authorities.  
 Commercially valuable resource use opportunities should be transferred to local 
authorities in addition to subsistence oriented usufruct rights. 
 Technical decisions to be made at central level should not be confused with political 
decisions concerning use of resources to be made at local level; i.e. who has access 
to and benefits from them. 
 Public resources such as forests should be kept within the public sector and not 
privatized.  
 Means of transfer of powers are secure. Until people believe that the rights they 
have gained are secure, they are not likely to invest in them. Transfers made by 
legislative reforms are more secure than those made by ministerial decrees, 
administrative orders or the discretion of authorities (Ribot 2005).  
 
Several authors point out that certain roles pertain to the central state to support 
effective decentralization. These include, for example, poverty reduction strategies, as 
poverty alleviation is not an automatic outcome of decentralized governance as often 
assumed. On the contrary, local level responsiveness to the poor is quite a rare outcome 
(Ribot 2005, Kumar 2002, Sundar et al. 2001) and it requires strong commitment by a 
national government or external party (e.g. NGOs) to ensure the interests of the poor are 
promoted at the local level (Ribot 2005). Ribot lists a number of questions to determine 
whether a decentralization effort is serious and likely to achieve effective and equitable 
outcomes, consisting of institutional choice and power choice questions. A sub-set of 
these questions of relevance to this study is reproduced in Appendix 1.  
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2.3.6. Participation    
Participatory development became an orthodoxy at the end of the 1980s, influenced by 
the work of Robert Chambers with the aim to “increase the involvement of socially and 
economically marginalized people in decision making over their own lives” (Guijt and 
Shah 1998). It is justified on the basis of sustainability and empowerment. With 
increasing practice, strong critique arose that “participatory development facilitates 
illegitimate exercise of power and can both conceal and reinforce oppressions and 
injustices in their various manifestations”, as Cooke and Kothari (2001:14) state in their 
book titled „Participation: the new Tyranny?‟. The emphasis on the micro level is 
perceived to hide and reinforce systemic macro-level inequalities and injustice (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001), so that the rhetoric in participation becomes a „masquerade‟ of 
continued centralization in the name of decentralization (Biggs and Smith 1998, Mosse 
1994). Furthermore, Chambers (1997), in „Whose Reality Counts‟, suggests that 
participatory development approaches construct a particular reality, which may not truly 
represent the local situation.  
 
Participation is a buzz word that can label almost any practice that involves people. 
Hence, Cornwall calls for “clarity through specificity”, by spelling out exactly what 
people participate in, for what purpose and who is involved and who is absent 
(Cornwall 2008:281). Cleaver (2001) adds the why dimension to these specifications by 
claiming that participatory approaches overlook individual motivations to participate 
and how the multiple identities of individuals impact upon their choices whether and 
how to participate.  
 
At a theoretical level, typologies of participation can be useful in differentiating degrees 
of participation. In practice these differences are less distinct and the forms can all be 
found in one single intervention at different times (Cornwall 2008). The forms of 
participation are usually placed along an axis of „good‟ to „bad‟ with a focus on the 
intention of those who initiate participation (Cornwall 2008). Arnstein (1969), in her 
three-tiered ladder of participation, places „citizen control‟ – which includes delegated 
power – at the top of the ladder, and „non-participation‟– which is based on 
manipulation – at the bottom. She places „tokenism‟ in the middle, in which category 
she includes consultation and informing, which is similar to definitions of development 
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organizations claiming to promote participation. As Cornwall points out, consultation is 
widely used as a means of legitimizing already-taken decisions, providing a thin coating 
of participation to lend the process moral authority (Cornwall 2008). Rarely are there 
any guarantees that what is said will be responded to or taken into account. Arnstein‟s 
typology is a reminder that participation is ultimately about power and control 
(Cornwall 2008), which is in line with Ribot‟s (1999) view that participation means 
power sharing in decision making and must include real devolution of significant 
powers.  
 
Pretty‟s (1995) typology of participation puts emphasis on the motives of users of 
participatory approaches as being an important factor in shaping the outcome (Cornwall 
2008). His typology equally ranges from „lesser‟ forms of „manipulative participation‟ 
and „passive participation‟ to „better‟ forms of participation including „participation by 
consultation‟ and „for material incentives‟. Manipulative participation is simply 
pretence with people‟s representatives on official committees who are not elected and 
have no power. Lack of representativeness and delegated power are characteristics that 
match Ribot‟s 2005 description of local PFM institutions. Passive participation in 
Pretty‟s typology involves unilateral announcements by external agents without 
listening to people‟s responses. Participation by consultation allows people to express 
their views on pre-defined problems, which external agents may or may not take on 
board in their pre-defined information gathering and analysis process. Participation for 
material incentives enlists people by contributing resources, for example their labour in 
return for promised incentives. „Functional participation‟ is often associated with 
efficiency arguments: people participate to meet project objectives more effectively and 
to reduce cost, after the main decisions have been made by external agents. This is the 
most frequent type applied in development. „Interactive participation‟ uses 
interdisciplinary methodologies and involves people in joint analysis to search for 
multiple perspectives and apply a systematic learning process. The „best‟ type of 
participation is „self-mobilization‟, where people take initiatives independently of 
external agents to change situations and then develop contact with external institutions 
for resources and technical advice while keeping control over how resources are used. 
This last form of participation may challenge existing distributions of wealth and power 
(Pretty 1995). Arnstein‟s and Pretty‟s typologies describe a spectrum defined by a shift 
from control by authorities to control by the people (Cornwall 2008).  
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White‟s (1996) description of different interests in various forms of participation can be 
useful to analyse why or how participation is being used at any particular stage in the 
process. „Nominal participation‟ is simply used by the implementing agency to 
legitimate that they are doing something, which for people at the receiving end means 
inclusion to ensure they retain some access to potential benefits. In this case 
participation is simply for „display‟. The second form is „instrumental participation‟ 
where it is used as a means of achieving cost effectiveness. „Representative 
participation‟ is intended to give people voice and to create sustainability, which in turn 
means for those on the receiving end leverage to influence the shape of the intervention. 
The last form, „transformative participation‟ stands for empowerment both at the 
implementing and the receiving end and represents a continuing dynamic to enable 
people to derive at their own decisions (White 1996).  
 
As Cornwall points out, these typologies of participation show that a process that 
simply enlists a small group of articulate elite community members is very different to 
one in which community members themselves delegate power to such a group to engage 
with the authorities, remaining content to receive information and be consulted on key 
issues (Cornwall 2008). The latter process is then more likely to create what Ribot 
describes as democratic institutions, which are elected and representative. Farrington 
and Bebbington (1993) differentiate between depth and breadth of participation. A deep 
process includes a process from identification to decision making while a wide process 
must go beyond a particular interest group. This emphasizes the intersections between 
inclusion and exclusion and degrees of involvement.  
 
While a deep and wide process might be ideal, in practice it can prove to be impossible 
and time-consuming (Cornwall 2008). Participatory processes can also serve to deepen 
the exclusion of particular groups unless explicit efforts are made to include them 
(Cornwall 2008). Participatory forest management implies changes in tenure conditions 
and management responsibilities to include local people, although it does not usually 
imply a change of ownership of forest resources, which remain with the state. Thus, in 
Arnstein‟s typology this is manipulation or at best consultation but due to the lack of 
power delegation is it not the highest category of citizen power. Li (2007) argues that in 
PFM rights to resources are often made conditional on performance, adding a coercive 
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element to governmental strategies, which could then be compared to functional 
participation in Pretty‟s typology. Often participation in forest management is 
introduced to achieve predetermined project goals at given conditions to reduce cost. 
The typologies will be useful in examining the nature of participation applied in the 
JFM process at the research sites of this study.  
 
Cleaver (2001) highlights the neglected role of social structure and individual agency in 
shaping participation. Participatory approaches often assume that people have 
overriding productive identities („irrigators‟, farmers) and clear social roles (leaders, 
women). The emphasis on such participators is problematic as formal institutions 
formed on this basis often reproduce patterns of inequity and may serve to shape and 
reinforce other differences. The prioritizing of single aspects of people‟s identities while 
forming institutions of participatory resource management ill reflects complex social 
and livelihood identities and multiple motivations. People‟s identities are dynamic, and 
social norms that shape institutions are difficult to categorize. Norms and practices and 
the relationships of trust and cooperation that underlie them are often generated and 
negotiated outside the formal institutions.  
 
It is further noted that the participatory discourse and approaches have been naive about 
the complexities of power (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Cleaver 2001). Power relations are 
exercised in diverse often less visible ways embedded in social practices. Participatory 
practitioners need to acquire a deeper understanding of the concept of power and to 
reconsider the claims of empowerment that are rooted in power (Cooke and Kothari 
2001).  
2.4. Common property regimes  
Common property (or pool) resources, such as grazing land, fisheries and some forests 
are characterized as hard to sustain and easy to deplete. Access to them and the rate at 
which they are consumed is difficult to control. They are contrasted to private property 
resources (or goods) with clearly specified and secure property rights, exclusive to the 
owner of the right. Private property rights can encourage protection and investment in 
the resource (or good) to which they attach, provided there is security to enforce the 
right and a long-term horizon. Rights that are vague, tenuous, or nonexclusive are not 
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fully private (McKean 2000). Property rights to resources have been defined as human 
institutions or sets of mutually recognized claims, and decision making powers over 
those resources (Gibson et al. 2000). Shepherd et al. (1995) emphasize that property 
regimes with regard to forest land are socially defined, and as such may be either legally 
codified (de jure) or unwritten but commonly understood (de facto); they are never 
absolutely secure, but are subject to revision. This division of rights between the 
legitimating body (i.e. nation-state, local government, community or clan) and the 
designated users reflects the prevailing balance of power, and may be reason for conflict 
and subject to change.  
 
Hardin started a critical debate about common pool resources, claiming that common 
property resource (CPR) management regimes inevitably lead to over-extraction to the 
point of exhaustion, described as the „tragedy of the commons‟ (Hardin 1968, Gordon 
1954). The resulting policy recommendation was to place all natural resources under 
public or private ownership. However, the hypothesis of the tragedy of the commons 
was criticized for its underlying utilitarian world view typical to neo-classical economic 
theory. It is based on game theory models of individuals‟ self-seeking behaviour that 
assume that natural resources yields could be individually maximized (Berkes and Folke 
1999). Scholars critical of the conventional natural resources theory call for a multi-
disciplinary, multi-method, comparative research design to develop a coherent theory of 
the commons (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). They explain Hardin‟s 
„tragedy of the commons‟ as „institutional failure‟, meaning the breakdown of local 
institutional mechanism for the regulation of common use, ascribed to changes in the 
legal framework and tenure structures. This breakdown is believed to result in the de 
facto open access situation described by Hardin. Hardin himself later recognized that his 
famous 1968 article should have been titled “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons” 
(Hardin 1998).   
 
Many forests in developing countries, once managed under customary arrangements as 
common pool resources during pre-colonial times (see Chapter 4 below) and then 
placed under state ownership through nationalization, are presently facing this de facto 
open access situation. These government owned forest reserves, although de jure public 
property, have become de facto common pool resources, because the property rights are 
not enforced and an open access regime has established in practice over time in the 
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dearth of monitoring and rule enforcement. This is the case with the six state forests 
included in the present research study. PFM, in contrast, has been compared to putting 
these de facto common pool resources under a common property (of the community 
institution) regime acting as an incentive for protection (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006).  
 
A vast number of theoretical and empirical contributions emphasize that decentralized 
collective management of common property resources by their users could overcome 
the „tragedy of the commons‟, lead to ecological sustainability, greater long-term 
productivity and reduced administrative cost (Berkes 1989, Poffenberger 1990, Ostrom 
1990, Larson and Bromley 1990, Bromley 1992, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994, 
Baland and Plateau 1996, Chakraborty 2001, Agrawal 2001, Adhikari et al. 2005, 
Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). McKean (2000) argues that forests make good candidates 
for common property regimes, or for vesting clear, secure, exclusive rights to managing 
a resource in nearby communities.  
 
Forest adjacent communities have shown to be able to create robust institutional 
arrangements for governing the commons sustainably (Berkes and Folke 1998, National 
Research Council 2002, Ostrom 2005, Bray and Klepeis 2005). This trend led to 
proposing CBNRM or PFM respectively as a cure all approach to conservation in the 
form of a blueprint approach (Pritchett and Woolcock 2003). However, some authors 
are concerned about inequality with negative effects on the ability of community groups 
to undertake successful collective action (Baland and Plateau 1999, Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999, Guijt and Shah 1998). Wealthier users contribute more to collective 
action as they have more incentives to cooperate, while poorer users capture less benefit 
and are hence less declined to participate in the collective action (Baland and Plateau 
1999). Increasing inequality between users redistributes incentives in different 
directions and has ambiguous effects on the ability of users to conserve their resources 
and towards setting up the required mechanisms. Hence, CBNRM generates little 
community involvement and leads to elite capture of benefits (Plateau 2004).  
 
Despite this critique, Ostrom and Nagendra (2006) consider PFM more effective than 
publicly protected areas (Bray et al. 2005 and Nagendra et al. 2005 quoted in Ostrom 
and Nagendra 2006). From a comparative study, Ostrom and Nagendra (2006: 19230) 
conclude that “without substantial investment in fences and official guards to patrol 
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boundaries to prevent illegal harvesting, government owned „protected‟ forests may not 
be protected in practice”. However, if users have a role in designing rules, or consider 
the rules legitimate, they are often willing to monitor and sanction uses considered 
illegal, even of public property (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). The existence of a set of 
agreed rules, specifying access to and extraction from the resource is a key feature of 
successful common property regimes. The rules can be designed, enacted, and enforced 
by the group of individuals who jointly own the resource (Chakraborty 2001). This 
corresponds to the concept of „regulated common property‟ used by Baland and Plateau 
(1996). The lack of such rules, monitoring arrangements, and sanctions is according to 
Ostrom et al. (1999) an explanatory variable of forest degradation.  
 
Other authors confirm that more important than the particular ownership form is 
whether boundaries of linked social-ecological systems have been established as 
legitimate in the field and whether regular monitoring and enforcement of rules related 
to entry and use exist (Dietz et al. 2003, Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000, Pagree 
et al. 2006). Effective systems to curb over-extraction of natural resources need time to 
evolve and effort to design so as to fit both the local ecology and the social structure of 
the users and the officials involved, and to avoid crowding out intrinsic motivation 
(Berkes 2004, Berkes and Folke 1998, Frey 1997). Thus, simple formulas on formal 
ownership of common pool resources, particularly if based solely on public ownership 
of forest lands, will not solve the problems of over-extraction (Ostrom and Nagendra 
2006).  
2.4.1. Categories of property rights 
Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) identify four categories of property rights that are crucial to 
understand common pool resource management: withdrawal, management, exclusion 
and alienation. These categories allow scaling up local forest management institutions 
regarding their independence from government forest departments. Nagendra and 
Gokhale (2008) apply these rights to forest resources as follows:  
 Withdrawal: The right to withdraw specified forest products from a defined physical 
area;  
 Management: The right to manage a forest area and regulate use;  
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 Exclusion: The right to determine who has the right to harvest forest products and 
how the right can be transferred;  
 Alienation: The right to sell or lease the rights of withdrawal, management and 
exclusion.  
Schlager and Ostrom 1999 define four categories of property rights holders depending 
on the de facto rights to the forest. Owners, such as the state forest departments and 
local rulers in pre-colonial times, have rights of withdrawal, management, exclusion and 
alienation. Proprietors, such as forest industries, hold rights of withdrawal, management 
and exclusion but lack authority to alienate these rights. Authorized claimants, such as 
the village forest committees in India, can withdraw forest products and manage the 
land, but they lack the authority to exclusion and to alienation. Authorized users, such 
as the most marginalized communities, have the most limited rights, with only the right 
to withdraw specific forest products in practice, even though they may hold de jure 
rights to withdrawal.  
2.4.2. Attributes of successful common property institutions 
Success factors identified for effective local common property institutions include 
certain characteristics of the community and the existence and enforcement of rules 
(Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996, Agrawal 2001). Agrawal (2001) lists 36 such 
factors conducive to collective action, including small area extent of natural resource, 
well-defined boundaries, small group size, shared norms and cohesiveness, 
homogeneity of identities and interests.  In a different study Agraval (2000) provided 
evidence that smaller councils were disadvantaged in their efforts to generate sufficient 
human and other resources to monitor and enforce local rules, which challenged the 
earlier „smaller is better view‟. Varughese and Ostrom (2001) discuss heterogeneity 
instead of homogeneity as a criterion in collective community action. This debate about 
general institutional characteristics conducive to the success of CPRs is on-going, while 
at the same time it is becoming evident that PFM outcomes depend on the specific 
circumstances of each site (Sundar et al. 2001, Woodcock 2002). This research study 
shows that there is a large variance between the site-specific cases, which can each 
generate lessons but they also offer common insights.  
Attributes identified as key for successful common property institutions can serve as 
guiding criteria during the analysis of PFM case studies. Amongst these are:   
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 Clearly defined resource boundaries and group membership criteria.   
 No interference to the user groups‟ attempt to organize.   
 Clear and easily enforceable rules. Restrictions on equipment a user takes into the 
forest may be easier to enforce than quantitative extraction limits (McKean 2000).  
 Infractions of use rules are monitored and punished. Evidence shows that 
communities with healthy forests reinvest fines collected into paying their guards. 
Communities with degraded forests enforce rules less, have fewer guards, collect 
fewer fines, and put the fines into a general village budget rather than into 
enforcement (Agrawal 1992). 
 Users have the right to modify the use rules to allow for the ability to adjust to 
ecological changes and new economic opportunities by, for example, lengthening 
the period of closure on a forest, altering distribution of forest products, and so on.  
 Fair distribution of decision making and access rights with acceptable balance of 
cost and benefits. If any subgroup feels cheated, it may become unwilling to invest 
in protecting the commons. Rules that award more benefits to those who invest 
more and no benefits to those unwilling to invest, seem to have the best chance of 
winning the allegiance of both rich and poor (McKean 2000).  
 Methods of conflict resolution exist. Possibilities to air grievances need to be 
provided, for example through regular committee meetings.  
Agreement on rules is considered a prerequisite for successful enforcement. Lack of 
agreement about rules would achieve a lower level of rule compliance and efforts to 
guard effectively, resulting either in corruption between government guards and local 
forest users (especially bribery) or high levels of conflict (Gibson et al. 2000). Once 
some common agreement is achieved, the investment in monitoring has a high return by 
ensuring that the temptations that face all users do not grow into consistent rule 
breaking behaviour (Gibson et al. 2000). There is theoretical consensus that without 
common understanding and resources sufficient to monitor and sanction rule breakers, 
rules restricting activities that generate high private benefits are doubtful, whether made 
and enforced by the national government or by the local community (Gibson et al. 
2000). Financial support to local common property regimes is considered to undermine 
local cooperation and forest committees should be self-sustaining institutions (McKean 
2000).  
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Ostrom (1990) defines three factors that can support the stability of common property 
institutions. First, each actor has to make a commitment to comply with credible rules. 
Chakraborty (2001) argues that this is difficult to achieve as incentives for individual 
resource users to deviate from their commitments are always present as long as it 
remains unnoticed. Second, monitoring mechanisms are in place to detect violators and 
enforcement mechanisms that increase the cost violators incur for their infringements. 
The existence for these mechanisms works as an additional incentive to make a 
commitment. Third, external factors of the legal and political environment support or 
erode the stability of an institution. Chakraborty (2001) found that external support in 
the enforcement of rules by the FD stabilized common property institutions in Nepal. 
Credible commitment to protection rules was facilitated by the fact that state managed 
forests nearby offered a reserve that could be exploited to satisfy subsistence needs, 
indicating a replacement effect. An institution is unstable if compliance to informal 
constraints and formal rules is low and rules are changed frequently (Chakraborty 2001).  
Cleaver argues that formal or „bureaucratic‟ institutions of forest management are often 
superimposed on the existing social structures. These mediate the residents‟ access to 
forest benefits. In contrast to the orthodox view of the common property literature, 
Cleaver claims that “collective decision-making institutions may not be the process of 
conscious selection of mechanisms fit for the collective action task, but rather a messier 
process of piecing together shaped by individuals acting within the bounds of 
circumstantial constraint” (Cleaver 2002:17). These processes of „bricolage‟, which 
shape institutions, are embedded in networks of social relations and norms. Maintaining 
social consensus may be equally as important as optimum resource management 
outcomes (Cleaver 2002:17). Cleaver‟s concept helps to understand the complex and 
dynamic nature of natural resources management and the „fit‟ between (newly created, 
formal) institutions and the (existing) web of livelihoods networks and practices in 
which they are embedded. Formal institutions often reproduce existing patterns of 
inequity and may serve to shape and reinforce other differences (Cleaver 2002).  
Property regimes and tenure systems remain crucial issues in the debate over 
sustainable forest management. Real-world property regimes and institutions are highly 
complex and location-specific. The evidence that public protection is the only effective 
way to conserve forests is not clear. Neither is the evidence that handing forest over to 
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local users is a secure way to achieve conservation. Some communities manage their 
forests better than others. Some conditions are more conducive than others (Gibson et al. 
2000; Andersson 2004, Berkes 2004). Many forest dependent communities have failed 
to conserve all components of their resources even under well-defined property rights 
regimes (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Sundar et al. (2001:233) conclude their review of 
JFM in India: “JFM is too diverse to allow generalized conclusions about whether it is 
successful or replicable”. Thus, PFM is location-specific and there is no „blueprint‟ for 
it. The following chapter summarizes some of the experiences with PFM in India and 
Nepal and the lessons that have emerged.  
41 
 
3. Lessons of PFM  
3.1. Experiences in Asia  
While PFM has been implemented worldwide, this review of experiences focuses on 
India and Nepal. The PFM programmes in both countries have generated a wealth of 
lessons, among others through long-term research programmes
5
. These have to some 
degree informed the African PFM process. The Indian JFM programme and the 
Nepalese Community Forest (CF) programme are among the largest programmes in the 
world (Kumar 2002).
6
  
3.1.1. Background  
Since the 1970s the PFM experiments in both India and Nepal have generated similar 
lessons despite their different implementation approach (Hobley 1996; Nagendra and 
Gokhale 2008). Nepal‟s CF policies are described as the most innovative among 
developing nations, while India has implemented a JFM programme on a wider scale 
but with less devolution of power (Sundar et al. 2001). While in both countries land 
tenure remains in principle with government who retains the right to reclaim forests if 
misused by local people there is a significant difference in the PFM property regime.  
 
In India, based on the 1990 JFM resolution the rights of Village Forest Committees 
(VFCs) to share forest products are only granted administratively and are not a legal 
right with the exception of some states (Hobley 1996). In contrast in Nepal, the 1993 
Forest Act foresees legally registered Forest User Groups (FUGs) with clear property 
rights over the forest (Tachibana and Adhikari 2009). In India 97% of the forest land is 
owned and managed by the state Forest Department (FD) and has been under extensive 
management for the last 100 years (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). By contrast, in Nepal 
most of the forests were under community control prior to the mid 1950s but were 
                                                 
5
 Such as the Ecological and Economics Research Network (EERN) of the Centre for Ecological Sciences, 
Indian Institute of Sciences, the Nepal Forest Resources and Institutions Research Programme and the 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research programme of Indiana University. 
6
 Launched in 1990, the Indian JFM Programme covered all 28 states, encompassing 22 million ha of 
forest land and involving 106,482 villages by 2006 (Nayak and Berkes 2008, Murthy et al. 2004; 
Ravindranath et al. 2004; Kumar 2002). In Nepal, by 2005/2006, over one million ha of forest area had 
been handed over to 14,227 forest user groups (FUGs) in the Nepali hills and plains, and the programme 
covered over 1.6 million families in 74 districts (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). 
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brought under government ownership through the Nationalization Act of 1957 
(Nagendra and Gokhale, 2008).  
 
In both countries, the nationalization of forests, which replaced traditional systems of 
forest management, is believed to have led to the alienation of local communities from 
the forest (Nagendra and Gokhale, 2008, Sundar 2000, Hobley 1996). They have 
created de facto open-access forests, which were previously limited in access through 
customary rules (Ostrom 2005). The large areas of forest subsequently under public 
property were difficult to control by the FDs in both countries due to limited manpower 
and finances (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008, Sudha and Ravindranath 2004). Community 
management was assumed to be a step towards reversing the alienation introduced by 
the state (Sundar 2000). This is similar to the Tanzanian history (see Chapter 4). The 
Nepali CF programme drew on traditional systems of community management, which 
had existed since 1952 (Hobley 1996). The Indian programme built on self-initiated 
Community Forest Management (CFM) experiments dating back to 1936 in West 
Orissa and West Bengal (Human and Pattanaik 2000). These early experiences provided 
proof that communities had the capacity to undertake forest management without the 
assistance of FDs (Human and Patt 2000). The formal expansion of the national scale 
programmes was then largely externally driven and funded, designed as top-down 
approaches in which communities lack control over planning and implementation 
(Sundar 2000, Ribot 2004, Ravindranath N H et al. 2004, Sundar et al. 2001). India‟s 
JFM programme was perceived by community groups as an intention of the FD to re-
gain gradual control over forest resources that had previously been handed over to 
villagers for management and which had been successfully regenerated and protected by 
the villages under CFM (Human and Pattanaik, 2000). Many communities were 
reluctant to engage in JFM due to a long history of distrust of the FD and due to their 
belief that JFM is a one-sided affair where the FD holds the real power.  
3.1.2. Impacts on forest quality 
PFM in India and Nepal is considered successful in terms of forest protection and 
regeneration (Iversen et al. 2006, Yadav et al. 2003, Dev et al. 2003, Richards et al. 
2003, Chakraborty 2001, Kumar 2002, Sundar et al. 2001). While most FUGs in Nepal 
initially put their forests under closed access to allow for regeneration, over time the 
protection practice was adjusted, harvesting controlled and planting practiced. This 
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combined led to sustainable management of the forests (Springate-Baginski et al. 1999, 
Adhikari et al. 2007, Dev et al. 2003). However, Lund et al. (2009) document that the 
apparent consistency in research about PFM leading to improved forest quality in India 
and Nepal actually build on a number of methodological weaknesses which means that 
the observed and perceived positive developments in forest quality over a certain time 
span cannot be clearly linked to PFM (other potential causal factors cannot be ruled out).  
 
In India the main positive impacts from a community perspective were that JFM forests 
had improved tree density and canopy cover (Ravindranath et al. 2004). The diversity, 
quality and quantity of forest products available for collection had increased in some 
states. There had been a reduction of illegal forest product extraction and other 
environmental benefits were noticeable. Rishi (2006) found that VFCs had a clear 
positive attitude towards forest protection and management. Murthy et al. (2004) in 
contrast document that the majority of VFCs in Karnataka reported increased tree 
density and canopy cover of naturally regenerating forests, however the impact on the 
availability of fuelwood, grass and NTFPs differed considerably between sites.  Based 
on a long-term vegetation study a positive correlation between the length of the 
protection period and regeneration of natural forests was established (Murthy et al. 
2004). The natural regeneration approach promoted in the Indian model in degraded 
forests with suitable rootstock combined with protection from grazing and extraction 
proved to be a successful low-cost approach to restoring biodiversity (Murthy et al. 
2004).  
 
Ravindranath et al. (2004) found that there are positive synergies between promoting 
biodiversity and meeting the diverse biomass needs of the community for fodder, 
NTFPs, fuelwood and timber. In the Middle Hills of Nepal, CF has encouraged the 
regeneration of forest cover with an improvement in forest biomass and biodiversity 
levels in several sites (Nagendra 2002). In the Terai Plains, results have been mixed, 
with the FD handing over poor quality forests to the local communities, and retaining 
the better quality forests as national forests. However, even in these cases the 
community forests are reported to regenerate. Tachibana and Adhikari (2009) found that 
improved forest condition in CF forests was due to rotational use of the forest area 
leading to regeneration of saplings, as well as due to tree planting.  
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In addition to natural regeneration of forests, the Indian JFM programme included the 
establishment of plantations on degraded forest land. While in India the JFM plantations 
tend to be monocultures of exotic water hungry species such as Acacia and Eucalyptus, 
in Nepal, at least a mixture of local useful species of trees is often planted to restore 
degraded lands (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). While there is consistency in the 
research on India and Nepal that PFM leads to improvements in forest quality, several 
studies raise equity and distributional problems affecting the outcomes for the 
livelihoods of the poor (Kumar 2002, Adhikari and Lovett 2006, Adhikari 2005, Malla 
2009, Yadav et al. 2003, Chakraborty 2001). As Kumar (2002:764) notes “JFM is well 
suited to the promotion of sustainable forest regeneration, but such regeneration is 
currently being achieved at the expense of the poor”. However, Lund et al. (2009) even 
question this cause – effect relation between forest quality and PFM.   
3.1.3. Impacts on livelihoods and poverty   
Impact studies on livelihoods show both positive and negative results. JFM committees 
in several Indian states had greater legitimate access to forest benefits, which enhanced 
their livelihoods and enabled them to create village funds for development activities. 
The protection of the forest had a direct impact on the productivity of NTFPs and grass, 
which resulted in larger populations of milk cattle in the JFM villages. Initially 
employment was created by the FD through paying local people as guards and for 
planting activities. However this effect declined over time (Ravindranath et al. 2004). 
Negative livelihoods impacts are reported from Nepal due to the closed access regimes 
that were introduced in the initial years of CF. This led to lower amounts of forest 
products collected (Springate-Baginski 1999).The cash income from CF in Nepal as 
well as from JFM in India has to date been marginal and barely enough to cover the 
salaries of the local forest guards and did not justify the transaction and opportunity 
cost
7
 over a long protection period (Malla 2009; Kumar 2002). 
 
Wealth disaggregated studies show that for poor households negative outcomes 
outweigh the positive ones. This is due to several reasons. First, due to their limited land 
ownership, poor households are particularly affected by the restricted access as they are 
                                                 
7
 Transaction cost includes, for example, the time spent in meetings, while opportunity cost includes time 
spent collecting forest products from elsewhere, or time spent on patrol that cannot be used for other 
activities. 
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unable to replace forest resources from private land (Pokharel and Nurse 2004). At the 
same time poorer people have higher forest resource dependency: the share of forest 
income to total household income is significantly higher for landless poor households 
compared to cultivating non-poor households (Kumar 2002). Thus, while the potential 
income from community forests may be insignificant to the well-off, it is substantial for 
poorer households (Malla 2009). 
 
Second, poor households have a more restricted access to benefits due to their lack of 
participation in decision making (Malla 2009, Adhikari et al. 2004, Malla et al. 2003, 
Hobley 1996, Kuechli 1997, Kumar 2002, Hobley and Wollenberg 1996, Yadav et al. 
2003). PFM regimes in India and Nepal, it is claimed, have been built on alliances 
between the state and village elites, which dominate decision making. The inadequate 
participation of marginalized sections of communities – e.g. women, landless, artisans – 
reinforce inequity and poverty (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008; Ravindranath et al. 2004; 
Murthy et al. 2004; Hobley 1996).  
 
Several studies state that decisions in FUGs are dominated by large landholders who 
have little incentive to use community forests for commercial purposes but at the same 
time siphon off most of the benefits generated by the forest (Malla 2009, Sundar 2000, 
Iversen et al. 2006). Interests of poorer households in terms of rules of forest product 
harvesting are not properly represented in the forest operational plans (Adhikari and 
Lovett 2006) so that procedures for distribution of forest products harvested (Malla 
2009) and FUG price and payment policies (Iversen et al. 2006) favour wealthier 
households. In many sites the VFCs open the forest only for certain days in a year and 
the forest grows mainly in terms of timber under the protection regime. This mirrors the 
preference of wealthier members for timber, while poorer sections of the village are 
more dependent on NTFP for subsistence and income. Not only do poorer households 
benefit less due to restrictions imposed on collecting forest products, they also bear a 
higher proportion of transaction cost
8
 relative to their resource benefits if compared to 
wealthier households (Adhikari and Lovett 2006, Hobley and Wollenberg 1996). 
 
                                                 
8
 Iversen et al. (2006) found that in the Terai in Nepal, the transaction cost amounted to 10% of the total 
cost.  
 
46 
 
Kumar 2002 argues that the assumption inherent in PFM that direct benefit sharing 
between state and village committees will tackle equity issues and contribute to poverty 
alleviation is ignoring the fact that village communities are highly stratified in terms of 
assets and patterns of social exclusion. None of the state JFM resolutions specifies 
suitable mechanisms to ensure increased access of landless households or marginal 
farmers to the forest and forest benefits (Kumar 2002). Gender equality principles 
entailed in the Indian JFM policy framework were largely ignored at field level 
(Ravindranath et al. 2004; Murthy et al. 2004). Women were found to either not 
participate in committee meetings at all or register their physical presence with no 
participation in the discussions. The „one person per household‟ rule for committee 
membership led to a systematic exclusion of women (Alderman et al. 1997). Even the 
introduction of „all women‟ forest committees in India did not change this situation 
(Bingemann et al. 2004, Nayak and Berkes 2008, Ravindranath et al. 2004; Murthy et 
al. 2004). Agrawal (1994) in contrast suggests that all-women panels in village 
panchayats are more responsive to women‟s concerns and that women are more likely 
to take their grievances to women representatives. Several authors argue that the JFM 
regime itself aggravates gender disparity (Cleaver 2002; Sundar 2000). Cases are 
reported of women coming into confrontation with members of the control committee 
and suffering severe deprivation due to closure of forests (Sarin et al. 1998 in Sundar 
2000). Disputes over boundary issues contribute to inequitable outcomes and exclusion 
in both India and Nepal (Hobley 1996).  
 
Second generation impacts are emerging in Nepal with positive livelihood outcomes 
also for poorer people. Several studies report that although there are short-term adverse 
effects on the poor by curtailing access to forests, over time improved forest condition is 
leading to increased collection rates of forest products (Adhikari et al. 2007, Iversen et 
al. 2006, Dev et al. 2003 and Springate-Baginski et al. 2003). As the forests are 
regenerating, FUGs are putting in place more permeable access regimes and more 
equitable distribution rules. Adhikari et al. (2007) conclude that CF has not adversely 
affected livelihoods as there has been an increase in fuelwood collection rates and 
people have adjusted to the new institutional arrangements. Long-term studies show that 
households are adapting their livelihoods to the change introduced through PFM. For 
example, in India, villagers have changed their livestock herds to a different type of 
cattle that needs less grass (Murthy et al. 2004, ) and in Nepal, households have shifted 
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livelihood strategies, reallocated activities or shifted membership to other forest user 
groups (Iversen et al. 2006). Chakraborty (2001) identified as an impact of JFM a shift 
of forest resources demand to state managed forests without community involvement, 
indicating a replacement effect leading to stronger degradation of these other forests.  
Thus, the timeframe is emerging as an important aspect when considering livelihood 
impacts of PFM. While there might be trade-offs in the short-run, there is a potential for 
positive outcomes in the longer term provided equitable access and distribution rules are 
put into place once the forests have regenerated (Chakraborty 2001). However, Kumar 
(2001) claims that even over a long-term (40 year) horizon, JFM reflects a social 
preference of the rural non-poor and the poor are net losers in comparison to state 
managed forests. Thus, although the Indian JFM programme succeeded in halting forest 
degradation, its poverty reduction objective has not been met (Kumar 2002, Sundar et al. 
2001). 
3.1.4. Impacts on governance and decentralization  
Even if there was equitable forest access, it may not lead to sustainable resource use 
unless local institutions of resources management provide a suitably accountable 
framework for local participation (Lele 1991). Several aspects have not been conducive 
for the establishment of sustainable local forest institutions in India and Nepal.  
 
First, the lack of clear property rights is considered to have maintained the power and 
control of FDs over forest resources. Indian VFCs, although meant to be registered as 
legal entities under the Societies Act, were in practice registered with the respective 
Deputy Conservator of Forests, thus increasing state authority (Nagendra and Gokhale 
2008, Murthy et al. 2004). The FD reserves the right to dissolve committees if they 
perform unsatisfactorily or denies them the benefits expected (Sundar 2000, Nagendra 
and Gokhale 2008).  There have been cases in which the FD refused to register 
committees, if forests under their protection have changed from degraded into good 
forests (Sundar 2000). In other situations, the FD has made use of existing committees 
while denying the legitimacy of earlier rules which did not fit into state resolutions or 
replaced the leadership or members in place of the existing ones (Sundar 2000). This 
demonstrates the high level of interference and control. Based on the categories of 
property rights described in Section 2.4.1 above, VFCs are authorized proprietors or 
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authorized claimants to the forest as tenure can be changed or withdrawn at anytime 
(Nagendra and Gokhale 2008, Murthy et al. 2004, Behera and Engel 2006). In Nepal 
the state retains the right to dissolve and deregister the community groups at any time, 
as with all state initiated programmes (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). The ownership of 
forest land as well as high value timber trees on the land remains vested with the state 
(Nagendra and Gokhale 2008).  
 
Second, the VFCs remained dependent on higher authorities for decision making 
(Springate-Baginski et al. 2003, Ravindranath et al. 2004). Ravindranath et al. 
(2004:318) state that “the most important and hazardous duty of protection have been 
given to the people, while all the other responsibilities such as planning, implementation 
of plans, collecting revenue, allocating funds and decisions on forest management have 
remained with the FD”. In India, the FD largely controls all decisions so that often 
apprehending offenders and confiscating material has led to legal complications 
(Ravindranath et al. 2004).The FD limits and undermines the scope of the VFCs to set 
and enforce rules. In some cases FD officials even supported the violation of VFC rules 
(Behera and Engel 2006). In Nepal management interventions proposed as relevant by 
the villagers were often not implemented due to the requirement of requesting district 
approval for changes related to management agreement regulations (Springate-Baginski 
et al. 2003).  
 
The imbalance of power between the FD and the communities is also visible in the 
planning process. Although in Nepal there is reportedly considerable scope to design the 
work plans according to local needs, the FD retains the right to approve the plans 
(Chakraborty 2001). In India, plans were often written and executed by the FD staff and 
the villagers were not aware of the contents and the budget (Ravindranath et al. 2004, 
Sundar 2000, Murthy et al. 2000). Resource inventories were not adequately dealt with. 
Insufficient capacity building in skills to plan, implement and manage JFM aggravates 
the weaker situation of the communities (Murthy et al. 2004). Joint forest committees 
have performed better where NGOs have played an active role as they have helped to 
resolve conflicts (Ravindranath et al. 2004). Further, federations of forest committees 
and forest user groups
9
 have helped to resolve conflict, enhance negotiation power 
                                                 
9
 For example FECOFUN is a powerful network of Forest Users in Nepal (Brown et al. 2002). 
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towards the state, and exchange information (Ravindranath et al. 2004, Human and 
Puttanaik 2000, Brown et al. 2002).  
 
Third, PFM offers only limited types of participation. The programmes were initiated 
by the FDs who mobilized villagers for a set agenda (i.e. afforestation of degraded land) 
and not for a self-defined purpose, such as getting more timber for local needs. Sundar 
(2000) argues that JFM makes villagers responsible for afforestation although they have 
not been responsible for deforestation in the first place. The granting of benefits is 
limited to the share of the committee in the final harvest which is dependent on its 
performance. In the absence of a benchmark, the assessment of performance depends on 
goodwill of the FD. The FD can change membership rules any time making 
participation a rule bound exercise being used in different measures for different 
purposes according to the different rule.  
 
The question of who participates is also specified by the state resolutions in terms of the 
selection of participating villages and the „one person per household‟ rule in India. 
Targets, funding and the manpower in the FD limit the number of village committees 
that can be set up and the selection is made by forest staff based on their perception of 
which would be good, responsive villages on the basis of visibility and accessibility. 
Villagers cannot exercise their opinion on this choice, such as, for example, through a 
district council meeting. Villagers have their own opinion as to why a village was 
chosen over another including allegations of corruption, which may spark inter village 
tensions (Sundar 2000). Sundar (2000:270) notes that the “membership and selection 
process show how the non participatory nature of the programme affects the ability of 
different sections to participate within the community in terms of access to resources or 
their ability to negotiate in future government programmes. The contours of the 
community become refashioned along with the balance of power between different 
communities”.  
 
It is argued that JFM distorts agency and reduces the ability of the community to 
manage its own affairs (Sundar 2000). By retaining a leading role, and specifying who 
has what rights and how resources are to be managed, communities have been reshaped 
and committees have become susceptible to the overall imperatives of the FD, turning 
PFM into a vehicle of control. There have been examples where in the name of JFM the 
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FD superimposed new committees on existing informal village committees and replaced 
members that were perceived not to be in line with state principles. Thus, JFM offers 
the state “the ability to appear flexible and participatory while retaining the deciding 
vote” (Sundar 2000: 257). In addition, institutional linkages between village and outside 
agencies such as other villages have been abandoned in favour of a close relationship 
with the FD, and the administration of the forestry resource has become politicized.  
 
PFM has changed the role of the foresters from protecting and policing to supporting 
and advising local forest managers (Springate-Baginski et al. 2003). This has been 
observed with mistrust by the villagers (Sundar 2000) and often interpreted as a loss of 
power by foresters (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008, Kuechli 1997). The hierarchical 
structure of FDs may not provide a supportive environment for the change in roles. In 
Rishi‟s (2006) attitudinal survey, forest officers expressed a negative attitude towards 
the FD in terms of limiting freedom of their work and using a participatory approach. 
On the other hand, attitudinal surveys also show improvements in the relationship 
between forest officers and community managers (Ravindranath et al. 2004, Rishi 2006).  
 
A fourth factor that impedes sustainability of the local forest management institutions is 
an observed lack of good governance in terms of low accountability of both FD and 
VFC leaders (Behera and Engel 2006) and corruption (Iversen et al. 2006). Hidden 
transactions have been increasing over the last few years as “new loopholes to take part 
in illicit actions have surfaced” and the forest value has increased as forests have been 
regenerating (Iversen et al. 2006:29). 
 
 High forest value adds new problems and challenges to PFM in Nepal Terai (Iversen et 
al. 2006). There is a prevalence of illicit acts, such as illegal harvesting of timber, 
accepting bribes or engagement in other types of embezzlement, such as theft from the 
FUG fund (Iversen et al. 2006). FUG members are reported to exempt themselves from 
obtaining permits to collect NTFPs and a few influential members were reported to 
graze their livestock in forests adjacent to their farms or settlements – benefitting from 
the exclusion of others (Pandit and Thapa 2004). Members prioritize direct personal 
gains over ensuring regular income of the FUG since all revenues generated by FUG 
must be deposited in the group‟s bank account and can only be used for community 
development or forest management purposes (Pandit and Thapa 2004). Petty corruption 
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was identified as the most common reason why elected office holders were forced to 
step down prematurely (Iversen et al. 2006).  
 
Institutional aspects contribute to explain corrupt practices. There is a reported 
selectivity of candidates into leadership positions, attracting candidates motivated 
primarily by private economic gains. Frequent turnover of committee members and 
problems in finding good leaders prepared to stay in the job have been identified as 
problematic (Iversen et al. 2006, Messerschmidt et al. 1994). High fluctuation of 
membership is an indicator of strong disharmony and distrust, resulting in lack of 
communication and clarity about forest management rules (Messerschmidt et al. 1994). 
Leaders of FUG who want to bring change are caught between a rock and a hard place: 
corruption works from within the FUGs and attempts at changing the status quo may 
have personal repercussions as well as vigorous external response from forest officers 
who benefit from the present situation (Iversen et al. 2006). This confirms the opinion 
of Chakraborty (2001) that meaningful participation is difficult to achieve in complex 
local institutions and set ups as existing structures of authority in Nepalese villages limit 
participation in decision making on PFM rules. Village leaders, who belong to the 
wealthy strata of the community (large farmers), support PFM and determine the rules 
for the FUG together with the FD. The mutual alliance is evident from the fact that the 
actual process of the formation of the FUG remains unclear. FUG members are not 
elected in a true sense but presented to the general users meeting and assigned their 
positions by an act of retroactive general consent (Chakraborty 2001). While some 
authors argue that strong leadership and external support are required for common 
property institutions to work (Chakraborty 2001), others advocate based on evidence 
that community management without external support functions better (Tachibana and 
Adhikari 2009).  
 
Finally, doubts about the sustainability of the local institutions arise from the large 
amounts of external funding spent for their implementation. In India external funding 
accounts for 30% of the JFM budget (Ravindranath et al. 2004). Emphasis was on 
meeting physical and financial targets rather than institution building and preparing the 
community to take over JFM (Ravindranath et al. 2004, Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). 
Kumar (2002) raises the concern that the improved tree cover in Indian JFM forests is in 
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many cases the result of significant direct investments of the FD
10
. Foresters fear that 
many VFCs will be unable to sustain their activities once the external funding dries up.   
3.1.5. State managed forests  
Views of scholars differ about which management regime – PFM or sole state 
management – achieves better outcomes. Sunderlin et al. (2005) emphasize that the 
open access, low barriers of entry characteristic of state forests is a pro poor feature that 
makes them a means of survival and a magnet of economic opportunity for people with 
limited options. PFM instead has led to a privatization of common property resources in 
a non-equitable manner and in the case of JFM in India is believed to have increased 
rural poverty (Sundar et al. 2001, Kumar 2002):  “The basic reason for rural poverty … 
is the privatisation of common property resources in a non-equitable manner” (Singh 
1986). State ownership without PFM may act as a de facto open access, which makes 
resources commonly available to many people, including those who were already 
utilising the resources. This may lead in practice to a more equitable outcome than PFM, 
which puts ownership or access rights into hands of elite groups (Kumar 2002).  
 
However, the literature shows consistently that state forests are subject to severe 
degradation (Chakraborty 2001: 346, Pandit and Thapa 2004, Sundar et al. 2001, 
Kumar 2002). Hence, state property regimes neither achieve ecological sustainability 
nor contribute to poverty alleviation (Chakraborty 2001). The reasons for the continuing 
non-compliance with state property rules are a combination of: i) high monitoring cost, 
due to the difficulty of collecting information on the state of the forest and the 
behaviour of the rural population; ii) a lack of credible commitment by the rural 
population to state property rules as the exclusive use right of the state to the forest is 
not considered as legitimate; and iii) ineffective enforcement due to corruption within 
the forest administration (Chakraborty 2001: 346). Chakraborty notes that illegal forest 
use is tolerated as long as it presents a source of income for forest officials. Bribes paid 
by the local population for covering subsistence needs from state forests are an 
important source of income to the lower levels of the forest administration (Chakraborty 
2001: 350). Also, the forest use by outsiders has raised frustrations of local villagers as 
they could not prevent their entry to the forest due to the lack of legal rights and the lack 
                                                 
10
 These are ranging, for example, from USD 56.23 per ha in West Bengal to USD 714 per ha in Kerela 
(Ravindranath et al. 2004). 
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of monitoring and supervision of the forests by government (Pandit and Thapa 2004). 
Thus, state management, in the way it is practiced (or not practiced) it not an alternative.   
 
Chakraborty 2001 defends PFM with the argument that common property serves well to 
protect forests locally. In the long term every member of a FUG benefits from 
community forestry because without it the forest area would further decrease. Negative 
impacts for poorer landless villagers arise only in the short term due to the temporary 
closure of community forests, which does not affect land owners with trees on private 
land as alternatives. While the use rules applied by most FUGs reinforce existing 
inequalities of female and landless members, this should not be an argument against CF. 
This is because the benefits of the poor must be compared with the benefits they are 
likely to obtain from alternative property rights regimes such as state property.  
 
Kumar (2002) argues that in both scenarios common property and state property of 
forests, there is a trade-off between effective forest protection and the pursuit of a pro 
poor social agenda. Many of the products of a public forest are private (excludable) 
goods, which in the absence of a specific mechanism to protect the poor, are often 
captured by members of a village elite that might under a JFM regime have already 
been captured by the decentralized village level forest institutions (Kumar 2002). While 
in state forests in Nepal people harvest freely but degradation for more valuable 
resources is stronger, in community forests not all components of the forest‟s resources 
are protected and priority is given to timber regeneration over NTFP growth (Pandit and 
Thapa 2004). Hence, irrespective of the property rights regime, some components of the 
forest resources degrade more than others.  
 
In any case, the impacts of PFM cannot be evaluated without the impacts it has on 
nearby state forests, as the regeneration of forests under PFM may have intensified 
degradation in nearby unprotected areas. In Nepal, state forests presented a reserve to 
satisfy subsistence needs which enabled FUG members to commit to the protection of 
the community forest (Chakraborty 2001). At the same time the distributive conflict 
between poorer landless forest users and non poor landed forest users was reduced as 
the former resorted to utilizing state forests (Chakraborty 2001). Chakraborty notes that 
“it is doubtful whether the poor will continue to comply with the community forest 
protection rules in a situation where they cannot satisfy their basic fuelwood needs and 
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at the same time do not have access to fuelwood substitutes” (Chakraborty 2001:352). 
Hence, the test for PFM in Nepal will come when nearby state managed forests cannot 
provide a back-up anymore, either due to stricter enforcement or because they have 
become too degraded (Chakraborty 2001). While villagers may be active in protecting 
their degraded forest patch, their needs do not disappear and pressure to fulfil these 
needs is often merely shifted to alternative, good forest land. Robinson et al. (2005) 
suggests that the increased resource extraction and degradation outside an exclusion 
zone (generated through PFM) can be worse than the environmental benefits of keeping 
an area of forest pristine.  
3.2. Experiences in Africa 
3.2.1. Background and overview 
Similar to Southeast Asia, the depletion of forest resources in Africa is often blamed on 
its colonial past, which is assumed to have undermined people‟s authority over natural 
resources. The strong concentration of power over forest resources in the central state, 
the collapse of traditional institutions and lack of local participation in forest 
management after independence led to an institutional vacuum in many African nations 
(Watts 2003; Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000).  
 
Deforestation combined with international pressure for CBNRM and the wider, ongoing 
decentralization reforms in most African nations are considered to be the drivers 
towards PFM (FAO 2007, Alden Wily 2002). The loss of forest on the continent is 
accounting for around 55% of global forest loss. Tanzania, with over 400,000 ha lost 
between 2000 and 2005, is among the countries with the highest forest loss (FAO 2007). 
Additional driving forces were changes in forest legislations in parallel with broader 
trends towards democratization and devolution including wildlife, land and local 
government laws. Although PFM is currently widespread across the continent, it is still 
at an earlier process of evolution than in India and Nepal (Wily 2002). By 2002 over 30 
nations had a legal provision for PFM in their newly enacted forest legislations, 
extending over 100 projects in more than 100 forests, involving around 5,000 
communities (Wily 2002:4). The area of forests under PFM accounted for less than 1% 
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of the estimated total forest area across all 56 African states (635 million ha of land
11
) 
(FAO 2007). Tanzania, where the national Forest Policy (1998) and the Forest Act 
(2002) make PFM a main focus, is considered the most progressive country (Wily 
2002) in its approach and implementation.  
 
PFM is implemented across a range of natural forest types (moist, dry and coastal) and 
under a variety of land tenure arrangements, from cropping and renting (e.g. Ghana), to 
traditional customary systems of ownership (e.g. Ghana), and state-owned land to 
community owned land (Tanzania). The range of focus in the PFM initiatives across 
African nations can vary from fuelwood extraction (e.g. Niger, Mali, Senegal), timber 
harvesting (Cameroon) and grazing management (e.g. Mauritania, Mali, Niger), to 
employment creation in the francophone Sahel (Wily 2002). Despite these differences, 
broad commonalities exist (Wily 2002). African PFM shares the worldwide focus on the 
rural poor. Policy justification that local involvement in management is essential for 
livelihood purposes is widespread, despite the weak exploration of this linkage in the 
national poverty reduction strategies (Ellis and Freeman 2005, Wily 2002). PFM has 
begun in both reserved and unreserved forests with different processes. In India most of 
the shift towards granting local management responsibility takes place in unreserved or 
poor quality forests with the difference that they have not been formally under 
government tenure (e.g. Zambia, Cameroon, Burkina Faso). In Nepal where practically 
all forest was nationalized in 1957, community and leasehold forest takes places in 
forests under formal government ownership where the management authority is 
delegated to local communities.  
 
PFM is still contested, considered innovative and sometimes risky among government 
foresters. Early projects are referred to as pilots to pre-empt them forcing permanent 
changes (Wily 2002). In several African states there was considerable resistance to legal 
reform, for example in Kenya (Wily 2002) and Cameroon (Brown et al. 2002). In 
Cameroon, the first community forest was legally created in 2002 in high-value tropical 
forests with only reluctant, donor imposed government support and resistance from the 
logging industry (Brown et al. 2002). While PFM in Southeast Asia is supported by a 
strong civil society, in Africa civil society is comparatively weak and externally 
                                                 
11
 16% of this area is plantations (FAO 2007). 
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dependent. Forest extension agents are few and focus on policing rather than facilitation 
(Brown et al. 2002).  
 
PFM in Africa draws on the earlier experiences of Nepal and India, while maintaining 
its own momentum. Advances beyond the South Asian approaches are perceived in the 
promotion of local roles and attention given to forest tenure (Wily 2002). In some 
African nations, such as Tanzania, for example, PFM was sparked by catalytic projects 
in which local people gained jurisdiction over non-reserved forest land, based on 
traditional custodianship (Lund and Nielsen 2006, Wily 2002). These projects were like 
the early CFM experiments in India based on bottom-up initiative rather than on 
national top-down strategies for PFM.  
 
The flagship of PFM in Africa, the Community Forest, where devolution includes local 
forest ownership, is the most developed in The Gambia, Cameroon and Tanzania (Wily 
2002). Just like in India and Nepal, the primary construct of PFM in Africa is a 
management agreement with the state through the traditionally dominant forest 
authority. Rarely, do communities declare management regimes autonomously. An 
exception is Tanzania, where most of the unreserved forest estate is within lands 
broadly acknowledged as locally owned. Village governments can establish Village 
Land Forest Reserves by informing the district local government with or without formal 
support. District approval is required for village made by-laws to add legal force to their 
decisions. Support from the central state is only required for National Forest Reserves. 
In The Gambia, the process of formalizing community ownership over the forest is also 
well developed (Wily 2002). The local right to determine if and how the forest will or 
will not be utilized is also legally provided for in Uganda. In most other nations, 
management plans are either strictly dependent upon official approval or formulated by 
officials with local inputs. The readiness of FDs to empower local people in reserved 
forests with high biodiversity or commercial value is much lower. In such cases, 
communities have at best become cooperating forest users, such as under JFM.  
 
Despite its wide spread use, there are few impact studies on African PFM. As Appiah 
(2001) notes, “there are few formal analyses of the success of co-management regimes 
because they are new initiatives”. With regard to assessing impacts of PFM in Africa, 
there are no national level long-term research studies, with the exception of one in 
57 
 
initial stages in Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania 2009). The evidence on impact 
so far is thus limited to site-specific project experiences. Systematic information about 
institutional variables at a micro level is not available in any existing data set (Appiah 
2001).  
3.2.2. Impact on forest quality 
Until recently empirical evidence from Africa that PFM results in improved forest 
quality was anecdotal and consisted mainly of community perception data that forests 
are improving and wildlife encounters are increasing (Blomley and Ramadhani 2004, 
Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Blomley et al. (2008) assessed the impact of PFM on 
forest condition in Tanzania through three different case studies covering different areas, 
forest types and PFM regimes. They found increasing basal area and tree volume per ha 
in miombo woodlands and coastal forests under PFM. There was also a greater number 
of trees per ha, mean height and diameter of trees in sub-montane and coastal Eastern 
Arc forests as well as a decline in cutting in coastal forests since the introduction of 
PFM.  
 
Persha and Blomley (2009), in a study in the West Usambara mountains in Tanzania, 
found an improvement of JFM over state-managed forests. However, long-evolving 
community-driven initiatives showed even better forest condition due to stronger 
protection and more effective local institutions than the state-initiated PFM sites. These 
results are similar to the findings of Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe (2000) in a 
comparative study of five forests in Uganda where secure tenure and local rights to 
forest products and clear and well enforced access rules were correlated with better 
condition of the forests. The same authors also found that the physical structure of 
forests reduces the time and effort needed to achieve higher levels of rule conformance. 
This confirms Agrawal‟s (2000) findings that physical variables and locally understood 
and enforced rules and norms jointly affect incentives and behaviour. In this context, the 
choice of the village as administrative unit for PFM in Tanzania is considered 
problematic because large forest areas are managed by large, heterogeneous, and 
geographically dispersed communities (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005, Boiesen and Lund 
2003 quoted in Lund and Nielsen 2006). Institutional theory of collective action regards 
such settings as problematic (Ostrom 1998). Evidence shows that forest managers had 
problems monitoring users in remote sub-villages close to the resource but far away 
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from the main village. Poor transport and communication pose additional problems for 
monitoring and rule enforcement (Lund and Nielsen 2006).  
 
Further impediments to forest quality monitoring by local forest managers are the lack 
of simple and user-friendly monitoring techniques in PFM implementations (Topp-
Jørgensen et al. 2005). Even where they exist they may not be suitable to evaluate 
changes in the biodiversity status of montane forests (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). 
Some authors raise concern about the ecological sustainability of current PFM 
management practices due to the fact that few villages monitor wood resource 
extraction levels in relation to assigned quota (Koppers and Vignon 2004, Topp-
Jørgensen et al. 2005). Lund und Treue (2008) found that CBFM in a village in Iringa 
improved the control of forest utilization. Extraction was managed within the forest‟s 
reproductive capacity. Monitoring and management interventions by Village Natural 
Resources Committees (VNRCs) are considered successful in reducing threats to the 
forest. Flexible and immediate response of villages to resource decrease, e.g. by 
stopping to sell a specific timber species, was conducive to prevent forest degradation in 
woodlands (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005).  
3.2.3. Impact on livelihoods and poverty  
Like in India and Nepal, the importance of forest resources for rural households in 
Africa has been demonstrated through empirical studies (Cavendish 1999, Campbell et 
al. 2002, Meshack et al. 2002, Kaale et al. 2002, Roe et al. 2002). While poor 
households are more resource dependent than richer ones, aggregated total resource 
demands increase with income, indicating that rich households use greater quantities of 
environmental resources in total (Cavendish 1999). A significant share of household 
income (35%) originates from freely provided environmental goods and especially 
poorer households depend on communally held resources (Cavendish 1999). Similar 
trends have been observed for forest resources in particular (Campbell et al. 2002, Lund 
and Treue 2008). Where food production from subsistence agriculture cannot cover the 
annual food demand, forests reduce vulnerability through sale and direct consumption 
of forest products (Meshack et al. 2002). On the other hand, households experiencing 
increasing cash incomes from alternative sources tend to move away from low-income 
activities such as forestry (Fisher and Shiverly 2005). Just like in Southeast Asia, 
restricting forest access and use is often the consequence of PFM in Africa.  
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For example, in Iringa in Tanzania, village councils managing miombo woodlands set 
annual quotas for charcoal production (Lund and Treue 2008). Charcoal production is 
providing supplementary income to farming, especially in periods of drought when the 
demand for charcoal licenses rises steeply. While setting a quota and license fee made 
charcoal production legal and increased the villagers market power, at the same time, 
procuring the permits provided an entry-barrier and made this livelihood diversification 
more difficult for the charcoal producing households (Fisher 2004, Lund and Nielsen 
2006, Lund and Treue 2008). The closure of the forest between December and May to 
induce people to concentrate on farming deprived people of alternative income sources 
during the dry season (Lund and Nielsen 2006). On the other hand, there are also 
positive examples of increased revenue gains from both CBFM and JFM in Iringa, 
Tanzania (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005, Lund and Treue 2008).  
 
Boundary issues contribute to access restrictions under African PFM. Lund and Nielsen 
(2006) report that disputed village land boundaries had negative impacts in Iringa and 
Lindi regions where remote forest dependent sub-villages were deprived of their access 
to forest resources near their homes and to land for agricultural expansion due to 
inconsiderate demarcation of protection zones.  
 
Evidence in relation to distributional effects of PFM in Africa is scarce and the need for 
further research is pointed out (Lund and Nielsen 2006). Where data exists, it indicates 
cases of inequity just like in India and Nepal. Cost/benefit comparison of PFM in 
African initiatives show, similar to India and Nepal, that transaction cost (i.e. attending 
meetings, forest monitoring and patrol), relative to benefits are higher for poorer 
households compared to medium income and richer households (Meshack et al. 2006, 
Veltheim and Kijazi 2002). Poor users gather more low value products such as 
fuelwood and place emphasis on selling NTFPs to obtain income. The relatively higher 
net benefits of the rich and middle groups were attributed by Meshak et al. (2006) to the 
possession of livestock by these households, which makes them higher users of forest 
products, in particular fodder grass. While PFM may lower the government cost, a large 
proportion of these cost are borne by poorer members of the community (Meshak et al. 
2006). PFM in productive woodlands areas can work on a cost covering basis and 
compensate guards and committee members for their transaction cost incurred. 
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However, this is rarely the case in PFM in protection forests (Meshak et al. 2006, Topp-
Jørgensen et al. 2005). For example in Iringa, guards and committee members spent 300 
man-days per year on management and monitoring activities and members were paid 
sitting allowances of approx. 1 USD per day, comparable to the prevailing daily rate of 
unskilled labour (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). 
 
The average annual revenue per village generated through PFM is low (USD 604 per 
CBFM village and USD 107 per JFM village), which is consistent with findings in 
Nepal (Malla 2009, Kumar 2002). While in most woodland villages only 4% of 
registered expenditures were used to finance community projects, the forest revenue 
was spent mainly on manager compensation or was deposited in bank accounts (Topp-
Jørgensen et al. 2005). In contrast, Lund and Nielsen (2006) report that the majority of 
the revenue was distributed to village leaders, leading to decreasing appreciation of 
PFM in the perception of forest users. In contrast to India and Nepal, village forest 
committees in Iringa, Tanzania, do not charge for NTFP extraction if it is not for 
commercial use (Lund and Nielsen 2006, Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). There are large 
variations in the amount of revenue generated between different woodland villages and 
between montane forest JFM villages. Closeness to local markets for wood products or 
to local production using wood – e.g. tobacco curing, fish processing – was positively 
correlated to the revenue base in woodland villages (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005).  
 
Revenue sharing and economic incentives have been recognized as a critical success 
factor of PFM (Petersen and Sandhoevel 2001, Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005, Iddi 2000). 
Experiences from the wildlife sector in Zimbabwe and Namibia have contributed to the 
increasing body of knowledge on this issue (Barnes and McGregor 2001). Furthermore, 
land ownership has been identified as an important incentive for communities to 
actively engage in PFM (Wily 1997; Poffenberger 1996). Both parameters – economic 
incentives and tenure – are usually lacking in the JFM scenario (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 
2005, Lund and Nielsen 2006, Wily 1997, 2002). Montane forests are rich in 
biodiversity and restrictions are usually placed on resource extraction to protect national 
and international interests. Other non-economic incentives, such as appreciation of the 
water catchment value of montane forests, exemption from village labour days and 
increased prestige associated with being a committee member, were found to keep up 
the commitment of villagers in Iringa, Tanzania. However, it is questioned if these can 
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sustain long-term commitment (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). In contrast, woodland 
areas provide better revenue opportunities for the managing villages derived from, for 
example, charcoal burning, firewood collection and timber pit sawing (Anthon et al. 
2008, Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Opportunities for benefits are very limited in 
montane forests (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005, Lund and Nielsen 2006). Veltheim and 
Kijazi (2002) suggest that, because the Eastern Arc forests are important for 
biodiversity conservation, government should continue paying for the intensive labour 
activities by casually employing community members. This would be a tangible benefit 
and could help provide the poor with income to overcome food shortages.   
3.2.4. Impact on governance and decentralization 
Symptoms of poor local governance are common in African countries (Brockington 
2004, Brockington 2005, Ellis and Mdoe 2003, Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001) and 
institutional issues are emerging as concerns in PFM implementation. There is evidence 
of uneven power and benefit sharing between state and communities in JFM and lack of 
accountability of local forest managers to the wider community (Wily 2002, Topp-
Jørgensen et al. 2005, Lund and Nielsen 2006).  
 
In certain cases, such as in some Tanzanian sites, PFM has reportedly contributed to 
improved governance. There, the formation of effective forest management committees 
resulted in calls for new elections of lethargic village chairmen (Wily 2000) and 
questionable revenue records of forest committees led to stronger reporting regimes and 
firmer measures of transparency (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Topp-Jørgensen et al. 
(2005) report a case where village forest committees needed to report their management 
and economic transaction to the Village Council and Village General Assembly, which 
increased transparency and allowed villagers to influence the forest management. The 
village forest committee was monitored by the district authorities and an annual visit 
from the auditing department ensured accountability and transparency of the accounts. 
Power struggles between the Village Council and the VNRC were reported due to the 
introduction of PFM as the VNRC reduced the possibilities for the village leaders to 
receive bribes and informal payments for permitting illegal resource extraction (Topp-
Jørgensen et al. 2005).  
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CBFM in Tanzania is perceived as a positive example of decentralization and benefit 
sharing. The devolution of management rights and responsibilities is vested in 
management plans and village by-laws that provide for natural resources management 
on village lands, including rights to issue permits as well as to collect and retain revenue 
from forest use (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Influenced by the Tanzanian experience 
with CBFM in woodlands, Wily (2002) represents the very positive view that “beyond 
gains in forest conservation and livelihoods improvements ... PFM has been part of 
social transformations of societies in Africa towards more inclusive and effective 
management of society” (Wily 2002:3). She further states that “participation as a whole 
is visibly moving from consultative to more collaborative norms into those where 
partnerships between state and communities are being forged and in a growing number 
of cases for the purpose of enabling communities to operate as effective autonomous 
forest authorities” (Wily 2002:2).  
 
However, not all accounts of PFM in Africa are that optimistic, and there are examples 
that show the uneven power relationship between state and communities prevails, in 
particular in JFM. Appiah (2001) in his study of JFM in Ghana between communities 
and timber companies shows that a project remains a main decision maker and gives 
advice to famers on what to do. However, reportedly due to the “unique exchange of 
ideas and knowledge, people‟s feeling of shared responsibility was enhanced” (Appiah 
2001:354). Such statements raise serious doubts about JFM and the extent to which it is 
pretence rather than genuine government commitment to shared decision making. 
Similarly, Matose (2006) highlights the example of a pilot initiative for JFM in 
Zimbabwe to emphasize that co-management may not offer any partnerships between 
state and local people.  
 
Incentives are sometimes provided to persuade farmers to buy into participation in 
forest management but do not provide genuine benefit sharing. A JFM project in Ghana 
between two timber companies and local communities provided infrastructure 
development and free tree seedlings to make farmers put their land under tree cover 
instead of cropping (Appiah 2001). The decrease in arable land resulted in decreased 
income for the farmers until the trees matured. At the same time, the sums provided by 
the company for social projects were modest compared to their revenue from timber 
harvest. Given the high trade-off for the farmers it is not surprising that one of the 
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shortfalls of the project was “its inability to reach its anticipated quota of participants, a 
shortage of around 50%” (Appiah 2001: 357). Such remarks show rather naive 
assumptions about the willingness of farmers to be co-opted into unfair deals. 
 
The prevailing uneven power relationship between state forest institutions and local 
people is also evident in the fact that there is “much hesitancy across Africa in 
empowering communities to take licensing and enforcement functions” (Wily 2002). 
While communities are allowed to make rules about use, protection or managerial 
aspects of the forest, the legal weight of these rules is limited and courts are unable to 
uphold the rules when challenged (Wily 2002). Thus, the possibility of local forest 
managers to enforce compliance beyond the managing community is restricted. Where 
the rules are by-laws their litigation is limited to certain functions, for example often the 
community has the legal right to protect the forest but must bring offenders to the 
government partner to deal with (Wily 2002).  
 
Confidence of FDs in local capacities to manage is rarely strong and much attention is 
devoted to establishing conditions and requirements that both test and bind the local 
level management authority to certain practices. Nigeria, Botswana and Kenya are 
examples where FDs are wary of the growing involvement of non state actors and delay, 
restrict or control this through bureaucratic measures (Wily 2002). Cameroon and 
Ghana are examples of countries where PFM policy and practice suffer from 
overcomplicated procedure in the establishment of local roles, responsibilities and rights. 
Demands upon communities to conduct surveys, plan and implement boundary 
demarcation, zoning, etc. often go beyond the requirements administrations have placed 
upon themselves or demand private sector managers to do. In The Gambia, the final 
step of handover of forests to communities is being delayed by unduly sophisticated 
survey, mapping and authentication procedures (Wily 2002).   
 
Similar to Nepal, where the importance of requesting extension assistance for conflict 
mediation was highlighted (Springate-Baginski et al. 2003), the need for extension 
support is emphasized in African PFM, not only for technical advice but also to assist 
with conflict resolution (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). However, although close 
collaboration may be envisaged, lack of incentives at the district level can lead to a high 
degree of village autonomy (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Although, as in Nepal, this 
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may limit the chances of some VNRCs to become self-supportive as it takes time to 
develop capacities within the village level management (Springate-Baginski 2003) it 
gives the villages a greater degree of autonomy. In Tanzania, where village committees 
cannot take decisions single-handedly and need approval of higher authorities, it led to 
delay or presented the main obstacle for the implementation of forest management 
interventions. The revision of forest management agreements had been requested to 
allow for greater decision making power of the villages, but a year later no decision had 
been made (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 200).  
 
In Tanzania, rent seeking behaviour of local forest managers and forest users was 
counterproductive for village level cooperation and local decision making was 
dominated by richer groups (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Similar to the findings in 
Nepal, systems of informal payments by VNRCs have been found in Iringa, Tanzania. 
Committee members and guards were accused by the Village Council of receiving 
bribes instead of bringing offenders to the village council or to waive permit fees, or of 
exempting themselves or their kin from paying fees for resource extraction permits 
(Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Topp-Jørgensen et al. (2005) indicate a positive 
correlation between revenue collected and level of corruption of local committees, 
which confirms Ostrom‟s theoretical predictions (Ostrom 1998). CF in Cameroon also 
shows cases of elite capture (Wily 2002). However, a more inclusive approach may 
reduce the direct influence of forest users on forest management decisions where they 
are a minority in the village assembly (Lund and Nielsen 2006). On a positive note, 
embezzlement and elite capture, where it exists, has in some cases led to higher levels 
of transparency as villagers force their leaders to step back or adhere to democratic 
practices (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005,), leading to a restructuring of community norms 
towards more democracy and accountability (Wily 2002). There is the limitation that in 
some cases, this had more the nature of horizontal accountability – i.e. leaders 
questioning leaders – rather than downward accountability towards ordinary villagers 
(Lund and Treue 2008). However, it is this downward accountability of forest 
committees that controls the effects of restrictions on forest use and ensures true 
decentralization as described by Ribot (2005).   
 
A more recent study by Lund and Treue (2008) showed signs of good governance in 
terms of well-documented public finance and disciplinary measures for committee 
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members involved in embezzlement combined with harassment of forest users and 
corrupt practices. They conclude that PFM has created a new arena of political struggle 
at the village level.   
3.2.5. Emerging issues 
3.2.5.1. Gender, poverty and elite capture  
Empirical evidence shows that PFM can be an effective tool for the regeneration of 
degraded forests but it bears trade-off for villagers‟ livelihoods. Regeneration focused 
closure of forests as a short-term response to handing over forests for local management 
affects the poorest people the worst. They are the most dependent on common property 
resources and more vulnerable to reductions in forest product flows due to limited 
opportunities for livelihoods diversification. In cases where no favourable rules have 
been negotiated, poorer villagers are likely to be worse off in comparison to state forests 
under de facto open access, at least in the short term.  
 
Poor, landless villagers and women are considered as the net losers of PFM regimes, 
which are skewed in favour of existing village elites, usually composed of wealthier 
male. If the poor are the net losers of PFM, why do (poor) forest users comply with the 
protection rules as some of the evidence suggests they do? What motivates villagers to 
engage in a process that has no obvious advantages for them? Are there livelihood 
benefits as a result of JFM?  If yes, how are the benefits spread across the local 
community?  If there are negative outcomes on the livelihood side through introduction 
of JFM how does the situation compare to villages nearby the solely state controlled 
forests? Are these latter forests indeed de facto open access or do other actors possess 
enough agency to control some control over access to the forests? 
 
There are indications that the support by the villagers rests on expectations of increased 
access to timber resources in the future (Koppers et al. 2004; Chakraborty 2001). Others 
assume that the forest is protected by more powerful village members and people may 
comply out of fear of being caught or because the prevailing power structure in the 
village is not questioned (Chakraborty 2001, Kumar 2002). The poor depend on the 
non-poor for a variety of reasons other than forestry – e.g. employment during the 
harvest season – which inhibits the poor from articulating their demands too strongly. 
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The same is likely to be true for female members who are bound to the existing gender 
hierarchy (Chakraborty 2001). In cases where the approval of local forest management 
institutions has been subject to the inclusion of female or landless members based on 
donor pressure, these members did not play an active role in the committees, which 
reflects the fact that the traditional class and gender hierarchy have high legitimacy in 
the villages.  
 
Inequity and elite capture are to some extent inherent characteristics of village 
communities formed through norms and traditions. It is argued that PFM reinforces or 
alters the existing systems of authority in the villages. This happens as powerful 
community members increase their influence through the control over the forest as a 
resource that is of central importance to rural livelihoods (Cleaver 2002, Chakraborty 
2001, Sundar 2000, Kumar 2002). While some authors believe that these social rules are 
sufficiently strong to ensure compliance with protection rules and to suppress objection 
(Chakraborty 2001), others worry that with a lack of trust in the FD and the village 
leaders, villagers will start to ignore the forest protection rules despite the consequences 
of being caught (Kumar 2002). Rishi (2006) points out that more research is needed on 
the behavioural dimensions and their relevance for JFM.  
3.2.5.2. Incentives  
Financial incentives are a necessary prerequisite to starting JFM in a village in order to 
motivate villagers to participate and to sustain their participation (Ravindranath et al. 
2004, Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). So far there is no evidence of forest committees 
harvesting forest products for purposes beyond subsistence needs (Malla 2009, Sundar 
et al. 2001). Incentives are particularly important in areas where restrictions on resource 
use have been imposed due to a deprived resource base or outside interest, such as, for 
example, in montane forests with watershed or biodiversity value. JFM in montane 
forests restricts forest use and does not generate income from forest management, which 
impedes the incentives for both managers and users to sustain the regime. Different 
options for providing incentives to local users and managers have been forwarded, such 
as controlled timber and wildlife harvesting, water taxes in the case of catchment forest 
reserves, and tourism (Koppers et al. 2004). The potential for non-extractive income 
generating activities or ecotourism exists in only few montane forests in Tanzania 
(Lund and Nielsen 2006). Therefore, it has been argued that protection forests should 
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not be subject to JFM unless communities are paid by the government for their 
management services (Koppers et al. 2004).  
How can any improvements in forest quality through JFM be explained given that JFM 
in montane forests does not provide direct economic incentives to the local 
communities? Do communities engage in protecting the forest despite unfavourable 
tenure and benefits? If yes, what motivates village forest managers to engage in a 
process that has no economic incentives and no obvious advantages for them but bears 
high opportunity cost? While non-economic incentives have been identified to be 
effective to enlist the villagers in protecting the forest in instances (Topp-Jørgensen et 
al. 2005), will they be sufficiently strong to last? Assumptions are that committee 
membership builds up the stock of social capital. This is because it gives leverage in 
village politics and ensures influence through at least some village institutions.  
3.2.5.3. Imbalance of power between state and community 
JFM is characterized by new partnerships between forest agencies and local 
communities, which are a complex outcome of debates, policies and practices. However, 
existing evidence shows that through JFM local institutions are created without 
transferring equal rights for participation in decision making. Experience in Asia has 
shown that forest bureaucracies took on JFM without the necessary changes to 
traditional views and while retaining control (Sivaramakrishnan 1998, Matose 2006, 
Appiah 2001). In India JFM provided an excuse for the state to reassert control at the 
expense of community management in cases where the community had rehabilitated 
forest through self-initiative. Thus, JFM is a new way for the state to expand its control 
(Lele 2000, Matose 2006, Appiah 2001, Nayak and Berkes 2008). 
As long as control, cost and benefits are not shared between the two partners there is no 
„jointness‟ in JFM (Sundar et al. 2001). The incomplete transfer of property rights from 
FD to communities has created uncertainty and providing legal rights is regarded as an 
important incentive to make PFM successful (Behera and Engel 2006, Wily 1998). 
Hence, “without the political will to initiate the necessary policy changes, co-
management is unlikely to succeed” (Appiah 2001: 355).  
 
Therefore, for this research study the question emerges if JFM leads to the 
establishment of local forest management institutions that are democratic, representative 
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and effective? How reliable are the two main partner stakeholders: The FD and the local 
forest users in fulfilling their sides of the deal? Do FDs share control of forests or just 
co-opt forest users into regeneration schemes „on the cheap‟? Are the types of 
participation rather „manipulative and functional‟ or „interactive and mobilising‟ in 
practice?   
3.2.5.4. Appropriate extent of state involvement 
The appropriate extent of government intervention in communal management is debated. 
While some scholars argue that there has been too much interference (Tachibana and 
Adhikari 2009, Murthy et al. 2004), others state that strong external support by the FD 
helps to achieve stability of local institutions, to ensure that natural resources are not 
over-exploited and that equity is not compromised (Ribot 2005, Chakraborty 2001). 
NGOs have played a role conducive to the PFM process with regard to facilitation, 
resolving conflicts and building capacity. However, their involvement has not altered 
the underlying power asymmetry between state and people (Hobley and Wollenberg 
1996). 
 
A few recent studies hint at evidence that government intervention in the form of co-
management can distort agency of the communities compared to self-initiated forest 
management by local communities without any external control (Tachibana and 
Adhikari 2009, Nayak and Berkes 2008, Persha and Blomley forthcoming). This 
supports the earlier argument that community based rules tend to break down when the 
state intervenes or disrupts these systems (Baland and Plateau 1996). There is evidence 
that in sites of self-initiated forest management forest condition and governance 
improved more significantly than in sites under state initiated PFM programmes 
(Tachibana and Adhikari 2009, Persha and Blomley forthcoming).  
3.2.5.5. Lack of fit with true local organization  
How do local forest management institutions fit with other governance structures at 
village level? Often village committees set up through PFM initiatives lack the fit with 
true local organizations. They are not formed based on self-initiative but by instruction 
of state forest departments, including in certain cases even membership conditions. 
Frequent interference with decision making and lack of control over forest management 
and financial decisions indicate that the local JFM institutions are not autonomous from 
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the state. Several authors point at the fact that PFM is context-bound and site specific 
and that one size fit all approaches do not work (Ravindranath et al. 2004, Sundar et al. 
2001, Matose 2006, Woodcock 2002, Nayak and Berkes 2008).  
Local forest committees are often superimposed on existing traditional institutions and 
Cleaver (2002) argues that rules need to be melted with the prevailing norms and 
traditions through a process of „bricolage‟. Local communities both filter and ignore the 
central government‟s rules, add their own rules, generating local institutions, rules in 
use, and patterns of activity that can diverge widely from legislators‟ and bureaucrats‟ 
expectations (Gibson et al. 2000). In set ups where PFM is biased towards a stronger, 
often elite dominated forest committees and a weaker general village assembly it erodes 
the power of locally elected institutions (Nayak and Berkes 2008, Ribot 2005). This 
may hinder the future ability of the village to solve its own problems. In self initiated 
community forest management schemes, where the village general assembly played a 
stronger role, a more equitable distribution of benefits resulted (Nayak and Berkes 
2008). This supports Ribot‟s argument that in order to achieve effective local PFM 
governance arrangements, the common property institutions need to be embedded in 
democratic institutions of local government at village level. Ribot (2005) notes that 
research will need to determine whether decentralization is being achieved through 
PFM.  
3.2.5.6. The nature of participation 
JFM has only opened up limited spheres of participation (Sundar 2000, Nayak and 
Berkes 2004, Agarwal 2001). Even where villagers do exercise initiative, it is under 
terms dictated by an agenda set by the government rules, which in some sense distorts 
their agency (Sundar 2000, Mosse 1996). Participation is often limited to patrol forests 
and cannot resolve the bigger issues of forest degradation, which often lie outside the 
forest sector. The basic structural problem remains: participation is necessary not only 
in small scale sectoral units but in influencing the entire direction of the political 
process. Presently ordinary people have little or no say in a whole range of important 
policies. They are limited to voting for politicians imposed from above by undemocratic 
centralized party structures. Rather than asking how the entire system of representative 
democracy can be transformed to give more power to people, donor institutions, by 
focusing on village participatory committees, helped to create a discourse that diverts 
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attention from the real issues. Participation in JFM has been defined, shaped and limited 
while a system of centralized governance and the basic structural problem prevails and 
there is no genuine partnership between state and people in forest management (Sundar 
2000, Gadgil and Guha 1995). 
3.2.5.7. Sustainability 
Due to the lack of secure property rights, a consistent flow of economic benefits, and a 
flexible, adaptive management approach, the local institutions created through PFM are 
not regarded as sustainable (Ravindranath et al. 2004, Murthy et al. 2004).  
  
Expectations that PFM would be a way for governments to cheaply achieve forest 
regeneration have not proven to be realistic. PFM is knowledge and cost intensive, 
which created constraints to continuation of project activities after ending of donor 
support (Meshack 2006, Brown 2002, Lund and Nielsen 2006). In Africa, the scaling up 
from often cost and time intensive donor-funded projects with limited time horizon to 
national PFM strategies is still a challenge. Involved foresters, who have proven 
themselves competent, may leave and as PFM enters the mainstream, foresters who 
have played little role in its development or who do not approve the direction in which 
participation is moving, often hinder widespread entrenchment of new norms (Wily 
2002, Kumar 2000).  
 
For example, in Iringa, Tanzania, PFM villagers turned to higher level authorities to 
assist in resolving conflict or in supporting new forest managers as previous ones 
moved on to greener pastures after the project‟s ending. However, the district office was 
either unaware as information was not passed on or unable to send assistance. The lack 
of oversight from districts destroys the villagers‟ trust in the PFM idea (Lund and 
Nielsen 2006). However, it may not always be unavailability of resources but rather 
commitment at district leadership and higher levels to support village level PFM. 
Comparable to the resentment of local PFM successes recorded in India and Nepal, 
sometimes African forestry administrations appear to regret the rights or powers they 
permit local actors and seek to retrieve these.  
 
Finally, the sustainability of PFM is being questioned on the basis of a displacement 
effect of forest use. Forest closure under PFM may have exacerbated the exploitation of 
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nearby state forests not included in the PFM scheme with a more permeable access 
regime. In the long run, this may threaten the commitment to abstinence in the protected 
forests as alternatives can no longer be provided from open areas due to over-extraction. 
On a global level it may neutralize a positive effect of PFM on forest quality.     
3.2.5.8. Rhetoric and construction of communities 
The incorrect perception of communities in PFM as being small, homogeneous and 
cohesive groups within which distributional conflicts are absent, leads to a design based 
on wrong realities (Agrawal 1999, Kiss 1990, Kumar 2002). Ex ante assessments of 
socio-economic village structures, although a prerequisite for designing equitable 
management regimes, have been absent in practice (Adhikari and Lovett 2006, Sundar 
et al. 2001). Scholars raise the need to translate community into a workable entity 
(Brown et al. 2002) but disagree if a user group focus or a more encompassing village 
focus is preferable. Vesting PFM in existing local administrative systems is considered 
to create more effective, democratic and representative institutions (Ribot 2005). 
However, it may create structures that are weak and that do not necessarily coincide 
with forest user groups, the preferences of which the management decision should 
reflect (Matose 2001, Hobley 1996, Lund and Nielsen 2006). Rights to forest resources 
become resident based. This can lead to exclusion of forest users who do not reside 
within the administrative boundaries of the particular village selected for PFM by 
external parties. Kumar (2000) emphasizes that instead of expecting to find ready-made 
communities which can be mobilized for a defined purpose (i.e. PFM), communities are 
often constructed for specific purposes. Communities that have been settled by the state, 
such as the „resettlement villages in Tanzania‟, or which have their rules framed by 
government intervention, eventually solidify into seemingly natural associations and 
then contrasted to the state (Kumar 2002). This is consistent with Sundar‟s view that the 
attributes of communities that PFM policies assume are partial products of the PFM 
procedures themselves, rather than inherent characteristics of the people and the place. 
As the PFM initiative takes root, people acquire stakes in the new privileges and the 
artificially created attributes of the community begin to take on a life of their own 
(Sundar 2000). Nayak and Berkes (2008) point out that JFM analysis requires attention 
to the historical context of community forest management. The following chapter 
provides an overview of the changing political economy of the Tanzanian Forestry 
Sector and the historical context of PFM.   
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4. History and political context of PFM in Tanzania 
4.1. Introduction  
The history of forest management in Tanzania follows a trend starting from locally 
managed to increasingly centralized, distanced management of forests (Woodcock 
2002). The forest sector is not unique in this sense, as there is a tradition in Tanzania of 
the state exercising politics of central control of the rural peasantry with negative and 
inhibiting consequences. The introduction of scientific forestry, the villagization 
campaign, and the continuous curtailing and control of local government are examples 
of centralization. The Tanzanian rural population was subjected to excessive control and 
coercion by an authoritarian state to realize modernist ideologies adopted from the West 
(Scott 1989).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to show how Tanzania‟s colonial history and continued 
policies of disempowerment during independence influenced the relationship between 
the rural population and state actors. It is argued by the author of this study that this 
history influences the outcomes of community based approaches to manage natural 
resources owned by the state, such as JFM. This is of relevance with regard to three 
aspects:   
 
 There is a historically ingrained mistrust of the rural population towards the state. 
 Modernist, technocratic views combined with a depreciation of local traditional 
knowledge still persist in Tanzania‟s sector ministries today, precluding real 
delegation of authority and sharing of power.  
 Behavioural strategies of evasion of state control can be observed in participatory 
projects and do in many cases influence the outcome of such initiatives. While 
outright opposition is rarely seen in Tanzania, disapproval is concealed by altering 
the system to fulfil more selfish motives.  
 
The following section presents in brief the history of the Tanzanian Forest Sector from 
pre-colonial times through to independence (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 describes the 
political framework of the post-independence era which influences the framework of 
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PFM implementation in Tanzania. Section 4.4 summarizes selected historical events in 
the Uluguru mountains of relevance to this research study. 
4.2. History of Tanzanian Forestry 
The history of forest management in Tanzania between the pre-colonial era and present 
times is marked by some fundamental changes. Just like in India and Nepal (see Section 
3.1. above) colonial administration in Tanzania led to an alienation of local 
communities from forests. Traditional management systems that existed during pre-
colonial times were undermined, local leaders disempowered and forest management 
increasingly centralized. This trend was continued in the post independence years. As 
Woodcock (2002:150) states, “it is ironic that through time, the stakeholders who are 
physically closest to the forest – the local community – have become the stakeholders 
whose official relationship with … the forest is the most distant”.   
 
PFM was launched at the beginning of the 21
st
 century by the government of Tanzania, 
largely donor supported, as a way to reserve this trend. The following sections will 
describe the changes in the relationships between the main stakeholders of forest 
management over time, divided into the pre-colonial era, the colonial era, the post 
independence years and the participatory era. Over time, power to control forest rights 
has moved from local community based authority in the customary pre-colonial era to 
district and central government authority in the colonial and post independence eras. 
This has been largely maintained up to today.  
4.2.1. Pre-colonial era  
Before 1886, in pre-colonial Tanganyika, chiefdoms and customary laws directed the 
governance of natural resources management. The effectiveness of these laws was based 
on social sanctions imposed in the case of infringement (Luoga et al. 2005). All land 
was owned by the local chiefs or kings. Forest tenure regimes were hierarchical, 
whereby clan leaders held authority in making and upholding forest rules and use rights, 
which were widely respected. Tenure was held by the clan as a whole, socially defined 
and secured by being and remaining a member of the clan. Women secured their tenure 
through their relationships with men, as daughters or wives (Woodcock 2002).  
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The management of forests was based on both the systems of beliefs and traditions and 
the political system personified through the elders and leaders. Local communities 
embodied a philosophy of conservation: “forest resource use was controlled by 
restricting access and user rights to a one product per person per trip rule” (Woodcock 
2002:104). Trees were regarded as hosts of ancestral spirits and could therefore not be 
felled without permission from clan leaders. The beliefs were embedded in agricultural 
practices with positive influence on the conservation of forests and woodlands. Shifting 
cultivation, practiced as the dominant land use form in woodland and savannah areas, 
had minimal effect on the vegetation due to the sparse population (Lundgren and 
Lundgren 1983, Kikula 1997). The respected power of the leaders over the forests was 
connected to their responsibility of carrying out ritual traditions, which were believed to 
protect the environment. Some ritual forests were for leaders or chiefs only, where other 
community members were prohibited from entering and would fear the ancestral spirits 
if they did so. The clan forests were often managed more for local returns and for clan 
members to customarily obtain agricultural land by clearing forest. In the periods that 
followed the traditional leadership, the chiefdom was abolished and the authority of 
local leaders over forests gradually eroded. This resulted in a breakdown of customary 
institutions that had traditionally been responsible for local resource management. 
While tenure regimes had been socially defined during pre-colonial times, they have 
been spatially and economically defined since colonial times (Woodcock 2002). 
4.2.2. Colonial era  
Centralized state forestry practices were introduced in colonial Tanzania and throughout 
much of the developing world in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. They were based on 
principles of territorial control, „scientific management‟ (developed from European 
industry-oriented methods), and regulation of local people‟s use of the forest (Seppälä 
1989). The restrictions imposed on local people‟s use of forest during colonial times 
gave rise to mutual resentment and conflict which from thereon characterized forest 
departments‟ relations with local forest users in most areas (Scott 1989). Scott 1989 
notes that the point of departure for colonial policy was a complete faith in what 
officials took for „scientific agriculture‟ (and „scientific forestry‟ respectively) on the 
one hand and scepticism about the actual agricultural (and forestry) practices of 
Africans on the other. The detailed local knowledge, acquired over years of experience, 
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which prevailed and was valued during pre-colonial times, was ignored, devalued and 
lost its importance (Scott 1989, Woodcock 2002, Seppälä 1989).  
4.2.2.1. The German Administration (Deutsch Ost-Afrika 1891-1918) 
The German colonial administration first tried to practice centralized control over 
Tanganyika which began the disintegration of indigenous political forms and left their 
mark on the institutions of independent Tanzania (Fortman 1980). German rule over 
Tanzania is described by a policy of „Schrecklichkeit‟, or frightfulness, and associated 
with military rule and the spilling of a lot of blood (Friedland 1966:259 quoted in 
Fortman 1980). There was free use of coercion, chiefs were publicly beaten for failing 
to obey orders and the use of forced labour was common (Stephens 1968 quoted in 
Fortman 1980). It was a centralized system where orders flowed from the top down and 
labour and taxes flowed upwards (Fortmann 1980).  
 
The German administration first established a state controlled forest estate and 
introduced scientific forestry in Tanzania around 1897 (Schabel 1990, Seppälä 1989). 
Scientific forest management included gazetting areas, clearing boundaries to prevent 
fire encroachment, commercial exploitation and experimental plantations of indigenous 
and exotic species (Burgess and Mbwana 2000, Wood 1966). The creation of forest 
reserves, although backed up with ecological arguments, was done mainly because 
tenure security was associated with spatial aspects and not the belonging to a certain 
social group or clan like before (Woodcock 2002).The forest tenure regime was 
hierarchical, like in pre-colonial times, but now control over rights to forest access and 
use was vested in the colonial state and not the local leaders and elders. Thus, the 
German forest policy of creating reserves officially broke the customary relationship of 
local communities with the forest and decreased authority of community leaders 
(Woodcock 2002). In the non reserved public lands forests, pre-colonial customary 
relationships were maintained during German and initially also during British 
administration (Woodcock 2002). Thus, a dualistic tenure regime existed with both 
statutory and customary tenure regimes coexisting up until the 1950s. 
 
Forests were valued for their commercial worth and were protected against clearance 
both by settlers and local people. Control over timber resources was exerted through 
surveying and demarcation of forest reserves which was first pursued in the montane 
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forests including the Uluguru mountains (Burgess and Mbwana 2000). With the dual 
aim of protecting the water catchments and securing timber production, by 1914, 231 
forest reserves were delineated with a total area of more than 750,000 ha (Lundgren and 
Lundgren 1983). Although some people were most likely evicted from the forests 
during this early period of reservation, most forests brought under protection were 
uninhabited (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983).  
 
During the First World War, forestry activities had come to a standstill and people 
invaded the mountain forest reserves trying to escape enlistment into the German 
colonial army (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983, Woodcock 2002).   
4.2.2.2. The British Administration (1918-1961) 
The new British administration resumed activities again in the early 1920s and 
established a Forest Department with 11 European foresters and about 100 local guards 
(Grant 1924, Troup 1936 quoted in Woodcock 2002). The first task was to reinstate all 
montane forest reserves established by the Germans, such as the Ulugurus, through the 
1921 Forest Ordinance (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983, Lovett 2003, Woodcock 2002). 
The British administration considered the management of valuable natural resources to 
be the exclusive domain of the colonial state, excluding African forest use. They placed 
restrictions on access to, and the use of, forest products by the local population. These 
restrictions were not in the spirit of the 1922 League of Nations Mandate for 
Tanganyika Territory, which placed paramount importance on the interests of the local 
inhabitants and stipulated that indirect rule was to lead to independence (Lovett 2003). 
Although the strict nature of the 1921 Forest Ordinance was modified in 1926 and 1930 
to permit local people greater access to forest products, these entitlements were again 
restricted in a new Forest Ordinance passed in 1933 (Lovett 2003). The Forest Rules of 
1933 with later amendments regulated all forest activities for 20 years with the main 
thrust of maintaining government‟s monopoly over forest resources (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1998). The 1957 Forest Ordinance retained the earlier restrictions and 
prevailed until the late 1980s.  
 
The objectives of forest policy during the remainder of the British Administration were 
essentially two-fold: First timber production and plantations, and second protection of 
natural forests for water catchment. It was in pursuance of this latter policy that the 
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state-controlled forest estate was expanded, particularly during the 1950s, to cover most 
of the natural closed forests not originally gazetted by the Germans (Lovett 2003). The 
continuing gazettement led to a doubling of the reserved area by 1942 (Iversen 1991 in 
Woodcock). At the end of the British time the areas under forest reserves were 
practically the same as today (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983).Two categories of forest 
reserves were created and still exist today: Central Government Forest Reserves 
(CGFR) and Local Government Forest Reserves (LGFR). CGFR became the 
responsibility of the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) under the Ministry of 
Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism. Thus LGFRs were managed by district 
authorities under the guidance of the FBD (Woodcock 2002). 
4.2.3. The post-independence years  
The independent post ‟61 socialist state of Tanzania was ruled largely according to the 
same principles as the prior colonial regime (Scott 1989, Lovett 2003, Burgess and 
Mbwana 2000). Most of the state-controlled forest estate and infrastructure were 
retained and policy and legislation remained the same as laid out in colonial times, until 
the early 1990s when the new Forest Policy was introduced (Burgess et al. 2002, 
Woodcock 2002, Lundgren and Lundgren 1983, Lovett 2003). The continued use of the 
1957 Forest Ordinance maintained the focus on protection of natural forest for 
catchment and plantations of exotics for production (Lovett 2003, Lundgren and 
Lundgren 2002).The division of CGFR and LGFR from British times was maintained. 
In 1976 the category „Catchment Forest Reserve‟ was created for the protection of water 
catchments, such as the Ulugurus (Hermansen et al. 1985, Lundgren 1985).   
 
The FBD and its staff were in the eyes of local people regarded as representatives of 
higher authorities with a policing task to prevent people from using land and wood 
resources (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). People were not allowed to reside in forest 
reserves or to use any products from them. However, locally customary rights had 
developed, whereby people residing near the reserves were allowed to collect firewood 
or to herd cattle through the reserves along special tracks (Lundgren and Lundgren 
1983).  
 
The role and efficiency of the forest division and district authorities as guardians of the 
forests was ambiguous. Often damaging activity was implemented or supported by the 
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very agents of state (foresters, local leaders) in whose trust the protection and 
management of the forests was placed (Wily 1998). Districts were using timber from 
the forests as a means of relieving financial pressures (Lovett 2003). Local people were 
often assisted in illegal practices by forest staff after offering bribes (Rodgers et al. 
1983, Woodcock 2002). The forest division maintained plantations inside reserved 
forests (such as for example in Kimboza), contributing to forest destruction (Rodgers et 
al. 1983). Logging carried out since German administration continued on an even 
grander scale after independence, partly supported by some international donors 
(Woodcock 2002, Lovett 2003). The years post 1961 are thus associated with even 
greater forest degradation.  
 
During the independence years, the traditional leadership of the chiefdom was officially 
abolished. The still existing authority of local leaders over non-reserved forests was 
eroded. This resulted in the final total breakdown of customary institutions that had 
traditionally been responsible for local resource management (Woodcock 2002). In the 
outlier forests of the Uluguru North mountains traditionally maintained by the chief for 
the ancestors of the Luguru tribe, large-scale deforestation has been associated with the 
loss of chiefly power subsequently to political changes since 1964 (Burgess et al. 2002). 
Forests that had not been reserved or taken as private estates were officially given the 
status of forests on public lands. Forests, which had been customarily „closed‟, with 
community leaders controlling access and use, had become „open‟, leaving the 
community leaders powerless to control forest access and use. Public forest was the 
only forest that local communities had statutory access to. Local communities therefore 
continued as was customary to obtain forest products and land from these areas. Those 
tree species valued for timber, such as Mvule (Millicia excelsa) were reserved by the 
state as national trees and local people needed permits to fell such species on public and 
even on farm land. Thus, local communities held statutory access and user rights to 
these public lands forests but without corresponding responsibilities for management. In 
increasingly reserving forest on public land, statutory tenure regimes moved from 
public tenure where rights were held by the public as a whole to public tenure where 
rights were theoretically held by the state, moving de jure tenure of the forests from 
open to closed access. De facto, however, the forests which had been closed under 
traditional leadership had become open through reservation (Woodcock 2002). By 
officially removing access and user rights from communities, any responsibilities they 
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may have felt toward the forest were also removed and all responsibilities placed on the 
forest guards of the state (Woodcock 2002).  
4.2.4. The participatory era   
In the 1980s, an early participatory period began. There was an increased recognition of 
the biodiversity and ecological value of forests on the mountains in the east of the 
country and the coastal plain. It was acknowledged that communities needed to be more 
involved in forest management (Lovett 2003, Woodcock 2002). With participation 
becoming a paradigm, the increased focus on biodiversity conservation still led to 
further creation of reserves and the extension of existing reserves. Villagers complained 
that often their fields were incorporated into forest reserves while forest areas 
sometimes were not (Woodcock 2002). Thus, the management approach of the post 
independence years was in principle perpetuated during the early participatory era with 
a hierarchical forest tenure regime where the state controlled rights and responsibilities 
to forest access and use. Community-based projects that offered alternatives to forest 
products and educated villagers about the ecological benefits of conserving forest were 
perceived as the solution to the problem but failed their goal. As Woodcock (2002) 
notes, villagers often state the advantage of conserving forest for water catchment, a 
point that has been put across repeatedly in project educational packages. However, 
villagers feel that the disadvantages in terms of loss of farm land are more important in 
the short term than the conservation for water catchment.   
 
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank in the 1980s initiated a process by which Tanzania shifted unevenly 
and reluctantly from a centralized to a market oriented economy. The transformation of 
the country under market reforms facilitated an increasing economic diversification into 
non-farm activities in rural areas (Ponte 2001, Seppälä 1998). These changes of the 
political economy under the decentralization and SAP called for a review of the old 
Forest Ordinance of 1957. A new forest policy was launched in March 1998. The two 
main changes of the new policy framework from previous approaches were the 
inclusion of biodiversity conservation as a policy objective, and the recognition of the 
importance of community and private forestry (Lovett 2003).  
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From the second half of the 1990s onwards PFM type arrangements were developed in 
a number of places in Tanzania that culminated in the signing of numerous PFM 
agreements over the last 10 years, all of which predate the current Forest Act. The 1957 
Forest Ordinance only provided a narrow legal basis and no guidelines for PFM/JFM 
existed. All PFM agreements were developed locally, mostly within the framework of 
donor-sponsored forestry projects, which resulted in the application of different 
approaches. The three JFM sites that are part of the present study fall within this period 
of time. The FBD deemed it necessary to legally streamline both existing and future 
PFM arrangements under the new 2002 Forest Act through a set of clear and concise 
rules and regulations. In 2006 guidelines for CBFM and JFM implementation were 
published.  
 
The Forest Policy of 1998 and the Forest Act of 2002 legally introduced PFM as a 
forest management strategy. Combined with heavy donor support, there was a boost in 
the country-wide implementation of PFM. The move towards PFM in Tanzania was 
partly driven by the recognition that neither central government nor local government 
had the capacity to sustainably manage the country‟s forest estate without the support of 
forest adjacent communities. Thus, PFM was perceived as a management strategy to 
address “the on-going degradation problem on a national scale” (Blomley and 
Rhamadani 2006). At the same time, the on-going broader local government reform 
process put pressure on sector ministries for decentralization following the principles of 
subsidiarity. Other scholars describe that PFM is regarded as an attempt to reverse the 
alienation of communities from the forests and equip them with increased 
responsibilities in forest management (Woodcock 2002; Khare 1999).  The formation of 
local institutions called village forest committees, village environmental committees or 
village natural resource committees was a step towards a decentralized system granting 
democratic rights to communities (Khare 1999). This is at least the theory. In practice, 
as this study shows, the village forest committees formed under JFM were neither 
democratic nor were they equipped with rights towards the forest reserves.   
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4.3. The post-independence political framework 
4.3.1. African socialism and villagization 
In 1967, President Julius Nyerere published the Arusha Declaration, his development 
blueprint for a socialist state, in which he expressed the need for an African model of 
development. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), founded by Nyerere in 
July 1954, became popular in rural areas mostly due to its endorsement of resistance to 
the onerous agricultural regulations of the colonial state (Scott 1989). Nyerere created a 
one party system under the leadership of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which 
succeeded TANU and which is still the ruling party in Tanzania to date. Ujamaa was 
the concept that formed the basis of Nyerere‟s social and economic development 
policies until 1985 when Nyerere gave up power to Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Ujamaa, 
derived from the Swahili word for extended family, describes that a person becomes a 
person through the community. Ujamaa had special significance as playing on supposed 
cooperation and reciprocity in rural communities, and is therefore of relevance for 
initiatives like JFM. With the concept of Ujamaa being based on public ownership and 
centralized management (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003), the ownership of all land was 
transferred to the state, vested in the President on behalf of all citizens (Lundgren and 
Lundgren 1983, Woodcock 2002). With increasing nationalization, the scope of the 
state penetrated all key economic sectors. As a result purchasing power declined and 
essential goods became unavailable. Farmers lost their freedom, and the state took over 
their lands and claimed their crops. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and excessive 
tax rates created a foundation for systemic corruption. A system of permits (vibali) 
allowed state officials to collect huge bribes in exchange for the vibali. The African 
socialism introduced after independence was a perpetuation of the disempowerment of 
the rural peasantry that had started during colonial times. Tanganyika was an 
authoritarian administrative state that routinely used coercion to subject the rural 
peasantry to its vision of development and modernization (Scott 1989). 
 
The post-independence political culture continued much of the coercion and criminality 
that rural peasants had experienced during colonial times with the forced villagization of 
the 1970s being the most far reaching example (Scott 1989; Brockington 2008). It laid 
the structures that govern villages in rural Tanzania today (Brockington 2008). 
Implemented with the help and blessing of some international donors (Seppälä 1989), 
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since 1973 the villagization moved 12 million people into 8,000 villages forcing them 
onto collective farms (Mnzava 1980 quoted in Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). This 
greatly disrupted agricultural efficiency and output and turned Tanzania from a nation 
of sustenance farmers into a nation of starving collective farmers. The result of the 
villagization was an “alienated, sceptical, demoralized, and uncooperative peasantry for 
which Tanzania would pay a huge price, both financially and politically” (Scott 
1989:237). Thus, the villagization is described as “one of the great human tragedies of 
the twentieth century in terms of lives lost and irretrievably disrupted” (Scott 1989:237).  
 
The villagization had a threefold aim: The delivery of services, the creation of a more 
productive modern agriculture and the encouragement of communal, socialist forms of 
cooperation following Ujamaa (Scott 1989). Nyerere‟s idea was that modernization 
required physical concentration into standardized units that the state would service and 
administer. Scott (1989) argues that physical concentration was a way to transform a 
dispersed, autonomous population that thus far had escaped most of the state policies 
they found difficult. Thus, villagization meant not simply village formation and 
communal farming. It largely meant control of Tanzania‟s peasantry in order to 
regiment it politically and economically (Scott 1989). The peasants‟ tactical advantages 
to escape the force applied are described to include flight, unofficial production and 
trade, smuggling, and foot-dragging (Scott 1989). It is the opinion of the author of this 
study that tactical behaviour of similar nature is still influencing the outcome of state 
initiated projects such as JFM in current times. In situations when the local villagers do 
not truly see an advantage and mistrust the state, they do not openly show opposition 
but find tactical ways of evasion.  
 
The villagization campaign had vast negative ecological consequences (Scott 1989, 
Kikula 1997, Blaikie 1985, Colson 1971, Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). The 
declaration of public lands through Ujamaa , turned 70% of the total forested area into 
de facto „open access‟ areas without any protection (Luoga et al. 2005:76). This, 
combined with the fact that the villagization programme within a short time created 
enormous concentrated pressures on forest and wood resources throughout the country, 
led to forest degradation. Some Ujamaa villages were even declared inside the 
boundaries of forest reserves (Woodcock 2002). Most of the woodlands had 
disappeared within five years following villagization due to the increased demand for 
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wood resources in concentrated areas (Kikula 1997). It also led to changes from 
traditional shifting to permanent agriculture. The decline in agricultural productivity 
during the post-villagization period was responded to by more intensive farming 
systems, further aggravating deforestation (Kikula 1997). Scattered settlement patterns 
and the traditional methods of land management during the pre-villagization period had 
an environmental conservation value as rural people seemed to have had an eminently 
empirical, albeit cautious, outlook on their own practices (Kikula 1997, Scott 1989, 
Kjekshus 1977). The resettlements reduced the ability of the settlers to adapt to their 
new environment, resulting in adverse ecological effects as the traditional systems of 
conservation were eliminated without a sound alternative (Blaikie 1985, Colson 1971, 
Kikula 1997, Scott 1989).  
 
With the same modernist beliefs as the previous colonizers, Nyerere‟s planners and 
specialists claimed a monopoly on useful knowledge. The imposing of their knowledge 
led to a complete disruption of traditional systems (Scott 1989). At the same time rural 
peasants were considered as ignorant, an attitude that can still sometimes be 
encountered when working with central government officials. Scott (1989) argues that 
just like scientific forestry was a colonial attempt to bring natural forests under aesthetic 
order, the resettlement scheme during independence replicated this to the human 
geography.  
4.3.2. Village governance 
Since the villagization, communities in rural Tanzania are divided into villages. With 
the introduction of PFM, the village as a legal entity has become increasingly important 
again in the management of forests. The Forest Act (2002) states that the village 
government as the lowest level of the government system performs executive and 
legislative powers together with other responsibilities and duties, including forest 
management (United Republic of Tanzania 2002a). Under CBFM, villages have been 
granted ownership and use rights of forest resources and under JFM they have become 
co-managing parties with central and local government. Villages in Tanzania are 
registered institutional entities, with discrete and recorded physical boundaries (village 
area) and are considered well-organized bodies with high degree of cohesion and 
capability of management (Wily 1997, Lund and Treue 2008). In most cases, villages 
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that adjoin natural forest areas have longstanding tenurial and user interests in the 
adjoining forest.  
 
Per the 1975 Villages Act, villages are managed by Village Councils to be elected by 
the Village Assembly. Village Councils are corporate bodies, answerable and 
accountable to the Village Assembly, which consists of all adults residing within the 
village area (Blomley et al. 2008). The Village Council consists of 25 councillors 
elected by the Village Assembly every 5 years. The Council may form sub committees, 
which may represent the village in any government forum or court of law. The Local 
Government Act of 1982 provided villages with authority to make village by-laws. 
Once a village by-law is drafted and approved by the local District Council, it becomes 
law, upholdable in any court. These by-laws provide communities with a tool for 
creating statutory land and natural resource management rules at village level (Blomley 
et al. 2008, Wily 1997). Usually such by-laws address issues of natural resource use 
(forest harvesting, hunting, grazing), enforced by sanctions and fines. Lund and Treue 
(2008) emphasize that present day villages carry forth the historical elements of fused 
powers in the village chief as they carry simultaneously legislative, executive and 
judiciary powers. This is a potential weakness in achieving equity. Villagers at odds 
with the leadership face the difficulty that appealing to higher levels in the local 
government system requires a letter from the Village Council.  
 
The history of top-down administration and command policies requiring „voluntary‟ 
contributions, as well as excessive taxation (Ellis and Mdoe 2003) led to withdrawal of 
villagers from the formal sector and a split between villagers and the local government 
(Seppälä 1989). Kajembe and Monela (2000) observe that villages tend to be divided 
between traditionalists, who keep distance from the state, and elites, who dominate and 
co-opt village government. Several authors describe the state‟s monopoly for violence, 
apparent in the tax collection through coercive methods and by violent forms of 
enforcement (Fjeldstad 2001, Brockington 2008). Brockington (2008:112) describes 
various forms of „institutional violence‟, e.g. extraction of taxation, misappropriation of 
funds, corruption and failure of accountability that characterized the villagers‟ 
experience of local authority. As speaking out in public against abuses by local officials 
was considered dangerous, silent resistance and non-compliance with state initiated 
activities became a constant feature of rural life (Brockington 2008, Thompson 1975, 
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Hopkins 1985). Fjeldstad considers accountability between the state and the citizens in 
Tanzania as non-existent (Fjedlstad 2001). Therefore attempts to introduce 
accountability will face challenges if attempting to work within existing political 
structures and customs. Corrupt practices of local governments will only die slowly and 
painfully, if at all (Brockington 2008). This has implications on a policy like PFM 
whose implementation is based on mutual cooperation and trust amongst villagers and 
between villagers and local and central government bodies. The development of 
effective local institutions of forest governance will be a long struggle which also has to 
change the democratic cultures filling them (Brockington 2008). The above concerns 
about village governance apply to local government in general. Several studies have 
documented problems of poor governance in Tanzanian local governments (Fjedlstad 
2001, Kelsall 2000, Brockington 2007), leading to questioning decentralized forest 
management (Brockington 2007). Decentralization, it has been argued, creates rent-
seeking motivations of inadequately remunerated public servants (Ellis and Mdoe 2003).   
4.3.3. Decentralization of local government 
The major institutional change that PFM brings about is that FBD is not solely 
responsible for its implementation (Hamza and Kimwer 2007). Local government has a 
critical role to play in facilitating planning and implementation of PFM activities 
(United Republic of Tanzania 1998). District councils provide technical assistance and 
capacity building for implementing PFM activities at village level. Opinions concerning 
the capacity of local governments to implement PFM differ. While some authors argue 
that the shift towards decentralization and devolution of government power to district 
and village government levels has increased district capacity to support PFM activities 
(Hamza and Kimwer 2007) others believe that district capacity is low in both human 
and financial resources (Ngaga et al. 2003). However, statements by central or district 
government representatives of low local capacity are often just signs of reluctance to 
commit to decentralization (Brockington 2008; Ribot et al. 2006).   
 
Tanzania is considered to have one of the strongest frameworks of local government in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Wily and Dewees 2001). Local governments existed in Tanzania 
as separate elected bodies until 1972 and after 1984 with diluted independence. There 
were several local government reform processes. The first reform of 1972 placed 
emphasis on regional and district level committees, which were supposed to follow the 
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party guidelines. The independence years from the 1960s up to the 1980s were marked 
with a transfer of power to the central level while open politics at the local level were 
suppressed. The operational independence of districts was curtailed and they were 
placed under a politically controlled and heavily top-down oriented administrative 
hierarchy aimed at standardizing and formalizing (Seppälä 1989).  
 
During the villagization scheme in 1972, the district councils were terminated. At the 
same time central government tried to penetrate the rural areas through establishing and 
strengthening regional administration and parastatals. The village councils were retained 
only to receive decisions made by higher government levels and to implement agreed 
politics (Seppälä 1989, Shivji and Peter 2000). The village level administration was 
placed between two forces. On the one hand, it tried to please the views of fellow 
villagers and to play along the lines of the narrow politics. On the other, it was expected 
as to fulfil the demands from above. The excessive demands from above were watered 
down and the strict regulations were simply circumvented (Seppälä 1989). The central 
government interpreted the lack of local initiatives as a matter of lack of technical 
capacity to plan projects and posted village managers in the villages. However, the 
villagization had shaken the basic livelihoods of the rural population and people simply 
did not have the inclination or other resources to implement additional village level 
economic activities.  
 
The economic inefficiency of the sectoral top-down administration forced the 
government to start the district councils (local governments) anew in 1984 (Seppälä 
1989) through the decentralization programme of 1982. While the new local 
governments were given a number of tasks and public lands were placed under their 
jurisdiction, they were administratively still controlled by the regional authorities and 
ministries. After the reform, a part of the central government was nominally called local 
administration. However, its manpower and finances were allocated from above. Hence, 
the key administrators perceived themselves as answerable to higher ministries rather 
than the elected district councils (Seppälä 1989). The practice of political decision-
making was far from the model of a democratic decentralized structure (Ribot 1995, 
Seppälä 1989). At that time the major aid projects influenced local administration by 
marginalizing them and placing emphasis on the regional administration as local 
authority was perceived as a weak arm of central government. Due to their financial 
87 
 
muscle a donor could buy a substantial amount of expertise from local governments 
using allowances as incentives and a dependency relationship was created.  
 
The new administrative reforms introduced in the 1990s deviated from policies in 
previous decades, in that they included new donor approaches, multi-party politics, 
market forces and civic organizations. Donors started to work directly with district 
authorities who were allocated money for their own development projects (Seppälä 
1989). Donor agencies still had a central position in allocative decision making and 
were involved in intricate political debates. In the late 1990s donors moved towards a 
coordinated approach to give up the area based programmes, where certain donors 
would support certain areas only. Instead the funding was pooled and disbursed to 
qualifying local authorities through a central mechanism established under the Capital 
Development Grant of Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP). The politically 
elected district councils were given more economic power as the central government 
funding was to be allocated as block funding to district councils.   
4.3.4. The politics of JFM   
Under the overall goal of sustainable development in Tanzania, the Forest Policy of 
1998 contains two statements in support of PFM. Policy statement number 5 promotes 
ownership and management of forests on public lands by villages and private 
individuals and establishes the right for villages and local governments to demarcate 
and establish forest reserves. Policy statement number 39 encourages local communities 
to participate in forest activities and states that clearly defined forestland and tree tenure 
rights will be instituted for local communities. Central government responsibility is 
limited to the management of forest reserves of national strategic importance. Emphasis 
is given to joint forest management (JFM) between central government, specialized 
agencies, the private sector or the local government. JFM is defined in the Tanzanian 
Forest Policy as cases where local communities or NGOs are involved in the 
management and conservation of government forest reserves. It takes place on land 
reserved for forest management such as National Forest Reserves (NFRs) and Local 
Authority Forest Reserves (LAFRs). These forests are managed with appropriate user 
rights and incentives (United Republic of Tanzania 1998). The new balance of power in 
JFM is laid down in a Joint Management Agreement (JMA) which is signed between 
the state, represented by the Director of FBD and the people, represented by those 
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villages that take on management authority over adjacent parts of the forest reserve. 
Thus, the Forest Act (2002) defines JMAs as tools for the decentralization and 
devolution process.  
 
Although PFM offers a legally binding institutional framework to formalize a new 
balance of power away from the state into the hands of village forest management 
authorities, it is questionable to what extent this is realistic. In practice, the 
formalization of PFM has been deliberately delayed (Wily 1998). As this study shows, 
the user rights and incentives that the policy calls for have in practice not always 
materialized during the JFM process. There are growing doubts in Tanzania as to 
whether the assumption that PFM improves the livelihoods of forest adjacent 
communities holds true in the case of JFM. These doubts arise in particular in the 
context of Catchment Forest Reserves, which are strictly protected and where no 
exploitation is legally allowed. The potential community benefits of engaging in joint 
management (e.g. fees, fines, eco-tourism, and forest services) may not be sufficient to 
outweigh the transaction cost that communities incur through their involvement in JFM.  
 
In JFM, in order to arrive at an equitable process, it is not enough to look at the contents 
of the JMA. One needs to look as well at the underlying negotiation process. There is no 
agreement as to what role local communities should play in the management of forests 
of high biodiversity, such as the Ulugurus. These forests have, if at all, been placed 
under JFM rather than CBFM and roles of communities limited to the responsibility of 
management work and if at all – limited use rights. But even these high biodiversity 
forests were once managed effectively by communities under customary traditions. 
Woodcock (2002) argues that the fact that the policy does entrust communities with the 
management of forests on public and private lands but does not for forest reserves of 
high value shows that the FBD does not fully believe in the ability of local communities 
to play a meaningful role in forest management. Thus, scholars perceive JFM as 
maintaining the power imbalance between state and communities in Tanzanian forestry 
that has existed since colonial times (Woodcock 2002, Wily 1998, Koppers et al. 2004).  
 
Wily (1998, 1997, 1996) emphasizes that stakeholders‟ roles in forests need to be 
negotiated. The negotiation process will influence the way in which the JMA is 
enforced and JFM is implemented. It is questionable to what extent stakeholders with 
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unequal power successfully negotiate their roles in the management of forest reserves. 
Where the state will try to facilitate the negotiation process itself this could impair the 
success of the process and increase conflict between two groups of stakeholders with a 
long history of mistrust (Woodcock 2002). Woodcock (2002) therefore calls for the 
facilitation of the negotiation process by independent experienced professionals, i.e. 
NGOs, who are aware of unequal power relations between stakeholders. A study 
conducted by FBD (Koppers et al. 2004) in preparation of guidelines on cost benefit 
sharing emphasized that the legal awareness of local communities about their potential 
rights and duties as stipulated in the Forest Act is limited. The study (Koppers et al. 
2004) further outlines a gap in the current legal framework. According to the Forest Act, 
the inclusion of basic duties and rights in the JMA is only required between village 
councils and community groups (Section 16.3). This leaves a gap with regard to all 
other JMA arrangements between local and central government and village councils. 
Thus, there is a legal grey area about benefit sharing in JFM (Blomley et al. 2008). It is 
hence not surprising that from preliminary fieldwork and literature review it emerges 
that most of the existing JMAs do not stipulate clearly the rights and obligations of the 
contract partners. In the case of the three JFM sites that were part of the present study, a 
signed JMA did not even exist.   
4.4. History and politics of the Uluguru mountains 
The Ulugurus have a long history of conflict of human– forest interaction and land use 
management and have thus witnessed villagers‟ outright opposition against government 
policies of coercion. Land scarcity is the main feature of agriculture. Deforestation and 
soil erosion are major problems (Ponte 2001). The area has limited agricultural carrying 
capacity. Consequently, Van Donge (1992) described Uluguru farmers as “trapped in 
decline”. Ponte (2001) tended towards a more positive outlook arguing that Uluguru 
households could improve their livelihoods mainly with the increase of non-farm 
income. Ponte (2001) considers the fact that farmers have been increasingly diversifying 
into non-farm activities positively. Rather than being caught in a poverty trap, rural 
people are reacting to market changes, demographic pressure and land degradation 
(Ponte 2001).   
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With high potential for crop production, the area has high population density and 
deforestation on the mountain slopes. On the main Uluguru ridge, 50 villages touch the 
forest boundary of the Uluguru Nature Reserve and over 151,000 people are found 
within the mountain area, often at increasing densities at higher altitudes up to the forest 
boundary. Lundgren and Lundgren (1983) assume that permanent settlements have 
always existed in the mountain forests and they were often used as temporary refuges 
during war times (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983, Woodcock 2002). Large-scale 
population movements up the mountain slopes occurred first during the eighteenth 
century, as a result of the invasion and occupation of the plains by the cattle-raising 
Maasai (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). This forced the agriculturalist Bantu tribes to 
settle in the mountains where they could better defend themselves. They cleared the 
forest on the lower slopes and depending on skill and land potential, different forms of 
permanent and semi-permanent agriculture developed.  
 
Although all land in Tanzania is owned by the state, in the Uluguru mountains land is 
still de facto regarded as private and inherited between generations (Mnzava quoted in 
Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). Some of the mountain tribes developed into powerful, 
well-organized societies (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). The Waluguru have attracted 
much attention from the national and international research community. Much of the 
work on the Waluguru has focused on their agricultural practices, land use (Brain, 1980; 
Maack, 1996; Young and Fosbrooke, 1960), land degradation (Jones, 1996) and related 
socio-economic changes (Van Donge, 1993 and 1992; Ponte  2002) and forest 
disturbance in relation to agricultural use (Hymas, 2000 and 2001). As Bhatia and 
Ringia (1996) note, studies on forest resource use were undertaken in villages distant 
from the reserves and may hence have underestimated the actual use of the forest 
reserves.  
 
Intensive small-scale arable farming on mountain slopes led to soil erosion and land 
degradation. Landslides are triggered in years of extreme rainfall (Lundgren and 
Lundgren 1983). This deterioration was already visible in the 1930s when the British 
administration launched the Uluguru Land Use Scheme, a soil conservation and 
rehabilitation project conducted in the post-war time (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). 
The failure of the scheme is attributed to unsound and unwise implementation and 
practices that were badly adapted to the strongly developed traditional social and 
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cultural systems (Lundgren and Lundgren 1983). Through this, the Waluguru have 
become known as local cultivators who resisted the generic colonial solution to soil 
erosion: ridging (Scott 1989). The Ulugurus continued to be a focus of project work in 
post independence year up to today focusing on agricultural practices by Waluguru 
communities and their demands placed on forests (Forrester et al. 1996; Bhatia and 
Buckely 1998) as well as tests with forest management approaches such as CBFM in 
public lands forests and JFM in local authority forest reserves of the Ulugurus (Moshi et 
al. 2000). The Ulugurus are further an example of traditional management of public 
lands forests (Hymas 2001 and Ylhaisi (2000) in which resource use conflicts over 
public lands forests (Burgess et al. 2001) and the linkage of forest clearance and the loss 
of chiefly power (Hymas 1999) have been described.  
 
The forests of the Uluguru mountains are protection forest reserves where harvesting of 
forest resources is not legally allowed. Their conservation history dates back to 1909 
during the German colonial period when the gazettement of several forest reserves took 
place. Early conservation efforts (1940s) focused in the agricultural and land use 
practices of the Waluguru, which start with the basic perception of villagers as forest 
users - a potential „threat‟ to the forests managed in a central government controlled 
regime. The failure of the state to manage Catchment Forest Reserves sustainably 
necessitated new approaches. In the 1990s a range of experiments with assigning 
specific forest management roles to communities started being implemented in and 
around the Uluguru mountain range and are today at various levels of implementation. 
These include government initiatives implemented through the Regional Catchment 
Forest Office of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) for example in Kimboza 
and Kitulang‟halo forest reserves as well as NGO implemented initiatives in particular 
by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST) for example in Milawilila 
forest reserve of this study. Since 1999, WCST has been implementing forest 
conservation project activities in the Uluguru Mountains. There has also been a project 
supported by the Sokoine University of Agriculture in Kitulang‟halo Forest Reserve. 
All these early initiatives offer a wealth of experience in terms of JFM implementation. 
However, so far, the lessons learned of these initiatives have not been systematically 
analysed. Forest loss in the Uluguru Mountains has been documented since the 1950s 
up to date (Burgess et al., 2002, Brooks et al. 2002, Hamisy 2000) and forest 
disturbance in these sites has been documented (Hymas 2001). However, existing 
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studies do not research the impact on livelihoods of the participating communities and 
local forest governance.    
 
The three JFM forests included in this study were once harvested intensely. Although 
Kitulang‟halo forest reserve has been a Catchment Forest Reserve since 1955 with 
protection history, it used to include a 155 ha part that was declared for productive use 
until 1985. Then, as a result of the catchment logging ban, the entire reserve was put 
under protection by FBD. During the transect surveys conducted as part of this study, 
signs of historic timber harvesting were visible. Biological interest in Kimboza goes 
back to the early German administration (Stuhlmann 1894, Kaiserliches Gouvernement 
von Deutsch-Ostafrika 1903). As a forest reserve it was initially formed during the 
German occupation and was later formally gazetted by the British. From 1983 onwards, 
Kimboza was administered by the Regional Forest Catchment Officer of Morogoro 
under direction from Divisional Headquarters in Dar es Salaam. In Kimboza, valuable 
timber species such as Mvule (Milicia excelsa), Mninga Maji (Pterocarpus sp) and 
especially Mkangazi (Khaya anthotheca (formerly K. nyasica) were common in the 
1960s (Rovero et al. 2009). Logging has almost completely deprived the forest of its tall 
canopy trees. Rodger and Hall (1986) reported in the 1980s about pole cutting 
intensities of 50% of available poles in easily accessible areas in Kimboza associated 
with pit sawing activities.  
 
Rodgers et al. (1983) describe how the practice of selling licenses to pit sawyers by the 
regional catchment office in Morogoro was ambiguous. While in theory up to three 
trees were allowed to be taken out at one time, at least five had been issued on occasion. 
In addition, the licenses did not represent the actual numbers as more logging was 
taking place than indicated in licenses. The fact that all planks were stamped would 
indicate that the local forest guard, whose prior approval was required, was aware of the 
higher level of extraction (Rodgers et al. 1983). Although, the collection of minor forest 
produce was in theory illegal unless done by license or permit, in practice, the collection 
of poles and firewood was thought insignificant and not seen as a threat. So, no permits 
were issued nor would they have been if applied for (Rodgers et al. 1983). Historically 
there are innumerable minor tracks and footpaths in Kimboza providing easy access to 
the interior of the forest to search for firewood, building poles and traditional medicines 
and food items.  
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The example of Kimboza forest shows the politics and conflicts of the forest guards that 
were placed in the villages by the forest division. Their duties included boundary and 
general patrolling plus checking, measuring and stamping of logging activities and 
timber planks (Rodgers et al. 1983). The forest staff had lived in the area for several 
years and became part of the social community of the village. Because of this the guards 
felt unable to control the cutting of forest produce by villagers: “If I arrest them, they 
will destroy my crops” (Rodgers et al., p 23). Thus, pit sawing was done in 1983 by 
imported labour from Iringa on contract to an entrepreneur in Morogoro, to avoid that 
enforcement of the law regarding timber extraction had „community problems‟.   
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5. Research design, methods and study sites 
5.1. Research design   
In order to answer the research questions, changes in forest condition, livelihoods and 
local governance resulting from the introduction of JFM needed to be assessed. Data 
were not available to compare the “before” and “after” situation, nor was it possible to 
conduct a longitudinal study. Changes were therefore assessed through a comparison 
between government forest reserves under JFM and nearby and closely similar 
government forest reserves under traditional state management (“non JFM”). The latter 
served as a control group for the subject under study, i.e. “JFM forests and adjacent 
villages” (experimental group). The main method used to assess change was to compare 
the forest condition of the experimental group with the forest condition in the control 
group at the same point in time.  
A time dimension was built into the study design through certain questions of the 
household survey. Respondents were asked about perceived changes (to the forest, to 
certain livelihoods or governance aspects) in the present situation compared to five 
years ago (prior to introduction of JFM). This was undertaken because it was not 
possible to conduct interviews prior to the introduction of JFM or complete a 
longitudinal study. Thus, a control group and a time factor were built into the study 
design from the outset, aiming to assess JFM related changes. This type of research 
design is called retrospective experimental design (De Vaus 2002). 
An important consideration in selecting the study sites was that they needed to contain 
forests that had been under JFM for a number of years, so that impact could be assessed. 
Therefore some of the early test sites of JFM in Tanzania, initiated in the late 1990s had 
to be selected, so that by the time of this study between June 2005 and July 2006, the 
effects of 4 to 5 years of JFM implementation could be assessed.  Such sites existed 
only in and around the Uluguru or East Usambara Mountains. We selected sites in the 
Uluguru Mountains for this study. 
These early pilot JFM areas were implemented by FBD to “test” JFM as a new 
approach. They predate the 1998 Forest Policy and the 2002 Forest Act. Since no 
guidelines for PFM/JFM existed at that time, these PFM agreements were developed 
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locally within the framework of donor-sponsored forestry projects, which resulted in the 
application of different approaches. The focus of the early donor funding in PFM was 
on securing high biodiversity forests (such as catchment forests), which had minimal 
local use options and corresponding management responsibilities (Blomley and 
Ramadhani 2006). A “national” approach was only developed after the 2002 Forest Act 
defined clear PFM regulations. Largely with funding from development partners, the 
FBD was developing a national programme for the implementation of PFM. By 2006 an 
estimated 3 million hectares of  Tanzania‟s 33 million hectares of forest land were under 
PFM including 1200 of the 11,000 villages in 50 districts. This comprised both CBFM 
and JFM approaches, the latter comprising 1,386,000 hectares and 568 villages 
(Blomley and Ramadhani 2006).
12
 
Another requirement of the site selection was that a comparable state managed forest 
needed to be nearby to serve as control group. Forest reserves fall under the same policy, 
laws and regulations, giving them all an equal status in the Tanzanian policy framework. 
Furthermore, each forest needed to have at least one adjacent sample village. In order to 
minimize the other factors besides the forest management regime that could influence 
the comparison, the experimental and control group forest and village pair needed to be 
in the same agro-ecological zone. The villages needed to be fairly similar in their 
livelihood and socio-economic patterns. The data collection took place during the dry-
season months of two subsequent years to eliminate problems of seasonal effects. These 
elements of the study and field work design helped reduce the number of other factors 
that might influence the results, hence trying to leave JFM / non-JFM as a main factor 
under study.  
One of the variables for the selection of each village – forest pair was their proximity to 
each other. This was based on the assumption that distance influences peoples‟ selection 
on which forest to use, favouring a nearby forest over a more distant forest. At the same 
time, an attempt was made to maximise the distance between the experimental and the 
control group within each of the three sites. This was done to strengthen the assumption 
of a relationship between one village and one forest per site. The distance between each 
of the three different sites is at least 10 kms so that one can assume that there was no 
influence between them and they could be investigated as separate case studies, but 
                                                 
12
 In addition there is an estimated 1,641,000 hectares of forest area under CBFM with 670 villages 
involved. This totals 1,238 PFM villages across the country (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006).  
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contributing data that can provide for some more general conclusions. The data analysis 
did not reveal any results which would question this assumption.  
 
The Uluguru mountain range fulfilled these site-selection requirements because it has a 
number of forest reserves – amongst them some under JFM and some under ordinary 
state management. Livelihood patterns are quite similar in these rural Uluguru villages. 
The human use patterns of the forest reserves are also similar amongst the local 
villagers. At the same time forest utilization varies depending on outside market forces 
for forest products or particular features of the landscape, i.e. existence of mining 
resources. The vicinity of large urban centres or a regional road may exert high market 
pressure on forest products, in particular charcoal and timber. As Blomley and 
Ramadhani (2006) state, this makes it difficult for villages to prevent illegal harvesting 
by outsiders and undermines the JFM process.  
To summarize, the study design required sites (government forest reserve with adjacent 
village) under JFM for 4 to 5 years (“the experimental group”), with a “mirror” forest-
village pair not under JFM in the same agro-ecological zone to serve as a control group.  
Thus, the sites chosen for this study comprise six forest reserves in the Uluguru 
mountain range, which are part of the Eastern Arc Mountains and six villages in 
Morogoro Rural District in Tanzania. The six forest reserves were arranged in three 
paired sets: Within each pair one forest was under JFM (the experimental group) and the 
other was under state management without community involvement (the control group). 
The sample villages were selected based on the same principle. In each of the three sites, 
one village is located directly adjacent to the forest reserve under JFM (experimental 
group) and a second village adjacent to the forest reserve under state management 
(control group). Thus, each site consists of two village – forest pairs, one forming the 
experimental group and the other the control group. This study design is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1 overleaf. 
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Figure 5.1 Study Design 
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Despite the efforts to eliminate other potentially influential factors than JFM, the 
method of comparing JFM with “non JFM” forests has certain limitations in assessing 
JFM related changes and hence to the ability to test the formulated hypotheses.  The 
limitation of this experimental design is that the control group is never a perfect mirror 
image of the experimental group. This is because two forests and two villages are never 
absolutely similar even though they are located in the same zone and have similar 
physical and socio-economic characteristics.  
Furthermore, with regard to forest quality, although the forests were paired in similar 
forest types, there was variation within in the vegetation type across the plots in each 
forest. By comparing all sampled plots split by JFM versus non JFM, sometimes forest 
and woodlands habitats were compared. These have naturally differences in some of the 
parameters, which may not be due to JFM, i.e. tree height, grass coverage etc. A 
separate analysis of wet forest and woodlands habitat plots within a particular forest was, 
however, not possible within this study.  
In addition, the empirical analysis showed that despite this careful research design and 
resulting site selection there was not a unilateral relation between one forest and one 
village. With access restricted in the JFM forests, villagers sometimes used the control 
group forest to meet their resource demands despite longer walking distances. In 
particular in sites 2 and 3 the distance was not sufficient to prevent that villagers in the 
experimental group were using the “other” village‟s forest.  
We do not have data on the investigated variables from before the JFM process in any 
forest or village. In the absence of such “before-JFM” data, there is no certainty that we 
are measuring changes in forest quality, livelihoods and governance due to JFM in the 
forests that are under JFM. It might be for example that the JFM forests were better off 
even before JFM was put in place or that certain livelihood differences exist even 
without JFM. As such, the methods used cannot reliably tell us that the differences in 
forest quality found are the real impact of the JFM. However, the comparison of sample 
plots and households from before and after the introduction of JFM, although preferable, 
was not possible within the scope of this study.  
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5.2. Research methods 
5.2.1. Mixed method approach 
5.2.1.1. Introduction 
Mixed methods design is increasingly being used among socio-economic and poverty 
researchers because synergies can be gained from the careful combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Gibson & Duncan 2005, Kanbur 2003, Sharp 
2007, London et al. 2007, White 2002, De Vaus 2002, Place et al. 2007, Longhurst 
1994, Moris and Copestake 1993). This is because “focusing on a single research 
method used by one academic discipline for understanding complex, multi-scale 
processes does not provide an understanding of how individuals in complex social-
ecological settings react to institutional rules and affect ecological systems” (Ostrom et 
al. 2006:19231).  
 
Quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches each have their strengths and 
weaknesses in generating certain types of empirical information. As White (2002) 
points out a combination of techniques will yield greater insight than either one if used 
in isolation.  
Quantitative methods are suitable for determining mean or average strengths of 
relationships while qualitative methods are more effective in understanding cause and 
effect relationships and local power dynamics in participatory natural resources 
management (Place et al. 2007, Sharp 2007). The benefits of mixed methods design are 
also perceived in the sequencing of methods so that each can enrich and clarify the 
results of the other and in the triangulation of data during the analysis (Parker and Kozel 
2007, Kanbur 2003, White 2002). However, the nature of data and different sample 
sizes lead to difficulties of integration. The qualitative analysis captures what is 
occurring across a small portion of households and therefore adds richness to just a 
small number of surveyed households (Place et al. 2007). 
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5.2.1.2. Mixing methods in this study  
In this study, the forest condition questions required natural science methods, and 
inquiry into livelihoods, equity and governance required social data gathering. Thus the 
following methods-mix was used:    
 Quantitative methods  
A household questionnaire survey: Carried out for a sample of households in all study 
villages to collect quantitative data on household socio-economic and wealth 
characteristics, perceptions on forest management and governance, access to 
information, as well as forest resources use.  
Forest transects: Conducted in each of the forest reserves to derive data on forest quality. 
The transect plots generated quantitative data on the condition and utilization of the 
forest reserves.  
 Qualitative methods 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) exercises: Designed to yield information directly 
relevant to the research questions, and generated both qualitative and quantitative data. 
These exercises were used to establish baseline socio-economic profiles of the study 
villages, to gain an overview of household economic dimensions, forest use and access, 
the role of relevant institutions, issues of power relations and to conduct a participatory 
wealth ranking. 
 
Personal observation: During all the three above components, the researcher took 
detailed notes during both the village level fieldwork and the forest level fieldwork. 
Personal observation during the forest transects elicited first hand information on forest 
resource use. This data collected at the forest level was then triangulated with the 
village and household level data on forest resource use through the previous methods. 
 
A research design matrix was developed to map the broad research questions to more 
specific ones, and to the different methods that would be used to answer each question.  
 
The rationale for blending together the above methods was to achieve mutual 
advantages of each method to improve the quality of information. The quantitative 
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methods served the purpose of capturing measurable differences as well as some causal 
relationships between samples and sub-samples. The qualitative methods contributed to 
understanding the more complex relationships and interactions of forest resource use, 
power and socio-cultural relations around forest management that were particularly 
salient in the household survey. Thus, they helped explain some of the „why’ questions 
that arose through the quantitative methods. This was particularly important as the study 
was to explore dimensions of illegality, given that the Forest Act prohibits forest 
resource harvesting in the six forest reserves of this study. Honest answers cannot be 
expected about illegal livelihoods if asked for in a survey (Place et al. 2007).  
 
There were great variations between the different villages in the degree to which the 
PRA exercises could disclose illegal access and forest resource utilization from the 
reserved forests. It was only through triangulation with the quantitative and 
observational data from the forest transects that the actual utilization of the forests could 
be revealed. For example, in Mwalazi village, people said that nowadays mining inside 
the forest is not an economic activity practiced anymore. However, while undertaking 
transects in nearby Ruvu Forest Reserve, active small-scale mining sites were sighted 
and the majority of miners encountered in the forest named Mwalazi as their village of 
residence. A foreigner counting trees was obviously perceived as an eccentric but 
harmless undertaking and villagers could be involved in open discussions while met 
inside the forest.  
 
With regard to the sequencing of methods, the present study scheduled the qualitative 
PRA component first so that it could not only create a free standing base of information 
but also to focus and strengthen the subsequent survey. The sequencing of the PRA 
study at the beginning of the research further allowed the researcher to avoid working 
through the „contact villagers‟. These were farmers selected to work closely with the 
FBD in the enforcement of the forest management regime. Using these contact villagers 
would have been an obstacle to reaching greater numbers of villagers, including poor 
villagers. A similar finding was confirmed by Place et al. (2007: 320) in agricultural 
research in Kenya.  
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5.2.1.3. Research phases 
The three major research phases of the present study were: sampling of households and 
stratification, questionnaire/checklist design, and analysis and interpretation. The 
integration of these phases is similar to what Carvallho and White (1996) call 
„systematic integration‟.  
 
Criteria for sampling and stratification were developed through the PRA study. The 
formal household and forest surveys were then used to quantify the findings of the PRA 
study. Through the PRA group discussions lists of criteria for wealth ranking were 
created. A list of households falling into the different wealth categories was developed, 
which formed the basis for stratification and sampling of households for the quantitative 
survey to capture many of the stated wealth indicators over wide areas.  
 
The PRA exercises helped to identity the key issues related to forest management and 
utilization, which were then built into the questionnaire design for further testing. Some 
initial analysis of the PRA exercises revealed interesting differences between gender 
groups and leaders and non leaders. It was thus decided that the quantitative study 
would be structured to allow these types of stratification. Within each village, 
households were selected to capture variation: first stratification was done across rich, 
middle and poor, and across all sub-villages. Across these categories, other variations 
were sought: gender, female-headed households, „younger‟ and „older‟ households as 
well as leaders and non-leaders. The latter was done due to the hypothesis that 
leadership plays an important role in determining access to forest resources, which was 
established during the PRA work.  
 
Another major influence of the qualitative on the quantitative data was the notion that 
forest name, boundaries, ownership and management status are contested and unclear 
concepts at village level and differed from the perceptions of FBD and the official 
literature. The surveys thus included the local name of the respective forest reserve 
established during the PRA work in order to avoid confusion during the survey over 
which forest was meant. Lastly, the participatory wealth ranking allowed for the 
development of a list of assets suitable for the study area to be included in the 
household survey.  
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During the analysis and interpretation of data, the forest transects did not only provide 
quantitative data on the condition of the forest reserves but at the same time participant 
observation was used to understand everyday life and interaction with the forest, 
watching and talking to whoever walked in, out and through the forest. This revealed 
aspects of forest resource use and paths of explanation that were not revealed during the 
village level work. The same analyst was working on the analysis of the quantitative 
and qualitative data, which is considered beneficial (London et al. 2007).   
 
The data collection for this study took place between April 2005 and August 2006. The 
researcher recruited a team of research assistants, who were trained in the required 
research methodologies prior to collecting the data. The research team consisted of two 
PRA facilitators and one translator; two to three enumerators during the household 
surveys; two to three transect recorders and one botanist during the forest transects. To 
facilitate the forest transect work one transect cutter was locally recruited from the 
surrounding villages on a daily basis. A field manual was prepared to guide the 
researcher and her team during the data collection. The manual included checklists for 
interviews and group exercises for the PRA sessions and data collection sheets for the 
forest transects.   
5.2.2. PRA study 
5.2.2.1. Introduction 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), developed in the early 1990s, uses a range of 
techniques that are facilitating in nature and attempt to be less extractive and more 
participatory than survey based methods. PRA methods are considered fundamental 
tools for working in rural situations. Compared to formal surveys, PRA techniques are 
valued for their multidisciplinary and holistic examination of issues, and their flexible 
and responsive approach. The primary objective of PRA is the empowerment of local 
people and stimulating sustainable local action and institutions (Chambers 1994).  
 
PRA data is usually considered robust in that cross-checking and triangulation can be 
made by professionals while they are in the field (IIED 1994). High validity and 
reliability can be achieved where properly conducted studies have been validated 
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against other approaches and sources of information (White 2002, De Vaus 2002, 
Longhurst 1994). However, PRA studies need to be conducted properly to lead to 
reliable results. PRA requires particular skills such as team management and facilitation 
skills and the ability to relate to local people within the context of a reversal of learning. 
Rushed and uncritical applications of the methodology can lead to biased results.  
 
A critique of PRA studies is that they are affected by individual interest, influence of 
the facilitator and social dominance and authority in a community. Sometimes leaders 
let individual factors of interest prevail over wide group participation. The use of PRA 
techniques for data collection tends to emphasize the expression of general, normative 
information by consensus, and may therefore fail to identify the differences of opinion 
within the community. The perspectives and interests of the most powerful section of 
the community are likely to dominate the expression of consensus, to the exclusion of 
the views of non-dominant community members. It is for these reasons that Mosse 
(1994) warns that PRA can lead to the „construction of local knowledge‟. PRA events 
are usually not equally accessible to all social sections of the community and often 
women, in particular, and disadvantaged farmers of lower social status are less likely to 
participate in PRA events or to dominate groups (Place et al. 2007:320). The reasons for 
non participation can be practical (time, distance) and social (fractions, alliances). 
Furthermore, due to their limited sample size, PRA data is less suitable for comparison 
across villages because of the different meanings attached to numbers (Place et al. 
2007).  
5.2.2.2. Objective 
The purpose of the PRA study was to:   
 Collect general population and economic data to construct village profiles; 
 Get to know the communities and get known them and to gain trust; get permission 
for the subsequent household survey and forest transect work; 
 Establish an understanding of the patterns of natural resource use, forest resource 
use in particular and the prevailing forest management aspects and conflicts; 
 Construct the sampling frame for the questionnaire survey, in particular the 
stratification by sub-villages and wealth groups; 
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 Pre-test aspects of survey methodology, such as how to best ask questions and the 
effect of alternative question wording on patterns of response.  
The present PRA study was carried out during the month of June 2005 in Fulwe and 
Maseyu villages and during the months of June and July 2006 in Milawilila, Logo, 
Mwalazi and Ngong‟olo villages.  
5.2.2.3. Design   
Key informants, single and multiple sex groups of up to 31 men or women contributed 
information in discussions, semi-structured interviews, mapping, diagramming and 
ranking exercises. In total 204 villagers participated in the PRA exercises in the six 
study villages. Table 5.1 overleaf provides an overview of the techniques used and the 
information outputs.  
A programme for the PRA study, interview checklists and data entry sheets for the 
various exercises were prepared beforehand by the researcher to ensure consistency 
across the gender groups and across the villages. At the beginning of the PRA sessions, 
informants were encouraged to express their views and participate as freely as possible. 
All exercises were carried out in Kiswahili. 
The villagers worked in gender groups, which were assisted by one trained male and 
female facilitator each, while the researcher took notes of the proceedings assisted by 
the translator. In this way, the PRA study involved process observation by the 
researcher, which introduced another source of triangulation (and validation) and 
generated valuable information about community structures and relationships. The 
facilitators recorded their notes and observations in the pre-developed data entry-sheets. 
The interviews and exercises were carried out so that the various topics of research were 
covered at least twice from different perspectives (i.e. men and women, village leader 
and non-leaders). The outputs produced by the villagers, notes of the facilitators and 
proceedings recorded by the researcher were compared at the end of each field day and 
the results discussed within the research team for validation.  
The activities and discussions lasted two days per village. The researcher visited the 
villages prior to the PRA exercise for a brief introduction with the Village Chairman 
and/or VEO to request permission to conduct the research study. 
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Table 5.1 PRA techniques used in sample villages 
Information type Participants Total numbers of 
participants in six villages 
Technique used Information output 
Village profile  Village leaders, key 
informants  
12  
(Village Executive Officer 
and Village Chairman in 
each village) 
Focus group discussion 
Semi-structured interviews 
Population and ethnic groups 
Access to community services 
Infrastructure and housing 
Local economy 
Natural resource features 
Land ownership, tenure and access 
Forest resources and management 
Role of village 
environment/fores
t committee  
Village environment/ 
forest committee 
members 
68 Focus group  
Venn diagram 
History and formation 
Activities  
Meetings and records kept 
Licenses and fees/Dealing with offenders 
Understanding of JFM 
Perception of cost and benefits 
Importance of committee to villagers  
Village spatial 
information 
Men, women 124 Village Sketch map Natural 
Resources map 
Village layout and land use 
Source area for natural resources  
Village temporal 
information 
Men, women 124 Seasonal calendar 
 
Focus group discussion 
Cycle of farm and non-farm activities 
 
Livelihoods past and present/trends 
Forest resource 
inventory  
Men, women  124 Group discussion 
Ranking exercises 
Species and type of use 
Preferred species  
Forest resource 
values and 
perceptions  
 124 Focus group discussion Perceptions on forest governance 
 
Wealth ranking  Men, women 124 for indicators Ranking exercise Wealth ranking of households picked randomly 
from village register 
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To minimise the influence of the leaders on the invitation of villagers to the PRA 
sessions, participants were randomly pre-selected by the researcher from the village 
register. This minimized the potential danger of information bias. From the randomly 
selected households, either a woman, a man, an elderly person, or a young person, were 
invited so that each sub-village had one representative from each category. This was to 
ensure both equal representation of all sub-villages and participation of „ordinary‟ 
villagers from various social segments of the community.  
 
To avoid dominance during the discussion and to allow the villagers to talk freely, the 
leaders were interviewed separately and requested to leave the PRA exercise once their 
interviews were completed. Furthermore the separate gender groups allowed women to 
express their views more freely in the presence of a trained female facilitator. Women 
were more reluctant than men to express their views and to take an active role in group 
discussions and exercises, particularly in those involving discussion about forest 
management. Forestry was considered a men‟s topic.   
 
The selection of experienced Tanzanian facilitators, focus of the research on recording 
of proceedings and team management, sound preparation of tools and daily team 
meetings to discuss the results and prepare for the next day were meant to ensure sound 
application of PRA methods and to reduce the risk of information bias. Careful cross-
checking of data from group exercises and key informant interviews with direct 
observations of the research while working in the study villages was done to increase 
the reliability of information collected. Nevertheless due to the potentially sensitive 
subjects under discussion such as forest resource use in state forests, and my perceived 
position as an outsider with connections to the forest management authorities, people 
were reluctant to fully disclose their patterns of forest harvesting. Overall, the PRA 
study is considered to provide a reasonably accurate overview of the prevailing social, 
economic, ecological and institutional conditions in the study villages within a 
relatively short time period. The information gathered provided the basis for the 
construction and sampling of the household survey. The use of PRA methodology was 
furthermore an effective way of making personal contacts with the villagers and gaining 
trust as a harmless foreign researcher for the subsequent forest work and household 
interviews.  
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5.2.2.4. Wealth ranking   
The wealth ranking exercise gave rapid and detailed insight into particular facets of 
rural wealth differences and local perceptions. The official village register served as the 
basis list from which names of households were randomly picked for each sub-village. 
Wealth ranking exercises were guided processes in which facilitators asked for 
measurable indicators, with some preconceptions about what type of indicators were 
sought. Groups of men and women from the respective sub-village were then 
responsible for ranking the households in their sub-village. Participants of small groups 
of about four people were then ranking the households of particular sub-villages once 
the criteria for the wealth groups had been established jointly in the larger group. Place 
et al. (2007:316) consider the use of PRA methods for wealth or poverty criteria more 
efficient than survey and it can be done with relatively few respondents.  
 
Wealth is usually a sensitive issue. Nevertheless the people were open and willing to 
discuss wealth categories and not reluctant to classify village members according to 
these criteria. The wealth ranking exercise helped to sharpen differences between types 
of households because they also sought cut-off levels of the indicators that could sort 
households into different wealth groups. The most commonly cited relative wealth 
indicators were lack of or possession of various assets and ability or inability to meet 
important needs such as educating children or affording health services. The tables in 
Appendix 7 containing the wealth class indicators reveal for each village that villagers 
perceive well-being more in terms of assets than in the outcomes of assets and 
capabilities (i.e. consumption of goods and services). The fact, that poor people are 
considered lazy and thieves hints at a degree of marginalization. The ownership of a 
bike proved to be an important wealth indicator in the six villages. Having a house 
made of bricks indicates being better off, having a thatched house means the household 
is less well-off. The number of livestock (i.e. chicken, goats) is seen as evidence of 
wealth. Land acreage held by the household was positively correlated to wealth in this 
study. These findings are consistent with other participatory poverty assessment studies 
in Tanzania (e.g. Van Campenhout 2006).   
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5.2.3. Household survey 
5.2.3.1. Introduction 
Until the 1980s surveys were the dominant methodology in field research in rural 
development. Surveys are characterized by a systematic set of data which produces a 
variable-by-case data grid, often collected through random sampling and structured 
questionnaires, analysed through statistical techniques (de Vaus 2002, Carvalho and 
White 1997). Survey research is regarded as inherently quantitative and positivistic. 
Some of the common problems of surveys relate to the restricted focus as a result of the 
use of questionnaires with a narrow enquiry. Contrasted to qualitative methods, surveys 
are described as being rigid and unable to adapt to change once the fieldwork has started, 
unable to describe qualitative information and hence unable to investigate complex 
issues of causation. Bias is difficult to eliminate in sampling and interviewing. 
Nevertheless surveys are considered well suited to providing certain types of factual, 
descriptive information. By their nature, surveys must assume similar models of 
behaviour for all households (Place et al. 2007). This is beneficial for systematically 
testing for the effects of specific variables. However, its high degree of complexity can 
render interpretation difficult. The advantages of surveys are seen in their generation of 
representative quantitative information reliable with quantified confidence limits. It also 
generates data that allows comparative analysis across sites and results that can be 
replicated (White 2002). Survey data allows making inferences which can be 
generalized more with respect to certain topics (Place et al. 2007).  
5.2.3.2. Objective  
The household survey of this study aimed at obtaining quantitative data on some of the 
emerging aspects of forest resource use and management identified during the PRA 
work to complement the qualitative data collected. The survey objectives were to:  
 
1. Collect household asset and income data; 
2. Assess socio-economic differentiation between the households in the study villages 
and their relation to access to and utilization of forest resources; 
3. Identify the knowledge and perception of villagers on the prevailing forest 
governance and management regime.  
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5.2.3.3. Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was developed to include indicators that were identified to address 
the three survey objectives described in Section 5.2.3.2 above. In addition it used 
indicators standardized by the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics as „core poverty 
module‟ (United Republic of Tanzania 2006a). The questionnaire was pilot tested 
through six interviews in Lubungo village located between Dindili and Kitulang‟halo 
forest reserves, which were not included in the main household survey. The type of 
testing employed was „undeclared‟, meaning that it was not disclosed to the respondent 
that the questionnaire is being tested prior to recording the responses (De Vaus 2002). 
Once the questionnaire was completed, the interviewer informed the respondents about 
the test and gathered their views and feedback afterwards. After the testing the 
questionnaire was reviewed and revised. The final version of the questionnaire used for 
the survey (Appendix 2) consisted of questions on the subject of:  
 
 Core household and poverty information (Sections 1 to 6 , and 11) based on the 
core poverty module  
 
 Forest resource use and access (Sections 7 and 9): 
 Name of forest, frequency of entry  
 Products obtained and type of use (consume/sale) 
 Access and main use of forest, change   
 Benefits obtained 
 Perception on forest quality and its change; effect on livelihood 
 
 Forest governance (Sections 8 and 10):  
 Forest ownership and management 
 Existence of committee and management agreement 
 Patrol activities 
 Forest revenue  
 Access to information about rules of access and use of forest reserve 
 By-laws and dealing with offenders, permits  
 Perception on forest governance 
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The use of factual questions in the opening sections allowed the respondents to become 
accustomed to the interview process. The core questions on forest resource use and 
governance then came in the middle of the interview to minimize the risk of reduction 
in the respondents‟ concentration and the most sensitive questions were placed at the 
end. The questionnaire combined „open‟ and „closed‟ questions. All questions were 
asked as open questions to which the respondent was free to answer as he/she saw fit. 
Responses to the closed questions were field-coded in the questionnaire such that they 
were checked into pre-set response categories that were not shown to the respondent 
(Sudman and Bradman 1982). To cross-check against the potential risk of 
misinterpretation of responses, the questionnaire included a set of statements relating to 
similar issues under different sections which were then cross-checked and compared 
during the analysis. The questionnaire was translated into Kiswahili and verified by the 
Institute of Agricultural Extension at the SUA in Morogoro. 
5.2.3.4. Sampling  
The household survey was carried out in the six villages of Fulwe, Maseyu, Milawilila, 
Logo, Mwalazi and Ngong‟olo. The household is an important level of analysis, as farm 
households are key decision makers with regard to the management of the resource base 
and are hence considered the driving force of success or failure to achieve resource 
conservation policy and poverty reduction objectives at aggregate level (Reardon and 
Vosti 1995).  
The researcher is aware of the difficulties of defining the household as a unit of analysis 
due to the complexity and variability of the arrangements that people make – either 
individually or in groups – for providing themselves with food and/or other essentials 
for living (Guyer 1981, Collier et al. 1986). For the agricultural population in Morogoro 
Region, the household unit is defined in terms of rights to land, with every village 
household being allocated its own residential plot and farmland by the village 
government. New households are formed as adult children move out of their parents‟ 
house to marry and start their own families, with their own areas of farmland. Within 
the household, husbands and wives – particularly in the case of polygamous households 
– sometimes cultivate separate farm plots. The majority of the population in the study 
area is of Moslem religion and one husband may have several wives living in separate 
houses. Although household members may then use some or all of the income generated 
by the sale of crops from these different plots for their individual needs, the subsistence 
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requirements of the household for food are met by the pooling of the crops produced. 
The head of the household is responsible for major decisions regarding the allocation of 
resources within the household. This might explain why some of the households 
interviewed were female headed, although the women themselves did not declare 
themselves as household head.  
As Table 5.2 below shows, the sample sizes represented between 1 and 7% of the 
village population. It is important to note that the sampling technique was not adjusted 
to population size but rather tried to ensure an equal number of interviews per wealth 
group and sub-village. Therefore, purposive sampling was used to ensure representation 
of all wealth groups and all sub-villages, so that those sub-villages closest to the forest 
and those furthest from the forest were represented. Furthermore the purposive 
sampling ensured representation of both gender groups as well as leaders and non 
leaders. Usually the chairman and executive officer of the village government and the 
chairman and/or secretary of the village forest committee were interviewed, as well as 
other leaders where available.  
Table 5.2 Village study sites and sample sizes 
Village  
Population 
2002/03 
Census 
Population 
this study*) 
2005-2006 
Households 
sampled 
Percent of 
population  
Maseyu 2,034 1,328 66 5 
Mwalazi 1,697 3,000 62 2 
Milawilila 828 910 63 7 
Fulwe 6,511 8,630 75 1 
Ngong‟olo 2,224 2,700 72 3 
Logo 1,109 534 60 5 
*) Based on information provided by the Village Leaders during interviews.  
The remainder of the interviews (n = 371) were carried out in households that were 
selected through stratified random sampling from the household lists based on the 
village register. The following sampling procedure was used:  
From each sub-village in a respective village 20 households were selected randomly 
from the village register. These names of households were then given to the small 
groups of village representatives from each sub-village during the PRA sessions for the 
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participatory wealth ranking. Given that each village has 4 to 8 sub-villages (see Table 
5.9 in Section 5.3 below), per village a total of 80 (4 x 20) to 160 (8 x 20) households 
had been wealth grouped by the villagers. This constituted the sampling frame of the 
village household lists classified by wealth. From this sample frame a target sample size 
of at least 60 interviews per village was set to ensure representation of each of the three 
wealth groups (rich; middle; poor) with 20 interviews each per wealth group. 
Representation from each sub-village in the sample frame was ensured. The actual total 
sample size was 401 households with between 62 to 73 households per village.  
The wealth distribution of the total sample and per study village is shown in Table 5.3 
below. Again, it is noted, that the aim of the sampling method was to have a balanced 
representation of the three wealth groups within the sample to allow for wealth 
disaggregated analysis. The aim was not to represent within the sample the general 
distribution of wealth classes within the study area, a variable which is not known.  
Table 5.3 Wealth distribution of household survey sample 
Village rich  middle poor ∑ 
Fulwe     
n 23 26 26 75 
% 30,7 34,7 34,7 100 
Maseyu     
n 17 27 22 66 
% 25,8 40,9 33,3 100 
Logo     
n 20 25 18 63 
% 31,7 39,7 28,6 100 
Milawilila     
n 19 21 23 63 
% 30,2 33,3 36,5 100 
Ngong'olo     
n 16 30 26 72 
% 22,2 41,7 36,1 100 
Mwalazi     
n 19 25 18 62 
% 30,6 40,3 29,0 100 
Sample     
N 114 154 133 401 
% 28,4 38,4 33,2 100 
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When respondents were not available for the interview or declined to be interviewed 
(20% of all cases) a random selection of substitutes was undertaken from the village 
register for the particular sub-village to achieve the required sample size. These 
„replacement‟ households had not been part of the household list subjected to the 
participatory wealth ranking undertaken during the PRA and were therefore ranked 
retroactively based on their list of household assets, which showed to a large extent 
consistency with the participatory wealth ranking (see Table 5.5 below).  
For each household in the sample, one respondent was interviewed; that person being 
either the head of the household (67.8% of the sample) or a wife of the head of 
household (31.9% of sample).
13
 14% of the household heads interviewed were female, 
81% male and in 5% of the cases the household head did not indicate the sex. The 
gender distribution of the total sample is 58.4% male and 41.6% female respondents, 
which allowed for gender disaggregated analysis.  
In addition to the leaders included through purposive sampling, leadership status was 
established from within the questionnaire through inclusion of two questions relating to 
i) membership in village government and ii) membership in a village committee.
14
 
These two were then combined, into the „leadership status‟ of the household. This was 
done since the number of leaders obtained prior to the interview through purposive 
sampling was very small and this second method allowed identifying a larger number of 
leaders. The sample then had 34.2% of households with leadership status and 74.8% not 
with leadership status.  
The rate of non-response in the sample was low, although women more frequently than 
men refused to answer some of the questions pertaining to forest governance and 
management on the grounds that matters pertaining to the forest were „men‟s business‟. 
5.2.3.5. Interview procedure  
Interviews were carried out during April 2006 and from June to August 2006 by three 
Tanzanian enumerators and lasted approximately 60 minutes per household. The 
researcher accompanied each interviewer during his/her first five interviews to ensure 
                                                 
13
 In one case a relative of the household head other than the wife was interviewed, which represents the 
remaining 0.2%. 
14
 While the first question generated a sample distribution of 23.7% yes and 76.1% no answer categories, 
the second generated a distribution of 24.2% yes and 65.6% no answers. 
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consistency with the interview procedure. Meetings with the interviewer prior and after 
visiting each of the six villages further ensured consistency and the recording of 
additional notes and observations. The completed questionnaires were field checked 
within a couple of days of the interview to minimize errors and missing data items.  
The enumerators were sometimes accompanied by a village guide, usually a person 
selected by the village leaders, who was well known in the village to direct the 
enumerators to the households and to help with initial introductions. Their presence was 
important as an indication that the work was being carried out with the knowledge and 
approval of the village leadership. However, in order to avoid that their presence at the 
interview would inhibit the respondent from freely expressing their views, even those 
expressing criticism of village institution and leaders, the person was requested not to 
participate in the interview and to leave.  
Most interviews were carried out outside of people‟s houses, a setting at which 
respondents would feel familiar and not be inhibited in their responses. The setting 
furthermore allowed the enumerators to assess the characteristics of housing through 
personal observation without directly asking and to note down any other personal 
observations about the living conditions of the particular household. In some cases the 
household members had to be followed to their fields where they were undertaking their 
daily agricultural labour or to a funeral site. In such instances the respondents were 
formally asked about the condition of their housing facilities.  
5.2.3.6. Wealth ranking  
Although participatory wealth ranking is considered reliable, one limitation is that it 
does not allow comparisons across villages because definitions and criteria may vary, 
resulting in non-comparable distributions (Place et al. 2007). As Campenhout (2006) 
points out, participatory poverty assessments can be a fast and cheap way to gather 
information about poverty in a geographically limited area like a village or a subvillage, 
while large-scale surveys are superior in terms of comparability. Wealth ranking derived 
through participatory methods measures the „relative‟ wealth of one particular village. 
However, the wealth or poverty levels differ between study villages. Therefore, this 
study used two methods of wealth grouping. First, the households were classified 
through participatory wealth ranking into three groups – rich, middle and poor – during 
the PRA sessions which served the purposive sampling of the household survey. Second, 
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the calculation of an asset level for each household, based on monetary values, provided 
the basis for the division of the entire sample into asset quartiles. The total asset value 
for each household was based on the type and number of assets owned valued at the 
average price across the full sample. The classification based on the total value of assets 
of the household therefore generated a grouping of households that allows for inter-
village comparison. According to Carter and Barrett (2006) the measurement of asset 
values can help to overcome the various limitations of other poverty measures. The 
comparison of the result of the two methods of wealth ranking is shown in Table 5.4 
below. Both types of wealth grouping were highly significantly positively correlated 
(Spearman: r=0.417, p<0.01; Kendall‟s tau_b: r=0.370, p<0.01). 
Table 5.4 Comparison PRA wealth grouping and asset quartile groups (in % of respondents) 
    Asset quartile group  Total (n) 
   1 2 3 4  
wealth group  rich 56 28 15 15 114 
per PRA middle 32 48 49 25 154 
  poor 12 24 36 60 132 
Total   100 100 100 100 400 
(Note: The total asset value (ranges) of the asset quartile groups in TSH are as follows:  
1: > 610, 001; 2 = 370,001 - 610,000; 3 = 22,001 - 370,000; 4 < 22,000) 
 
5.2.4. Forest transects  
Forest transects were conducted with a method derived from what is called in 
conservation literature „disturbance transects‟ (Ahrends et al. 2010; TFCG 2006, 
Frontier-Tanzania 2005c, Frontier-Tanzania 2001). These measure the type and extent 
of human use of a particular forest through the number of cuts of trees and poles. 
However, since the term disturbance is biased, the author of this thesis prefers to use the 
term „human use‟ instead on the grounds that the main purpose of the present study was 
to assess the condition of the forests as a function of human forest use.   
5.2.4.1. Sampling  
Table 5.5 overleaf shows the sample sizes of the forest transects. Transects were marked 
on Tanzania Ordnance Survey topographic maps (Series Y742; 1:50,000) prior to the 
fieldwork and were laid randomly along the grid to cover areas with access from forest 
edge (area 0–1 km from identified forest boundary) and areas in the forest centre (all 
areas further than 1 km from the boundary). Every sub-unit was sampled to ensure that 
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spatial variations of human forest use within the sites could be assessed. Within these 
systematic divisions, sampling locations have been randomly assigned before knowing 
the actual area. This procedure is known as restricted random sampling (Krebs 1999; 
Moore and Chapman 1986) and allows statistical data analysis. Appendix 3 includes 
maps with transect lines to illustrate this sampling scheme. 
Table 5.5 Forest study sites and samples drawn  
Forest Study Site   
Forest Size 
(hectares) 
Number of 
50 metre 
sample 
sections 
Percent of 
total forest 
area sampled 
Kitulang‟halo 22,380 169 0.4 
Kimboza 4,050 60 0.6 
Milawlila 128 20 0.4 
Dindili 10,069 80 0.4 
Ruvu 30,935 310 0.5 
Ngambaula 28 20 0.4 
The field assessment was conducted along transects. The randomly assigned transect 
starting points were U.T.M. grid positions. They were fed into a previously calibrated 
GPS (Garmin 12), and the GPS navigation aid was used to reach the location. Due to 
the random sampling, some of the intended transect starting points proved to be 
impossible to access. In these cases, the nearest accessible area has been sampled 
instead. In other cases, it was impossible to continue on a particular transect as the 
thicket became impenetrable or the terrain inaccessible due to rock cliffs. Whenever 
possible, the survey team moved round these areas and continued the forest transect in a 
straight line.  
The total area of the forest sampled by the transect lines was set to 0.4 to 0.6% of the 
area and using a compass, all transects were aligned north-south or east-west as far as 
possible. They were 10 m in width and, depending on the restrictions that the 
accessibility imposed on the headway, between a minimum of 500 m and 1,000 m in 
length. Ideally, all transects would have been 1 km in length. However, in areas of 
impenetrable terrain the forest transects needed to be aborted and on other days, where 
possible, they were expanded to cover the required sampling intensity in the given time 
period. The transects were subdivided into 10 x 50 m sections and data was collected 
separately for these sampling units, from now on referred to as „plots‟.  
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Changes in vegetation structure were assessed using standard plot-based vegetation 
sampling techniques (Mueller-Dombois and Ellenberg 1974). Along each 50 m section 
or plot of the transect the occurrence of the various tree species was recorded using the 
classification method to obtain a complete list of tree species in each sample (Mueller-
Dombois and Ellenberg 1974). This method is based on generalizations about variable 
plant communities that allow a classification by abstracting from particular properties of 
individual plant communities. The limitations of this method are that the classification 
system is, due to the abstraction, only of regional significance and entails an element of 
personal judgement (Mueller-Dombois and Ellenberg, 1974).  
The forest condition assessment required five people: a transect cutter, who went ahead 
with the measurement tape (50 m), a botanist for species identification and collection of 
herbarium samples, two observers of human forest use and site conditions and one 
recorder (the author herself), who also carried a compass.  
5.2.4.2. Variables assessed  
The assessment focused on relevant vegetation parameters and disturbance indicators. A 
simple methodology to measure man-made disturbance developed by Frontier and 
based on Hall and Rodgers (1986) was applied in this study. The methodology has been 
widely used in forest projects in Tanzania (Frontier-Tanzania 2001, Frontier-Tanzania 
2001a, Frontier-Tanzania 2001b, Frontier-Tanzania 2005a, Frontier-Tanzania 2005b, 
Frontier-Tanzania 2007, Lowe and Clark 2000). In its core essence the Frontier 
methodology was applied during this study but some adjustments were made, which are 
described in this section. The Frontier methodology consists of a series of max. 300 m 
transects (30 m apart) recording all trees (>15 cm in Diameter at Breast Height (DBH) 
and 3 m long) and shrubs/saplings (<15 cm DBH). Within these two categories, the 
„trees‟ are classified as „live‟, „dead‟, „new cut‟ or „old cut‟. The Frontier approach was 
extended in the present study to include:  
 Detailed DBH measurements of standing trees  
Instead of merely distinguishing between two size classes (pole and trees), the DBH 
was measured for each tree > 15 cm DBH and larger or equal 3 m height at the standard 
height of 1.3 m above the ground. If at 1.3 m height the stem had growth anomalies, the 
measurement was taken directly above these. In the absence of a calibrated DBH tape, a 
normal measurement tape was used, and the DBH was obtained with standard circle 
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calculations. Trees between 10–15 cm DBH and > or equal 2.5 m height were recorded 
as poles. In addition the height of each standing tree was estimated. Estimation is not 
perfect and cannot claim precision. However if consistently done by the same person in 
all samples, any errors have been made consistently and should thus not make a 
difference to the comparison between the forests.  
 Recording of withies  
Recording of withies using the definition of Hall and Rodgers (1986) as a pole about 2 
to 10 cm DBH and < or equal 2 m long was included in the study method. 
Whereas poles, locally known as nguzo, are used for supporting structures during house 
construction, withies, in Kiswahili called fitu, are used to hold mud and thatch in place. 
 Recording of cuts 
The Frontier methodology was followed in that for each plot the number of old and 
recent cuts of timber trees and cuts of poles was recorded. In addition the cuts of withies 
were recorded as well. A “recent” cut is regarded less than 6 months ago. The “age” of 
the cutting was assessed by the colour of the tree stump, the crown and the surrounding 
surface area (Ahrends et al. 2010; TFCG 2006, Frontier-Tanzania 2005c, Frontier-
Tanzania 2001, Graham et al. 2000). As Graham et al. (2000) describe “for a few 
months after felling the cut ends of the stump remain brown in colour. Within a year 
they have generally bleached grey or white. Eventually, under the combined actions of 
termites, boring insects, fungi and fire the stump decays away. In summary, a stump 
less than 6 months old is conspicuous by the state of the crown, colour of the cut ends, 
and presence of debris and clearing of the surrounding area. By 12 months the crown is 
bare and may be partly burnt away, the colour of the wood is grey and the vegetation of 
the ground round the stump shows little discontinuity. It then becomes impossible to 
assign an age with any confidence.” 
 Species identification  
The various tree species that occurred throughout the 50 m plots were identified and 
recorded. While in most cases the identification could be made in the field, 
approximately 350 samples were collected for subsequent identification by the botanist 
in the herbarium of the University of Dar es Salaam.  
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 Assessment of canopy cover, ground cover and liana density  
At the end of each 50 m plot the canopy cover, ground cover and liana density were 
assessed. Canopy cover was estimated as percentage of the sky being covered by the 
tree layer. Various methods exist to measure canopy integrity, commonly expressed as 
percentage cover. These methods range from sophisticated methods of using fish eye 
camera lenses to simple methods as using sighting tubes. The present study used a 
simple method with sighting tube during which the researcher assessed the percentage 
cover at four different points within a 10 by 10 meter square which were then averaged. 
The estimates were assigned to relatively robust percentage categories (> 5%, 5–10%, 
10–20%, 20–30% etc). Although precision of the absolute percentage value is 
questionable, they can however validly be compared as they were estimated by the same 
observer throughout the study. Liana density was described through a scaling system 
between 0 and 5 (see Table 5.6 below).  
Ground cover was assessed through three variables: the amount of grass, the amount of 
leaf litter and the amount of seedlings. For each of these variables a scale from 0 to 5, 
indicating increased intensity, was used.  
Table 5.6 Liana density score 
Score  Liana density 
0 No liana  
1 Very few  
2 Some  
3 Thicket with some liana 
4 Thorny thicket with some liana 
5 Lots of liana/impenetrable thicket 
 Accessibility parameters 
A score of accessibility (Table 5.7 below) of the terrain was calculated based on the 
following parameters and attributed to each plot based on the field notes:  
Table 5.7 Accessibility scores 
Score  Description Attributes 
1 easy flat, no rocks, no streams or dry riverbeds 
2 medium slight slope, some smaller rocks, small stream or dry riverbed 
3 difficult medium to steep slope, big rocks, medium stream or dry 
riverbed 
4 very difficult very steep slope, many big rocks or cliff, larger stream 
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Furthermore, for each plot, the distance to the forest edge, to the nearest road, the 
nearest settlement, distance from Morogoro and distance from Dar es Salaam were 
noted. This has been established subsequently from field notes on the location of any 
road, settlement or footpath encountered.  
 Recording of other human use   
In the field notes, for each plot any other human use of forest resources (besides cutting) 
was also recorded. This included: burn marks on trees; traps and snares; pit-saw timber 
harvesting sites (both old and recent); charcoal production pits (old and recent); farming 
(both old and recent); mining, evidence of grazing; debarking for medicinal use and 
parts of tree stems removed for tool making. The purposes of such signs of human use 
were interpreted by the local villager leading the transect team through the forest. 
Evidence of grazing was recorded through encounters of livestock and cow dung during 
fieldwork.  
5.2.5. Data analysis and interpretation   
5.2.5.1. Forest data  
In order to investigate research question one, experimental study design was used, 
allowing an analysis at two levels of comparison between JFM forest plots 
(experimental group) and non JFM forest plots (control group), the results of which are 
presented in Chapter 6 below:  
 A plot wise comparison across the entire sample (N=659), to investigate the overall 
forest condition in the study area and major differences between JFM plots (N=249) 
and non-JFM plots (N=410); 
 A pair-wise comparison across sites between the two forests (one from each group) 
within the three sites. The latter was done to investigate the differences between the 
three sites, which are ceteris paribus, due to the different JFM approaches.   
The terms forest condition and forest quality are often used as synonyms in the 
literature measured through a range of variables. Commonly these are bio-physical 
indicators such as the number and density of trees, diameter of trees at breast height 
(DBH), basal area, canopy density and species richness (Ravindranath N. H. et al 2004). 
This is then differentiated from forest „disturbance‟ measured through the number of cut 
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trees and poles in a forest. Without conservation bias, this shows the level of „human 
use‟ of wood resources harvesting and other forms of anthropogenic use of the forests.  
In the present study the term „forest condition‟ is defined as encompassing two 
elements: i) the quality of the forest; and ii) the extent of human use.  
Forest quality (i) is measured through the following variables:  
 Number of standing trees per plot (Trees) 
 DHB value of all standing trees per plot (DBH) 
 Height of all trees per plot (Height) 
 Number of poles per plot (Poles) 
 Number of withies per plot (Withies) 
 Number of naturally dead trees and poles 
 Canopy cover  
 Liana density 
 Leaf litter, seedlings and grass coverage 
 Species richness (average number of species found per plot) 
For these variables mean values per plot have been calculated.  
To measure the extent and type of human use of the forests (ii), mean values per plot 
have been calculated for the following variables:  
 
 Number of trees cut per plot 
 Number of poles cut per plot 
 Number of withies cut per plot 
 Other forms of human use, including: recorded incidences of burning, footpaths, 
traps, sawpits, charcoal burning sites, farm fields, mining sites, grazing, tool making, 
debarking.  
Thus, in this study, forest condition describes the bio-physical indicators of forest 
quality as well as the extent of human forest use leading to disturbance of the bio-
physical qualities of the forest.  
 Potential explanatory variables to be used for the analysis of predictors of human forest 
use through multiple regression analysis included the following:  
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 Distance from Dar es Salaam  
 Distance from Morogoro 
 Distance from nearest feeder road  
 Distance from village  
 Distance from forest edge  
 Accessibility/ease of access scoring scale  
 JFM  
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality (Field 2005) showed significantly non 
normal distribution for the majority of variables across the full sample, the two groups 
(JFM/non JFM) and the six forests. Thus, non parametric tests were used to assess 
statistical significance of the differences between groups. Where a variable was 
normally distributed, both parametric and non parametric tests were used.  
5.2.5.2. Household data  
The analysis of the household data reflects the experimental study design by comparing 
the experimental (three village adjacent to JFM forests „JFM villages‟) and the control 
group (three villages adjacent to the forests under sole state management „non JFM 
villages‟). The data gathered through the household survey was, where appropriate, 
triangulated with results from the qualitative PRA research and personal observation. 
The data set was first disaggregated and compared for the two groups. Subsequently, to 
investigate the equity question, the data was further disaggregated by the four asset 
wealth groups, by gender and into the sub-samples of leaders (N=137) and non leaders 
(N=263). The gender analysis used sex of the respondent (male=234, female=167) or 
sex of the household head (Male=324, Female=56, missing=21) as grouping variable, 
depending on whether the question was about individual opinion and behaviour or 
household level decisions.  
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality showed significantly non-normal 
distribution for the majority of household level variables. Thus non parametric tests 
were used to assess statistical significance of the differences between JFM and non JFM 
households. Where a variable was normally distributed, both parametric and non 
parametric tests were used.   
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It is important to note that in this study total household income could not be calculated. 
This is because people were reluctant to give reliable quantitative information on their 
household cash income. The wealth groups were therefore formed on the basis of 
household asset wealth. In contrast, forest income could be calculated as people 
indicated the type of forest products collected and sold as well as the prices. The study 
did not distinguish between cash and subsistence forest incomes.  
In order to determine how important forest income is to people, this study compared 
forest income to total household asset wealth. The author of this study is fully aware 
that comparing income (a flow variable) with wealth (a stock variable) has limited 
illustrative validity only. Forest income is better compared to total income (annual flow 
variables). In a limited way forest income can be compared to total wealth, provided one 
is aware of comparing a flow variable with a stock variable. A Maasai, who owns 400 
head of cattle, but only consumes blood and milk and wears a blanket and beads, has 
enormously high wealth and very low income. The translation of wealth into income or 
income into wealth is thus not a linear or proportional process. Nevertheless, the 
comparison made here can serve as an approximation of the relative significance of 
forest income to the households and the wealth categories.  
5.3. The study sites  
The three research sites of this study are located in the Uluguru mountains in Morogoro 
Rural District. This district is one of the six districts that comprise Morogoro Region in 
the mid-eastern part of Tanzania about 196 km south west of Dar es Salaam (see Figure 
5.2 overleaf). The six forest reserves and six villages selected as study sites based on the 
criteria outlined in Section 5.1 above are shown in Table 5.8 below and Figure 5.2 
overleaf.  
Table 5.8 Study sites: Forest reserves and villages selected for the study 
Site  Forest Reserve  Adjacent Village   Study Group 
1 Kitulang‟halo Maseyu Experimental Group 
Dindili Fulwe Control Group 
2 Kimboza  Mwalazi  Experimental Group 
Ruvu  Ngong‟olo  Control Group 
3 Milawilila Milawilila Experimental Group 
Ngambaula Logo Control Group 
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Figure 5.2 Map of Eastern Arc Mountains, including Ulugurus and Morogoro 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 and 5.10 below present an overview of key data about the six study villages 
and forest study sites. The forest study sites focused on forest reserves in two ecological 
zones: Tropical Lowland „Coastal‟ Forests in Kimboza, Ruvu, Milawilila and 
Ngambaula, as well as sub-montane gradational lowland coastal forests and miombo 
woodlands in Kitulang‟halo and Dindili. Six forest reserves were chosen that are all 
protection forest reserves, meaning they are meant for conservation and not for 
productive use. With regard to the legal status, four of the forests are under central 
government ownership by the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) and two are 
owned by the local government authorities (LGA) at district level. It was also possible 
to sample institutional differences with regard to the main party that first initiated and/or 
facilitated the JFM process. These are FBD in the case of Kitulang‟halo forest reserve, 
the regional catchment forest office in Morogoro in the case of Kimbosa forest reserve 
and a non-governmental organization (NGO) on behalf of the local government 
administration in Milawilila forest reserve.  
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The three JFM villages were selected because it was either the only forest adjacent 
village where JFM had been initiated (i.e. in the case of Maseyu village), or the village 
which according to the initiators of the process was showing the best performance with 
regard to the implementation of JFM (i.e. in the case of Mwalazi and Milawilila 
villages). Chapter 8 below describes the JFM process itself and provides information 
about the quality of the implementation as part of the governance related analysis.  
 
The six study villages are located in the same district and agro-ecological zone and have 
similar patterns of livelihood, which are described in more detail in Section 5.4 below. 
However, there are some distinct characteristics which differentiate the villages, which 
the researcher gathered through observation and during the PRA. These should be 
mentioned here.    
 
Maseyu and Fulwe villages in site 1 of this study are located about 150 km west of Dar 
es Salaam and 10–35 km east of Morogoro municipality on the regional trunk road from 
Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border in Mbeya region (TANZAM highway). The 
village of Maseyu was formed in 1974/75 by the resettlement scheme of the mid 1970s 
villagization policy in Tanzania, when most people were moved from scattered 
settlements north of the forest reserve to be concentrated near the Dar es Salaam–
Morogoro trunk road (Luoga et al. 2000). This road now marks most of the southern 
boundary of the Kitulang‟halo forest reserve (Luoga et al. 2000a). The highway 
provides market access and exposes these villages to strong market forces putting 
pressure on forest resources. The PRA study revealed that in these two villages, 
charcoal making has replaced farming as the main source of livelihood for both men and 
women, providing an important source of cash income. Charcoal making is most 
prominent in Maseyu village. In Fulwe there were richer farmers with large land 
holdings and mechanized tools. Both Maseyu and Fulwe have no land scarcity and 
access to public lands forests that provide alternatives to the government forest reserves.   
In Fulwe, around the northern and western boundaries of the Dindili forest reserve are 
wide areas of woodlands. With the first settlements having been established there in the 
late 1990s, these areas have been added as sub-villages of Fulwe named „Newland A 
and B‟. Its location in the Mikese ward headquarters and closeness to Morogoro 
municipality provide market access and exposure to outside visitors. There is an 
agricultural extension officer of the SUA stationed in Fulwe. 
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Figure 5.1 Study sites, six forest and six villages 
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Table 5.9 Key data of the study villages 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group 
Village Maseyu Fulwe Mwalazi Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi Milawilila Logo 
Ward  Mikese rural Mikese rural Mkuyuni rural Lundi rural Tawa Tawa 
Sub-villages 5 7 4 4 8  4  
Population 2,034 (2002 census); 
1,328 (2006 village 
records)  
6,511 (2002 census); 
8,630 (2006 village 
records)  
1,697 (2002 census ); 
3,000 (2006 village 
records)   
2,224 (2002 census); 
2,700 (2006 village 
records)  
828 (2002 census); 910 
(2006 village records)  
1,109 (2002 census); 534 
(2006 village records) 
Median age 20.9 21.2 18.2 17.9 16.3 16.8 
Migration Net in migration 
100% increase between 
1990 and 2000 due to the 
acquisition of land and 
charcoal business (Ngaga 
2004) 
Net in migration due to 
good pasture and farming 
land  
Neutral. Inward for 
mining activities, 
outward to larger towns 
Net out migration Net out migration Net out migration 
Ethnic group Mixed, some Waluguru, 
Christian and Muslim 
Mixed, mainly Wakame, 
then Waluguru. Christian 
and Muslim 
Mixed, mainly 
Waluguru, Christian and 
Muslim 
Waluguru, Christian and 
Muslim 
Waluguru, Christian and 
Muslim 
Waluguru, mainly 
Muslim 
Literacy rate 80% 85% 75% 80% 75% 75% 
Land No scarcity, no 
household without land, 
10-15 acres per 
household of max 6 
people, inheritance 
patrimonial 
No scarcity, 2-3 acres per 
household owned by men 
and women. Inheritance 
patrimonial, access 
through village 
government 
No scarcity, no 
households without land, 
20-50 acres for 
household with up to 6 
people, owned by men 
and women, farm sizes 
increasing, price of land 
TSH 1,000 per acre to 
village leaders 
Scarcity, 0.25-0.5 acres 
owned by both sexes, 
farm sizes decreasing 
strongly, used to be 10 
acres per person 5 to 10 
years ago 
Scarcity, 3 acres per 
person owned mostly by 
men, decreasing sizes 
about 200 acres in 2005, 
land distribution through 
village council  
High scarcity. 30% of 
households without land. 
1.5 acres owned only by 
men. Sizes decreasing 
strongly from 3-4 acres 5 
years ago, old fashioned 
system of in kind land 
rent from landlords  
 
Sources of 
livelihoods 
Charcoal making most 
important (80% of 
households), followed by 
farming 
Farming, small scale 
business, charcoal and 
brick making 
Farming, mining Farming, mining, small-
scale business, casual 
labour.  
Farming, small business, 
brick making, casual 
labour 
Farming, mining, fishing, 
casual labour 
Agriculture Subsistence crops: 
maize, millet, grams, 
cowpeas, beans. Cash 
crop: Sesame („simsim‟). 
Main crops are maize, 
millet, sesame, 
sunflower, cassava, 
sweet potatoes and 
Crops: Maize, millet, 
paddy rice, sesame, 
cassava. Fruits: Oranges, 
tangerine, mangoes 
Maize, rice, sesame, 
millet, cassava, coconut, 
banana 
Rice, millet, cassava, 
pepper, coconut, 
pineapple, banana 
Rice, sorghum, sesame, 
maize, black pepper, 
coconuts, oranges, 
pineapple, cassava, 
  
129 
 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group 
Village Maseyu Fulwe Mwalazi Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi Milawilila Logo 
Poor productivity due to 
bad weather, poor soils, 
tools and input supply, in 
particular seeds and 
fertilizers 
tomato  
 
grown as cash crops and 
sold to Arusha, Tabora 
and Dar es Salaam via 
middlemen.   
banana  
Livestock Chicken, ducks, goats Chicken, goats Chicken, goats, rabbits, 
ducks  
Chicken, goats Chicken, goats Chicken, goats 
Non-farm 
activities 
charcoal making, brick 
making 
petty businesses 
(biashara ndogondogo) 
such as the sale of fruit, 
brick making 
minor timber making, 
brick making 
charcoal making, brick 
making, beer brewing, 
mining 
brick making, biashara 
ndogondogo 
 
 
Forest 
resource use 
Firewood, brick making, 
building poles, whities, 
medicines, Kitulang‟halo 
has ritual value  
Firewood, charcoal 
making, timber and 
building materials. 
Timber sawing was 
going on at the time 
when we were 
conducting our forest 
transects.  
Fuelwood, brick making Fuelwood, timber, 
building materials, 
medicines, mining, ritual 
such as rain praying  
Firewood, in the past: 
collection of wild 
potatoes but not possible 
anymore due to JFM no 
access regime 
Firewood, poles, 
building material, timber 
if available. Most 
valuable timber has been 
extracted from the forest  
Main source 
of energy 
Firewood Fuelwood, charcoal, 
kerosene 
Firewood Firewood Firewood Firewood 
Village land 
forests 
Mazizi, Mavulu, 
Madondogo 
 Kulini, Hembadimala Kitonga, Luvimbo, 
Ngerengere 
none none 
Schools 2 primary schools 3 primary, 1 secondary 
school  
1 primary school No. Primary school 4 km 
away 
1 primary 1 primary, 350 students 
Health 
services 
Poor. Health centre in 
Mbwawani (6 kms away) 
Poor. Mikese, 
Mkwambarane, 
Morogoro 
Fair. Kibungo mission 
dispensary close by  
kms away 5 kms away in Tawa 12 kms away in Tawa 
Use of 
traditional 
healers  
Common  Common households  Common Predominantly Predominantly Predominantly 
Water supply Hand pumped village 
wells, dry out during dry 
Some subvillages have 
piped water. Others hand 
pumps which are dry 
Hand pumped village 
wells, dry during dry 
Hand pumped village 
wells in 3 out of 4 
subvillages, dry during 
Hand pumped village 
wells, dry during dry 
Hand pumped village 
wells, dry during dry 
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 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group 
Village Maseyu Fulwe Mwalazi Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi Milawilila Logo 
season during dry season season dry season season season 
Electricity No Three subvillages 
electrified 
No No No no 
Communicatio
n services 
Mobile, those who don‟t 
own a phone pay for use 
to others  
 
Mobile, those who don‟t 
own a phone pay for use 
to others  
 
Mobile, those who don‟t 
own a phone pay for use 
to others  
 
Mobile, those who don‟t 
own a phone pay for use 
to others  
 
Mobile, those who don‟t 
own a phone pay for use 
to others  
 
Mobile, those who don‟t 
own a phone pay for use 
to others  
Agricultural 
extension 
services  
Available, but poor  Extension officer based 
in Fulwe 
poor none good. Extension officer 
in Tawa.  
none 
Markets 
(distance) 
Chalinze (100km), 
Morogoro (35km), 
Mbwawani  
Lively road side market 
at highway in Fulwe, 
Morogoro (25km), 
through middlemen 
(walanguzi) from Dar es 
Salaam 
Mkwayuni (20km), 
Matombo (15km) 
Matombo, 10 kms away Tawa, 5 kms Tawa, 12 kms 
Roads At regional trunk road 
(tarmac), poor feeder 
roads poor, some 
subvillages without road 
access 
 
At regional trunk road 
(tarmac), poor feeder 
roads poor, some 
subvillages with poor 
road access 
Close to district gravel 
road from Mkwayuni to 
Matombo, other roads 
poor, most subvillages 
without road access 
Very poor. Narrow rural 
earth road leading into 
village about 5km off the 
Mkuyuni to Matombo 
road. Inaccessible during 
rainy season. Most 
subvillages without road 
access. 
Poor. Close to rural earth 
road about 10kms of the 
Mkwajuni to Matombo 
gravel road. Some 
subvillages without road 
access. 
 
Poorest. Narrow rural 
dirt road, hardly passable 
 (Source: PRAs conducted in the study villages)
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Table 5.10 Key data of the forest study sites 
15
 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group 
Forest  Kitulang‟halo  Dindili Kimboza Ruvu Milawilila Ngambaula  
Location South east of the 
Uluguru mountains, 35 
km east north east of 
Morogoro municipality, 
access from the 
Morogoro to Dar es 
Salaam regional road 
10 km from 
Kitulang‟halo forest and 
Maseyu village along the 
highway towards 
Morogoro, 25km north 
east of Morogoro  
Eastern Uluguru 
foothills, road access 
from the Morogoro to 
Kisaki road between 
Mkuyuni and Matombo 
villages, south of 
Kibungo mission  
Eastern Uluguru 
mountain foothills, road 
access from the Mkuyuni 
to Matombo road 
Southern direction on 
Morogoro – Kisaki road, 
turning right after 
Mkuyuni towards 
Changa village. 4 km 
walking from Changa. 
Forest boundaries within 
Milawilila village land 
Southern direction on 
Morogoro - Kisaki road, 
turning right after 
Mkuyuni towards 
Changa. Access during 
this study via a 1km 
footpath from Logo 
village  
Forest type/ 
Vegetation 
Miombo (60%)/ Sub-
montane (30% dry semi-
evergreen)  
Miombo (40%)/ Sub-
montane (60%, dry 
evergreen forest, closed 
forest with trees up to 
30m. Typical coastal 
lowland forest, a type 
that declined during the 
last century 
Tropical Lowland 
formerly 30-40m high 
canopy, now extracted, 
along the road Cedrela 
sp. and teak plantation 
protruding the forest 
Tropical Lowland / 
Riverine alongside Ruvu 
river 
Tropical Lowland 
closed canopy at 15 m, 
more open towards the 
edge, protects the banks 
of the Mvuha River 
Tropical Lowland, open 
canopy at 20 m  
Legal status National Catchment 
Forest Reserve 
(Protection) since 1955  
National Catchment 
Forest Reserve 
(Protection) since 1953  
National Catchment 
Forest Reserve 
(Protection) since 1964  
National Catchment 
Forest Reserve 
(Protection) since 1955  
Local Authority Forest 
Reserve (Protection) 
since 1968, in 1914 
gazetted as government 
reserve under German 
colonial rule 
Local Authority Forest 
Reserve (Protection) 
since 1986 
Altitude Ridge with an altitude of 
350 to 774 m  
North south running 
mountain ridge, altitude 
of 849m 
Karstic plateau with 
altitude of 300 to 400m 
Plateau on either sides of 
the Ruvu River gorge, 
altitude of 200 to 480m 
Gentle north-east slope, 
altitude of 320 to 400m  
Steep north facing slope 
above Mvuha River, 
altitude of 280 to 500m  
Climate Oceanic-continental, 
estimated rainfall 700-
900mm per year 
seasonally, wet season 
October to May, dry 
season June to 
September  
Estimated rainfall 700-
1000 mm per year, dry 
season June to October 
Oceanic temperatures, 
dry season June to 
August, estimated 
rainfall 1700 mm per 
year 
Oceanic temperatures, 
estimated rainfall 1800 
mm per year on the 
western edge, peaks in 
Dec. and May, 
decreasing eastwards, 
dry season July to 
Tropical, seasonal 
rainfall, driest periods 
September / October, 
orographic rainfall 
generated by the Uluguru 
Mountains  
Tropical, seasonal 
rainfall, driest periods 
September / October, 
orographic rainfall 
generated by the Uluguru 
Mountain, gets water 
from nearby river 
                                                 
15
 Sources: Ngaga et al. 2004, Luoga 2000a, Luoga et al. 2000a, Holmes 1995, Doggart et al. 2000. 
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 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
 Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group Experimental group Control group 
Forest  Kitulang‟halo  Dindili Kimboza Ruvu Milawilila Ngambaula  
September on the 
western edge, longer in 
the eastern reserve 
Adjacent 
villages 
Lubungo, Gwata 
Ujembe, Maseyu 
Fulwe, Lubungo Mwalazi, Changa, 
Uponda, Kibangile  
Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi, 
Mwalazi, Kibungo, 
Kibangile 
Milawilila, Mifulu Logo, Milawilila  
Human forest 
use 
Charcoal making Fires, charcoal making, 
exploitation of 
Brachylaena huillensis 
for construction, hunting 
of forest antelopes, 
farming  
 Ruby and gold mining, 
small scale farming, fire  
Mountain paddy 
cultivation, debarking of 
trees for medicine, 
logging of Milicia 
excela, Albizia versicolor 
and Khaya anthotheca, 
commercial hunting of 
Colobus monkeys, 
footpath runs through the 
middle of the reserve. 
Mountain paddy 
cultivation, removal of 
many tall trees opened 
up the canopy, 
understorey dominated 
by thorny woodland 
plants, commercial trade 
of colobus and blue 
monkey skins, Duiker 
are hunted  
Area 2638 ha  1006 ha 405 ha 3093 ha  14 ha  
 
2.8 ha 
Management 
status 
Since 1987 supported 
under FBD Catchment 
programme funded by 
Norway; JFM since 1999 
through FBD 
FBD, through the 
Morogoro Regional 
Catchment Office. No 
JFM   
Since 1987 under FBD 
Catchment  Programme, 
JFM since 1995 through 
Morogoro Catchment 
Office 
FBD, no JFM. Forest 
extension officer at 
Mwalazi village 
responsible for Ruvu  
Morogoro Rural district 
forest officer, JFM since 
1999  
Morogoro Rural District 
Forest Officer, no JFM  
(Sources: PRAs conducted in the study villages combined with literature study) 
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The aloofness of the village government towards the research team and a tiredness of 
receiving researchers were obvious signs of the high exposure to visitors. Prior to being 
allowed to ask questions, it had to be clarified how much people would be paid to spend 
time with the research team to answer the questions.  
 
Mwalazi village in site 2 seemed to have sufficient farming land, access to forest 
resources, and the mining in Ruvu forest reserve provides non farm income to mostly 
younger men. Ruvu is an important locality for ruby mining in Tanzania. Unlicensed 
mining is carried out in many places in the reserve, the soil cover removed and the 
whole area disturbed by the digging. Villagers of Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi village reported 
that land scarcity was high and access to land requires providing an “appreciation to the 
leaders” (VEO and Village Chairman, Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi village). The village of 
Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi is remotely located and thus lacks outside contact. There are few 
opportunities for non farm income other than mining. Upon our arrival in the village on 
Sunday afternoon the majority of the villagers had enjoyed the only distraction available, 
the local brew (pombe).  
In site 3, villagers of Logo village reported that most of the land was owned by a few 
people. Based on an old-fashioned system, which the Logo Village Executive Officer 
(VEO) called „Nyarubanja‟ system, the land is rented out in kind to the villagers. This 
used to be a system of customary law regulating tenure in the West Lake Region of 
Tanganyika, which was abolished after independence in 1961
16
. Nyarubanja is the name 
given to a group of plantations owned by an individual, usually a clan head or chief. 
The landlord (Mtwazi) rents land to the tenant (Mtwarwa), who is allowed to stay on the 
land and pays an annual tribute in the form of commodities to the landlord and renders 
his labour (Cory & Hartnoll 1971). Women in Logo were in a very disadvantaged 
position, “Luguru men use wives as land labourers” (Village Executive Officer, Logo 
village). The impression of the researcher of Logo being somewhat “backward” was 
confirmed through the fact that the village was very remote. The only access road to the 
village was a dirt road, which was not passable for the research team without prior 
clearing. It was obvious that the road had not been used in a long time. The arriving 
                                                 
16
 Through the „Act to enfranchise land held by Nyarubanja tenure‟, Act No. I of 1965, 18th March 1986.  
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researchers were surrounded by village elders and children upon their arrival making the 
remoteness of the village and lack of outside contact evident.  
Milawilila had relatively fair road access and market access and good agricultural 
extension services. This is due to its closeness to Tawa ward headquarters. An extension 
officer of the Uluguru Mountains Agricultural Development Project (UMADEP) of 
Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA), Morogoro, was stationed in Tawa. The 
deterioration of Ngambaula forest reserve and the enforced “no access regime” in 
nearby Milawilila forest reserve left the villagers in both Logo and Milawilila with no 
alternatives for their forest resource needs. There was land scarcity and there were few 
alternatives through village forests or public lands forests.  
5.4. Livelihood patterns in the study villages 
The descriptive statistics in the following sections serve to compare the socio-
economically similarity of the paired villages. The comparison of household categories 
across the three pairs of PFM – non PFM villages shows that these villages are indeed 
quite similar. This is important to note, since otherwise observed differences in forest 
use might be explained by socio-economic differences rather than differences in terms 
of official management regime (JFM/non JFM).  
5.4.1. Land ownership   
Almost half (45.6%) of all households interviewed own between 1–3 ha of land (Table 
A5.1 in Appendix 5). 31.2% own less than 1 ha and a fairly large percentage (13.5%) is 
landless. Only 5.7% of all households own farms larger than 3 ha and only 3.9% own 
farms over 5 ha in size. The comparison of land distribution between the six villages 
shows that households in Fulwe village are comparatively rich in land given that 13.3% 
of the interviewed households own more than 5 ha of land. In Maseyu the percentage of 
large land holders is 6%. The gap to the other villages is then fairly large, followed by 
Logo village where 1.6% of households own over 5 ha and in Ngong'olo 1.4%.  
In Milawilila and Mwalazi village none of the households had land holdings over 5 ha. 
The largest percentage of landless households was found to be in Mwalazi village 
(22.6%), followed by Ngong'olo (20.8%). In Logo and Fulwe the landless households 
represented 14.3% and 12%, respectively, of the sample. The smallest number of 
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landless households was in Maseyu (3%) and Milawilila (7.9%) villages. There was no 
statistically significant difference between JFM and non JFM villages in land ownership 
(U=19680.5, p>0.001).  
The sample households in Fulwe village owned together 189 ha of land out of which 
86% (163 ha) were cultivated in the same year (Table A5.2 in Appendix 5). This shows 
that Fulwe village is the village with the highest agricultural activity in terms of area 
cultivated. In Maseyu village only 55% of the total area owned by the respondents was 
cultivated. This corresponds with the finding of the PRA study that there was a shift in 
Maseyu village from farming to charcoal production as the main source of livelihood. 
Certain wealth groups cultivated more land than they owned in the respective year and 
others cultivated less land than they owned. Villagers in the poorest segment cultivated 
more land than they owned (Table A5.2 in Appendix 5). 
The analysis of the property rights of farm land showed that almost 80% of the 
respondents were farming on land that they owned. 12.2% were farming on private land 
provided for free, 7.2% were renting land, 0.5% was farming on share cropped land and 
0.5% on open access public lands. Mostly the poorest people were renting land and 
farming on private land provided for free.   
 
5.4.2. Housing condition 
Materials used for house construction are a proxy indicator for relative wealth. Metal 
sheets for roofs and brick walls are considered to indicate relative wealth compared to 
houses constructed of mud and grass materials for roofing (makuti). The type of bricks 
(burned or not burned) and other materials used for housing played a role as indicators 
identified by the villagers during the wealth ranking exercise of the PRA. Consistently 
across all villages, rich people had houses with burned bricks combined with iron sheets 
and mud flooring. Middle income people used the same materials but unburned mud 
bricks. Poor people relied on the old-fashioned poles and mud wall construction with 
makuti roofing. Table A5.3 in Appendix 5 shows the different materials for roofing, 
walls and flooring used in the different villages. Fulwe village had the highest 
occurrence of metal sheets for roofing and Maseyu the lowest. Fulwe also had the 
highest number of respondents with houses that were made with burned bricks and 
cement/concrete flooring. Poles were the main building material for house walls across 
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all villages, pointing at the importance of availability of poles from the nearby forests. 
With increasing wealth (like in Fulwe) bricks were replacing poles.  
The cross-tabulation of building materials and wealth group (Table A5.4 Appendix 5) 
confirmed a significant correlation (Kendall‟s Tau_b) between asset wealth and the 
variables „type of roof‟ (r=-0.152, p<0.01) and „type of floor‟ (r=-0.104, p<0.05), while 
the type of walls was not significantly correlated to the asset wealth. The first asset 
quartile had the highest number of houses with metal sheets, burned bricks and cement 
flooring. In addition the number of rooms and the wealth status of the household were 
also significantly correlated (r=-0.196, p<0.01), so that wealthier households had more 
rooms (M=3, SE=0.163) than poorer households (M=2, SE=0.091). The building 
material used for the houses was influenced by the gender of the household head (Table 
A5.5 Appendix 5). While 49% of houses with a male household head had metal sheets 
as roofing material almost 62% of houses with female household heads had grass, 
leaves and bamboo as roofing material. 17% male headed households lived in houses 
with burned brick walls compared to 7% of the female headed households. Almost 4% 
more female headed households lived in houses with earth flooring than male headed 
households. 
5.4.3. Education and social services  
With regard to the educational level, most household heads (over 50% of the sample) 
were educated at the Standard 5 to 8 level (Table A5.6 Appendix 5). In Fulwe village 
1.3% of the interviewed households had a household head with university education. 
The percentage of households with no formal education was highest in Logo village 
with 26.3%. Similarly, the comparison between education and asset group showed that 
29% of household heads in the lowest asset quartile had no formal education compared 
to 14.1% in the richest group (Table A5.7 Appendix 5). However the two variables asset 
wealth and level of education of the household head were not significantly correlated. 
The educational level of the household head was significantly influenced by the gender 
of the household head (see Section 5.4.6 below). 
The social services and infrastructure provided at communal level influence as part of 
the social capital the livelihoods of individual households. The social services situation 
was similar in all study villages with some slight variations. While Fulwe village was 
relatively well serviced due to its location at the Mikese ward headquarters, Logo and 
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Ngong‟olo villages were worst off due to their remoteness. All villages except Fulwe 
have neither electricity nor piped water. The drying up of the traditional wells during 
the dry season made water supply the most eminent problem for the villagers. Water 
supply was poor, mostly from public wells or rivers (Table A5.9 Appendix 5) with up to 
over 40 minutes walking time (Table A5.10 Appendix 5) to reach there. With none of 
the villages being electrified, firewood served as the main source of energy for cooking 
for 90% of the households in all villages and across all wealth groups. Firewood was 
either collected from nearby forests or purchased. Charcoal was produced for sale and 
served as a source of income rather than household energy. Mobile phone 
communication was accessible in all six villages and while some of the better off 
villagers (mostly younger men) owned mobile phones, other villagers could usually 
purchase phone services from them.  
The school and health services situation varied slightly between the villages but was 
generally described as poor by the villagers in all six villages. Taking natural medicines 
from the forest or referring to traditional healers was common in all six villages. While 
people in Maseyu (63%) and Fulwe (43%) had access to a public hospital, there were no 
health services available in Ngong‟olo, Logo and Milawilila villages. Fulwe (18.9%) 
and Maseyu (26.3%) residents frequently used traditional healers. The majority of 
respondents in Mwalazi (93.2%) used a private hospital (Table A5.11 Appendix 5). 
There was no significant difference in the type of health services used between the four 
wealth groups, apart from the fact that most people who use traditional healers were in 
the poorest wealth group (Table A5.12 Appendix 5), which was statistically significant  
( 0.01 level, 2 tailed; Pearson‟s correlation coefficient of 0.223). More female (14.5%) 
than male (6.7%) headed households used traditional healers (significant at 0.05 level 
Spearman‟s rho 0,105; see Table A5.13 Appendix 5).  
Fulwe and Maseyu villages had the comparatively best market access out of the six 
study villages due to their location by the highway. Logo and Ngong‟olo villages are 
worst placed in terms of market access (Table A5.14 Appendix 5). In Ngong‟olo, Logo 
and Mwalazi villages people walk on average over 2 hours (159, 146 and 131 minutes 
respectively) to reach the nearest market (Table A5.14 Appendix 5). There was no 
correlation between market access and wealth group. Whereas in all villages, except 
Maseyu most respondents walked to the market, 54.5% of respondents in Maseyu used 
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the minibus to reach the nearest market (Table A5.15 Appendix 5). In Maseyu (13.6%), 
Fulwe (12%) and Mwalazi (11.3%) over 10% of respondents used bicycles as a means 
of transport, whereas in the three remaining villages the percentage was below 5%.  
5.4.4. Sources of livelihood  
As Section 5.4.2 above has shown, the main source of household livelihoods in the 
study villages was agriculture combined with small scale businesses and small livestock 
keeping. Only teachers and government staff had formal employment, hence the 
unemployment ratio in these villages was very high. Daily labour on larger farms was 
an important source of income in particular for people with smaller land holdings or 
without land. While the inhabitants of the study villages traditionally named farming as 
their main source of livelihood (85% of the survey respondents), deeper inquiry during 
the PRA revealed that the yield from the fields they cultivate was too low to make a 
living. Villagers stated that the conditions for agriculture were not favourable due to the 
lack of land, infertile soils, lack of inputs, tools and extension services. In cases where 
people had not mentioned other sources of livelihoods from the beginning, they first 
hesitantly but then openly explained that they depended on other sources of livelihood, 
the majority of which was forest resource based. This might be because most of these 
activities, i.e. mining, charcoal burning, timber and pole harvesting, are conducted 
illegally in forest reserves.   
In Fulwe village the level of livelihood diversification was the highest, with 14.7% of 
households being self employed and 2.7% being employed in the private sector (Table 
5.11 overleaf). The percentage of households that indicated farming as their main 
activity was only 69.3%. This is comparatively low as in most other villages, except 
Maseyu, the percentage of farmers was around 90%. In both Fulwe and Maseyu the 
percentage of self employed households heads was relatively large (Maseyu 21%), 
which might be due to the charcoal business in these villages and their location directly 
adjacent to the highway which offers opportunities for economic activities. In Logo and 
Milawilila villages no household indicated „self-employed‟ as livelihoods activity and 
there seemed to be the highest dependency on farming.  
A cross-tabulation between the main activity of the household head and the asset wealth 
group showed that the level of livelihood diversification was low across all wealth 
groups (Appendix 5, Table A5.16). About 80% of households in all wealth groups 
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indicated farming as their main livelihood activity. In the richest wealth group it was 
even 88%, which is most likely due to large landholdings in this group. The lowest asset 
wealth group had the highest number of self-employed people, which may indicate that 
this group depends on petty business for survival.  
Table 5.11 Main activity of head of household (in % of respondents) 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi All 
farming 69.3 73.8 93.0 98.2 89.1 93.4 85.1 
government employee 2.7 1.5 5.3 0.0 3.1 0.0 2.1 
private sector 
employee 
2.7 1.5 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.1 
self-employed with 
employees 
2.7 16.9 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.3 4.5 
self employed 
without employees 
14.7 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 4.0 
unable to work (too 
old, retired, sick, 
disabled) 
6.7 1.5 1.8 0.0 4.7 1.6 2.9 
others 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
 
 
Business income (29%) and remittances (21.5%) played the most important role as non-
farm source of household income, followed by seasonal (7.8%) and occasional (7.1%) 
labour (Appendix 5, Table A5.17). 16.9% of households indicated other non-farm 
activities as source of income. A more detailed inquiry into types of non farm income 
(Table A5.18, Appendix 5), showed that mining was the most important non-farm 
activity (28.3%), followed by beer brewing (10.9%), casual labour (8.7%), carpentry 
(6.5%), house-building (6.5%) and weaving (6.5%). Only 2.2% of the respondents 
indicated charcoal burning as a non-farm activity. This percentage might be so low 
because charcoal burning is illegal and most respondents would not openly admit to it.  
In Maseyu village, 57% of the respondents had business income (Table A5.19, 
Appendix 5), which hints at the lively charcoal business in Maseyu. Seasonal wages 
(16.7%) and remittances (15.5%) were also important in Maseyu. In Fulwe, remittances 
were the most important non-farm source of income (33%), followed by business 
income (30%). In Logo (24%) and Milawilila (25%) village remittances were the most 
important source of non farm income. The fairly high percentages of other non-farm 
activities (Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi 28%; Mwalazi 37.8%) and business income 
(Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi 25.5%, Mwalazi 26.7%) hint at the mining activities in this area 
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(Table A5.19, Appendix 5). There were no significant differences (t-test 0,134) in non-
farm activities between the JFM and non JFM study sites (Table A5.20, Appendix 5)  
Households were growing between 1 and 8 types of crops at a time (Table A5.21, 
Appendix 5). Lowest mean values were in Fulwe (M=2.31) and Maseyu (M=2.37) and 
the largest variety in Logo and Milawilila (M=3.79 and M=3.89). At the same time 
these two villages had smaller land holdings. This indicates that a variety of crops was 
grown on small pieces of land, leading to lower productivity. There was no significant 
difference in the number of crops grown between the JFM and the non JFM villages 
(t=0.064; independent t-test (Levene‟s Test). Table A5.22 in Appendix 5 shows a full 
list of agricultural crops grown by the farmers in the study villages.  
In times of food shortages, households were primarily buying food on credit and 
undertaking casual labour as a coping strategy. Forest related activities, i.e. charcoal and 
mining, played a minor role, were however more common among richer than poorer 
people. Searching for edible plants and hunting in the forest was common across all 
wealth groups, but most common among the poorest (Table A5.23, Appendix 5). As a 
secondary strategy to overcome food shortages, the forest as a safety net becomes more 
important. Searching for fruit and hunting was a strategy for about a quarter of 
households, mostly among the rich. Burning charcoal featured as a secondary strategy 
only among the poorest households (Table A5.24, Appendix 5). Primary and secondary 
strategies were identified by asking people about their first choice and second choice of 
measures (if buying on credit or working on farm failed) to adjust to food shortages.  
5.4.5. Household asset wealth  
The wealth distribution across the villages (measured in asset wealth) is shown in Table 
5.12 below. While Fulwe village has the highest percentage of rich households (29.7%), 
it has at the same time the highest percentage of poorest people (43.2%), followed by 
Maseyu (31.8%). Milawilila has the lowest percentage of poor people (7.9%).  
Table 5.12 Relative wealth in the study villages (% of households in asset groups) 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
1 (richest) 29.7 28.8 19.0 20.6 29.2 21.0 
2 8.1 24.2 31.7 44.4 25.0 19.4 
3 18.9 15.2 31.7 27.0 27.8 30.6 
4 (poorest) 43.2 31.8 17.5 7.9 18.1 29.0 
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Table A5.25 in Appendix 5 shows selected wealth indicators, i.e. value of assets in 
TSH, household size, land owned and land farmed per study village. The wealthiest 
people (in terms of asset value and land owned) of the sample population live in Fulwe 
village, the poorest in Mwalazi.  
Table A5.26 in Appendix 5 shows the full list of assets owned by the households and 
the frequency. There were no cattle owning households in the sample. The assets were 
grouped into the four asset categories: productive assets (PA), non productive assets 
(NPA), livestock assets (LSA), and land assets (LA).
17
 Table 5.13 overleaf shows the 
mean value of assets in TSH for the four categories disaggregated by wealth group. 
Wealth group 1 (richest) had the highest mean values for all four asset categories and 
wealth group 4 (poorest) the lowest mean values with the exception of land assets, 
where the second richest group had the lowest mean asset value.  
 
Table 5.13 Value of assets in TSH by household, mean values 
   1 (richest) 2 3 4 (poorest) 
Non productive Mean 202,809 132,187 109,706 89,251 
assets   Median 143,134 116,418 88,934 87,196 
Productive  Mean 396,104 9,821 10,745 7,508 
assets Median 10,547 6,947 6,947 6,855 
Livestock  Mean 86,255 34,236 22,284 10,674 
assets Median 39,389 18,381 9,191 2,626 
Land assets Mean 762,871 301,900 149,900 12,500 
  Median 600,000 300,000 200,000 0 
Total value of  Mean 1,448,039 478,144 292,636 119,933 
Assets Median 879,066 482,881 287,221 121,597 
 
The asset nets in Figure 5.4 below show that the richest wealth group (1) lies clearly 
above all other wealth groups in total asset wealth and the poorest group (4) has the 
smallest asset net. The asset values of the different asset categories were higher for the 
upper percentiles than for the lower percentiles. This result was highly significant based 
on the Kruskal-Wallis test.  
                                                 
17
 All four variables are significantly non-normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: Total value of 
assets (D(400)= 0.27, p<.05), Non productive assets value (D (194) = 0.14, p<.05), Productive assets 
value (D (194)=0.45, p<.05), Livestock assets value (D (194) = 0.29, p<.05) and Land asset value (D 
(194)=0.26, p<.05). Grouped into wealth groups, all variables are significantly non-normally distributed 
in the four asset groups, with the exception of non-productive assets for the second (D(72)=.08, p<.05) 
and the third percentile groups (D(44)=0.13, p>.05) which are normally distributed. 
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Figure 5.4 Asset nets, types of assets compared across wealth percentile groups 
 
(„Original in colour‟) 
The spatial analysis of household asset wealth showed only in site one a significant 
difference between JFM and non JFM households. Here, the JFM village Maseyu had 
significantly
18
 smaller asset wealth than households in Fulwe village.  
5.4.6. Gender and relative wealth 
The sample included 58.4% male and 41.6% female respondents. Among the 
households interviewed, 85.3% were male and 14.7% female headed. Mwalazi village 
had with 23% of the sample the largest representation of female headed households and 
Ngong‟olo village the smallest (6.1%). More female (45.5%) than male household 
heads (18.5%) had no formal education (Table A5.28, Appendix 5). The variables 
education of household head and gender were significantly correlated (r=-0.162, 
p<0.01, Kendall‟s Tau_b). The majority of female headed households were in the 
lowest asset category (r=0.208, p<0.01, Kendall‟s Tau_b) (Table A5.28, Appendix 5). 
The asset nets in Figure 5.5 below (mean values in TSH in Table A5.29, Appendix 5) 
show that male headed households had on average larger asset wealth than female 
headed households.  
 
                                                 
18
 Non-productive assets value t (138) = 2.81, p<.05 with a small to medium effect (r=.22). Productive 
assets value t(138) = 1.63, p<.05 with a small effect (r=.14).  Land assets value t(57)=2.88, p<.05 with a 
medium size effect (r=.36). Total value of assets t(138)=1.54, p<.05 with a small effect (r=.14). 
0
200.000
400.000
600.000
800.000
Non productive 
assets
Productive 
assets
Livestock 
assets
Land assets
1 (richest)
2
3
4 (poorest)
  
143 
 
Figure 5.5 Asset nets (mean values in TSH) by gender of household head    
 
This difference is significant in the case of the variable „value of productive assets 
(U=5,981, p<.001) with a small to medium size effect (r=-.19) and in the case of the 
variable „value of livestock assets‟ (U=2,482, p<.001) with a small to medium size 
effect (r=.20). Also for the total value of assets, this difference due to gender is highly 
significant (U=5,671, p<.001) with a small to medium size effect (r= -.22). For the other 
asset categories (productive and land), the Mann-Witney Test reveals a p value larger 
than .001 and is hence not significant.  
5.4.7. Leadership and relative wealth 
34.3% of the households in the sample had leadership status, which means either a 
household member who was part of the village government and/or a member who was 
part of a village committee. 65.8% of the households did neither have a member 
represented in village government nor a village committee (“no”). The comparison 
between leadership status and asset quartile group (Figure 5.6 below) showed that the 
majority of leaders fell within the first (46%) and second (36%) asset percentile groups. 
There were significantly more leaders in the richer wealth quartiles than in the poorer 
ones and leadership status of the household was strongly positively correlated to the 
asset wealth group with both Spearman (r=0.132, p<0.01) and Kendall‟s tau_b 
(R=0.132, p<0.01) correlation coefficients.  
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Figure 5.6 Representation of leaders in the asset quartile groups  
 
(Yes = leaders; No = non leaders) 
The comparison between leadership status and gender of the HH head showed that out 
of the households with leadership status, 61% were male headed and 39% were female 
headed households. However, the correlation between the two variables gender of 
household head and leadership status did not test as statistically significant (r=0.099, 
p>0.05, Kentall‟s tau_b).   
Figure 5.7 Asset nets (mean values in TSH) by leadership status  
 
 
Leaders had higher average asset wealth (M=609,992) than non-leaders (M=583,652) 
(Table A5.30, Appendix 5), however not at a statistically significant level. Figure 5.7 
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above shows the asset net for households where the household head had leadership 
status (“leader”) and those where he/she did not (“non leader”). Disaggregation into the 
asset categories showed that the higher average land assets value of leaders 
(M=511,213) in comparison to non-leaders (M=424,457) was significant (U=6.134, 
p<.001) with a small to medium size effect (r= -.23).  
The picture is reversed for the sub-category „productive assets‟, where non leaders 
(M=126,971) had larger wealth on average than leaders (M=59,581). The larger wealth 
in productive assets for non-leaders was significant (U=13,152, p<.001) with a small to 
medium size effect (r=-.22).  
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6. Impacts on forest condition 
6.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question “Does JFM influence 
the physical condition of the forest and forest use patterns? ”. The basis of the analysis 
is the research results on forest condition gathered during 120 days spent in the field, 
surveying 659 plots of 50 m lengths adding up to a length of 33 km of forest transects.  
 
PFM has been associated with improvements in forest condition (see Chapter 2 above). 
Thus, it was expected that the surveyed plots in the three JFM forests would contain a 
higher number of trees, poles and withies than the plots in the control group. If JFM 
shifts the harvest of timber trees from JFM forests to non-JFM forests, then we would 
expect to find bigger timber tress. However, trees need a long time to grow and JFM is a 
fairly recent development. It was implemented in the three sites at the end of the 1990s, 
which allows for a 5 year time span to time until the data collection through this study 
took place. Therefore, the effect on trees may not be visible in the data, or if at all, it 
will be slight. In contrast, poles and in particular withies should show a larger effect. 
Thus, there should be more poles and withies on average on the experimental plots in 
comparison to the control group plots. However, if the cutting of poles and withies is 
considered socially acceptable due to local subsistence needs, JFM forest might still be 
utilized in this way.  
 
All in all, it is expected that human forest use in JFM forests is less intense than in the 
control group. These expected results are in line with the general objectives of PFM and 
the policy goals of PFM in Tanzania (see Chapter 2). Due to the different quality of the 
JFM process in the three sites, it is expected that the forest condition improvements will 
be strongest in Milawilila, followed by Kimboza and then Kitulang‟halo. This is 
because the JFM process in the latter forest received the smallest input of external 
support and showed the highest degree of villagers‟ dissatisfaction (see also Chapter 8).  
 
Thus, the following hypotheses are applicable: 
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1. JFM forests have a better forest quality measured through a larger number of trees, 
poles and withies than in the non JFM forest plots. This result is strongest for 
withies, milder for poles and smallest for trees. 
2. The canopy density is higher in JFM than in non JFM forests.  
3. The species richness as an indicator of forest quality will be higher in JFM forests 
than in non JFM forests. 
4. The liana density, as an indicator of disturbance, is lower in JFM forests than in non 
JFM forests.   
5. The occurrence of seedlings and leaf litter on the forest floor is higher in JFM 
forests than in non JFM forests and the occurrence of grass cover on the forest floor 
is lower in JFM than in non JFM forests.  
6. The extent of human use measured through the number of cuts of trees, poles and 
withies is lower in JFM forests than in non JFM forests. 
7. The occurrence of other forms of human use is less in JFM forests than in non JFM 
forests, due to the less permeable access regime.  
8. The improvement of forest condition in the JFM versus non JFM comparison is 
strongest in the Milawilila-Ngambaula site, followed by Kimboza-Ruvu. 
Kitulang‟halo-Dindili forest reserves should have the least effect, if there is one at 
all.  
 
The results of the descriptive and comparative analyses are presented in the subsequent 
sections. Section 6.2 includes the analysis of the forest quality variables for the entire 
sample and Section 6.3 analyses spatial patterns of forest quality across the three sites. 
Human forest use is analysed in Section 6.4 for the entire sample, and then subsequently 
across sites in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 presents the results of multiple regression 
analysis to identify variables or factors that influence human forest use and the role that 
JFM has played. In addition to the quantitative analysis of forest condition through 
forest transects collecting biophysical data, forest condition was assessed through group 
discussion and household surveys to understand the perception of the community of 
forest condition. These perceptions are presented in Section 6.7. Section 6.8 discusses 
the findings of Chapter 6.  
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6.2. Overall forest quality in the study area  
6.2.1. Timber resources, poles and withies remaining  
A total of 7,877 trees, 12,293 poles and 6,041 withies were measured and trees 
identified in the 659 surveyed forest plots. On average, there were 12 trees per plot 
(SE=0.33, sd=8.5) with a maximum number of 51 and a minimum of 0 trees per plot. 
The average DBH value in this study across all 7,877 trees was 25 cm (SE=0.18) with a 
maximum value of 239 cm and large variation between the trees (sd=16). The tallest 
tree in the entire sample was estimated to be 45 m and the smallest 2 m, the average 
height of trees was 11 m (SE=0.08, sd=6.7). A total of 10,887 remaining poles and 
11,729 withies were recorded in the 659 surveyed plots. On average there were 16.5 
poles (SE=0.48) and 17.8 withies (SE=0.70) per plot, the maximum number of poles 
recorded on a plot was 74 and the maximum number of withies 92. The large standard 
deviations of poles (sd=12.35) and withies (sd=18.05) showed that the number of poles 
and withies in particular varied considerably across the different plots.    
The comparison between experimental and control group plots (Table 6.1 overleaf) 
showed that the JFM plots had on average significantly more trees than the non JFM 
plots. However, the trees on JFM plots had a significantly smaller DBH value than the 
trees found on the non-JFM plots. There was no significant difference in the height of 
trees found between the JFM and the non JFM plots. The larger standard deviations of 
all three variables in the JFM plots showed that there were larger variations in number, 
DBH value and height of trees across JFM plots compared to the control group.   
The comparative analysis of remaining pole resources showed a similar picture. JFM 
plots had on average significantly more poles than the non JFM plots. 
The average number of withies was also significantly higher in JFM forest plots than in 
non-JFM plots. The r values in Table 6.1 overleaf show the effective sizes of the 
differences between the experimental and control group plots. The strength of difference 
between JFM and non JFM forests was strongest for withies (r=-0.34), then trees (r=-
0.29), then poles (r=-0.24).  
  
149 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics, forest quality variables, JFM versus non JFM plots  
  JFM Non JFM Significance 
Trees M=15.30, SE=0.36, sd=9.97 M=9.99, SE=0.32, sd=6.39 U= 33,366.5, p<.001, r= -0.29 
DBH M= 22.57, SE=0.63, sd=9.7 M=27.02, SE=0.43, sd=8.57 U=33,051.0, p<.001, r= -0.30 
Height M=10.81, SE=0.34, sd=5.43 M=10.62, SE=0.19, sd=3.75 Not significant 
Poles M=19.50, SE=0.73, sd=11.56 M=14.70, SE=0.62, sd=12.47 U= 36,593.5, p<.001, r= -0.24 
Withies M=25.40, SE=1.23, sd=19.41 M=13.20, SE=0.76, sd=15.46 U= 30,194.5, p<.001, r=-0.34 
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Figure 6.1 Remaining trees, poles and withies: JFM versus non JFM 
 
(Mean values per plot)  
As Figure 6.1 above illustrates, the JFM plots had a comparatively increased abundance 
in wood resources, which represent a 54.5% increase towards the non JFM plots in 
terms of tree coverage, as well as 32.7% and 92.5% improvement in the abundance of 
poles and withies respectively. However, with regard to DBH value, the JFM forests 
show an almost 20% reduction compared to the non JFM forests. This might be 
explained by the fact that the JFM forests were harvested intensely in the past (see 
Section 4.3.4 above). Despite the lower DBH value, the above results are beginning to 
lend support to the idea that JFM forests are of better quality than the non JFM forests 
measured in abundance of the wood resources. There are variations across the three sites 
and additional variables were explored in order to confirm this result.  
6.2.2. Naturally dead trees and poles    
Naturally dead trees and poles are part of the forest regeneration cycle and thus indicate 
forest health. A total of 1,911 naturally dead trees and 1,857 naturally dead poles were 
recorded with an average of 3 of each per plot and little variation across the study area 
(sd trees=3.28; sd poles=3.44). There was no significant difference between the two 
groups.   
6.2.3. Canopy cover and liana density   
Canopy cover indicates how closed the forest is (Ravindranath N. H. et al. 2004). 
Canopy cover was on average higher in the JFM plots (M=17.3, SE=1.45, sd=22.83) 
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than in the non JFM plots (M=12.1, SE=0.87, sd=17.59). However, this difference 
tested to be statistically insignificant. This might be a result of big trees having been 
removed from JFM forests. 
Liana density indicates forest disturbance within the lowland coastal forest habitat 
(Mwasumbi et al. 1994). Thus, a high density of liana most likely points at disturbance 
that originated from before the introduction of JFM. Liana density was on average 
higher in JFM plots (M=0.8, SE=0.095) than in non JFM plots (M=0.7, SE=0.065), 
hinting at higher rates of forest disturbance in the past. However, this result was not 
statistically significant, neither in the plot-wise comparison, nor in the pair-wise 
comparison across the three sites.  
6.2.4. Species richness   
Species richness measures the average number of species per plot and is considered an 
indicator of forest quality (Ravindranath N. H. et al. 2004). Species richness in this 
study was on average significantly (U=39,789, p<.001, r= -0.19) lower (M=7.55, 
SE=0.14, sd=2.18) in the JFM plots than the non JFM plots (M=8.50, SE=0.14, 
sd=2.79). Appendix 6 contains a full list of species found in the six forest reserves. On 
average 79% of all species found were timber class V species, which are of lower value 
according to the classification of the Tanzanian FBD (United Republic of Tanzania 
2002). On average only 8% of all species found in JFM forests and 7% in non JFM 
forests were class I species. Figure 6.2 overleaf shows the mean values across the forest 
plots of the species found in the different timber classes from I to V. It shows that there 
is no significant difference between control group and experimental group. The 
complete lack of class I to IV timber trees is interesting and shows that all the six forests 
have been logged heavily and there is not much left to harvest. Given hundred years of 
logging this is not surprising. In the past these forests hosted class I to IV timber species, 
such as Pterocarpus angolensis (Mninga), Afzelia Quanzensis (Mkongo), Milicia 
excelsa (Chlorophora e.) (Mvule), Dalbergia melanoxylon (Mpingo), Albizia 
gummifera/schimperiana(Mkenge), Antiaris toxicaria (Mkula), Khaya nyasica (K. 
anthotheca) (Mkangazi), Khaya anthotheca (Mkungazi). JFM would not be expected to 
really have made any difference in the short time frame of its implementation and the 
heavy earlier logging in the JFM forests in the past.  
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Figure 6.2 Timber classes, JFM versus non JFM plots 
 
 
6.2.5. Leaf litter, seedlings and grass coverage  
In contrast to liana density, leaf litter, grass and seedling coverage on the forest floor 
responds on an annual cycle to forest disturbances. Therefore, responses to human forest 
use in these three variables were expected to show up more clearly in the JFM versus 
non JFM comparison. Table 6.2 overleaf confirms this expectation. The occurrence of 
seedlings and leaf litter on the forest floor was significantly higher in JFM plots than in 
non JFM plots. In contrast, there were significantly fewer plots with predominantly 
grass coverage among the JFM plots than amongst the non JFM plots. These results 
combined indicate better forest health and less canopy opening on the JFM plots, which 
is consistent with Section 6.2.3 above. The lower grass coverage makes it harder for fire 
to invade the forest. This may be an explanatory factor for the lower fire intensity in 
JFM forests (see Section 6.5 below), as much as a stronger protection regime.  
 
The results of analysing these three variables are highly compatible with the findings of 
higher numbers of tree, poles and withies resources in JFM plots in Section 6.2.1 above. 
This shows that the JFM forests are regenerating better than the non-JFM forests. The 
following section will investigate whether there are variations to this overall finding in 
the forest pairs across the three sites. This will provide the basis to explore potential 
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implications of such variations on livelihoods and potential institutional explanatory 
factors in Chapters 7 and 8.   
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics, ground cover variables, JFM versus non JFM plots 
  JFM Non JFM Significance 
Seedlings M=2.20, SE=0.12, sd=1.92 M=1.10, SE=0.08, sd=1.54 U= 33,796, p<.001, r= -0.30 
Leaf 
litter 
M= 2.78, SE=0.12, sd=1.92 M=1.53, SE=0.08, sd=1.59 U=32,639.5, p<.001,  
r= -0.31 
Grass   M=1.15, SE=0.11, sd=1.73 M=2.06, SE=0.08, sd=1.79 U=36,297.5, p<.001, r=-0.26 
 
6.3. Spatial patterns of forest quality across the sites   
Figure 6.3 below illustrates the spatial variation of trees, poles and withies across the six 
forests. While Milawilila has the highest average number of poles (M=33) and withies 
(M=45) per plot of all forests, Kitulang‟halo scores highest with its mean value of 17 
trees per plot. The non JFM forest Ngambaula scores lowest in all three variables – 
number of trees (M=3.7), number of poles (M=2) and withies (M=3) – followed by 
Ruvu, which is on the second but last position of all six forests. The lines demonstrating 
forest quality for Kimboza and Dindili forest run almost parallel, indicating that there is 
not much difference in forest quality, although one is a JFM and one a non JFM forest 
(albeit in different sites). In other words, although Kimboza the JFM forest in site 2 
scores higher in forest quality than its control group forest Ruvu, it is still at the same 
level of quality as Dindili the non JFM control group forest in site 1. This indicates that 
the forest management regime is not the only explanatory factor for the difference in 
forest quality variables presented here. Other physical factors were explored in this 
thesis to the extent possible in Section 6.6 below.   
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Figure 6.3 Remaining trees, poles, withies, spatial comparison across the six forests 
 
(„Original in colour‟) 
Taking a closer look at the trees in the forests, it was noticeable that although 
Kitulang‟halo forest reserve hosts the largest average number of tree resources in the 
entire sample, the trees were at the same time lowest in DBH (M=18.0) and smallest in 
height (M=8.1).This indicates that the trees are young in age. It points towards heavy 
harvesting in the past, with regeneration in recent years. On the other hand, this result 
could also indicate that as soon as trees reach a certain maturity they are harvested 
selectively, despite JFM. This assumption is supported by personal observation of the 
researcher during the transect work. Valuable trees of above average size in 
Kitulang‟halo had been marked by chipping a small piece off the stem with an axe. Our 
local village guide, who happened to be the secretary of the forest committee, explained 
that this meant that somebody had „reserved the tree‟ so that it could not be cut by 
anybody else.   
 
Milawilila holds first place among the six forests in average DBH value per plot 
(M=37.5). Kimboza forest hosts the tallest trees (M=17.0) within the sample. In this 
latter case, the result could be biased due to the fact that some of the trees recorded in 
Kimboza were Cederela odorota, an exotic fast growing species introduced as an inside 
forest plantation by the FBD in the 1970s. Furthermore, Kimboza as a lowland wet 
forest is environmentally more conducive for trees to grow tall than some of the drier 
forests in this sample. Tree height is partly influenced by the forest type. Kimboza and 
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Milawilila are both forests on the wetter lowlands. Kitulang‟halo, Dindili and Ruvu are 
drier and rockier so that trees get naturally shorter.  
 
Higher abundance of taller and bigger trees is usually correlated to higher canopy 
density of the forest. In this sense the data analysis showed consistency across the 
results of the various variables: Milawilila had the highest average canopy density 
(M=49.4, SE=5.26), followed by Kimboza (M=36.4, SE=3.46). However, the large 
standard deviations (Milawilila: 23.5; Kimboza: 26.79) indicate that this was not a 
consistent picture across all plots. Dindili (M=3.1, SE=0.37, sd=3.34) and Ngambaula 
(M=3.4, SE=1.63, sd=7.3) had the lowest canopy density. In the case of Ngambaula this 
well matches the earlier findings of few and small trees, showing that there is not much 
real forest left. In the case of Dindili, the low canopy density combined with fewer but 
comparatively big and tall trees, hints to the fact that there are mature trees, which are 
however selectively logged out, leading to canopy gaps. The data for the various forest 
sites is included in Tables A4.1 to A4.3 in Appendix 4.  
 
Site 3 showed the strongest positive difference in forest quality of a JFM forest, 
Milawilila, in comparison to the non JFM forest, Ngambaula (Figure A4.1, Appendix 
4). Out of the six forests, Milawilila had the highest species richness and Ngambaula the 
lowest. The improvement of the JFM forest in comparison to its non JFM control group 
forest is 3.5% for the number of trees, 5.2% for the DBH and 59% for the height of the 
trees. The higher abundance of poles and withies recorded in Milawilila presented a 
57% and 136% improvement respectively when compared to the neighbouring non JFM 
forest Ngambaula. This corresponds with the finding that Milawilila village had the best 
JFM regime out of the three sites (see Chapter 8). However, there are indications that 
this impressive impact that JFM may have had in Milawilila, may be partially based on 
a displacement effect due to the well enforced access restriction in Milawilila, which 
may have aggravated the poor forest quality of Ngambaula (see also Section 7.5 below). 
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6.4. Human forest use in the study area   
6.4.1. Types and extent of human forest use found   
Various types of human use were found in the forests throughout the study area. A total 
of 1,214 cuts of trees, 3,193 cuts of poles and 14,163 cuts of withies were recorded over 
a period of five months (between April 2005 and August 2006). Every forest and 86.9% 
of all the plots had evidence of some form of human use (Table 6.3 overleaf) while 
13.1% of the plots had no evidence of human use. This included cutting of poles, trees, 
withies, firewood and bark, farming and animal grazing inside the forest reserves, the 
presence of charcoal pits, pit sawing structures, woodcutter and charcoal maker camps, 
animal traps, footpaths, mining sites, incidences of burning of trees and taking of parts 
out of the tree stem for tool making. To avoid bias, only those incidences of fire were 
included in the transect records that looked like obviously set through human activities. 
For example very common were signs of burning of single timber trees possibly to 
justify illegal harvesting thereafter, given that they were damaged anyway.    
6.4.2. Cutting of trees, poles and withies  
The entire sample included a total of 10,988 recorded trees, out of which 72% were 
standing, 11% had been cut and 17% had died naturally. The ratio of tree cuttings to 
standing trees is 6.5:1; in other words, about every sixth tree had been cut. A total of 
45% of all plots on which trees were recorded had tree cuttings.   
It is interesting, however, that only 20% of all cuttings of trees were recent cuts (less 
than 3 month old), while the remaining (80%) were old.   
Out of the total 15,032 poles recorded, 72% were standing, 16% had been cut and 12% 
were naturally dead. The ratio of pole cuttings to standing poles was 4.8:1. In other 
words, about every fifth pole had been cut. A total of 62% of all plots on which poles 
were recorded had pole cuttings. The percentage of recent cutting of poles (4%) 
compared to old cuttings (96%) was even lower than for trees.  
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Table 6.3  Human forest use in the study area and extent across all the sample plots 
Pole 
cutting
Withies 
cutting
Tree 
cutting
Burning Foot-
path
Pit 
sawing
Charcoal 
making
Mining Farming Trap Parts 
of 
tree 
taken
Grazing Debar-
king
Total
No of plots 
with human 
use
409 370 299 155 67 51 30 18 15 13 11 8 2 573
% of plots 
with human 
use
62.06 56.15 45.37 23.52 10.17 7.74 4.55 2.73 2.28 2 1.67 1.21 0.3 86.9
Total no of 
incidences 
recorded
2,288 2,815 1,211 172 68 58 40 19 15 25 11 8 2
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A total of 11,729 withies were recorded and 1,968 cuttings of withies, which is a ratio 
of about 6:1, meaning there was one cut withies to every sixth recorded standing one. 
On 60% of the plots with occurrence of withies, cuttings of withies were found. 8% of 
withies cuttings were new cuts and 92% old cuts.  
The group comparison showed that overall JFM plots had a lower percentage of cuts 
(41%) than the non JFM plots (59%). The ratio of old and new cuts to total cuts was 
almost identical in JFM and non JFM plots: about 5% of recent cuts in both groups and 
95% and 94% cuts older than 3 months in the JFM plots and non JFM plots respectively. 
This was similar with regard to poles, where 46% of all cuts were on JFM plots and 
54% on non JFM plots. In both groups about 4% of all poles cut were recent cuttings 
and 96% were older than 3 months. 41% of all cuts of withies were on JFM plots 
compared to 59% on non JFM plots. The rate of old to new cuts differed with regard to 
the withies, as 6% of withies in JFM plots were cut recently and 94% were old cuttings, 
while in the non JFM forests 9% were recent cuts and 91% older than 3 months.  
Table 6.4 overleaf contains the descriptive statistics for the cuttings of trees, poles and 
withies. The average number of total tree cuttings was significantly higher in JFM than 
in non JFM forests. This is explained by the significantly higher rates of old timber 
felling in JFM than in the non JFM plots. The average number of new cuts of trees was 
the same in both groups. The relatively small standard deviations of the tree cuttings 
show that there was not much variation of the timber felling rate across the plots. This 
variation was slightly higher in the case of poles. Pole cuttings show a very similar 
picture to timber cuttings: the total number of poles cut and the number of old pole 
cuttings were both significantly higher in JFM than in non JFM forest plots. New 
cuttings of poles were only slightly higher in JFM plots and tested as statistically not 
significant compared to the non JFM plots. While the total number of cuttings of withies 
and the number of old cuttings was slightly higher in JFM forest than in JFM forests 
these differences were not significant. Fresh cuttings of withies were higher in the non 
JFM plots than in the JFM plots but only slightly and not statistically significant. It 
seems from these results that cutting is mostly a sign of old forest disturbance and there 
is a time factor involved. However time series analysis would be required to confirm 
this result. The pair-wise comparison statistics in table 6.4 tests the effect of JFM on 
actual forest utilization. 
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics, cuttings, JFM versus non JFM   
  JFM   Non JFM   Significance 
Trees, total cuts M=2.0, SE=0.2, sd=3.0 M=1.8, SE=0.2, sd=4.3 U= 39,559.5, p<.001, r= -0.21 
Trees, old cuts M=1.9, SE=0.2, sd=2.9 M=1.7, SE=0.2, sd=4.1 U=39,465, p<.001, r = -0.21 
Trees, new cuts M=0.1, SE=0.1, sd=0.8 M=0.1, SE=0.0, sd=0.5 Not significant 
Poles, total cuts M=4.2, SE=0.3, sd=5.1 M=3.0, SE=0.3, sd=5.4 U= 40,201.5, p<.001, r= -0.18 
Poles, old cuts M=4.1, SE=0.3, sd=5.0 M=2.9, Se=0.3, sd=5.2 U=40,537.5, p<.001, r = -0.23 
Poles, new cuts M=0.2, SE=0.0, sd=0.7 M=0.1, SE=0.0, sd=0.9 Not significant  
Withies, total cuts  M=6.6, SE=0.8, sd=13.3 M=2.8, SE=0.3, sd=5.6 Not significant  
Withies, old cuts M=3.0, SE=0.3, sd=4.6 M=2.6, Se=0.3, sd=5.2 Not significant  
Withies, new cuts M=0.2, SE=0.1, sd=0.9 M=0.3, SE=0.1, sd=1.7 Not significant  
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The “not significant” difference between new cuts of trees, poles and withies in JFM 
versus non JFM forests, respectively documents little difference in actual forest 
utilisation. These results strongly indicate that JFM has had little effect on wood-cutting. 
 
It is interesting to note that the standard variations increase from tree, to pole to withies 
cutting, showing that tree felling occurs more consistently across the forests, with poles 
and in particular withies showing stronger variations between the plots. The cutting of 
withies in JFM forests showed the largest degree of variation across the plots. This 
lends support to the idea that the cutting of withies due to their higher abundance, is 
stronger influenced by distance to the settlement while pole and in particular timber 
trees which are more difficult to find, and much more valuable, are harvested 
throughout the forest. This idea is supported through the regression analysis (Section 
6.6 below) where the distance to the village shows up as a significant predictor for 
withies cutting.   
 
Finding a higher rate of cuttings in the JFM forests was an unexpected result. In order to 
take the higher availability of trees, poles and withies in JFM forests into consideration, 
the cutting intensity was calculated as a percentage of the available forest resources for 
each of the categories trees, poles and withies (see Figure 6.4 below).  
 
Figure 6.4 Intensity of cutting as percentage of resources, JFM versus non JFM 
c  
  
161 
 
The intensity of tree cutting (U=41,293; p<0.01, r=-0.2) in relation to the remaining tree 
resources as well as the intensity of pole cutting (U=43,942.5, p>0.01, r=-0.2) in 
relation to pole resources, remained significantly higher in JFM forests. With regard to 
withies resources the difference did not test as statistically significant. To further 
explore the unexpected higher cutting rates in JFM plots, the data was disaggregated by 
forest to verify whether this was a consistent result across all sites (Section 6.5 below).    
6.4.3. Other forms of human forest use   
Table 6.5 below shows other forms of forest use. Incidences of fire were on average 
three times higher in non JFM plots (M=0.35, SE=0.028) than in JFM plots (M=0.12, 
SE=0.027). This difference is significant (U=39,781.50, p<.001, r=-0.25). Burning 
could be related to higher occurrence of grass, more open areas, and lower protection in 
the non JFM forests. Similarly, the incidence of traps, small scale mining and the 
harvesting of trees for tools are higher in non JFM plots. The higher intensity of mining 
in non JFM forests (M=0.05) than in JFM forests, where none were recorded, was 
significant (U=48,804, p<.001, r=-0.13). In contrast JFM forests had more footpaths, 
more saw pits and charcoal pits, more farm fields and incidences of animal grazing 
inside the forest, as well as debarking. However, the higher number of charcoal pits, 
saw pits and footpaths dissecting JFM forests were not a statistically significant 
difference to the control group.   
 
Table 6.5 Incidences of other human uses recorded, mean values per plot 
  JFM Non JFM 
Burning* 0.12 0.35 
Footpath 0.12 0.09 
Trap 0.03 0.04 
Saw pits 0.12 0.07 
Charcoal pit 0.10 0.04 
Farm field 0.03 0.02 
Mining* 0.00 0.05 
Grazing 0.02 0.00 
Harvesting for tools 0.01 0.02 
Debarking 0.01 0.00 
(*= statistically significant difference) 
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6.5. Spatial patterns of human forest use across sites  
The harvesting intensity of tree, poles and withies varied strongly across the six forest 
reserves. In some forests, in particular Dindili, timber harvesting was very intensive 
with a level close to 40% of the available timber resources. In Milawilila and 
Ngambaula the harvesting rate was with almost 30% also high. Tree harvesting was 
least intense in Ruvu and Kimboza where the cutting rate stayed below 10% of the 
available timber resources. The spatial analysis of pole cutting revealed a similar trend. 
Whereas withies cutting were highest in Ngambaula and lowest in Kitulang‟halo (see 
Figures A4.2 and A4.3 in Appendix 4).  
 
The above analysis reveals that there is not a consistent picture of the human forest use 
but that there are considerable differences between the sites.  
 
In site 1, the JFM forest Kitulang‟halo showed lower values than the non JFM forest 
Dindili consistently across all variables (Tables A4.4 and A4.5 in Appendix 4). Dindili 
was hosting trees of comparatively large DBH value and height, which provided a 
valuable resource for harvesting. These statistical results are confirmed by the personal 
observation of the research team, which witnessed on-going timber felling and pit 
sawing while transecting Dindili. The timber fellers ran away as soon as they noticed 
the researchers, well aware of their illegal undertaking. The freshly cut trees provided 
valuable timber, including mature Milicia excelsa (a class I timber) trees. The 
significantly (U=5,698, p<.001, r= -0.20) higher number of sawpits recorded in Dindili 
compared to Kitulang‟halo is consistent with the other results in confirming the high 
timber harvesting rate in the non JFM forest Dindili (Table A4.6 Appendix 4).  
 
In site 2, the picture of JFM performance is reversed: On average, the number of total 
cuts was significantly higher in the JFM forest Kimboza than in the non JFM forest 
Ruvu for all three variables (Table A4.7 Appendix 4). Old cuts of trees, poles and 
withies reflected the same picture of higher harvesting intensity in Kimboza, all three 
variables at significant levels. On average Kimboza had a significantly higher number 
of sawpits per plot than Ruvu (U=8613.5, p<.001, r=-0.19; see Table A4.8 Appendix 4). 
Just as in site 1, the higher number of saw pits matches with the higher timber cutting 
rate in Kimboza compared to Ruvu.  
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Surprisingly, site 3 showed significantly higher mean values of total cuts of trees, poles 
and withies in the JFM forest Milawilila in comparison to the non JFM forest 
Ngambaula (Table A4.9 Appendix 4). When disaggregated into old and recent cuttings, 
it became clear that all cuttings in Milawilila forest were old cuttings whereas there 
were no recent cuttings recorded at all. When only the recent cuttings were considered, 
the performance between Milawilila and Ngambaula was reversed as the cuttings where 
higher in the non JFM forests as compared to the JFM forest. The above analysis has 
shown that higher rates of human forest use in the JFM forest Milawilila compared to 
the control group forest are an indication that Milawilila was once harvested intensively. 
However, the fact that no recent cuttings were recorded, lends support to the idea that 
cutting has stopped most likely as a result of the no access regime enforced through the 
JFM in Milawilila. The number of incidences of burning recorded in Ngambaula were 
significantly (t (187) = -4.895, p<0.05) higher than in Milawilila and so was the 
occurrence of farm fields inside the forest reserve (t (187) =-6.490, p<.05) (Table A4.10 
Appendix 4).  
 
In summary, the spatial analysis of human forest use provides a very mixed picture. It 
seems to be influenced by historical forest use and the effectiveness of the JFM regime. 
This calls for a further examination of possible predictors of human forest use to test 
whether JFM is an explanatory variable for the variations in forest condition between 
the sites. This is done next.   
6.6. Predictors of human forest use  
6.6.1. Introduction 
The following Sections investigate possible other factors than the management regime 
that influence human forest use and that may in turn influence the viability of JFM 
implementation. In particular possible causal relations between forest use and economic 
factors are investigated.  Blomley and Ramadhani (2006) describe how market forces 
are believed to drive or destroy PFM processes in Tanzania. The influence of market 
pressure on a particular forest is supposed to be a dependent of the distance from urban 
centres and the road accessibility; pressure increases with increasing closeness and 
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quality of the access roads. In particular for charcoal and timber these two variables 
may make it impossible for villagers to prevent “relentless and illegal stripping of assets 
by outsiders” (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006: 97). On the other hand, weak market 
forces may undermine the villagers‟ possibilities to gain economic benefits through 
PFM. Distance from Dar es Salaam was shown by Ahrends et al. (2010) to be the 
largest factor explaining disturbance in forests on a transect of 200 km length south of 
Dar es Salaam. As the demand for wood products extends to the area of this study it has 
to be included as a possible factor explaining the results. During this study no data were 
collected on likely agents of harvesting, transporting and buying/consuming timber, 
poles and charcoal. However it was obvious during the PRAs conducted that Maseyu 
and Fulwe village are well integrated in markets due to their location at the TANZAM 
highway (see Section 5.3 above). This road is the main transportation route for 
agricultural and forest products to urban and commercial centres such as Dar es Salaam 
and Morogoro (Luoga et al. 2000a). According to the villagers, middlemen from 
Maseyu village buy the charcoal from the charcoal makers and place the bags along the 
road. Buyers come from Morogoro, Dar es Salaam, Mbwawani and Chalinze. The 
consumers of the charcoal and timber are the urban middle class.  The following 
sections test the validity of some of these factors with regard to the study results on 
human forest use.  
6.6.2. Predictors for the intensity of timber logging  
A stepwise regression model was built with the „percentage of trees cut compared to 
remaining timber resources‟ as dependent variable y (see Table 6.6 overleaf). 
This model was significant and explained 29% of the total variation in the data. The 
negative relationship between the dependent variable and the „distance from Dar es 
Salaam‟ in this case indicates that the rate of tree felling decreases with increasing 
distance from Dar es Salaam. Similarly, the cutting rate decreased with further distance 
from the nearest feeder road. With increasingly difficult accessibility the cutting rate 
decreased. The model shows a statistically significant relationship between the variable 
„JFM‟ and the dependent variable, with the intensity of tree cutting decreasing if there is 
JFM. In the above model, the variable „distance from Dar es Salaam‟ was not 
significant. A second stepwise regression model run without this variable still explained 
28% of the variation in the data (see Table 6.7 overleaf).  
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Excluded variables in both models were the „distance from the village‟ and the „distance 
from the forest edge‟, which seemingly did not influence the timber logging intensity. 
Both models indicate clearly that timber logging decreased with increased distance from 
the road and difficulty of access.  
6.6.3. Predictors for the intensity of pole and withies cutting  
A step-wise regression model to investigate the predictors of the intensity of pole 
cutting showed that significant predictors were the distance from the nearest feeder road, 
the distance from the forest edge, as well as the accessibility and the presence of JFM. 
These four variables together explained 15% of the variation in the data on the pole 
cutting intensity (see Table 6.8 overleaf). Excluded variables were the distance from 
Dar es Salaam and from Morogoro, the distance from the village and the distance from 
the nearest tarmac road.  
Pole cutting intensity decreased with increasing distance from the nearest feeder road 
and the forest edge, increasing difficulty in access and with the existence of JFM. The 
distance from urban centres and the village seemingly did not play a significant role.  
 
  
166 
 
Table 6.6 Regression: y =„percentage of cuts to remaining trees per plot‟    
Predictor Model Anova F Total df Sig. R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Beta In 
Distance from Dar es Salaam (x1) y=55.25+-.061x1-0.177x2-0.643x3-0.785x4 55.25 4 0.148 0.286 0.282 -0.061 
Accessibility score (x2)    0.000   -0.177 
JFM (x3)    0.000   -0.643 
Distance to nearest feeder road (x4)       0.000     -0.785 
Table 6.7 Regression: „y = percentage of cuts to remaining trees per plot‟   
Predictor Model Anova F Total df Sig. R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Beta In 
Distance to nearest feeder road (x1) y=48.11+-.806x1-0.174x2-0.623x3 86.55 3 0.000 0.284 0.281 -0.806 
Accessibility score (x2)    0.000   -0.174 
JFM (x3)       0.000     -0.623 
Table 6.8 Regression: „y = percentage of cuts to remaining poles per plot‟   
Predictor Model Anova F Total df Sig. R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Beta In 
Distance from nearest feeder road (x1) y=41.82+-.408x1-0.229x2-0.354x3-0.116x4 28.81 4 0.000 0.150 0.145 -0.408 
Accessibility score (x2)    0.000   -0.229 
JFM (x3)    0.000   -0.354 
Distance from forest edge (x4)       0.009     -0.116 
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In contrast, the step-wise regression model to investigate the predictors of the intensity 
of withies cutting excluded the variables distance to tarmac and feeder road, distance to 
forest edge and distance to urban centres (Dar es Salaam and Morogoro). Significant 
were the variables distance to the nearest village, accessibility and JFM (see Table 6.9 
overleaf). However, the model explained only 5% of the variation in the data. 
The withies cutting rate decreased with increasing distance from the village, increasing 
difficulty of access and the presence of JFM. The distance to roads and urban centres 
seemingly did not play a role in the intensity of withies cutting. This points to the fact 
that withies are predominantly used by the villagers for house construction and carried 
by foot from the forest to the building site. 
6.6.4. Predictors for the occurrence of charcoal pits and burnings 
A stepwise built regression model identified the distance from urban centres (Dar es 
Salaam and Morogoro), the forest edge, the accessibility and the presence of JFM to be 
significant predictors for occurrence of charcoal pits in the forests (Table 6.10 overleaf). 
The regression was significant, however explained only 7% of the total variation in the 
data. The variables „distance from the village‟ and „the road‟ were excluded. Clearly the 
distance to urban centres was the most important factor. The incidence of charcoal pits 
in the forests increased with decreasing distance from Dar es Salaam and from 
Morogoro. The significance of the variables JFM and accessibility is not high in this 
case. The distance to the forest edge, interestingly shows a positive correlation, 
indicating that charcoal pits are further away from the forest edge where they are less 
visible and where there are remaining wood resources. Generally pits are also not much 
near the road, although there can be a strip of good forest as a „screen‟, then a really 
degraded area and then better trees, which can be harvested.   
The frequency of incidences of burning in the forest was a significant difference 
between JFM and non JFM forests (see Section 6.4.3 above). A step-wise multiple 
regression model identified the distance to the road as the only significant predictor, 
which explained 6% in the total variation of the data. Interestingly, the positive Beta 
coefficient indicates that the frequency of burning increased with increasing distance 
from the road (Table 6.11 overleaf). All other potential predictors distance to urban 
centres, distance to village and forest edge, accessibility and also JFM were excluded.  
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Table 6.9 Regression: „y = percentage of cuts to remaining withies per plot‟   
Predictor Model Anova F Total df Sig. R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Beta In 
Accessibility score (x1) y=29.23+-0.146x1-0.231x2-0.181x3 11.37 3 0.000 0.05 0.045 -0.146 
JFM (x2)    0.000   -0.231 
Distance from village (x3)       0.000     -0.181 
 
Table 6.10 Regression: „y = occurrence of charcoal pits‟  
Predictor Model Anova F Total df Sig. R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Beta In 
Distance from Dar es Salaam (x1) y=0.96-0.35x1-0.278x2+0.075x3-0.098x4-0.09x5 11.58 5 0.000 0.081 0.074 -0.350 
Distance from Morogoro (x2)    0.000   -0.278 
Distance from forest edge (x4)    0.080   0.075 
Accessibility score (x3)    0.012   -0.098 
JFM (x5)       0.078     -0.090 
 
Table 6.11 Regression: „y = signs of burning‟  
Predictor Model Anova F Total df Sig. R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Beta In 
Distance to road (x1) y=0.104+0.251x1 44.09 1 0.000 0.063 0.061 0.251 
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6.7. Villagers’ perception of forest condition    
Table 6.12 below shows the villagers response (N=393) to the question of how they 
would describe the present condition of the respective forest reserve. Over 50% of 
respondents perceived the JFM forest in their vicinity to have many big trees of value in 
contrast to only 28% respondents for the non JFM forests. This shows that villagers 
perceive the forests under JFM to be of higher quality. A higher percentage of 
respondents in non JFM villages (16%) perceive the forest to have big trees of low 
value. Fewer people adjacent to JFM forests responded with „I do not know‟ (14%) than 
people adjacent to non JFM forests (25%).  The difference between the two groups was 
significant (X2 (6)=45.35, p<0.001, Cramer‟s V=0.34). 
Asked how they would rate the present condition of the forest reserve compared to 5 
years ago (Figure 6.5 overleaf), 57% of the households adjacent to JFM forests 
responded that in their view the condition of the forest had improved and 14% felt that 
it had worsened.  
Table 6.12 Villagers‟ description of the overall condition of the forest reserve 
  
JFM 
(n=188) 
Non JFM 
(n=205) 
many big trees of value 55 28 
many big trees but of no value 9 9 
a few big trees of value 10 14 
a few big trees but of no value 3 16 
no big trees, many little trees 9 5 
no big trees, few little trees 1 2 
I do not know 14 25 
(In percent of respondents) 
The period of 5 years was chosen to coincide with the introduction of the JFM processes 
in the respective sites.  The non JFM villagers were more equally divided: 32% voted 
for an improvement in forest condition and 31% for a worsening. Again, more villagers 
in the non JFM group responded with „I do not know‟ (32%) than in the JFM group of 
villagers (24%). Only 5% out of both groups felt that there was no change. The 
difference between the two groups was significant (X2 (5)=50.68, p<0.001, Cramer‟s 
V=0.36).  
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Figure 6.5 Villagers perception, change of forest condition compared to 5 years ago 
 
(N= 399, JFM= 189, non JFM=210)  
Thus, across the entire sample the villagers‟ opinion on change in forest quality matches 
the quantitative analysis. However, unfortunately there is no baseline to compare to. 
Spatial analysis disaggregated by village showed that similarly villagers adjacent to the 
JFM forests rated the condition of the forest higher than the villagers adjacent to the non 
JFM forests across all three sites. Nevertheless, in some instances, villagers‟ opinion did 
not match the statistical analysis of forest quality. The largest difference in opinion was 
in site one, where 57% of villagers in Maseyu felt that Kitulang‟halo forest reserve had 
„many big valuable trees‟ compared to only 13% of Fulwe villagers who had this 
positive perception of Dindili forest reserve. However, as Section 6.6 above has shown, 
Dindili had trees with significantly larger DBH value (some of them class I) and height 
than Kitulang‟halo. Interesting is also that Milawilila forest reserve, which ranked 
highest out of all six forest in average DBH value of trees (M=37.50, see Section 6.6. 
above) was not particularly strongly perceived by the villagers as containing large trees. 
21% of the respondents felt that Milawilila had „no big trees, but many little trees‟. 
Kitulang‟halo forest reserve in contrast, which ranked lowest in average DBH value 
(18.04), was perceived much more positively by the villagers in Maseyu, where only 
2% thought that there were „no big trees but many little trees‟ in the forest (Table A4.11, 
Appendix 4).   
The perception of male and female villagers about the forest condition differed during 
the focus group discussion. For example in site 1, the men felt that there were no 
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valuable species in the forest reserve, in particular Mninga. The women in contrast 
believed that these species were still in the forest. The household survey confirmed 
these results as in Maseyu 17% of the men felt that Kitulang‟halo forest had many large 
tree of value in contrast to 19% of the women who felt the same. Villagers in Logo 
village had observed that wild animals had lived close to people‟s houses some years 
ago, whereas nowadays they lived further away. This was interpreted by the villagers as 
an indicator of forest decline. In contrast, Milawilila forest was perceived to be in good 
condition because a donor supported the nearby villagers in reforestation and the 
formation of groups who guarded the forest. Further, Milawilila forest‟s location close 
to the road was perceived to prevent illegal entry and harvesting because of its visibility. 
Since Ngambaula forest was more remote and far away from the road there was 
reportedly more disturbance. Villagers in Logo village expressed that Ngambaula forest 
had in contrast to Milawilila much deteriorated over the recent years.  
These results show that the villagers‟ perception is congruent with the results of the 
quantitative forest quality analysis. In site 1, where the differences between JFM and 
non JFM forests are not statistically significant, villagers in the two groups are the 
closest in their judgement about the two forests. In site 3 where the statistical 
differences are most pronounced, so is the difference in opinion of the villagers.  
6.8. Summary and discussion of results     
In the sample of the six lower altitude Coastal / Eastern Arc forest and miombo 
woodland sites around the Uluguru Mountains, a comparative analysis of 659 forest 
plots divided into JFM forest plots and plots in forests under central management 
showed significant signs of improved forest quality in the JFM forests. This was 
consistent across a range of variables presented, such as presence of timber, poles and 
withies, as well as other indicators of forest health, such as coverage of seedlings and 
leaf litter on the forest floor, and lower invasion of grass coverage. This contrasts with 
measurements taken on land administered solely by government agencies with no 
community involvement (non JFM) where forest quality was significantly lower. While 
JFM plots had significantly higher numbers of trees (54.5% more), they were smaller in 
size when compared to the non JFM forest plots. The difference in average DBH value 
represented a 20% reduction compared to the non JFM forests. Since the size is an 
indicator of age, we can conclude that the remaining trees in the JFM forests are 
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younger on average than in the non JFM forests. This may be due to heavy logging in 
these forests prior to JFM and forest regeneration over the past 5 to 10 years or 
continuous selective logging despite JFM. There was no significant difference in the 
estimated height of trees between JFM and non JFM plots. Poles and withies resources 
on JFM plots presented an improvement compared to the non JFM plots of 32.7% and 
92.5% respectively.  
With the exception of the lower DBH value, these results confirm the first hypothesis 
that JFM forests have a better forest quality measured through a larger number of trees, 
poles and withies than non JFM forest plots. This result is consistent with Blomley et al. 
(2008) but differs from Persha and Blomley (2009), who found no signs of improved 
condition in their comparison of a co-managed to a centrally managed forest in the West 
Usambaras in Tanzania. The second part of the first hypothesis (that the improvement in 
abundance of resources in JFM forests is strongest for withies, milder for poles and 
smallest for trees), was not confirmed for the full sample. The improvement in forest 
condition measured through these three variables was strongest for withies, followed by 
trees and then poles. However, in the spatial analysis by sites the comparison between 
the JFM forests Kimboza and Milawilila to their paired non JFM forests Ruvu and 
Ngambaula respectively, showed progressively higher occurrences of trees, poles and 
withies in the JFM forests at significant levels.   
For the full sample, the second hypothesis, that the canopy density is higher in JFM than 
in non JFM forests, needs to be rejected. However, in the disaggregated comparison by 
site, canopy density was significantly higher in site 2 (Kimboza compared to Ruvu) and 
site 3 (Milawilila compared to Ngambaula). There were, however, large variations in 
canopy density between the plots within each of these two JFM forests. Dindili and 
Ngambaula, both non JFM forests, had the lowest canopy density.  
There was no significant difference between JFM and non JFM plots in terms of species 
richness. This is consistent with the finding of Huang et al. (2003) in their study of 
species diversity of tropical forests in Tanzania that species diversity is significantly 
influenced by the structure and composition of the forest. JFM may not be a significant 
predictor. Thus, the third hypothesis, that the species richness is higher in JFM forests, 
was not confirmed. The majority of species found in the forest reserves (80%) were of 
class V type. These are of lower value than class I species of which there were only 
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about 7–8%. This result supports earlier findings of Ahrends (2005) and TRAFFIC 
(2005) that valuable species are harvested first – independent of the management regime. 
This is consistent with the observation mentioned in Section 6.3 that timber trees are 
being marked for felling in JFM forests. It suggests that JFM rules are not implemented. 
However, it also needs to be considered that the occurrence of high value big size trees 
cannot be expected to change much over 5 years. This might be another factor 
explaining the lack of difference in species richness between the two groups.  
The fourth hypothesis that the liana density is lower in JFM forests than in non JFM 
forests, is rejected. On the contrary, the liana density was on average higher in JFM 
plots than in non JFM plots, which would indicate higher disturbance of the JFM forests 
from earlier times, but did not test as statistically significant in this study.    
Higher occurrence of leaf litter and seedlings on the forest floor as well as less grass 
coverage were significant indicators of better forest health and less canopy opening on 
the JFM plots. The fifth hypothesis is therefore accepted. While this result could also be 
related to the intensity of cattle grazing, in this study there was no significant difference 
in the occurrence of cattle grazing between the two groups (table 6.5). The lower grass 
coverage may be an explanatory factor for the significantly lower fire intensity 
measured in the JFM forests, as much as a stronger protection regime would be. Due to 
the limitations of the study design (see Section 5.1.2 above), i.e. comparing JFM with 
non-JFM without much evidence of “before-JFM” similarities of the investigated 
parameters, these results concerning grass coverage might be slightly biased. This is 
because plots in wet forest and woodlands habitat, which naturally have more grass 
coverage, were compared.  
In summary the analysis of all forest quality variables combined provided a fairly 
consistent picture of generally better forest quality in the forests managed under JFM by 
the communities when compared to the solely state managed forests. Villagers‟ 
perception of the condition of the respective forest reserve adjacent to their village was 
found to be fairly consistent with the quantitative forest transect analysis.   
While scoring better in forest quality, the JFM forests in the full sample comparison 
also showed significantly higher levels of tree and pole cutting than the non JFM forests. 
The harvesting of withies was also more intense on JFM plots. However, it did not test 
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as a statistically significant difference between the two groups. Thus, the sixth 
hypothesis that the extent of human use measured through the number of cuts of trees, 
poles and withies is lower in JFM forests than in non JFM forests needs to be rejected. 
Considering that JFM forests had better forest quality – in other words, more timber, 
pole and withies resources remaining – the cuttings were compared to the available 
forest resources. When the average cutting rate per plot was expressed as a percentage 
of the remaining resources, JFM forest plots showed significantly lower intensity of 
withies cutting than the centrally managed forests, remained however higher with regard 
to timber and pole cutting. The finding of higher cuttings in JFM forests is consistent 
with Persha and Blomley (2009), who found higher levels of anthropogenic disturbance 
in terms of illegal logging and pole cutting in their comparison of a co-management and 
centrally managed forests.  
Disaggregation into old and recent cuttings confirmed the significant higher values for 
old cuttings in the JFM forests, but did not produce statistically significant differences 
for recent cuttings. This is a strong indication of no effect of JFM on wood cutting. A 
higher ratio of old cuttings to recent cuttings is consistent with earlier findings in the 
Uluguru mountains (Frontier-Tanzania 2005a and 2005b). This result seems to indicate 
that the higher cutting rates on the JFM plots are from earlier times, prior to 
introduction of the relatively young JFM process. Further research is needed to confirm 
this assumption, in particular time series analysis. Some time series research over the 
period 2000 to 2004 has been conducted by Frontier-Tanzania in the Uluguru North and 
South Forest Reserves (Frontier-Tanzania 2005 a and 2005 b), which shows a 
significant increase in pole and timber cutting over 5 years time where there was no 
PFM, and no significant difference in the levels of pole cutting but increased timber 
extraction where PFM was introduced.   
Hypothesis seven, that other forms of human use are less in JFM forests than in non 
JFM forests due to the less permeable access regime, was confirmed through the 
analysis for the occurrence of opportunistically encountered burning, sawpit and mining 
sites as well as farming inside the forest. Non JFM plots had significantly more 
incidences of burning in the forest than JFM plots. Also, there were significantly more 
mining sites in non JFM plots compared to JFM plots, where there were none recorded. 
However, on the basis of recorded new cuttings of trees, poles and whities being not 
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significantly different (table 6.4), hypothesis seven must be rejected. This suggests a de 
facto management regime where only some but not all forest uses are effectively 
restricted by JFM. In other words, this supports the assumption of collective agency by 
JFM villages vis-a-vis the state. They do not implement JFM as it is officially intended, 
but modify the rules to suit their own ends and objectives rather than those of the state 
This supports Cleaver‟s (2007) hypothesis of “bricolage” that officially created local 
institutions and their rules are being melded by the villagers with existing and locally 
negotiated rules to fit their purpose (see Chapter 2). 
The results of the spatial analysis of the three sites provide indication to accept the 
eighth hypothesis as far as it refers to the forest quality component of this study. 
Improved forest quality in the JFM forest compared to the centrally managed forest is 
strongest in the Milawilila-Ngambaula site, followed by Kimboza-Ruvu and lowest in 
Kitulang‟halo-Dindili where there was no significant difference. With regard to the 
human use component, this ranking of sites is not confirmed. The spatial analysis of 
three separate JFM versus non JFM pairs showed that there was large variation in the 
results achieved through JFM. This which lends support to the idea that the degree of 
sustainable forest management is dependent on the quality of the JFM regime 
implemented.  
The study investigated possible predictors of human forest use and whether and to what 
extent the presence of JFM could explain the variation in the data. In a multiple 
stepwise regression model, the presence of JFM and accessibility played a significant 
role in predicting the intensity of timber logging, pole and withies cutting. With the 
presence of JFM and increasingly difficult accessibility, cutting intensities decreased. In 
addition to these two factors, the distance from Dar es Salaam and feeder roads 
influenced the intensity of timber logging. Pole and withies cutting was not affected by 
the distance from urban centres. This points to the fact that poles and withies are 
predominantly used for subsistence level rural housing construction. Timber cutting in 
contrast depends more on the demand from urban centres. Distance from the forest edge 
was not a significant predictor for pole and timber cutting, and the study did hence not 
confirm earlier findings that pole and timber cutting are greater at the forest edge 
(MNRT 2005a and b; Hofstad 1997). JFM did not play a significant role in predicting 
the occurrence of charcoal making, mining and burning in the forests. The distance to 
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urban centres was the most important factor explaining the occurrence of charcoal pits. 
It increased with decreasing distance from Dar es Salaam and from Morogoro and with 
further distance from the forest edge where they are less visible. This is consistent with 
the finding of Ahrends et al. (2010) that distance from Dar es Salaam is the largest 
factor explaining forest disturbance. This also confirms earlier studies which show that 
charcoal is besides timber the most commercialized forest resource supplying the large 
charcoal markets in Dar es Salaam and Morogoro (Luoga et al. 2000a, Luoga et al. 
2000b; Monela n.d.; Hofstad 1997).  These findings show that JFM rules have limited 
effectiveness in restricting economically motivated human use of forests. Economic use 
of forests is influenced by other factors, such as commercial demand for wood resources 
from urban areas and subsistence need for construction purposes from adjacent villages. 
These demand pressures might be so strong that controlling the related forest uses only 
through JFM is difficult, in particular if it is not well implemented. It might require a 
mix with economic policy instruments beyond the forest sector (i.e. taxation) that aims 
to influence the consumer rather than controlling the harvesting.       
 
The pair-wise comparison statistics in table 6.4 tests the effect of JFM on actual forest 
utilisation. The “not significant difference” between new cuts of trees, poles and withies 
in JFM and non JFM forests documents little difference in forest utilization. This is 
consistent with the results of the multiple regression analysis that JFM rules have not 
been effectively restricting the economically motivated human use of forests. This is an 
important governance related finding. At the same time it shows that the study design is 
more suitable to assess governance effects of JFM. As explained in Section 5.1 above, 
the study design has limitations in testing the hypotheses. The pair-wise comparison of 
JFM versus non JFM seems more useful in testing whether JFM rules were actually 
implemented in JFM forests and only secondly if JFM has resulted in improved forest 
quality. Pair-wise comparison to assess the bio-physical effects of JFM may produce 
biased results because we cannot assume that forests - apart from the management 
regime - are completely similar in their biophysical characteristics. Without taking the 
“before JFM” situation into account, we do not know if the variables measured and 
compared between the forests have not been already different between the two forests 
prior to JFM. Longitudinal studies would be better suited to assess bio-physical changes 
within a particular forest. However these were not possible within the scope of this 
study.  
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7. Impacts on livelihoods and equity 
7.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the second research question: How does JFM 
impact on households‟ forest access, forest related livelihoods and equity? In addition to 
improving the condition of the forests, a key assumption of PFM is to improve the 
livelihoods of forest adjacent communities. However, as the literature review in Chapter 
2 above has shown, PFM does not lead to positive livelihoods outcomes under all 
circumstances. Based on the literature review the following six hypotheses are 
developed for this study:  
1. People in the JFM villages face more limited access to the forest reserves compared 
to the control group. 
2. The more limited access in the JFM forests leads to reduced forest resources use.  
3. The more limited access in the JFM forests leads to reduced forest incomes.  
4. JFM improves the access of the villagers to information about forest access and use 
and their participation in decision making about forest management. 
5. JFM manifests inequity and poverty as it grants preferential access to certain social 
groups and excludes others from access to and benefits from the forest reserve.  
6. The less permeable access regime of the JFM forests leads to a displacement of 
forest harvesting to adjacent forest areas that are less well protected.  
This chapter presents the research results from the survey of 401 households conducted 
in the six study villages. The following section (7.2) looks at the specific livelihoods 
effects of JFM and Section 7.3 at unequal outcomes. Section 7.4 investigates 
displacement of forest resource use. The findings of this chapter are summarized in 
Section 7.5. 
7.2. Livelihoods effects of JFM 
Chapter 6 showed that the JFM forests had improved forest quality compared to the non 
JFM forests. About half (51%) of the respondents to the household survey expressed 
that the change in the condition of the respective forest reserve had no effect on their 
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livelihoods. The remaining half showed statistically significant differences between the 
JFM and the non JFM group of households (U=11.677, p>0.001, r=-0.19; X
2
 (2) = 
12.04, p<0.001. Cramer‟s V: 0.19; Kendall‟s Tau_b, p>0.05): Significantly more 
residents adjacent to JFM forests felt an improvement in livelihood (29%) compared to 
non JFM villagers (15%). At the same time, less JFM villagers (22%) than non JFM 
villagers (33%) expressed that their livelihood had worsened (Figure 7.1 below). 
Figure 7.1 Perceived livelihood impact due to change in forest condition 
 
While these results lend support to the idea that the JFM regime had some positive 
impact on people‟s livelihoods, at the same time they give reason to question the extent 
to which the formal management regime of a particular forest does actually matter for 
rural livelihoods. People could have learned these replies as part of the awareness 
raising usually conducted in the PFM process. In Chapter 6 the study demonstrated no 
effect of JFM in frequency of recent tree cutting, meaning that differences in forest use 
between JFM and non JFM forests are not that big. In other words, actual (as opposed to 
formal) differences on forest management regimes might still have an effect on rural 
livelihoods. Therefore, further variables are presented in the subsequent sections to 
analyse the impact of JFM on livelihoods in the forest adjacent villages.    
7.2.1. Forest resource use   
Households in the sample used on average about seven different types of forest 
resources for their livelihoods. In some cases, such as in Mwalazi village up to 16 
different forest resources were used. There was no difference between JFM villages and 
the control group in the type of forest resources that households were collecting. 
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Fuelwood (15%), building materials such as poles (13%), withies (12%) and ropes 
(11%), as well as farm land (12%) were the most important resources for both groups 
(Table A5.31 in Appendix 5).  
The choice of where to collect those forest products showed a statistically significant 
difference between the JFM and the non JFM villages (U=641.562; p<0.001, r= -0.16). 
Fewer people in the JFM villages (3.3%) indicated government forest reserves as their 
source of forest product collection than villagers adjacent to the non JFM forests (5.9%). 
The government forest reserve was named in the survey of the adjacent village to ensure 
that reference was made to the six reserves under study. For the purpose of data analysis 
they were summarized as “government forest reserve” (Table 7.1 below).   
Table 7.1 Sources of forest product collection, JFM versus non JFM villages (% of respondents)  
  JFM Non JFM All 
public lands forest 23.7 35.7 29.6 
village government forest 8.4 6.4 7.3 
community forest 1.4 0.4 0.8 
central government forest 3.3 5.9 4.8 
private forest 1.4 1.3 1.3 
home garden 4.0 8.5 6.4 
farm fields 58.7 42.0 49.8 
The fact that farm fields (58.7%) and village government forests (8.4%) played a 
stronger role as forest product sources in the JFM villages than in the non JFM villages 
(42% and 6.4% respectively; see table 7.4 above), hints at the more restricted access to 
the government forest reserve under JFM. The sample households in the JFM villages 
collected forest resources significantly less frequently (Kendall‟s Tau_b, p>0.05, at 0.01 
level), than the households in the non JFM villages (Table 7.2). Fewer respondents in 
JFM villages (15%) than in non JFM villages (19%) collected daily and more 
respondents collected less than once per month (JFM: 50%; non JFM: 41%). This 
difference in frequency of collection, although it is small, might be a possible indication 
of reduced accessibility to forest resources in the JFM scenario.  
Table 7.2 Frequency of forest product collection, JFM versus non JFM villages (% of respondents) 
  JFM Non JFM All 
Daily 15.0 19.0 17.0 
2-3 times per week 22.0 22.0 21.7 
once per week   4.0 10.0 6.7 
every other week  3.0 7.0 7.8 
less than once per month 50.0 41.0 46.1 
Never 1.0 1.0 0.7 
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With regard to fuelwood in particular people used a variety of sources. Only 8.4% of the 
households indicated government forest reserves as fuelwood source (see Figure 7.2 
overleaf), while farm fields (54%) followed by public lands (22%) were the 
predominant sources. Private woodlots played only a minor role in fuelwood provision 
(1.4% of respondents on Fulwe village only) in the study area. The above result did not 
significantly differ between the JFM and non JFM groups of households (U=17,778, 
p<0.001). This means that JFM did not significantly impact on the availability and 
accessibility of fuelwood.  
Figure 7.2 Type of land where fuelwood is collected (% of respondents) 
 
(„Original in colour‟) 
The spatial analysis across the three sites showed different trends with regard to 
fuelwood collection: In both site 1 and site 2, more respondents in the JFM villages 
Maseyu (18.2%) and Mwalazi (7.3%) than in the non JFM villages Fulwe (14.9%) and 
Ngong‟olo (0%) said that they collected fuelwood in the government forest reserve. 
This is because in both of the JFM forests in site 1 and 2 fuelwood collection was 
allowed on certain days. On the other hand, even in JFM villages such as in Mwalazi 
village, where fuelwood collection from the JFM forest Kimboza was allowed, only 
7.3% of the respondents utilized this source. The majority of people still collected 
fuelwood on public land and farm fields. Thus, despite the legal access to fuelwood 
from the reserve many people opted not to use this source. In Ngong‟olo village 
adjacent to the open access Ruvu forest, people did not rely at all on the forest reserve 
for fuelwood collection, 47.2% collected on public land 48.6% on farm fields. This 
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shows that other factors besides the management regime influenced people‟s choice of 
where to collect fuelwood.  
The distance from the house to the forest in minutes walking was significantly longer in 
the control group villages (M=48, SE=1.8) than in the JFM villages (M=36, SE=1.1) 
(U=630,437.5, p<0.001, r = -0.1). While the forest reserve was further away for the non 
JFM villagers, at the same time when asked about the distance to the fuelwood source, 
there was no significant difference between both groups in terms of minutes walking to 
the fuelwood source (U=18,009.5, p<0.001). It was on average between 5 to 10 minutes 
for all households. This indicates that people adjusted to the longer distance to the forest 
reserve by choosing an alternative nearer source of fuelwood, despite the seemingly 
open access to the reserve. Thus, distance in addition to the access regime of the nearest 
forest comes out as an important factor in the villagers‟ choice on where to gather their 
fuelwood.  
7.2.2. Forest cash income and wealth  
With regard to the use of forest products collected, 96.5% of the respondents favour 
home subsistence use over sale (2.0%) of forest products, while 1.5% both consumed at 
home and sold forest products. There was no significant difference in forest product use 
between JFM and non JFM villages. Home consumption remained the dominant use in 
both groups.  
Only 70 out of 401 households provided information on the cash income derived from 
forest resources
19
. This might be because only a small portion of the respondents sold 
forest products and many activities related to forest product collection were illegal. The 
information and valuation of subsistence income was incomplete and therefore not used 
for the analysis. The average forest resource cash income was with TSH 70,470/= 
(SE=15,896) higher amongst the respondents from JFM villages than the non JFM 
villages (M=TSH 64,603/=; SE=18,703), however the difference did not test as 
statistically significant. In the entire sample, the maximum cash income recorded in a 
JFM household was TSH 350,000/= while it was TSH 500,000/= in a control group 
household.   
                                                 
19
 Out of the 70 respondents, 37 were in JFM villages and 33 were in non JFM villages. 
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There was a large variation with regard to the mean annual cash forest resource income 
that the households earned (M=67704 TSH; s.d. = 12,095 TSH; SE= 101,193 TSH). 
While about a quarter of the respondents in the entire sample (24.3%) earned less than 
TSH 10,000 per annum, more than half of the respondents (57.1%) earned between 
10,000 and 100,000 TSH, 8,6% between 100,000 and 200,000 TSH and almost 10% 
earned over 200,000 TSH per annum. Although more respondents from JFM villages 
were in the higher forest cash income ranges (Table 7.3 below), the difference between 
JFM and non JFM tested as statistically not significant. In Section 7.3.3 below the forest 
cash income ranges are cross-tabulated with the four asset wealth groups.  
Table 7.3 Cash forest income ranges, by JFM and non JFM villages 
Forest income range (TSH) 
JFM Non JFM 
x<10.000 21,6 27,3 
10.001<x<100.000 54,1 60,6 
100.001<x<200.000 13,5 3,0 
x>200.000 10,8 9,1 
Total 100,0 100,0 
(Percent of respondents)  
The cross-tabulation of the forest income range group with the forest product type 
(Table 7.4 overleaf) showed which income range groups favoured which products and 
was thus able to derive the highest cash incomes from forest resources. These are 
charcoal, poles, timber and withies. Charcoal provides the number one cash based forest 
product, followed by timber. The spatial analysis showed that in site 1, Maseyu and 
Fulwe village, the highest forest income earned in the sub-sample was in the JFM 
village Maseyu and not Fulwe. This can be explained through the charcoal business in 
Maseyu village which was an important source of cash income. Rules or quota reducing 
charcoal production were not an integral part of the JFM regime, such as in some of the 
CBFM projects in Tanzania (Lund and Treue 2008).  
Studies that compare forest income to total household income show that forest products 
contribute between 12 and 20% to overall household income (MNRT 2009; Vyamana 
2009a).  
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Table 7.4 Cross tabulation: Forest product type and forest resource cash income group 
  x<10,000 10,001<x<100,000 100,001<x<200,000 x>200,000 Total 
Timber 1 8 0 1 10 
Poles 1 0 0 2 3 
Withies 0 1 0 1 2 
Ropes 0 1 0 0 1 
Firewood 4 0 0 0 4 
Charcoal 8 26 6 3 43 
Medicines 2 0 0 0 2 
Edible fruit, vegetables, leaves 1 0 0 0 1 
Honey 0 2 0 0 2 
Bush meat 0 2 0 0 2 
Total 17 40 6 7 70 
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These figures could not be compared in the present study (see sub-Section 5.2.5.2 above). 
In order to determine how significant forest income is to people, forest cash income was 
compared to total household asset wealth. Thus, the relative importance of forest income 
was calculated as an approximation of the relative importance of forest cash income to the 
households and not a proportional variable. The limitations of comparing a flow variable 
(forest income) with a stock variable (asset wealth) are acknowledged. Across the entire 
sample, the mean household forest cash income per annum (M=94,786/=TSH) was 14.2% 
in relation to the mean household asset wealth (M=666,801/=TSH). The JFM group of 
households had with 12.7% a lower proportional forest cash income compared to total asset 
wealth than the non JFM group of households (16.6%).  This comparison thus, indicated 
the same trend as studies that compare forest cash income with total household income. 
This calculation is done by wealth categories in JFM and non JFM villages in Section 7.2.3 
below). 
A disaggregated analysis of forest cash income by asset wealth groups and also gender 
related patterns of forest cash income are considered in Section 7.3 below. 
7.2.3. Information access and participation  
Villagers in the JFM villages were significantly more satisfied with the amount of 
information about access and use of the forest reserve (X
2
 (2) = 17.3, p<0.001., Cramer‟s 
V=.24) than the control group (Table 7.5 below). However, at the same time, over 90% of 
the respondents in both JFM and non JFM villages said that they would like to have more 
information about the forest reserve.  
Table 7.5 Satisfaction with amount of information about forest reserve 
  JFM Non JFM 
Feel well informed, have enough 
information 13% 8% 
Feel informed, have some information 56% 38% 
Do not feel informed, have no information 31% 54% 
The JFM process in the three JFM sites had not increased people‟s level of participation in 
decision making about the respective forests under JFM in comparison to the control group. 
The percentage of households that, during the past 5 years, had not taken part in making 
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rules about forest access and management was above 80% in both JFM (N=185) and non 
JFM villages (N=207). Table 7.6 shows that there was no significant difference.  
Table 7.6 Participation in decision making on forest management 
  JFM Non JFM 
yes during village assembly meetings 10% 6% 
yes during other village meetings 7% 5% 
no we have not taken part at all 83% 89% 
Rules about forest access and use were being made by the village government regardless of 
the fact if there was a JFM project or not, which is what most respondents in both groups 
replied (Table 7.7). Table 7.7 refers in each village to the respective adjacent government 
forest reserve. This shows that the non JFM forests are also subject to, de facto, 
management regimes made by village governments (with no de jure rights to pass such 
rules). Irrespective of JFM being implemented or not in a given forest, the village 
governments make and enforce rules on forest access and forest use. In other words, non 
JFM forests are de facto subjected to locally devised but not formally recognised 
management regimes and the same actually goes for JFM forests. This is in the sense that 
the de facto rules devised and enforced by village governments do not entirely 
correspondent with the (draft) JMAs. Thus, management regimes in non JFM forests can 
hardly be defined as de facto open access.  
Furthermore, JFM did not make much difference with regard to the awareness on by laws. 
70% of the JFM respondents and 75% of the control group respondents had never read or 
seen village by-laws about forest access and use.  
Table 7.7 Parties taking decisions about access to and use of the adjacent forest reserve 
  JFM Non JFM 
central government 6% 6.5% 
village government 37.5% 50% 
forest committee 14% 12% 
district 0.5% 0.5% 
village + central government jointly 25% 21% 
private person 17% 10% 
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Thus, in summary although JFM did lead to improved access to information compared to 
the control group, overall the level of information as not satisfactory. JFM did not lead to 
increased participation in decision making about forest access and use rules.   
7.3. Unequal access and outcomes  
This section accesses the validity of the fifth hypothesis that JFM manifests inequity, as 
certain social groups, in particular women and poorer villagers have less access to forest 
resources and related benefits. Forest access describes the opportunity or ability of a person 
to gain from a resource (Ribot and Peluso 2003) providing social identity and physical and 
material wealth. Access comprises a complexity of legal mechanisms, structures, and 
processes, which determine the de facto situation in contrast to the de jure legal provisions. 
Empirical research on forest access therefore can illustrate livelihood effects (Lund and 
Treue 2008) both in terms of social capital (social relations identity and relations) and 
physical capital. Three factors have been investigated as potential factors influencing equity 
in the JFM context: committee membership and leadership (sub-Section 7.3.1), gender 
(sub-Section 7.3.2) and poverty (sub-Section 7.3.3).  
7.3.1. Committee membership and leadership  
Two different sets of questions within the survey showed independently that in the JFM 
villages committee membership was strongly associated with preferential forest access and 
access to benefits. The question about which social group had primary access to the forest 
reserve brought out highly statistically significant differences between the respondents from 
the villages adjacent to the JFM forests and the control group (X
2
 (10) = 90.0, p<0.001; 
Cramer‟s V:0.47, p<0.001). 54% of the respondents from JFM villages answered that 
„forest committee members‟ were primarily accessing the forest reserve, compared to 59% 
of the respondents from the control group who answered “male villager” (Table 7.8).   
The perceived motivation of this primary access group to enter the forest reserve was also 
significantly different between the JFM and non JFM groups (X
2
 (13) = 78.58, p<0.001; 
Cramer‟s V: 0.44, p<0.001). In the JFM scenario, forest committee members primarily 
entered the forest to undertake patrol (54%) but also to take timber (25%). 
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Table 7.8 Primary access to the government forest reserve 
  JFM Non JFM 
all villagers 2% 8% 
women and children  4% 4% 
male villagers  31% 59% 
village leaders 7% 26% 
forest committee members 54% 1% 
people from district 0% 1% 
people from central government 1% 1% 
(N= 400, JFM=191, non JFM= 209) 
In non JFM villages, which were primarily accessed by ordinary villagers of male gender, 
the reason for entry were timber (47%) and pole (25%) cutting (Figure 7.3 below).  
Figure 7.3 Primary motivation of preferential access group to enter forest reserve  
c  
These results match with the second set of questions about the primary beneficiary of the 
forest reserve, which also brought significant differences between the JFM and the non 
JFM villages (X
2
 (10) = 43.1, p<0.001; Cramer‟s V=0.29, p<0.001). In the JFM case, the 
forest committee members were perceived (37%) to be the main beneficiaries of the forest 
reserves under JFM. In contrast, all villagers were perceived to benefit (by 43%) from the 
non JFM forests (Figure 7.4 below). This result confirms that while the non JFM forests 
benefit the large majority of the villagers (particularly men), JFM reduces these benefits in 
favour of the forest committee members.  
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Figure 7.4 Who benefits most from the forest reserve? 
c  
The JFM forest committees were provided with preferential access with the purpose of 
patrolling the forest on behalf of the state. The predominance of patrol as a reason of entry 
accompanied with a reduction of timber cutting as primary motivation of entry in the JFM 
forests reflects this. This result lends itself to explain the reduced disturbance of JFM 
forests. Nevertheless, when benefits are considered, it emerges that the forest committee is 
not interpreting its role simply as forest protectors but that they use their preferential access 
to enrich themselves with forest resources in the lack of other formal benefits. This is 
illustrated through the quote of a VFC member in Maseyu village below, which might 
explain why JFM did not lead to a significant reduction in wood cuttings (Chapter 6 
above):  
 
 
 
 
The villagers felt that the forest committee members benefitted mainly (Table 7.9) through 
taking timber (37%) and charcoal from the forest (22%), to some extent also through the 
receipt of allowances (6%), collection of fines (10%) and bribes (6%). 9% of the 
respondents felt that the committee members as the main beneficiaries of the JFM regime 
benefitted through increased power over decision making of the forest and 8% through 
gaining respect from other villagers. In the non JFM villages, in contrast, over 50% of the 
“I have my ID, if I see a timber tree how can I let it stand there? These people [from FDB] 
have not been here for 2-3 years. If I get no other benefits, I use my ID to take my own 
benefits from the forest.” Member VFC, Maseyu village 
 
  
189 
 
respondents indicated that primary beneficiaries of the forest reserve were male villagers 
and leaders, who got timber (55%) and charcoal (25%) from the forest reserve (Table 7.10 
below). 
Table 7.9 Ways in which forest committee members are perceived to benefit (JFM) 
 Perceived benefits of the forest committee (JFM) 
% of respondents 
n = 191 
salary/allowances 6% 
more power over decision making about forest 9% 
gain respect from other villagers 8% 
get charcoal 22% 
get timber 37% 
fines collected 10% 
bribes collected 8% 
 
Table 7.10 Ways in which male villagers and village leaders are perceived to benefit (non JFM) 
 Perceived benefits of male villagers and village leaders (non JFM) 
% of respondents 
n = 210 
get charcoal 26% 
get timber 55% 
fines collected 4% 
bribes collected 8% 
mining activities 7% 
This statistical result is illustrated with a concrete example from Kitulang‟halo forest 
reserve, where a leading forest committee member was well known in the neighbouring 
village as charcoal burner making his own profit off the forest. After the research team had 
come across several active charcoal pits while transecting Kitulang‟halo forest in the 
vicinity of the member‟s house, the village executive officer tried to stop the research. This 
shows the alliance between the village government and the forest committee.   
 
The village leadership data shows consistent results. Table 7.8 above showed that in the 
non JFM villages 26% of the respondents felt that the village leaders have primary access 
to the forest reserve, compared to only 7% in the JFM villages. This implies that the strong 
role of the village leaders over the state controlled forest reserves is shifted towards the 
forest committee in the JFM case. This may explain the close control of the forest 
committee by the village leaders observed in the JFM villages, which includes for example 
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nomination of committee members and dealing with offenders (see Chapter 8). More 
leaders (10.6%) than non leaders (7.7%) indicated that they would collect fuelwood from 
government forest reserves. However this difference was not statistically significant 
(U=16,387, p>.001). All other variables in the data set disaggregated by leadership status 
did not show any significant differences in forest resource use and income between the 
leaders and non leaders in the sample.  
 
Table 7.8 above has also shown that forest access was perceived to be male dominated by 
both groups of villagers, JFM (31%) and non JFM (59%). Given that the forest committees 
are mostly male dominated apart from sometimes one or two „quota‟ women, in general 
access to reserved forest areas is male dominated independent of the management regime. 
Gender related patterns are dealt with in more detail in the subsequent section.  
7.3.2. Gender  
The more detailed gender disaggregated analysis confirmed that women, children, elders 
and disabled were facing exclusion from the forest reserve in both groups. The association 
between who was excluded from the forest reserve and whether or not it was a village 
adjacent to a JFM forest was statistically significant (X
2
 (4) = 52.9, p<0.001. Cramer‟s 
V=0.36 p<0.001). However, this was more strongly so in the non JFM villages (65%) than 
in the JFM villages (39%) (Table 7.11). 
Table 7.11 Villagers‟ perceptions about which groups are excluded from the forest reserve 
  JFM Non JFM 
ordinary villagers 13% 5% 
women, children, elders, disabled 39% 65% 
all villagers, except forest committee members 16% 0% 
I don't know 20% 20% 
(Source: Household survey; n = 191 JFM; n = 210 non JFM) 
This result indicates that while JFM reduces forest access for ordinary villagers in general 
and favours forest committee members in their access, it does at the same time reduce the 
extent to which marginalized groups (e.g. women, elders, children, disabled) are excluded 
from the forest. Most likely this can be explained with the fact that there were designated 
days under JFM during which access to the forest is legal and then all social groups can go, 
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whereas in the non JFM reserves access always remains illegal and women were just told 
not to go. The PRA work also revealed that villagers in non JFM villages reported that 
bribes needed to be paid to the village leaders, which in turn excluded women and the 
poorer villagers (see Chapter 8 below).  
The analysis of the source of forest product collection confirmed the same picture. Whereas 
6% of the male respondents collected from central government forests, only 2% of the 
female respondents did so (Table 7.12). This confirms the stronger limitation on access to 
reserved forests for women. The correlation between the gender of the respondent and the 
source of forest products was highly significant (Kendall‟s_Tau b, p<0.05, significant at the 
0.01 level).  
Table 7.12 Source of forest resources by gender  
  Male Female 
public lands forest 31 27 
village government forest 7 8 
community forest 1 1 
central government forest 6 2 
private forest 1 2 
home garden 7 5 
farm fields 46 55 
Total 100 100 
Interestingly, there was no significant gender difference in the time spent walking to the 
fuelwood source. (U=17,990.5, p>0.001).  
The differences regarding the sources used for forest resource collection by the two gender 
groups were significant for both JFM (X
2
 (6) = 20,956, p<0.05; Cramer‟s V: 0.125,p<0.05) 
and non JFM (X
2
 (6) = 25,634, p<0.001; Cramer‟s V:0.148,p<0.001), however stronger in 
the non JFM case. This lends further support to the idea that to some degree JFM reduces 
inequalities for women vis-as-vis men when compared to the control group.  
However, this finding did not match the qualitative research where women during the focus 
group discussion in the non JFM villages spoke openly about going into the forest to collect 
forest products. In contrast, in the JFM villages women mentioned to only go into the forest 
on days allowed for fuelwood collection but would otherwise stay away from the reserve 
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because they were being told so by their husbands and out of fear of being caught by the 
forest committee.  
With regard to the use of forest products, 3% of the male respondents sold forest products 
while only 1% of the female respondents did so. The correlation between the gender of 
respondent and use of forest product was highly significant (Kendall‟s Tau_b, p<0.05, at 
0.01 level). Split into the JFM and non JFM groups, this gender difference was still 
statistically significant for the non JFM case (X
2
 (2) = 10,861, p<0.05; Cramer‟s V: 0.095, 
p<0.05) but not in the JFM case, where about the same percentage of men and women sold 
forest products.  
Although male respondents had a higher mean cash income from forest products (M= TSH 
69,317/=, SE= 14,200) than female respondents (M= TSH 63,044/=, SE= 23,660), this 
difference did not test as statistically significant. Furthermore, it was not possible to 
distinguish if the forest cash income originated from products collected from government 
reserves or other sources. Since very few people collect their products from government 
reserves (see Table 7.1 above; Table 7.13 below) the distinction between JFM and non JFM 
hardly matters to anybody‟s income.   
7.3.3. Poverty  
There was a statistically significant difference in the sources used for forest resource 
collection between the four wealth groups (H(3) =111.07; p<0.05). Poorest people out of all 
four asset groups relied most heavily on the central government forests (7%) compared to 
5% and 4% in the two rich groups (Table 7.13). Public lands forests and farm fields were 
the most important sources of forest products across all four wealth groups. Public lands 
were most heavily used by the poorest wealth group (38%) and farm fields less so (29%). 
Farm fields were the most important source for the second richest group (61%).  
With regard to fuelwood collection in particular, the highest percentage of respondents who 
collect fuelwood from government forest reserves (13.1%) was in the poorest wealth group 
(Table 7.14). 
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Table 7.13 Sources of forest product collection (in % of respondents) 
 1 (richest) 2 3 4 (poorest) 
public lands forest 32 22 28 38 
village government forest 8 4 7 11 
community forest 0 0 1 2 
central government forest 5 4 3 7 
private forest 1 2 0 1 
home garden 6 5 4 11 
farm fields 48 61 56 29 
However, the difference in the source of fuelwood between the four wealth groups did not 
test as statistically significant (H(3)=3.34, p>.05). A possible reason to explain the higher 
reliance of the poorest wealth group on reserved forests is their more limited ownership of 
farm fields.  
Table 7.14 Fuelwood sources, by wealth group (in % of respondents)  
  1 (richest) 2 3 4 (poorest) 
government forest reserve 9.3 7.1 4.1 13.1 
public land 28.9 18.2 20.6 21.2 
village forest 3.1 2.0 3.1 2.0 
private land 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
own woodlot 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
farm fields 47.4 65.7 59.8 43.4 
home garden 5.2 2.0 8.2 14.1 
buy on market 3.1 4.0 3.1 6.1 
brought to the house 2.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 
There was no significant correlation between the wealth group and the frequency or the 
variety of forest resources collection.  
The time spent in minutes walking to the fuelwood source was significantly dependent 
(H(3)=9.210, p<0.05) on the wealth group. Poorer people walked longer distances to collect 
fuelwood (see Table 7.15 below). Given that the predominant source of fuelwood was farm 
fields this indicates that poorest people have less access to farms located in the vicinity of 
the village. Or, in cases where the forest reserve is far away and other groups can rely on 
their closer fields, poor people still walk to the more distant reserve. Due to a more limited 
ownership of land assets the poorest people had hence fewer opportunities to adjust their 
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livelihood strategies (i.e. forest resource collection) in situations of reduced access to forest 
reserve through introduction of JFM.  
Table 7.15 Distance to fuelwood source in minutes walking, by wealth group    
  1(richest) 2 3 4 (poorest) 
Mean  21.9 25.5 29.3 27.5 
s.d. 30.7 38.1 50.4 29.9 
Median 10.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 
Maximum 180.0 180.0 300.0 180.0 
The type of forest products collected was significantly correlated (at the .05 level) with the 
wealth group (Kendall‟s tau_b, p<0.5). Figure 7.5 overleaf shows the wealth disaggregated 
use of wood based forest resources. Poorer people used the reserved forest mainly for 
firewood (17% of respondents), poles (15%), and withies (13%). More respondents from 
the richest wealth group (7%) than from the poorest group (6%) used the forest reserve as a 
source of timber.  
With regard to non-timber forest products (NTFPs) the differences between rich and poor 
people were even more pronounced (Figure 7.6). 12% of people in the richest wealth group 
(1) used the forest reserve to provide farm land, compared to only 1% in the poorest group 
(4). Similarly 5% of the villagers in the richest quartile used the forest reserve for grazing 
land while none of the poorest people did so. All four wealth groups used the forest reserve 
to collect medicines, leaves, vegetables, fruit and grass. The majority of people who used 
the forest reserve to provide edible fruit, vegetables and leaves were not in the poorest but 
in the second wealth quartile group (10%). 
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Figure 7.5 Wood based forest resource use by wealth group (% of respondents) 
 
(„Original in colour‟) 
Ritual use was more pronounced amongst the two middle wealth groups, the richest people 
did not practice rituals in forest reserves at all.  
Figure 7.6 Non Timber Forest Product use by wealth group (in % of respondents)
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While home consumption is the dominant form of forest resource use across all wealth 
groups, poorest people have the highest percentage of sale (3%) and the lowest of home 
consumption (94%) compared to the other three wealth groups (Table 7.16). This indicates 
their stronger dependency on forest resources as a source of cash in the lack of other 
sources. The correlation between the use of forest products and the wealth group of the 
respondent tested as statistically significant (Kendall‟s Tau_b, p<0.05, at 0.05 level). 
Table 7.16 Use of forest products by wealth group (% of respondents) 
  1 (richest)  2 3 4 (poorest) 
HH consumption 97 98 97 94 
sale 2 1 2 3 
both 1 1 1 3 
With regard to cash income from forest products, the poorest wealth group had the lowest 
average income. The correlation between wealth group and forest cash income tested as 
statistically highly significant (Kendall‟s Tau_b, p<0.05, at 0.01 level). There was a 
significant negative correlation between annual forest cash income and asset wealth group 
(r= -.236; p<.05; rs=-0.308; p<.01; ɽ = -0.236, p<.01). The poorer the household is in asset 
wealth, the lower the forest cash income (Table 7.17).  
Table 7.17 Average forest resource cash income by wealth group 
   1 (richest) 2 3 4 (poorest) 
Mean 88,406 99,894 60,840 35,387 
SE 20,832 36,286 27,524 122,507 
Min 1,000 4,000 1,500 1,000 
Max 300,000 500,000 350,000 297,000 
All wealth groups in the JFM villages except the second richest one had a higher average 
annual forest resource cash income than in the non JFM villages (Table 7.18 below). Thus, 
while wealth groups 1, 3, and 4 gained in the JFM scenario compared to the control group, 
wealth group 2 with the highest average annual cash income from forest resources in the 
non JFM scenario faces a cash income „loss‟ of over 100,000 TSH p.a. on average under 
JFM. 
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Table 7.18 Mean cash forest income p.a. (TSH) by wealth group 
  1(richest) 2 3 4 (poorest) 
JFM  98,250 36,643 92,888 42,880 
Non JFM 58,875 149,089 24,214 29,623 
Income 
gain/gap 39,375 -112,446 68,674 13,257 
Keeping the above mentioned (sub-Section 5.2.5.2) limitations about comparing forest cash 
income and asset wealth in mind, relative forest cash income was calculated as a percentage 
of the average asset wealth of the respective wealth group. This relative importance of 
forest cash income to the household was highest for the poorest wealth group and lowest 
for the richest group. For the poorest wealth group the average annual cash income from 
forest products represents almost 30% of their total average asset wealth. For the richest 
group in contrast the relative importance was only 6%. In other words, for the poorest 
households, forest resources play a more important role to contribute to contribute to the 
overall wealth situation of the household than for richest group. This situation was the same 
for the JFM (poorest: 35.6%; richest: 8.3%) and the control group (poorest: 24.7%; richest: 
3.4%).   
7.4. Displacement of forest resource collection 
This section assesses the validity of the sixth hypothesis that the less permeable access 
regime of the JFM forests leads to displacement of forest harvesting to adjacent forest areas 
that are less well protected (i.e. leakage effect).  
Section 7.2.1 above indicated reduced access to JFM forests in comparison to the control 
group. At the same time there are no signs of reduced availability and accessibility of forest 
resources to households in the JFM villages. Farm fields and public lands forests play a 
stronger role as a source of forest product collection in the JFM villages than in the non 
JFM villages. These results lend themselves to assume that due to the less permeable access 
regime in the JFM forests resource collection was diverted to the more easily accessible 
areas, i.e. public lands and farm fields, which still offer sufficient resources.  
The villagers were asked whether their access to the respective forest reserves had changed 
during the past 5 years. While over 60% in both groups responded that they never went to 
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the forest, over 25% said they went less often and 15% that they went more often. Those 
respondents who answered that they went less often to the forest reserve nowadays than 5 
years ago were asked about their strategy to respond to this change (Table 7.19 below). 
Increased use of public lands forests was the most important coping strategy of the 
respondents from the JFM villages (63%), while it was less relevant (23%) for the control 
group. This association between people‟s strategy to respond to reduced access to the forest 
reserve and whether or not it was a village adjacent to a JFM forest was highly significant 
(X
2
 (4) = 26.76, p<0.001; Cramer‟s V= 0.47 p<0.001).  
Table 7.19 Coping strategies of villagers who went less often to forest reserve than 5 years ago  
  
JFM 
(n= 53) 
Non JFM 
(n = 69) 
go more to public land forest 63% 23% 
use home garden more often 33% 61% 
buy forest products on market 2% 16% 
go when forest committee members are away, or at night  2% 0% 
This result hints at the fact that the restricted access through the JFM regime causes more 
frequent use of the public lands forest, indicating a leakage effect of the JFM process to 
open access forest areas. During the PRA, JFM villagers confirmed to be relying on open 
areas due to the limited access to the reserved forests. For example in Kitulang‟halo, 
villagers explained that since it was not allowed to make charcoal in the forest reserve, they 
would go to the unreserved areas. However, the ones who were close to the forest reserve 
were given permission to enter. This is consistent with Vyamana (2009), who found that in 
JFM villages where the community had access to „open‟ forests, the latter tended to become 
degraded once JFM „closure‟ was in place.  
The qualitative research confirmed the importance of alternatives for villagers in their 
strategies to cope with changed forest resource availability. In Logo village, where 
Milawilila JFM forest has an enforced no access regime, increased land scarcity, puts more 
stress on Ngambaula forest.  
 
 
 
“Milawilila is protected by the villagers. Other forests [on public land] have been cleared 
now, so more people go to Ngambaula. People still cut logs for timber. There is only this one 
forest for Logo village, we have no alternative.” Villager, Logo village 
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7.5. Summary and discussion of results 
7.5.1. Impacts of JFM on livelihoods 
With regard to hypothesis one, the study results support the assumption that villagers 
adjacent to a forest reserve under JFM face reduced forest access compared to villagers 
adjacent to a forest under sole state management. The three government forest reserves 
under JFM in this study were used less often by adjacent villagers as a source of forest 
resources than the three control group forests. However, the more limited access to the 
forest reserve did not in turn lead to a reduced household level accessibility of forest 
resources in the JFM villages. There was no difference in the types of resources used 
between the two groups of households and no indication of reduced fuelwood availability 
in the JFM households. Neither positive nor negative impacts of the JFM regime on forest 
resource use could be clearly identified and the second hypothesis is thus rejected.   
 
The spatial analysis by site showed that even in the non JFM villages the government forest 
reserves were not used for fuelwood collection, where other sources were available that 
were closer. Thus, the study results indicate that fuelwood availability at household level 
cannot be directly linked to the access regime of a particular forest reserve. Rather this 
study has shown that distance to the forest reserve is an important factor in addition to 
access for people‟s decision on where to collect fuelwood. This confirms the argument of 
Dewees (1997) that people adopt their strategies for fuelwood collection to their particular 
situation and there is hence no direct link between the access to a forest and fuelwood 
scarcity. Farmers develop tree management strategies and cultural responses to deal with 
scarcities on the basis of their access to bush and managed fallow land, the community‟s 
land and labour resources, and to on farm trees (Arnold and Dewees 1997). This explains 
why making fuelwood collection the only benefit for the villagers participating in JFM (as 
it was the case in two of the three research sites) is not a sufficient incentive for the 
villagers to protect the forest. Over 90% of the villagers in this study collected dead 
fuelwood available on the lands surrounding their homesteads and fuelwood collection was 
thus not a motive of forest entry and tree cutting. Therefore, in contrast to Ravindranath N. 
H. et al. (2004) this study does not confirm that the availability and accessibility of 
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fuelwood is a suitable variable to gauge the benefits that communities derive from the 
forest.  
 
Based on this study, the third hypothesis, that households in JFM villages have lower forest 
cash incomes compared to the households in the non JFM villages, needs to be rejected. 
The average forest resource cash income was higher amongst households from JFM 
villages than from non JFM villages, however not at a statistically significant level. There 
was a large variation with regard to the total annual forest resource cash income that the 
households earned and divided into income ranges, more JFM than non JFM households 
were in the higher income range groups. These results match other studies that showed that 
household incomes from PFM forests increased slightly (Vyamana 2009). Charcoal 
provided the number one cash based forest product, followed by timber. This explains why 
forest incomes were highest in the JFM village Maseyu where the active charcoal business 
provides an important source of cash income and has replaced agriculture as the main 
source of livelihood. This confirms the findings of Malimbwi et al. (n.d.) that an average 
charcoal making household around Kitulang‟halo forest reserve, realizes a monthly 
income
20
 above the minimum salary paid to government staff.  
 
The JFM villagers did feel better informed about forest issues than the villagers in the non 
JFM sites. However, the level of information was still unsatisfactory to the villagers. The 
study confirms earlier findings (Sundar 2002, Nayak and Berkes 2008, Agarwal 2001) that 
JFM did not increase participation in decision making about access and use rules. These 
were made by the village government in both scenarios. The fourth hypothesis is thus 
rejected.  
An important finding of this study (summarized in Table 7.7 above) is the fact that non 
JFM forests are not de facto open access. Rather, this study shows, that access to and use of 
non JFM forests by local people is de facto subjected mainly to village government 
decisions. In the lack of central government, represented through the forestry division, 
taking up its management role, the village governments have put unofficial management 
                                                 
20
 43 bags of TSH 1,000/= earning 43,000/= per month. 
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regimes in place without the de jure authority to pass such rules. This confirms the 
observations of Cleaver (2007 and 2002) that there are differences between de jure and de 
facto local level institutions.  
7.5.2. Impacts of JFM on equity 
The findings of this study regarding the fifth hypothesis are mixed. Forest access in both 
JFM and non JFM forests was male dominated. In JFM forests primary access holders were 
forest committee members while in non JFM forests primary access was for male villagers 
and village leaders. Women, elders and disabled are social groups facing highest limitation 
on forest access, which is more pronounced in the non JFM forests than in the JFM forests. 
In other words, the JFM process smoothened the more disadvantaged access position of 
these groups. Two reasons may explain this. First, JFM restricted access for all villagers 
more strongly compared to the non JFM forests in favour of committee members. Second, 
by introducing certain days during which all villagers can enter the reserve for firewood 
collection, women had enforceable opportunities to enter the forest whereas in the non JFM 
forests they were told by the men not to enter the reserve. To what extent the preferential 
access of the committee manifests or extends inequity is a complicated issue. This is 
because access to the forest reserve is even in the non JFM forests not fully equal to all 
social groups within the village. Therefore these forests cannot be considered “open access”. 
There are leadership, gender and wealth related patterns to forest access and resource use in 
both scenarios JFM and non JFM. Given that the committees comprised mainly male 
members and did not include the poorest village members, women and the poor were still 
disadvantaged in their forest access. In addition to access to the forest reserve, access to 
rule making was often not equal. The latter point is shown by other studies, which 
established unequal distribution of benefits from PFM which perpetuates or even reinforces 
social inequity and that while the potential exists to reduce social inequity, it does not 
increase benefits to poor and marginalized households (McDermott and Schreckenberg 
2009, Maharjan et al. 2009).   
 
With regard to poverty, the study confirms earlier findings (Lund and Treue 2008, Straede 
and Treue 2006, Cavendish 2000, McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009, Ngaga et al. 2009, 
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MNRT 2009) of a higher importance of reserved forests and forest incomes of poorer 
people. This is explained with their limited access to ownership of good land which may 
provide these resources in alternative to the reserved forest areas and to which richer groups 
divert their demand. There was no significant correlation between wealth and leadership in 
this study which might be due to the small sample size. Therefore it cannot be concluded 
that committee membership is primarily for the rich. The wealth disaggregated analysis for 
the forest resource variables showed that the type of forest products collected was 
significantly correlated with wealth. The majority of respondents in the richest wealth 
group used the forest to provide farm land and grazing land and as a source of timber, while 
poor people used the forest mainly for firewood, poles, and withies. This is consistent with 
research from India, where poorer people depend more heavily on firewood from the 
natural forests than richer people (Hobley 1996), who are more interested in the forest as a 
timber resource.  
 
The study results show that poorest people were the ones who relied most heavily on the 
central government forest reserves. Given their higher dependency, access restriction thus 
has a stronger negative effect on poorer people. The poorest people had the highest 
percentage of sale and the lowest of subsistence use of forest products compared to the 
other three wealth groups. This indicates their stronger dependency on forest resources for 
their livelihood and as a source of cash. The correlation between wealth group and forest 
income tested as statistically highly significant. The poorest wealth group had the lowest 
absolute income from forest products, however expressed in relative terms, the poorest 
group had the highest income derived from the forest. In contrast, the richest group had the 
lowest relative forest income. This means that for the poorest households, forest resources 
play a more important role to contribute to relative wealth than for the richest households. 
Their average annual cash income from forest products represents almost 30% of their total 
average asset wealth compared to only 6% for the richest group. These percentages are 
consistent with earlier studies (Lund and Treue 2008, McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009, 
Ngaga et al. 2009, Blomley 2009). In this study, households of all wealth groups (except 
the second richest one) in JFM villages had higher annual forest incomes than in the non 
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JFM villages. However, this higher income is most likely based on illegal forest use as no 
legal utilization was allowed in the forest.    
7.5.3. Impacts of JFM on displacement of resource use 
The research results show that forest products were collected from a variety of sources not 
only the respective forest reserves. The restricted access of forests placed under JFM then 
led to a stronger diversion of the demand for forest resources into surrounding forests and 
woodlands with open access. This latter finding supports the sixth hypothesis that the less 
permeable access regime of the JFM forests leads to a leakage effect into other forest and 
woodlands areas, which confirms earlier studies (MNRT 2009, Robinson et al. 2005). By 
spreading their demand for forest products on the surrounding more permeable forests and 
woodlands, the households were able to equalize a restriction in access to one particular 
forest placed under PFM. However, this is only possible as long as these open access areas 
still contain sufficient resources. This finding may contribute to explain why deforestation 
in Tanzania is highest on General Lands, the land which is neither classified as reserved or 
village land (REDD-net 2009). The synthesis of this chapter is that the access to the forest 
is reduced for the majority of (male) villagers and preferential access to the forest and 
related benefits is given to the forest committee. A diversion of forest resource collection 
by the majority takes place to public lands areas, while harvesting in the forest reserve 
continues on a smaller scale by a few privileged people of the forest committee. Thus, the 
study confirms the elite-capture concerns raised in Asian PFM sites (Iversen et al. 2006, 
Kumar 2002, Nagendra and Gokhale 2008, Behera and Engel 2006, Padit and Thapa 2004). 
Hence, the end results are comparatively better off forests, without a negative livelihoods 
effect for the majority of the villagers – at least in the short and medium term. Long-term 
effects remain to be seen, but with increasing inequity and harvesting in both public lands 
and the forest reserve continuing, the set up may not be sustainable.    
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8. Impacts on forest governance  
8.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to answer the third research question: “Has JFM created sustainable 
forest governance institutions at the village level?” The finding made in Section 6.4.2 that 
JFM has had no significant effect on actual forest utilization, raises doubts about the 
effectiveness of the local institutions of forest governance. Based on this result and the 
literature review in Chapter 2, the following hypotheses are formulated:  
1. A lack of delegation of power and rights at the local level inhibits the achievement of 
decentralization through JFM. 
2. The local institutions of forest management created at village level do not embody 
principles of good governance, and foster corrupt practices.  
3. The local institutions of forest management reinforce inequity.  
As a tool for the analysis, the JFM process in the three study sites will be compared to the 
process steps and guiding principles defined in the government JFM guidelines (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2006). These guidelines define what is considered „good practice‟ 
with the aim of leading to successful, sustainable JFM implementation. Although the JFM 
projects in the study sites had been initiated prior to the formulation of the JFM guidelines, 
the latter can serve as a useful tool to assess „what was done‟ against „what should have 
been done‟. Subsequently, conclusions about the sustainability of the JFM process and the 
local forest committees created in the three case study sites can be drawn.  
Chapter 2 above described theoretical concepts that can be useful to determine if the local 
forest management institutions created through the JFM processes in the three sites can be 
considered sustainable. These are Ribot‟s description of decentralization, the categories of 
participation and criteria for successful local CBNRM institutions based on the property 
rights literature.  
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In Section 8.2 the JFM process in the three sites is compared against the process steps and 
guiding principles listed in the government JFM guidelines. In Section 8.3 it is assessed 
whether the local forest committees created represent a serious decentralization effort. 
Section 8.4 presents a short summary of the findings on governance related impacts. 
8.2. The JFM process in the study sites 
The following sub-sections compare each stage of JFM implementation outlined in the 
government guidelines defining „what should have been done‟ to „what was done‟ in the 
study sites. This serves the purpose to provide an overview of the nature of the JFM 
schemes implemented in the study villages and to demonstrate the many shortcomings in 
the process. Reference to the JFM principles outlined in the government guidelines shows 
that these principles have not been realized. Comparison to the control group sites shows 
that JFM, in the way it was implemented, did not improve the forest governance situation 
compared to the sites without JFM.   
8.2.1. Stage 1: Getting started  
What should have been done: 
The JFM guidelines recommend that as a first step, the FBD staff should brief the district 
staff, and form an inter-disciplinary team to undertake the work at the village level. A 
meeting with the Village Council and the Village Assembly should be held. The team 
should then facilitate the establishment and orientation of a Village Natural Resource 
Management Committee or Village Forest Committee (VFC) as local institution of forest 
governance.  
What was done: 
The JFM process in the three sites was initiated by different actors: in Maseyu village by 
FBD staff; in Mwalazi village by foresters from the Regional Catchment Forest Office in 
Morogoro; and in Milawilila by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST), a 
local NGO. Only in Milawilila did the facilitation team consist of a mixed team composed 
of forestry and community extension staff, as well as ward and district representatives. In 
the two other sites, the team consisted of forestry staff only. Principle 7 of the JFM 
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guidelines points to the fact that forest staff are locally perceived as policemen but PFM 
responsibilities require work in partnership with communities. Therefore using forest staff 
only was not an ideal approach.  
The guidelines emphasize that the participatory approach requires foresters to turn into 
facilitators, advisors, mediators and environmental watchdogs. This study shows that this 
change of roles does not come easy. The district forest officer who facilitated the 
introduction of the research to one of the JFM study villages, quickly and reluctantly turned 
into a policing officer when he observed a villager with a push cart full of Dalbergia 
melanoxylon (Locally: mpingo) wood beside the road. He arrested the villager on the spot 
in the presence of the researcher.  
 
Usually the first contact people were the village leaders (village executive officer and 
village chairman). Meetings with the Village Council and the Village Assembly had only 
been held in Milawilila, where the NGO was involved.  
 
Forest committees had been established in all three JFM study villages, although in Maseyu 
and Mwalazi they seemed dormant. With the exception of Milawilila, the VFC members 
had not been elected by the Village Assembly but directly appointed by the village leaders 
and then retroactively announced in a Village Assembly meeting (see also Section 8.3.1 
below).  
 
Further orientation of the VFCs once they had been established was poor in Maseyu, better 
in Mwalazi and the best out of the three sites in Milawilila. In Maseyu village, identity 
cards had been given to the committee members by the FBD representatives, allowing legal 
entry into the forest reserve for patrol but there had been hardly any further orientation or 
training of the VFC. In Maseyu, the VFC members were promised payment of allowances, 
boots and working gear. However these items had reportedly never been provided by FBD. 
Resentments of the VFC members in Maseyu were expressed openly during the PRA:  
  
 
 
“We think forest officials keep away now because they have not kept their promise.” (VFC 
member, Maseyu village) 
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Only in Milawilila village did the VFC members report that sensitization meetings and 
workshops had been conducted. Village leaders had been on study tours to learn from other 
districts about PFM experiences. 
 
In Kitulang‟halo, although FBD had initially instructed the VFC to appoint a treasurer, 
there was no treasurer in place, as the committee had no income to administer. These types 
of instructions show that a blueprint approach was followed by forest officials when 
introducing JFM to the villagers without considering what makes sense in the particular 
circumstances. Similarly, in Milawilila villagers reported that they were told by WCST to 
open an account. There was no income from tourism related activities and there were no 
future plans for harvesting of forest products. When the villagers where asked by the 
researchers from which source the money for the account would be coming they replied 
“from donors”.  
 
8.2.2. Stage 2: Assessment and management planning  
What should have been done: 
The JFM guidelines foresee that internal and external forest boundaries are to be defined 
and marked jointly with the VFC. Internal boundaries refer to a division of the management 
of the forest into separate areas for each of the surrounding villages to manage, called a 
forest management area. A participatory forest resources assessment should be conducted 
as a basis for the forest management plan.    
What was done: 
Boundary issues were reasons of dispute in two of the three JFM sites. In the 1999 JFM 
proposal for Kitulang‟halo FBD acknowledges that confusion over the Kitulang‟halo forest 
boundary has historical nature (see Luoga et al. 2005). Nevertheless in Maseyu village a 
discussion of forest reserve boundaries had not been part of the JFM process. During the 
interviews conducted as part of this study, the villagers and the Regional Catchment Office 
in Morogoro had different views of the boundary lines of Kitulang‟halo forest reserve. In 
Mwalazi village joint boundary planning and marking between FBD and the VFC had 
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taken place during JFM implementation, however when this study was conducted the 
boundary was not marked at all places and perceptions between villagers and FBD staff 
about the boundary line differed. The view of the forest extension officer about the 
boundary was inconsistent with the map of Kimboza forest reserve issued by his office. 
Only Milawilila forest reserve was resurveyed in 2004 as part of the JFM process. The area 
was found to be almost intact compared to the gazettement in 1914. A permanent boundary 
had been established by planting trees und it was easily recognizable during the forest 
transect walks. There were no deviating perceptions about the boundary of Milawilila forest 
by the villagers during the PRA.   
 
With the exception of Milawilila, the JFM process did not make a difference with regard to 
the clarity of boundary issues when compared to the control group sites. In all control group 
sites, forest boundaries were disputed. The only map of Ngambaula that could be found to 
plan the forest transects was an old map from colonial times. Female villagers during the 
PRA expressed their wish for clarification on the forest boundaries. At the time of this 
study, forest border clearing and planting by the district forest office had just taken place in 
Dindili. This had caused much discontent amongst the villagers as the quote below 
demonstrates.  
 
 
 
 
 
There was no evidence that a participatory forest resource assessment and planning process 
had taken place for Kitulang‟halo and Kimboza forests. In Milawilila, in 2005 a 
participatory forest resources assessment had been undertaken assisting in the development 
of the Milawilila forest management plan. 
 
“People from forestry created boundaries and took areas of our farms. Land was taken away 
from us when the boundaries for the forest reserve were cleared, which had been given to us 
by the previous village chairman. We know where the forest started. There are old 
demarcations (holes in the ground). The new demarcations do not follow the old ones. The 
old village chairman, who now passed away told us to not bypass these. This was in 1986. In 
Kilombero people were participating in the process of boundary negotiation but here there 
was no participation.”  Elderly lady, Fulwe village 
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8.2.3. Stage 3: Formalizing and legalizing  
What should have been done: 
The Forest Act requires that every forest reserve has a management plan (Section 11(4)). 
The Forest Management Plan, to be developed in consultation with the adjacent 
communities, will describe if the overall objective of forest management is protection or 
production. The guidelines call for a Joint Management Agreement (JMA) to be prepared 
subsequently, defining how cost and benefit are shared between the parties. The JMA 
specifies important issues such as how the responsibility of management will be shared, 
which rules will apply, how funds from forest management will be managed and expended 
and the procedures for resolving disputes between the parties. By-laws are to be developed 
to enforce the JMA.  
What was done: 
 Forest Management Plan and Joint Management Agreement 
Although the 1999 Kitulang‟halo JFM proposal foresees the drafting and signing of a JMA 
during the six month trial period of joint management, no JMA existed by the time of this 
study in 2006. There was a management plan for Kimboza forest reserve dated May 2004, 
prepared by the Morogoro Regional Catchment Forest Office. There was also a JMA 
between the FBD and the four forest adjacent villages Changa, Uponda, Kibangere and 
Mwalazi dated June 2003. Both documents were available at the Morogoro Region 
Catchment Office but not in Mwalazi village. Hence, the Mwalazi VFC members were not 
sure if these documents existed and did not know the function of the documents. In site 3, 
the villagers and VFC members of Milawilila village claimed that there was no 
management plan and no written agreement about the JFM process in Milawilila forest. In 
contrast, the WCST office reported that a JMA had been drafted and sent to the district for 
approval, where it had been subject to delay.  
 
The lack of forest management plans led to confusion about the ownership and the 
management status of the forest reserves in both JFM and control group sites. These 
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questions required long debates during the PRAs. In Maseyu, villagers believed that due to 
the JFM process in Kitulang‟halo, the forest was owned by the village. In Mwalazi village 
government and villagers alike knew that Kimboza was owned by central government and 
that the role of the villagers was simply „guarding‟ the forest. In Milwawilila villagers 
responded that all villagers owned Milawilila forest. Similarly, there were conflicting 
ownership claims in the control group sites, as the quote below from the Village Executive 
Officer (VEO) of Logo village shows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the absence of clear rules of forest ownership and management, there is a cloud of 
mystery around forestry issues, which villagers in more powerful positions use to their 
advantage.   
 Cost-benefit sharing 
Principle 1 of the JFM guidelines “ Communities as Forest Managers”  stipulates that 
communities for their efforts of forest protection and patrol receive a range of concrete 
benefits, such as rights to harvest forest products, share revenue from forest harvesting, 
retain fines and confiscated materials, etc. The evidence collected in this study shows that 
no formal benefits were provided to the communities. An “equitable sharing of cost and 
benefits of forest management” as recommended in JFM principle 5 of the guidelines, did 
not take place. This is due to the lack of a JMA as basis for an agreement on shared 
management responsibilities and benefits. There was never a negotiation process but rather 
a top down way of instructing villagers to form a committee and start patrolling the forest. 
Dissatisfaction and conflict arose, once the villagers had realized that FBD did not even 
keep up its promises with regard to providing equipment and other incentives. The 
Kitulang‟halo case demonstrates how the lack of such balanced agreement makes the JFM 
“Ngambaula used to be protected by elders. After independence the government came and 
put up boundaries. There was some management but this is when the destruction started. 
Now it is our forest. The Land Act of 1999 says that anything around the village land 
belongs to the village. Also the District understands that. Lately, the District Commissioner 
came and said the forest belongs to the village. There is no documentation, there are no 
procedures. The forest is within our village hence it is our forest.” VEO, Logo village 
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process unsustainable in the long term – a concern even recognized by FBD in its 
guidelines.  
 By-laws 
All 3 JFM villages had developed by-laws referring to the illegal harvesting of forest 
resources. For example a fine of TSH 10,000/= was to be paid when someone was caught 
inside the forest with a saw; TSH 50,000/= if caught sawing (Maseyu), TSH 50,000/= for 
charcoal making, TSH 100,000/= for timber cutting (in Mwalazi), or TSH 500/= to TSH 
1,000/= if caught with a Panga (a local Machete) inside the forest reserve (Milawilila). 
Such by-laws that include restrictions on equipment a user takes into the forest are 
according to McKean (2000) simpler to enforce than quantitative extraction limits.  
 
However, approval of the village by-laws by the district was missing in all three JFM study 
sites. For example, in Milawilila, the by-laws had been approved by the Village Assembly 
and had been sent to the district in June/July 2005. 12 months later, the by-laws had not 
been endorsed by the District Council. The delay was attributed by WCST staff to the fact 
that some of the village or ward executive leaders were cushioning some of the illegal 
activities for their benefits. Thus, although by-laws had been formulated they were not 
enforced. Hence, the knowledge about the by-laws was not well spread amongst the 
villagers. Female farmers expressed that they had never seen any written by-laws. By-laws 
were formulated by the village government who read them out during the Village Assembly 
but the women had not been involved in their formulation. The women expressed fear of 
by-laws and believed that whoever was caught in the forest was jailed for 30 years.   
The situation in the JFM villages did not differ much from the control group villages. 
Forest related by laws had either not been developed (e.g. in Ngong‟oloNgong‟oloi), or 
they were not known to the villagers (e.g. Fulwe). In Logo village, draft by-laws had been 
formulated in 2004 but for two years they had not been endorsed by the district. 
8.2.4. Stage 4: Implementing  
What should have been done: 
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According to the JFM guidelines, the forestry extension staff should help the community to 
put systems of forest management into place, including appointing and training a patrol 
team, starting and maintaining records e.g. patrol book, receipt book, minutes of meetings 
etc., and making sure the rules about forest access and use are known. Frequent extension 
visits are required to keep an eye on progress and help with problem solving.  
What was done: 
 Patrol 
In Maseyu a patrol book was kept for patrol records from the year 1999 to 2004 with 
declining frequency of entries. There were regular monthly records in 1999, sometimes 
with forest patrols 3 to 4 times per month up to the year 2003. After 2003 the entries in the 
patrol book became much less regular (see Figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1 Approximate number of forest patrols per year in Kitulang‟halo 
 
(Source: Approximation based on patrol book records from Kitulanghalo village)  
This coincides with the time when the village leaders reported that the FBD officials did 
not come anymore, which hints at the importance of extension visits to keeping the system 
alive. The last entry in the patrol book was dated April 2005 and the second last one 
November 2004.  Patrols were reportedly undertaken twice per week, although this was not 
consistent with the written records.  
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In Mwalazi, although not verifiable through records, VFC members claimed to be 
patrolling regularly twice per month in groups of four people, including two men and two 
women. These sound like responses that people were told to give by government officials. 
Only in Milawilila were patrols conducted regularly and documented in a patrol book, 
which was shown to the research team. 
 Extension visits 
In Maseyu, forest officials had reportedly come to the village every six month initially to 
check how the committee was working and how patrols were organized. In Mwalazi village 
an FBD extension officer stationed in Mwalazi village made continuous follow-up. 
Consequently, the JFM process in Mwalazi seemed more alive than in Kitulang‟halo. In 
Milawilila, WCST staff reportedly came to visit Milawilila between one to three times per 
month. The NGO took an active role in facilitating the JFM process. They distributed forest 
education materials. While the frequent and continuous follow up of the NGO strengthened 
the JFM process in Milawilila, at the same time it reduced the perception of the importance 
of the district as partner to the village in the JFM process. The villagers were not aware of 
any meetings with the district that had taken place during the entire JFM process. They 
assumed that the district had delegated its responsibility to WCST. The District Forest 
Officer and donor representatives had come to visit the project about once per year.  
 Record keeping 
The investigation of public records and accounts kept was a way of analyzing the practices 
and the effectiveness of the forest committees. Although in the three JFM sites there was no 
forest revenue, prudence in keeping of information about the activities of the committee 
including patrols, fines collected and meetings held are signs of good governance – that is 
transparency and accountability.  However, in all villages, except Milawilila, no records 
were publicly available. There is a habit among leaders to lock away record books in their 
residential houses. This makes accessing them difficult, prevents transparency and creates 
power. Milawilila was the only village where the secretary of the VFC kept a range of 
records, e.g. minutes of meetings, a book of by-laws, a record of activities undertaken in the 
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forest, and a patrol book, which upon request where made available to the researchers 
without delay.    
 Rules of access and forest resource use 
In the dearth of any written agreement, the rules of forest access and forest resource use 
were not clearly established. The Maseyu village government leaders stated that the 
community was allowed to go to the forest twice a week to take out fuelwood and 
medicines under VFC supervision. However, just like in Mwalazi, could the days on which 
access to the forest for fuelwood collection was allowed not be established as views 
differed. This shows the lack of clarity and transparency with regard to forest related rules.  
 
Charcoal making was according to the leaders not allowed and the charcoal alongside the 
road was supposedly from open areas and a private forest (Ngerengere army). The VFC in 
contrast stated that charcoal burning was taking place inside Kitulang‟halo forest which 
was also observed by the research team during the forest transect walks.  
 
There was a different understanding about the rules between male and female villagers. For 
example in Kitulang‟halo, the male PRA participants claimed that they were allowed to 
enter the reserve twice per week to take out fuelwood and poles, which had been announced 
during the Village Assembly. Female participants did not know that entry into the reserve 
was allowed and claimed that they did not enter the reserve at all (“We do not even go into 
the reserve for fuelwood”). The women were suspicious to hear that the men reported to 
enter the forest for fuelwood collection as fuelwood collection was a woman‟s chore. Thus, 
the women assumed that the men had other motives. The women said that Kitulang‟halo 
had been protected since the 1960s and they were told that they were not allowed to enter 
this forest. These examples show that social norms and culture are at play when explaining 
gender related factors of resource access. These cannot be changed simply by introducing a 
female quota in committee membership, just like the experience in Asia has shown (see 
Section 3.13 above).  
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In Milawilila, access to the forest was not allowed at all. This was much to the discontent of 
the villagers who were not able to harvest wild forest potatoes anymore which had 
contributed a nutritional source in the past. VFC members explained that there was 
improvement in forest quality, more rainfall and higher water levels, because the villagers 
refrained from using the forest. These sound like the usual responses that people are told to 
give during awareness raising activities.  
 
In the control group villages, leaders as well as ordinary villagers spoke openly about 
harvesting forest resources from those forests:   
 
 
 
The villagers of Fulwe described the access to Dindili forest reserve as „free‟, whereas 
Kitulanghalo was perceived to be actively guarded by the Maseyu villagers.  
8.2.5. Stages 5 and 6: Revising and expanding  
The FBD guidelines recommend planning and budgeting for expansion as other villages 
start demanding JFM regimes (United Republic of Tanzania 2006). In Kitulang‟halo, in the 
absence of written procedures, there had been no revision of the same. The JFM process 
had stalled before it could even be fully implemented. In Maseyu villagers, VFC members 
and village leaders alike expressed their discontent with the JFM process. In Mwalazi, there 
had been no revision of the Management Plan and JMA and no expansion beyond the four 
forest adjacent villages. In Milawilila, at the time of this study the JFM project was coming 
to an end and there were worries among the WCST field staff about the sustainability of the 
JFM process because the district had not taken ownership in the process. Table 8.1 below 
summarized the main findings of the above analysis.  
 
 
 
“We go into the forest often as the public land is exhausted and there is no other option. We 
get caught and we go back. My son (30 years) was caught several times. Everybody just goes 
into the forest to steal things.” Elderly lady, Fulwe village 
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Table 8.1 Summary Table: The JFM process in the study sites  
“What should have been done” 
2006 JFM Guidelines requirement 
“What was done” 
Actual implementation process in the villages 
Maseyu Mwalazi Milawilila 
Stage 1: Getting Started 
 Interdisciplinary team Only forestry staff 
(FBD) 
Only foresters 
(Regional Office) 
Mixed team 
(WCST) 
 Meeting with Village Council & 
Assembly 
Village leaders Village leaders Done 
 Establishment of VFC  Done. Members 
appointed by leaders 
Done. Members 
appointed by 
leaders 
Done. Members 
elected by 
Assembly 
 Sensitization of VFC ID cards given, gear 
promised but not 
provided 
Sensitization 
meeting 
Sensitization 
meetings and 
workshops 
Stage 2: Assessment and management planning  
 Forest boundaries defined and 
marked jointly with VFC 
None; lots of dispute 
about boundary 
Joint planning and 
marking; still 
boundary disputes  
Joint process, 
boundary 
visible, no 
disputes  
 Participatory forest resources 
assessment  
No evidence  No evidence Done in 2005 
Stage 3: Formalizing and legalizing 
 Management plan No evidence Yes. In 2004. Not 
available at 
village 
Not available at 
village 
 Joint Management Agreement No evidence Yes. In 2003. Not 
available at 
village 
Not available at 
village 
 Cost benefit sharing None None None 
 By laws Existed. Not 
approved by district; 
not enforced; not 
known by villagers 
Existed. Not 
approved by 
district; not 
enforced; not 
known  
Existed. Not 
approved by 
district; not 
enforced; not 
well known  
Stage 4: Implementing    
 Appointing and training patrol 
team 
Patrol book, 
declining entries 
once extension visits 
ceased 
Impression of 
regular patrols not 
credibly 
supported 
Regular patrols, 
documented in 
book 
 Starting and maintaining records 
(patrol book, by-laws) 
No records available No records 
available 
All available;  
maintained 
 Making sure use & access rules are 
known 
Lack of clarity about 
rules  
Lack of clarity 
about rules  
Known by 
villagers 
 Frequent extension visits Every six months 
initially, then none 
Continuous 
follow-up; local 
FBD officer 
1-3 times per 
month through 
NGO 
Stage 5 and 6: Revising Plans and JMAs and Expanding to other areas 
 Not done  Not done  Not done  
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8.3. Sustainability of village forest committees 
Village forest committees are the principal local institutions created to govern the JFM 
process at the village level and to interact as counterpart with outside agents, in particular 
the FBD. The household survey researched the perceived mandate of the VFCs more 
deeply. This section investigates the extent to which the village forest committees set up in 
the three JFM sites fulfil the requirements of effective decentralization outlined in Ribot‟s 
(2005) institutional and power choice questions (see Appendix 1). 
8.3.1. Institutional set up   
The study investigated the question of how the forest committees were integrated into the 
routine governance structures at village level, in particular their linkage to the Village 
Assembly. This was explored from two angles: firstly the way in which VFCs had been 
formed and whether they had been elected through public voting in the Village Assembly 
as a representative body, and secondly, whether information was shared by the VFCs via 
the Village Assembly to inform all villagers. As described in Chapter 2 above, such 
embedding of the VFCs into the village assembly would be a measure of „good governance 
for PFM‟ (Ribot 2005).  
 
The majority of respondents said that the forest committee was appointed by the leaders 
and not elected in the Village Assembly. The form of inclusion or belonging to the VFC 
was based on residency and social status in the village, above all personal interest of the 
village leaders decided over membership. Poor populations had no voice in the VFCs. 
Although one or two quota women were usually selected, there was no effective 
mechanism to ensure the inclusion of women and poor populations in decision making and 
benefits. The study therefore confirms the finding of Cleaver 2001 that formal institutions 
of forest governance ill reflect the complex social and livelihood identities and the VFCs 
cannot be considered representative democratic organs of village governance.   
 
Principle 6 of the FBD JFM guidelines “making the most of the existing village framework” 
underscores for JFM not to create new institutions but build upon already existing ones. 
However, this principle was not followed. New committees were set up by FBD staff in 
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parallel to the existing routine village committees (e.g. the village development committee) 
and given the mandate to look after the forest and to receive powers in the name of 
decentralization. However, these forest committees were not downwardly accountable with 
respect to the exercise of the transferred powers and no mechanisms of accountability were 
put into place. Respondents said that they were not at all informed about the activities of 
the VFC. There was hence a missing link between the VFCs formed through the JFM 
process with the elected village governance bodies. Meetings of the VFCs were held 
sporadically and the Village Assembly was not briefed about forest activities. The village 
population could not sanction the forest committees via systematic and effective 
mechanisms to avoid rise of self-interest and power concentration. Table 8.2 below 
demonstrates that these forest committees were not accountable to the village assembly.  
Table 8.2 Villagers‟ opinion (%) on how forest committee informs the village assembly  
  JFM Non JFM 
Villagers are not informed about activities of environment/forest 
committee 58 55 
Committee briefs villagers regularly during assembly meeting 21 8 
Committee briefs villagers occasionally at village assembly  5 5 
Village government informs us at assembly meeting but committee 
does not appear 15 10 
There is no environment/forest committee in our village 1 22 
 
Over 50% of the respondents in all villages were not informed at all about activities of the 
forest committees. However, there was a significantly (X
2
 (5) = 52.00, p<0.001. Cramer‟s 
V=0 .37, p<0.001) higher number of respondents (22%) in JFM villages that reported that 
the forest committee informed the villagers during Village Assembly meetings than in non 
JFM villages (8%).  
The appointment by central government through the village leaders and the lack of 
democratic representation lifted the committees to some degree out of the realm of the local 
and the elected governance bodies at the village level (i.e. Village Council, Village 
Assembly). Villagers felt that they could not question them. This is compared by Ribot 
(2005) to privatizing public resources. The forest committees did not strengthen the 
decision making power of the local elected governance bodies but rather undermined their 
power leaving the village with no power over who is in charge of the forest.  
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The VFCs were not responsive in the sense that they responded to local demands. They did 
not encourage broad based involvement of local people, they did not give local people 
voice and agency nor did they enable long-term stability. The question of whose interest the 
VFCs were serving is therefore emerging. Surely, they were not serving the interest of the 
village as a whole. To a large degree the VFCs were serving the interests of central actors 
by being mandated to patrol and protect the forest. To some extent they were serving 
members‟ interests, or rather a sub-section of the members who benefitted from forest 
resources sometimes in cooperation with the village leaders. The VFCs were single purpose 
oriented and not integrative across sectors. Mediating conflicts was not included as a role.  
 
Given the fact that in the study sites village assembly meetings were not held regularly (see 
Table 8.3 below) and assembly meeting attendance was poor (64% attended sometimes, 
24% every time, 12% never), the results of this study lend itself to question the importance 
of the Village Assembly as a governance body. However, Ribot (2005) argues that it is 
better to use the elected governance bodies and strengthen them through the PFM process 
rather than to sideline and further weaken them.  
Table 8.3 Frequency of village assembly meetings (% in the perception of interviewed villagers)   
  JFM Non JFM 
every month 9 7 
every 2-3 months 32 40 
every 6 months 18 20 
sporadically  6 5 
None 4 2 
I do not know 29 25 
8.3.2. Transfer of power 
Principle 4 “Communities as Decision-Makers not just Protectors” in the FBD guidelines 
emphasizes that JFM is a power-sharing strategy. Communities should be given authority 
to make decisions. JFM should enable local participation in forest management and bring 
control and management to local levels. The right to control and manage the forest should 
be shared and not just the right to use and benefit. These principles have not been achieved, 
not only because there were no JMAs that could have provided the legal basis for such 
power sharing, but also because JFM was introduced as a forest conservation concept and 
  
220 
 
not a power sharing concept from the outset. The review of the 1999 FBD proposal for a 
pilot “joint management of Kitulang‟halo forest reserve between FBD, SUA and the 
community” shows this. It was developed with the immediate objective to „make an end to 
the continuing damaging of the forest‟ (United Republic of Tanzania 1999). The language 
used in this proposal shows that the communities were perceived as a means to enforce 
protection of the forest and the approach did not entail power sharing. As one of the early 
test sites for JFM, the introduction of this new management approach was driven by the 
excessive extraction of wood products as FBD faced lack of manpower, funding and 
working gear as main constraints to effective forest protection (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1999).  
 
The forest administration describes its own management style as limited to patrolling and 
boundary planting with little involvement of the local communities as regards to 
information giving about offenders (United Republic of Tanzania 1999). JFM was 
introduced to change this situation. The villagers were very clear about the fact that FBD‟s 
motivation to involve people was to reduce forest destruction and not to grant them rights 
and empower them. Interestingly the villagers had the suspicion that they would be co-
opted in an unfair deal, they still did not show opposition. This confirms the assumption 
that the history of coercion left its mark on current village-state relationships.  
 
In the JFM villages the VFCs were perceived as the main agents of forest management. As 
Figure 8.2 below shows, the majority of respondents (47%) said that the forest reserve was 
managed by the VFC. In contrast, in the non JFM villages 44% replied that the forest was 
managed by the village government. This statistically significant difference (X
2
 (10) = 95.1, 
p<0.001, Cramer‟s V: 0.54) shows that in the JFM cases the VFC replaced the village 
government in its role as the perceived management agent of the forest reserves. This result 
is consistent with the analysis of forest access in sub-Section 7.3.1 above. 
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Figure 8.2 Perceived management responsibility over the forest reserves 
 
Although in JFM villages, the VFCs were perceived as the main body responsible for the 
forest, responsibility over making rules about forest access and use still remained with the 
village government (Table 8.4 below). This shows that no decision making power had been 
devolved to the VFCs. Forest management was mainly associated with patrol. Decision 
making power over rules of forest access and utilization as well as law enforcement 
remained with the (local and central) government in both JFM and control group villages. 
These results about the VFC strengthen the findings of Chapter 7 that villagers‟ stated no 
increased participation in decision making on forest rules. The wide spread of responses in 
the non JFM group, hints at the fact that, there were no clear rules about forest patrol.  
Table 8.4 Body perceived to be responsible (%) to make rules about forest access and use 
 JFM Non JFM 
central government 12 10 
village government 42 51 
environment/forest committee 8 6 
village leaders 14 8 
village government + central government 22 25 
do not know  2 0 
Patrol is clearly the main role associated with the VFCs. The perceived frequency of patrol 
in JFM forests was significantly higher than in the non JFM forests (X
2
 (6) = 70.19, 
p<0.001. Cramer‟s V=0 .42, p<0.001). While 43% of the respondents from JFM villages 
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reported forest patrols were taking place 2-3 time per week, only 13% in the non JFM 
villages reported this. 13% of the non JFM villagers replied that the forest was never 
patrolled, while none of the JFM villagers gave this reply (Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5 Respondents‟ perceptions regarding patrol of government forest reserve  
  JFM Non JFM 
Daily 7% 4% 
2-3 times per week 43% 13% 
once per month 9% 12% 
only if there was an incident 7% 13% 
Never 0% 13% 
I do not know 34% 45% 
(n: JFM = 191; non JFM=207)   
There was a significant difference between the two groups (X
2
 (8) = 53.82, p<0.001, 
Cramer‟s V= .40, p<0.001) about the main party responsible with dealing with offenders 
against forest rules. Table 8.6 below shows that respondents in JFM villages were spilt over 
who was in charge: 46% said it was the village government and 40% said it was the forest 
committee. In contrast, the clear majority of non JFM respondents (64%) indicated that 
village government was in charge of dealing with illegal activities.  
Table 8.6 Body perceived to be responsible (%) for dealing with offenders 
  JFM non JFM 
central government (FBD) 4 3 
village government 46 64 
environment/forest committee 40 9 
village leader 2 10 
the police 1 2 
nobody cares 0 2 
I do not know 8 9 
Total 92 91 
(n: JFM = 167, non JFM = 169) 
The stronger role of village governments to deal with offenders is consistent with the PRA 
studies. In Mwalazi, VFC members who had caught offenders had sent them to the village 
government and if timber was confiscated, it had been handed over to the forest extension 
officer. A case was reported when the VFC confiscated three logs and the offender paid 
TSH 10,000/= to the Village Council, who gave money to the Village Executive Officer 
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and the Forest Extension Officer. The logs were still at the house of the extension officer. 
Similarly, offenders caught in Milawilila, were reportedly sent to the village government 
who judged over them. Not many offenders had been caught as they always ran away. The 
VFC reported to have collected some fines from timber dealers but did not know what 
happened to the money once it had been handed over to the village government. The VFC 
had no mandate to keep the fines and hence no revenue source.  
The existence of the VFCs did not make a difference with regard to enforcement. Table 8.7 
below shows that there was no significant difference between JFM and non JFM 
households with regard to their observation of people violating forest rules and whether and 
to whom such violations were reported. 20% of respondents from non JFM households had 
observed a forest rule violation during the past 12 months, compared to 11% of the JFM 
respondents. Only 30% of the respondents from both groups said that they reported such 
rule braking behaviour. There was no significant difference as to whom the report was 
provided nor with regard to the effect of the reporting between the two groups. The 
underlying sample was much smaller (N= 58) than for most other tables summarizing 
governance data because very few people responded to this question.   
While the above results seem to indicate that although VFCs have been created at the 
village level as local governance agents of JFM, they have not received any real power over 
decision making of the forest and law enforcement. This power still rests with village and 
central government, just like in the control group sites. 
Table 8.7 Effect of reporting of offenders (in percent of respondents) 
  JFM non JFM 
no action was taken 6 3 
offender was fined  38 20 
offender taken to police/court 6 3 
offender put in jail 17 5 
offender sent to court 0 3 
forest products were confiscated 0 35 
I do not know as villagers are not informed 33 33 
(n: JFM = 18, non JFM= 40) 
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Although the three JFM villages did have by-law authority, they did not have the principle 
power to act over the forest, including power to develop local laws pertaining to the forest. 
Therefore, villages had no regulatory power over resource use or users. The VFCs as 
appointed local forest management institutions did not receive the right to determine who 
exploits the resource and who has subsistence access to the resource. Where the district 
needed to approve by-laws, the time period in which to respond was not enforced and the 
process was delayed as the village had no power to enforce the process. Similarly, FBD 
was not given a time frame in which to respond to village requests.  
The villages did not have the power to develop and implement a forest management plan. 
Due to the absence of signed JMAs, the transfers of power made to the VFCs and the rights 
of access they had gained were not secure and could have been taken away at the whim of 
central authorities. Under such circumstances, the committee members were not likely to 
invest in keeping up the patrol regime. Also, there were no agreements on how cost and 
benefits in relation to forest management would be shared. While the villagers carried all 
cost associated with JFM (transaction cost of patrol, time invested in meetings) there were 
no official benefits. Apart from patrolling the forest, no other mandates had been 
transferred to the VFCs. The mandate of patrolling the forest was not matched with fiscal 
resources and sufficient technical support. The committees were not provided with a budget 
to cover their cost. No power over forest revenue had been delegated and no power to 
establish economic incentives for forest management. The VFCs could not allocate 
commercial exploitation rights. Therefore there was no generation of financial resources at 
the local level, which could have compensated the villagers for the cost they incurred. 
Approval was required for every decision and no decisions could be made locally. Political 
decision choices, such as who can use a resource and who can benefit, were being retained 
at the centre by FBD and not transferred to local decision makers.   
Given this situation it is not surprising that the VFCs were not operational anymore at the 
time of this study, which was about 5 years after their initiation. While some VFC members 
tried to keep up the picture towards the researchers that the committee was meeting 
regularly twice per month, others admitted that the committee was dormant. The 
assumption that the Maseyu VFC was not playing an active role in forest management was 
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confirmed during the Venn Diagram exercise, where the VFC for Kitulang‟halo forest did 
not even appear. In Mwalazi in contrast, the VFC was the second most important institution 
after the Mwalazi village government in the Venn Diagram. In both villages, there were no 
meetings being conducted, no written records and no forest patrols. In this way, the VFC 
members showed their protest against the unsatisfying deal silently but the image of a 
functioning committee was kept up to impress outside visitors and to intimidate fellow 
villagers to keep them out of the forest.   
It was not possible to establish at which point in time the VFC of Maseyu village started to 
stagnate. Possibly it was a process of declining interest over time once there was no follow-
up from FBD who initiated it. Since Kitulang‟halo is still referred to as a JFM site by FBD, 
it seems that this stagnation is not well known at the policy level. The consequences for the 
forest are that even with a non-operational VFC, the “impression” of keeping up a working 
JFM regime by a few elitist village members helps to reduce illegal harvesting to some 
extent.  
Although Milawilila is in many aspects an exception, transferring powers to NGOs, who 
are not accountable to or representative of local people, cannot be considered more 
democratic or representative. It is according to Ribot (2005) not a form of decentralization. 
The more active role of the NGO in the case of Milawilila was accompanied by a remoter 
role of the district and central government, who were not active partners in the JFM regime. 
Thus, the JFM process in the three sites has not led to meaningful power transfer to local 
representative institutions. The process followed had the motive of administering the local 
population to be used for a purpose defined by the FBD rather than empowering and 
enabling. The forms of local forest governance established in the three case study sites can 
thus not be considered sustainable or replicable. It rather leads to the development of 
corrupt practices due to the lack of an enforceable system of control from within the village 
and reinforces the existing imbalance of power between state and community.  
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8.3.3. Misuse of power  
In all three JFM case studies the VFCs were not earning any income through the forest 
management activities. There were no financial incentives to compensate the transaction 
cost incurred: 
 
 
In the absence of formal benefits and lack of control it is not surprising that power is 
misused for personal enrichment. The requirements of permits for forest harvesting were 
not transparent and there were signs of corrupt practices and embezzlement both at the 
village level and the central government – village interface. Village leaders in Maseyu 
stated that to harvest timber, poles and charcoal from Kitulang‟halo a permit needed to be 
obtained. They further claimed that the forest was divided into a reserved area and an area 
where harvesting was allowed. This information is not consistent with FBD records where 
Kitulang‟halo is a catchment forest reserve under protection. The VFC was not issuing any 
permits in relation to forest resource use. The VFC had no source of income from permits 
or fees. This was confirmed by the male farmers who stated that there were no official 
permits or licenses for forest products. However, the harvesting of poles from Kitulanghalo 
forest required a special permission from the village government. The village government 
had tried to introduce a tax on charcoal (TSH 100/= per bag) to finance a village project, 
however, the villagers were refusing to pay.  
In Mwalazi village a campsite had been established close to the forest reserve, from which 
tourists were taken on tours into the forest. This „eco-tourism‟ initiative could in principle 
provide an income to the VFC, however, on every occasion that the researcher had arrived 
on this campsite over the period of several months, it was the chairman of the VFC himself 
who took the role of a guide to work for tourists. He was setting his prices randomly and no 
receipt was ever issued. Although initiated through the JFM project with good intentions, in 
the absence of a control mechanism and downward accountability, the income generated 
through the campsite turned into a source of corruption and did not benefit the village nor 
was it reinvested into sustainable forest management.  
“The VFC receives no direct money, all goes through the village government. Our duty is 
only to guard the forest. The government should think about compensating us.” Maseyu 
village, VFC member 
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In Mwalazi village several cases of embezzlement of previous committee chairmen were 
reported, which led to their dismissal by the villagers. After the researcher of this study left 
Mwalazi village, her research assistant who remained behind reported that the present 
chairman and village leaders were being questioned by the villagers and put under pressure 
to resign because there was no public reporting about the income received from the 
campsite.  
Villagers in Milawilila reported that the District Forest Officer had issued timber licenses in 
the past. For example in 1982 the license fee was THS 180/= per tree. Timber could not be 
transported unless it was hammer marked. Nowadays such licenses were not issued 
anymore. The VFC in Milawilila further reported that sometimes people carried a 
permission to cut for example 2 trees but they were cutting more trees. In these cases, the 
District was involved, they were corrupt.   
In Mwalazi village, the VFC and the FBD extension officer reported that no timber 
harvesting licenses for Kimboza were issued by FBD. In contrast the farmers said that one 
could buy licenses from the Forest Extension Officer based in the village to harvest forest 
products. It was nowadays more difficult to get a permit for Kimboza as one needed to 
negotiate with the VFC as well as with the extension officer. The villagers claimed that 
lumbering and pole cutting required a special permission. The villagers of Mwalazi further 
reported that for Ruvu forest illegal harvesting continued as there was no committee to 
protect the forest. The male farmers reported about roadblocks for preventing timber 
transport to town. However an a priori mobile phone call and payment of the forest staff 
and the police would help to get the road blocks removed if one had access to the 
established network of corruption. However, the quote below lends support to the 
assumption that the level of corruption is somewhat reduced compared to the pre-JFM 
situation, where there has historically been corruption in Kimboza (see Chapter 4).   
 
 
In comparison to the control group, the JFM process seems to have reduced the extent to 
which village leaders monopolize the benefits derived from the forest. There was a 
“Before you could bribe the forest officer to go into the forest but now this is more difficult 
because of the committee.” Farmer, Mwalazi village 
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significant association between people saying that they had to pay for cutting 
timber/poles/withies and with whether it was a JFM or a non JFM village (X
2
 (1) = 8.25, 
p<0.001, Phi value=.19, p<0.001). 21% of the non JFM respondents (N=67) needed to pay 
for cutting timber and poles compared to 8% of the JFM respondents (N=159).  The 
respondents indicated that they had to pay the village leaders to cut a timber tree or poles. 
Prices for such direct payments varied between TSH 3,000/= to 10,000/=. 10 participants 
(from Logo, Ngong‟olo and Mwalazi villages) openly expressed that the village leaders 
took bribes and were corrupt. In the absence of control from outside and a VFC, in the 
control group sites, village leaders had monopolized the power over the forest reserves 
more freely.  
 
The quote below illustrates that the village leaders in the control group control access and 
use of the forests:   
 
 
In Logo a fee of THS 5000/= had to be paid to the VEO to get the permission to cut a tree 
in Ngambaula forest.  There was a tendency for leaders to be randomly setting fees of all 
kinds. For example the VEO in Logo villages needed to be paid to permit the practice of 
traditional dances on Maulid day (TSH 2,500/=), to build kigenge (small shops; Tshs 
5,000/= per year). This confirms the generally weak local governance in Tanzanian villages 
described in Chapter 4 above. The data and analyses indicate that JFM leads to a slight 
modification of elite capture, which already existed before JFM and still exists in the non-
JFM villages.  
8.3.4. Type of participation 
The typologies of participation explained in Chapter 2 were used to assess the level of 
participation achieved in the three JFM projects. The process applied in the three sites 
carried elements of „manipulative participation‟, where people‟s representatives on official 
committees were not elected and had no power. This is described by Cornwall (2008) as 
simply pretence as it lacks representativeness and delegated power. The process also 
“If you need timber, poles or charcoal you ask the village leaders. Fuel wood is free.”  
Ngong‟olo, Village Executive Officer  
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carried elements of „functional participation‟, where people participate to meet project 
objectives more effectively and to reduce cost, after the main decisions have been made by 
external agents. These forms of participation do not challenge existing distributions of 
wealth and power (Pretty 1995).  
8.3.5. Criteria for successful common property institutions 
Most of the key elements of successful common property institutions (see Chapter 2) were 
not in place in the case study villages. The resource boundaries and group membership 
criteria were not clearly defined. Clear and easily enforceable rules existed only to a limited 
degree. Infractions of use rules were not monitored and not always punished. Fines were 
not reinvested into paying forest guards but evaporated in the pockets of the leaders. Users 
did not have the right to modify the use rules to allow for the ability to adjust to ecological 
changes and new economic opportunities by e.g. lengthening the period of closure on a 
forest, altering distribution of forest products etc. There was no fair distribution of decision 
making and access rights with an acceptable balance of cost and benefits. As McKean 
(2000) points out, if a group of people feels cheated, they become unwilling to invest in 
protecting the commons, as it was the case with the villagers in Maseyu. This was 
aggravated by the fact that no possibilities to air grievances were provided, for example 
through regular meetings with FBD. No methods of conflict resolution existed. A clear 
agreement on rules, a prerequisite for successful enforcement, was not always in place. 
According to Gibson et al. (2000), this leads to a lower level of rule compliance and the 
effort to guard effectively results in either corruption between government guards and local 
forest users (especially bribery) or high levels of conflict. The categories of property rights 
defined by Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) allow scaling local forest management institutions 
regarding their independence from government forest departments. Using these categories, 
the communities in the three sites are authorized users, the most marginalized category with 
the most limited rights to withdraw specific forest products in practice (Nagendra and 
Gokhale 2008). 
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8.4. Summary and discussion of results   
The study results confirm the first hypothesis. The forest committees were merely organs of 
patrol while decision making power over access and use and law enforcement remained de 
jure with FBD and de facto with the village leadership. With the ownership status of the 
forest generally remaining unchanged in JFM, the JMA is important in clearly defining the 
rights and responsibilities of both partners. However, in the three sites, there were no 
signed JMAs and hence no secured rights for the communities. There was no official 
compensation for the hours put into looking after the forest, and illegal benefits were 
captured by a few privileged committee members and leaders. The lack of enforceable 
powers also shows that central government does not yet perceive the villagers as equal 
partners in forest management and historical patterns of state control and patronising 
perpetuate even through the implementation of JFM. Communities are not equal partners, 
their wishes are not considered and future rights are not secured. Thus, the principal 
imbalance between state and communities persists, as has been criticized by earlier studies 
(Matose 2006, Appiah 2001, Lele 2000, Sundar et al. 2001, Kumar 2000). 
 
Essential ingredients for decentralized forest governance are political accountability, 
democratization and responsiveness (Nygren 2005; Ribot 2005). However, with setting up 
forest committees in parallel to the existing elected local governance bodies at village level, 
the three JFM cases did not fulfil these conditions. The village forest committees were non-
representative institutions, who were given (limited) public decision-making power over 
the forest without making them accountable to the villagers to exercise these powers. In the 
absence of any mechanism of downward or upward accountability, the committees 
developed their own patterns of self-interest. Thus, the JFM process transferred the benefits 
to a selected interest group which was not accountable to the majority of the villagers.  
 
The VFCs did not embody principles of good governance. No records were kept by the 
VFCs, hence there was no transparency and accountability and cases of corruption and 
embezzlement were reported. Villagers were found to highly mistrust government officials 
from higher levels, be it district or central government. This is reinforced by the fact that 
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there were obvious examples where government staff had been involved in corruption and 
used the JFM regime to their benefit. The second hypothesis is hence confirmed. 
 
On a positive note, to some extent JFM led to higher awareness of good governance issues 
amongst the villagers who in some places started to question their leaders and forest 
committee members due to their higher exposure to information and visitors from outside 
the village. The fact that in some instances villagers started to question corrupt committee 
chairmen and village leaders about the activities of the forest committee. In particular in 
situations when income was involved such as through the campsite in Kimboza, the JFM 
process contributed to some extent to more public accountability and transparency. In 
contrast to Lund and Treue (2008), who reported that the dismissal of corrupt chairmen was 
due to horizontal accountability – leaders checking on leaders – in the case of Kimboza, it 
was downward accountability, as ordinary villagers tried to bring their leaders to justice, 
triggered through the embezzlement in the JFM process.  
 
By not being representative, the formal institutions set up for JFM seem to reproduce 
existing patterns of inequity. However, with regard to the third hypothesis, this study has 
shown that even in the forest reserves under sole state control, access is not fully equal to 
all social groups. Leaders had privatized forest access to their personal benefit and bribes 
needed to be paid. Thus, forest access and use patterns are a complex mixture of the 
prevailing cultural norms and do not only depend on the access regime. The research 
therefore supports Cleaver‟s argument (2000) that social rules and norms within a village 
have long traditions and are formed partly outside the formal institutions of local resource 
management. The local forest committees formed by outsiders are also shaped by the 
existing social structures and norms existing within a village and the society at large. These 
social relationships and collective action may structurally be based on the exclusion of the 
poorest, which are then reproduced in the local institutions (Cleaver 2001, Cleaver 2005, 
Cleaver and Toner 2006). By creating new institutions of local forest governance through 
JFM a new layer of rules is added to the already existing informal rules and traditions but 
inequity that existed within the village prior to its introduction is not resolved. This is why 
even the non JFM forest reserves cannot be considered as de facto open access. Rules of 
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asses and use were devised by the village government without having the de jure right to do 
so. The non JFM forest reserves were thus managed “unofficially” in a slightly different 
manner by the village government/elite. In this sense, the study confirms the findings of 
Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) that elite capture in JFM is owing to pre-existing social structures 
at the village level.  
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9. Summary and conclusions for forest management 
 policy 
 This thesis set out to examine the three dimensions of JFM, comprising its impact on forest 
condition, on livelihoods and equity, and on forest governance. Key research questions and 
hypotheses arose in respect of each of these dimensions. They are listed below in summary 
form, focusing only on the key points that contribute to the overall narrative of the thesis. 
Interesting but more minor aspects are put aside here.  
Research question one: Does JFM influence the physical condition of the forest and forest 
use patterns?  
To answer research question one, the following hypotheses were formulated:  
1. JFM forests have a better forest quality measured through a larger number of trees, 
poles and withies than in the non JFM forest plots. This result is expected to be 
strongest for withies, milder for poles and smallest for trees. 
2. The canopy density is higher in JFM than in non JFM forests.  
3. The species richness as an indicator of forest quality will be higher in JFM forests than 
in non JFM forests. 
4. The liana density, as an indicator of disturbance, is lower in JFM forests than in non 
JFM forests.   
5. The occurrence of seedlings and leaf litter on the forest floor is higher in JFM forests 
than in non JFM forests and the occurrence of grass cover on the forest floor is lower in 
JFM than in non JFM forests.  
6. The extent of human use measured through the number of cuts of trees, poles and 
withies is lower in JFM forests than in non JFM forests. 
7. The occurrence of other forms of human use is less in JFM forests than in non JFM 
forests, due to the less permeable access regime.  
8. The improvement of forest condition in the JFM versus non JFM comparison is 
strongest in the Milawilila-Ngambaula site, followed by Kimboza-Ruvu. Kitulang‟halo-
Dindili forest reserves should have the least effect, if there is one at all.  
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The comparative analysis of 659 forest plots confirmed the first hypothesis that the forests 
placed under JFM have a better forest quality than forests under sole state control without 
community involvement. This was measured through a significantly larger number of trees, 
poles and withies. However, the higher abundance was not strongest for withies, milder for 
poles and smallest for trees as was assumed in the second part of the first hypothesis. The 
trees on JFM plots were significantly smaller in size (average DBH value) when compared 
to the non JFM forest plots, indicating that the trees in the JFM forests were younger in age 
than in the non JFM forests. This may be explained through the heavy logging history of 
these forests prior to the introduction of JFM. It may also be a sign that there was 
continuous selective logging of mature trees by a few elitist village members despite JFM. 
The second hypothesis, that the canopy density is higher in JFM than in non JFM forests 
was only confirmed for two sites but rejected for the sample sites taken together. This study 
found no correlation between species richness and JFM; thus, the third hypothesis that the 
species richness is higher in JFM forests is rejected. 80% of all species found in both 
groups of forests was of low commercial value (class V type), compared to only about 7 to 
8% of the high value class I species. This result shows that all six forest reserves had 
basically been depleted of valuable timber resources. The assumption that liana density, as 
an indicator of disturbance, is lower in JFM forests than in non JFM forests (hypothesis 4) 
was not confirmed. There was a significantly higher occurrence of leaf litter and seedlings 
on the forest floor as well as less grass coverage on the JFM plots compared to the non JFM 
plots. The fifth hypothesis is therefore accepted. These are significant indicators of better 
forest health in the JFM forests. The lower grass coverage may be an explanatory factor for 
the significantly lower fire intensity measured in the JFM forests, as much as a stronger 
protection regime would be.  
In summary, the analysis of all forest quality variables combined hints of some degree of 
forest regeneration taking place under JFM when compared to the forests solely managed 
by the state without community involvement. This result is consistent with the villagers‟ 
perception about the condition of the two groups of forests. However, the finding that there 
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were no valuable timber species in both groups of forests hints at the fact that selective 
logging of mature valuable timber species is continuing by a few elitist village members 
independent of the management regime. This was confirmed through personal observation 
during the forest transects and triangulation with the PRA data. It is consistent with the 
result that the number of cuttings in JFM forests was higher than in non JFM forests. When 
the average cutting rate per plot was expressed as a percentage of the remaining resources, 
JFM forest plots showed significantly lower intensity of withies cutting than the centrally 
managed forests; however, they remained higher with regard to tree and pole cutting. 
Disaggregation into old and recent cuttings confirmed significantly higher values for old 
cuttings in the JFM forests, but did not produce statistically significant differences for 
recent cuttings. This is a strong indication of no effect of JFM on wood cutting. The pair-
wise comparison statistics between new cuts of trees, poles and withies in JFM versus non 
JFM forests (Table 6.4) tests the effect of JFM on actual forest utilization. The “not 
significant” difference strongly indicates that JFM has had little effect on wood-cutting. 
The sixth hypothesis is therefore rejected. The higher old cutting rates on the JFM plots 
indicate also that they are from earlier times, prior to introduction of the relatively young 
JFM process. Further research is needed, in particular time series analysis, to confirm this 
assumption.  
Other forms of human forest use measured through opportunistically encountered burning, 
sawpit and mining sites as well as farming inside the forest, were less prevalent in JFM 
forests. On this basis, the seventh hypothesis would be confirmed. However, on the basis of 
recorded new cuttings of trees, poles and whities being not significantly different, 
hypothesis seven must be rejected.  
These results suggest a de facto management regime where only some but not all forest 
uses are effectively restricted by JFM. In other words, this supports the assumption of 
collective agency by JFM villages vis-a-vis the state. They do not implement JFM as it is 
officially intended but modify the rules to suit their own ends and objectives rather than 
those of the state. This supports Cleaver‟s (2007) hypothesis of “bricolage” that officially 
created local institutions and their rules are being melted by the villagers with existing and 
locally negotiated rules to fit their purpose.  
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The spatial analysis of the three separate research sites showed that there were large 
variations in the results achieved through JFM. Improved forest quality in the JFM forest 
compared to the centrally managed forest was strongest in the Milawilila-Ngambaula site, 
followed by Kimboza-Ruvu and finally Kitulang‟halo-Dindili. In the latter case there was 
no significant difference between JFM and non JFM. This result confirms the eighth 
hypothesis and lends support to the idea that the degree of forest regeneration is dependent 
on the quality of the JFM regime.  
Multiple regression models confirmed that JFM was a significant predictor of the intensity 
of timber logging, pole and withies cutting, even though it explained the data variation only 
partially. JFM did not play a significant role in predicting the occurrence of charcoal 
making, mining and burning in the forests. The differences in timber cutting and charcoal 
making were explained by additional factors. These were the accessibility of, and in 
particular the distance to, urban centres. The intensity of pole and withies cutting was not 
affected by the distance from urban centres. The pole cutting intensity increased with 
decreasing distance to the road and the forest edge. The rate of withies cutting increased 
mainly with decreasing distance from the village in addition to being affected by decreasing 
accessibility. This shows that poles and withies are predominantly used for subsistence 
level rural housing construction, whereas timber cutting depends more on the demand from 
urban centres. These factors will influence forest utilization in addition to the forest 
management regime, and thus need to be considered in policies that aim at forest 
conservation. These findings show that JFM rules have limited effectiveness in restricting 
economically motivated human use of forests. Economic use of forests is influenced by 
other factors, such as commercial demand for wood resources from urban areas and 
subsistence need for construction purposes from adjacent villages. These demand pressures 
might be so strong that controlling the related forest uses only through JFM is difficult, in 
particular if it is not well implemented. It might require a mix with economic policy 
instruments beyond the forest sector (i.e. taxation) that aim at influencing the consumption 
rather than controlling the harvesting. JFM (or PFM) is thus only one piece in the puzzle of 
complexity that explains forest quality and human forest use.  
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The pair-wise comparison statistics between new cuts of trees, poles and withies in JFM 
and non JFM forests documents little difference in forest utilization. This is consistent with 
the results of the multiple regression analysis that JFM rules have not been effectively 
restricting the economically motivated human use of forests. This is an important 
governance related finding. It also shows that the study design is more suitable to assess 
governance effects of JFM. Thus, the results confirm the limitations of the research design 
in testing the hypotheses (see Section 5.1.2 above). A pair-wise comparison of JFM versus 
non JFM seems more useful in testing whether JFM rules were actually implemented in 
JFM forests and only secondly if JFM has resulted in improved forest quality. Without 
taking the “before JFM” situation into account, we do not know if the variables measured 
and compared between the forests have not been already different between the two forests 
prior to the introduction of the JFM process.  
Research question two: How does JFM impact on households‟ forest access, forest related 
livelihoods and equity? 
Hypotheses:  
1. People in the JFM villages face more limited access to the forest reserves compared to 
the control group. 
2. The more limited access in the JFM forests leads to reduced forest resources use.  
3. The more limited access in the JFM forests leads to reduced forest incomes.  
4. JFM improves the access of the villagers to information about forest access and use and 
their participation in decision making about forest management. 
5. JFM manifests inequity and poverty as it grants preferential access to certain social 
groups and excludes others from access to and benefits from the forest reserve.  
6. The less permeable access regime of the JFM forests leads to a displacement of forest 
harvesting to adjacent forest areas that are less well protected.  
The first hypothesis is confirmed. The somewhat better condition in the JFM forest reserves 
is achieved as JFM creates a barrier of entry for the majority of villagers. However, 
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surprisingly, this reduced access did not in turn lead to reduced forest resources use and 
forest cash incomes. The second and third hypotheses are therefore rejected. There was no 
difference in the types of resources used between the two groups of households and no 
indication of reduced fuelwood availability in the JFM households. The average forest 
resource cash income was higher amongst households from JFM villages than from non 
JFM villages, although not at a statistically significant level. The higher annual forest 
income of JFM households compared to non JFM households was consistent across all 
wealth groups (except the second richest one). However, given that harvesting is not 
allowed in these forest reserves, this higher income is either based on illegal forest use or 
on resources from public lands. 
Charcoal is the most important forest product providing cash to households, followed by 
timber. This explains why forest cash incomes were highest in the JFM village Maseyu 
where the active charcoal business provides an important source of cash income. It has 
replaced agriculture as the main source of livelihood. In this sense the study confirms the 
earlier established safety-net function of forests (Lund und Treue 2008, Sunderlin et al. 
2005, Chambers and Leach 1989). Charcoal production and mining are becoming 
increasingly important as agriculture is becoming a less reliable source of livelihood due to 
land scarcity and climate changes.  
The fourth hypothesis is rejected. Although the JFM process in the three sites did provide 
the villagers with somewhat improved access to information about forest management 
compared to the control group sites, overall the level of information provided was still not 
satisfactory. Information and knowledge of rights are key factors to a successful JFM 
regime but these factors had not been given sufficient attention during JFM implementation 
in the three case study villages. Participation of the villagers in decision making about 
forest access and use rules did not increase. These decisions were de facto made by the 
village government in both the JFM and the control group villages.  
In the non JFM forests village government did have a dominant role in decision making. 
This shows that also the non JFM forests are subject to de facto management regimes made 
by the village government, although they do not have the de jure rights to pass such rules. 
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Irrespective of JFM being implemented or not in a given forest, the village governments 
make and enforce rules on forest access and forest use. In other words, non JFM forests are 
de facto subjected to locally devised but not formally recognised management regimes and 
the same actually goes for JFM forests in the sense that the de facto rules devised and 
enforced by village governments do not entirely correspondent with the (draft) JMAs. This 
study therefore does not confirm the common description in the literature that forests under 
state control are de facto open access. The central government, represented by the FBD 
does not hold much or any de facto control over the non-JFM forests. However, this does 
not automatically imply that the forests have become open access resources. If, as this study 
documents, other actors possess enough agency to “capture” some if not total control over 
access to the forests, then that is the de facto regime. Thus, the data and analyses indicate 
that JFM leads to a slight modification of elite capture, which already existed before JFM 
and still exists in the non JFM villages.  
The findings of this study regarding hypothesis five are mixed. While there are clear 
indications that the JFM regime equipped certain social groups with preferential access to 
the forest reserves, to what extent this manifests or extends existing inequity is a 
complicated issue. Access to the forest reserve even in the non JFM forests is not fully 
equal to all social groups within the village. Leadership, gender and wealth related patterns 
are at play in both scenarios, JFM and non JFM. Forest access in both JFM and control 
group villages was male dominated. Leaders and male villagers were perceived as the 
primary access holders in the non JFM forests. This privilege was shifted strongly towards 
the forest committee in the JFM forests. However, given that the committees comprised 
mainly male members, it seems that women remained just as disadvantaged in their forest 
access.  
Women, elders and disabled are social groups facing the highest limitation on forest access, 
which is more pronounced in the non JFM forests than in the JFM forests. In other words, 
the JFM process softened the more disadvantaged access position of these groups. By 
introducing certain days during which all villagers could enter the reserve for firewood 
collection, women had enforceable opportunities to enter the forest whereas in the open 
access scenario they were told by the men not to enter the reserve. Transparent use rules, 
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which are publicly known, provide women and other marginalized groups with a basis to 
claim equal rights regarding the forest.  
An important finding of this study is the fact that non JFM forests are not de facto open 
access. Rather, this study shows that access to non JFM forests is also subject mainly to 
village government decisions. In the lack of central government, represented through the 
forestry division, taking up its management role, the village governments have put 
unofficial management regimes in place. This confirms the observations of Cleaver (2007 
and 2002) that there are differences between de jure and de facto local level institutions.  
The JFM forest committees were provided with preferential access with the purpose of 
patrolling the forest on behalf of the state. The predominance of patrol as a reason of entry 
accompanied with a reduction of timber cutting as primary motivation of entry in the JFM 
forests reflects this. This result lends itself to explain the better quality of JFM forests. 
Nevertheless, when benefits are considered, it emerges that the forest committee is not 
interpreting its role simply as forest protectors but that they use their preferential access to 
enrich themselves with forest resources in the lack of other formal benefits. This might 
explain the “not significant” finding with regard to the difference in wood cutting rates in 
Chapter 6.   
With regard to poverty, the study confirms a higher dependency of poorer people on 
reserved forests and forest related cash incomes to make their living. This is explained by 
their limited access to ownership of good farming land which may provide wood resources 
in alternative to the reserved forest areas. However, despite having more alternatives, the 
majority of respondents in the richest wealth group used the forest reserve to provide farm 
land and grazing land and as a source of timber. In contrast, poor people used the forest 
reserve mainly for the collection of firewood, harvesting of poles, and withies. Poorest 
people had the highest percentage of sale and the lowest of subsistence use of forest 
products compared to the other three wealth groups. This indicates their strong dependency 
on forest resources as a source of cash income. If people who are already disadvantaged 
through lack of access to land also have their access to forests restricted or removed, then 
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they will be even worse off as a consequence of the introduction of JFM. These results 
support the fifth hypothesis.  
This study has shown that we cannot assume that managing forests at the local level leads 
to broad community ownership, nor management in the interest of all. Socially fair and 
equitable solutions for the poorest cannot be automatically assumed through PFM or 
CBFM in a broader sense. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 the study demonstrated no effect of 
JFM in frequency of recent tree cutting, meaning that differences in forest use between 
JFM and non JFM forests are not that big. In other words, actual (as opposed to formal) 
differences on forest management regimes might still have an effect on rural livelihoods 
and poverty. 
Hypothesis six is confirmed by this study. The restricted access of forests placed under 
JFM then leads to a stronger diversion of the demand for forest resources into surrounding 
forests and woodlands with open access. In this way, households are able to substitute the 
restriction in access to one particular forest placed under PFM and to avoid negative 
livelihood impacts. However, once these open areas are depleted, negative livelihoods 
effects are bound to occur. In the Milawilila-Ngambaula site, there were few alternatives on 
public lands and land scarcity. Thus, the non JFM forest Ngambaula was severely degraded 
while the nearby JFM forest Milawilila was well regenerated and was the only forest with a 
significant reduction in recent cutting rates. In the other two research sites, villagers had 
more alternatives to resort to surrounding woodlands to satisfy their resource needs as well 
as larger farm sizes. In order to avoid this “leakage” effect of JFM, a different approach 
needs to be followed that goes beyond the protection of single forest patches. The current 
policy debate about how PFM can be used as the main vehicle to deliver Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) under the UNFCCC in Tanzania 
and elsewhere may further increase the forest area put under PFM. A village may decide to 
conserve a forest to get REDD payments for carbon credits but the results of this study 
suggests that this may aggravate degradation of forests outside the protected areas. In other 
words, there may be no benefits in terms of carbon reduction. This shows the importance of 
general forests and woodlands outside reserved areas (Treue 2001). 
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Research question three: Has JFM created sustainable forest governance institutions at the 
village level?  
Hypotheses: 
1. A lack of delegation of power and rights at the local level inhibits the achievement of 
decentralization through JFM. 
2. The local institutions of forest management created at village level do not embody 
principles of good governance, and foster corrupt practices.  
3. The local institutions of forest management reinforce inequity.  
The first hypothesis is confirmed through this study. The local forest committees were only 
empowered to patrol the forest, while decision making power over access and use and law 
enforcement remained de jure with FBD and de facto with the village leadership. In that 
sense, JFM did not make a difference compared to the control group, where the village 
government was the main decision making body regarding forest access and use. The 
results hint at the fact that the central government represented through the FBD does hold 
only limited, if any, de facto control over the non JFM forests. However, this does not 
automatically imply that the forests have become open access resources. If, as this study 
documents, other actors possess enough agency to capture some if not total control over 
access to the forests, then that is the de facto regime. Even in the JFM forests, a de facto 
regime developed, which was subject to interpretation by local actors. As the results of 
Chapter 6 indicated some but not all forest uses appear effectively restricted through JFM. 
Rules were not implemented as they might have been originally intended by FBD. The 
villagers posses agency vis-a-vis the state because they do not implement JFM as it is 
officially intended. They modify the rules to suit their own ends and objectives rather than 
those of the state (Cleaver 2007). The absence of signed JMAs was in a sense “conducive” 
to this situation as there were no clearly established rules. In the absence of signed JMAs 
there were also no secured rights or benefits that the communities could have demanded for. 
Despite this, there was little outright opposition. Disapproval is shown rather silently by 
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altering the system to fulfil more selfish motives – a culture that has its origins in 
Tanzanian history.  
The involvement of an NGO in Milawilila, although it did increase villagers‟ trust and 
improve the JFM process to some extent, did not lead to the delegation of power or rights 
to the community, either. The NGO has been the main driving force of the process while 
the state (represented through the district) refrained from taking up its responsibilities as 
partner in the JFM process.  
The fact that the forest committees were set up in parallel to the existing elected local 
governance bodies at village level supports the first and the second hypothesis. This 
prevented decentralization as it created institutions that are non-representative and not 
accountable to the villagers. In the absence of any mechanism of accountability, the 
committees developed their own patterns of self-interest. Illegal benefits were captured by a 
few privileged committee members and leaders. This led to an inequitable outcome since 
some more powerful members of the forest committee used their legal access to the forest 
as a privilege to support their own interest, such as in Maseyu the charcoal business. Thus, 
the JFM process itself created a situation that nurtured corrupt behaviour. The lack of forest 
management plans led to confusion about the ownership and the management status of the 
forest reserves in both JFM and control group sites. In the absence of clear rules of forest 
ownership and management, there is a cloud of mystery around forestry issues, which 
villagers in more powerful positions used to their advantage.   
The study therefore supports Ribot‟s argument that decentralization is only achieved when 
meaningful powers to democratically elected and downwardly accountable decision making 
bodies is achieved (Ribot 2004). Insufficient delegation of power to the local forest 
governance institutions and lack of downward accountability of those institutions to the 
villagers prevent the realization of livelihood benefits and sustainable local forest 
management. Although elected village authorities have a bad track record, local forest 
management has to be vested in these local institutions and not through parallel committees 
(Ribot 2005, Brockington 2008). Brockington 2008 argues that the presence of adversity 
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enhances local action and that problems of government performance are a necessary 
ingredient that drives local change and success.  
With regard to hypothesis two, villagers were found to mistrust government officials from 
higher levels in general, be it district or central government. Occasionally, villagers 
questioned corrupt committee chairmen and village leaders about the activities of the forest 
committee, sometimes triggered through information brought by visitors from outside. One 
could argue that in this way JFM has increased exposure and did make some contribution to 
more public awareness of the self-serving actions of civil servants and village leaders. On 
an optimistic reading, this suggests that decentralized forest management does hold „self-
correction potential‟ (Lund and Treue 2008) contrary to state controlled set ups and that it 
can curb corruption.  
On the other hand, it is questionable if this can be regarded as a positive impact of JFM, as 
the very JFM process itself created the situation that fostered corruption in the first place. 
This happened as new local institutions of forest governance were created by outsiders to 
the village, equipped with the mandate to control the forest on behalf of the state without 
formal compensation. It provided them with exclusive right of access without supervision 
while at the same time weakening existing systems of downward accountability (which did 
not really function in the first place). This may well have aggravated inequity as the village 
leaders and members of the forest committee in leading positions turn JFM to their own 
benefit. While excluding the majority of villagers more or less successfully, they have 
privatized the forest for their own use. Thus, charcoal burning and timber harvesting is 
continuing through an exclusive group but on a comparatively smaller scale than in the 
forests under sole state control. They keep up the system and get recognition and 
professional credit by randomly visiting government and donor representatives. They can 
show that „their‟ JFM works, as the forest is doing better and they are controlling access to 
the forest by keeping their fellow villagers out. It is them who usually get the contact to 
those outside visitors, which re-enforces the unequal power relations within the village. 
While the leaders „shine‟ in front of the visitors, the story of exclusion and inequity never 
gets told. The origins and mechanisms of this story, which are based on a complex social 
system, are not at the core of the interest of the forest officer who is satisfied to see that the 
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forest is improving and they are beyond the time span and level of detail available to the 
visiting donor representative.  
Thus, while this line of argument supports the third hypothesis, one needs to keep in mind 
that forest access is not equal to all social groups even in the absence of PFM. Data and 
analyses indicate that JFM leads to a slight modification of elite capture, which already 
existed before JFM and still exists in the non JFM villages. It results out of a complex 
mixture of the prevailing cultural norms, traditions and negotiations. These take part partly 
outside the formal institutions created by outsiders for forest management and are 
influenced by the norms of the society at large. JFM does not touch upon or resolve these 
but rather adds new rules to the existing ones and is a highly political process at the local 
level itself. JFM requires a process of institutional change that is very complex, where 
issues of wealth and power are at play. This shows the need for a social definition of forest 
management and for politically negotiated implementation. These findings are consistent 
with Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) who found that elite capture occurring in JFM in India was 
largely due to pre-existing social structures.   
In summary, most of the key elements of successful common property institutions (see 
Chapter 2) were not in place in the three case study JFM villages. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the VFCs once created by outsiders were actually not really functioning. The 
resource boundaries and group membership criteria were not clearly defined. Clear and 
easily enforceable rules existed only to a limited degree. Infractions of use rules were not 
monitored and not always punished. Fines were not reinvested into paying forest guards but 
evaporated in the pockets of the leaders. Users did not have the right to modify the use rules 
to allow for the ability to adjust to ecological changes and new economic opportunities. 
There was no fair distribution of decision making and access rights with an acceptable 
balance of cost and benefits. As McKean (2000) points out, if a group of people feels 
cheated, they become unwilling to invest in protecting the commons, as it was the case with 
the villagers in Maseyu. This was aggravated by the fact that no possibilities to air 
grievances were provided, for example through regular meetings with FBD. No methods of 
conflict resolution existed. A clear agreement on rules, a prerequisite for successful 
enforcement, was not always in place. According to Gibson et al. (2000), this leads to a 
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lower level of rule compliance and the effort to guard effectively results in either corruption 
between government guards and local forest users (especially bribery) or high levels of 
conflict. The categories of property rights defined by Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) allow 
scaling local forest management institutions regarding their independence from government 
forest departments. Using these categories, the communities in the three JFM sites are 
authorized users, the most marginalized category with the most limited rights to withdraw 
specific forest products in practice (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). 
This study therefore underpins the critique of other authors that JFM is just a „confidence-
trick‟ (Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 2007:374) of the state to co-opt communities into 
management through patrolling without transferring any clear rights or benefits (Lund and 
Nielsen 2006, Blomley and Ramadhani 2006, Meshack and Raben 2006, Blaikie and 
Springate-Baginski 2007, Blomley et al. 2008, Springate-Baginski 2001). If the 
government felt politically able to adhere to its own principle in the JFM guidelines of 
sharing benefits with communities, there would be ways to do so, even in mountain forests 
of high biodiversity. Benefits would then need to go beyond the current two to three open 
access days per week for fuelwood collection to incorporate forms of utilization that can be 
combined with sustainable management. For example, in Milawilila this could mean 
allowing the traditional collection of wild potatoes. In Kimboza it could mean selective 
harvesting and sale of cederela odorata for the benefit of the villagers. This would at the 
same time reduce the invasion of this exotic species throughout the natural forest. In 
addition, for catchment forests, where no commercial exploitation is possible, community 
forest managers should be paid for their protection work as they exercise a service function 
to the state as the legal owner of the forest and to the majority of the population who 
benefits from the ecosystem services. However, it is not clear that the political will exists 
for this to happen in practice.  
This study confirms earlier findings that central governments in Sub-Saharan Africa rarely 
devolve actual powers to the local level, resulting in a lack of checks and balances in the 
institutional set up and preventing institutions of local governance to take up their 
comparative advantage of being close to the resources (Brockington 2008, Blaikie 2006, 
Ribot 2002a, Ribot 2004a, Oyono 2004, Campbell et al. 2001). The lack of delegating 
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enforceable powers through JFM shows that central government does not yet perceive the 
villagers as equal partners in forest management, their wishes are not considered and future 
rights are not secured. Historical patterns of state control and patronising perpetuate even 
through the implementation of JFM.  
There are certain paradoxes inherent in the JFM concept that may never quite be resolved. 
On the one hand, the desire is to hand over to the community their own fate. This involves 
central or even local government releasing power and control to new community-led 
institutions. Then, on the other hand, when these institutions are observed to behave 
(sometimes) in perverse ways, e.g. the finding that they use their new powers of exclusion 
to reserve the resource for the own use of the committee (and leaders and officials), there is 
a tendency to call for the government to intervene to correct this outcome. However, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the government will do this. It was already over-stretched and 
was unable to police its own state-owned forests, so it certainly does not have the resources 
and manpower to police the varying outcomes of JFM forests on an individual basis. 
Advocates of PFM or CBNRM often seem to want it both ways – they want community 
control, but then when the community control goes wrong, they want the government to 
come back in to enforce the even more complex institutional process that now exists 
compared to the previous „state exclusion‟ regime. Maybe the conclusion is that 
government should not even interfere and try to regulate these local institutional processes.  
The author recognizes that success can seldom be engineered by outsiders. Therefore, one 
has to take a realistic look at the likelihood that the relevant institutions will evolve in ways 
that make JFM more effective. Some scholars (Cleaver 2005, Brockington 2008, Ribot 
2005) argue that these problems of governance that occur in the local forest committees are 
normal and necessary ways of dealing with a process of change. It is what Cleaver calls 
„bricolage‟ and what will eventually lead to solutions that local people find acceptable. As 
Collier et al. (1986) state, inequality has historically been an inherent characteristic of 
Tanzanian villages and there will hence always be winners and losers. The poor may accept 
losses in some areas knowing they gain in others. These local social processes are so 
complex that outsiders cannot understand them and interference from outside can often 
distort more than help the situation. If there was the political will, it would be preferable to 
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provide the necessary framework (law, education, etc.) that empowers people to make their 
own decisions, rather than trying to regulate local institutions and processes.  
A second paradox is that providing statutory provision to enable local institutions to 
function in an independent and formal manner would empower them to take cases of abuse 
to court. The fact that this would then include abuse by the forestry staff itself might be a 
disincentive for the FBD to promote such legal rights. It is for the same reason that the lack 
of providing information can be explained, as civic education of local people would provide 
them with a basis to demand accountability, as people would know what they can demand 
and what they can hold local and central authorities accountable for (Ribot et al. 2006).   
A third paradox is that PFM requires a change in roles of forest extension staff that may not 
be compatible with the prevailing hierarchical structures of the state forest department. 
Ylhäisi (2003) argues that inefficiency, informal structures, and rent-seeking behaviour in 
the Tanzanian forest administration caused by complex administrative procedures, lacking 
economic resources, and poor incentive structures may work against principles of 
democratic decentralization. These problems have been observed in PFM processes as well 
as in government decentralization processes in other parts of the world (Ellis and Bahigwa 
2003, Ellis and Mdoe, Blair 2000). The very existence of the forestry bureaucracy would be 
threatened by the required unpacking of the PFM model (Appiah 2001).  
These paradoxes are very difficult to resolve in practice, compared to the ease with which 
someone can write what „ought to be done‟ in an advisory report. Although government‟s 
own guiding principles entail all the right concepts, the practice of implementation shows a 
different reality. PFM, as many other policies of decentralization, is based on government 
documents written by consultants. Often there is a lack of buy in, and the understanding of 
the same documents by different stakeholders differs. In consequence people do not do 
what they should do or ought to do; they often do what is in their personal or family or 
political interest to do, which may not be in anyone else‟s interests particularly.  
This study has shown that although JFM may work when the line up of interests, forces and 
institutions comes together in a particular way, this cannot be guaranteed. The adverse 
factors may outweigh the positive ones, in ways that are just not susceptible to being 
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overcome. JFM may not turn out in the way it is intended by the forest policy or by the 
ideals of its enthusiasts. Ultimately there might be a lack of political will to true community 
empowerment as it would be perceived as a threat to the power of the state (Hobley and 
Wollenberg 1996, Sundar 2000).  
Thus, this study confirms that the main obstacles to successful JFM are not local people or 
elite capture but the bureaucratic structures and culture within which JFM must operate 
(Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 2007). Underlying this situation are problems of 
unresolved conflicts over resource rights and benefits and contradictions between scientific 
and local forest management. As several scholars state, these require continuous structural 
reforms of the long established classic forestry administration and its set of practices and a 
civil society that holds local and central government accountable to the implementation of 
agreed policies. Ultimately, PFM has to deal with the question of to what extent the 
governments of the implementing countries represent true democracies.  
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Appendix 1: Criteria to evaluate decentralization  
The following questions are formulated by Ribot 2005 to determine whether a 
decentralization effort is serious and likely to achieve effective and equitable outcomes, 
consisting of institutional choice and power choice questions.  
Institutional choice questions 
 What kind of institution (elected or appointed committee or elected local government 
authority) is receiving powers in the name of decentralization?  
 To whom is the local institution accountable with respect to the exercise of the 
transferred powers and through what mechanism? Are they multiple?  
 How does the origin of their funding or their powers affect their accountability? 
 Is the institution integrative across sectors, multi-or single purpose, and does its role 
include mediating among sectors? 
 Is the form of inclusion or belonging based upon residency, identity or interest? 
 Do poor populations have influence over and voice in the institution? Are there 
mechanisms to ensure the inclusion of women and poor populations in decision making 
and benefits? 
 Whose interests are served by the chosen local institutions? Is the institution serving 
patronage interests of central actors, only members‟ interests, or only a sub-sector of the 
population, or the population as a whole? 
 When non-representative institutions are given public decision-making power, are they 
accountable to representative authorities concerning the exercise of these powers? Do 
these institutions compete with and undermine representative authorities, or do they 
strengthen them? 
 Do these institutions encourage broad based involvement of local people, do they give 
local people voice and agency, do they enable long-term stability? Are they replicable 
across territory? 
 
Power choice questions 
 Are transfers of powers made in a secure manner or can they be taken away at the whim 
of central authorities? 
 Are mandates (obligations) being transferred?  
 Are those mandates sufficiently funded and within the capacity of local authorities to 
implement? 
 Are political choices, such as who can use a resource and who can benefit, being 
retained at the centre or transferred to local decision makers? 
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 Are resources, i.e. forests, that have been accessible to the public and service the public 
interest being privatized? 
 Is there sufficient power (executive, legislative, judicial) in the local arena to balance 
and fight central interests? 
 Are local authorities receiving the right to determine who exploits the resource? Can 
they decide over who has subsistence access to the resource? Can they allocate 
commercial exploitation rights? 
 Is approval required for every decision or are there decisions that can be made locally? 
  
  
253 
 
Appendix 2: Household survey questionnaire 
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Questionnaire for Household Survey  
0. Interview Details 
Enumerator: _________________ Questionnaire no._____ 
Date of interview: ______________________ Household Name: _________________ 
Interview start time: ________________ Village: _______________________  
Interview end time: ________________ Sub-village: ________________  
 
Date checked by researcher: _________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
00. Section for comments on the interview by the enumerator:  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………….... 
 
 
To interviewed is the head of the household (male or female) or his wife in case of a male head of 
household. Remember to ensure equal gender distribution.  
 
1. Basic Household Information 
1.1. Name, age, sex, relationship to head, education and main activity of all people who have been living in and sharing the food of this household on a daily basis for at 
least 6 of the past 12 months?      Circle the respondent 
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 1 2 3 4 7 8 
ID Name  Age  
(years) 
Sex Relationship to HH 
head  
What is the highest grade (NAME) 
completed?  
During the last 12 months what was 
(NAME)  main activity? 
  
The name is only required for the 
head of the household and his wife! If 
the respondent is reluctant to reveal 
names of children do not insist as 
long as you have filled columns 2 to 
8.  
 1 = M 
2 = F 
1 = Head  
2 = Wife/Husband 
3 = Child 
4 = Other relative 
5 = Other permanent 
1 =  no formal education 
2 =  Std 1 to Std 4 
3 =  Std 5 to Std 8 
4 =  Form 1 to 3  
5 =  Form 3 – 6  
6 =  Training after primary  
7 =  University/related Training 
 after secondary 
8 =  Adult Education 
 
1 =  Farming/Livestock 
2 =  Govt. employee 
3 =  Private sector employee 
4 =  Self employed with employees 
5 =  Self employed without 
 employees 
6 =  Unpaid family helper in a non-
 agricultural business 
7 =  Not working &  available for 
 work 
8 =  Household chores 
9 =  Student  
10 =  Unable to work (too old,  retired, 
sick, disables) 
11 =  Nursery school 
12 = Others (specify)  
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
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1.2.  Is any member of the HH a member of the village government?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No  
 
1.3. Is any member of the HH a member of a village based committee?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No  
If yes on 2.2 or 2.3, specify which one? ____________________  
Position held? ________________ 
 
1.4.  Has your family always lived in this village (may vary according to whether you interview a husband 
or a wife)?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No  
3 = I do not know 
If no,                  a) when did you move here? ……………………………… 
                          b) why did you move here? ……………………………….. 
                          c) where did you move from? …………………………. 
2.  Housing Particulars (2.1. and 2.2. To be completed by RAs through observations,  without 
asking, unless Q 2.2 is answered with „yes‟) 
 
2.1  Is the house you live in owned by your household?  
1 = yes (→ Q 2.3.) 
2 = no, it is rented 
3 = others (specify…………………………..) 
 
2.2. If this house it not your own, do you own a house somewhere else?  
1 = yes (specify where? ………………………..) 
2 = no  
 
2.3. What are the main building materials used for the roof of the main dwelling owned by your 
household?  
1 = Grass, leaves, bamboo 
2 = Mud and grass  
3 = Concrete, cement  
4 = Metal sheets  
5 = Asbestos sheets 
5 = Tiles  
6 = Other (Specify) ________________ 
 
2.4.  What are the main building materials used for the walls of the main dwelling?  
1 = Poles, branches, grass  
2 = Poles, mud, stones  
3 = Mud only   
4 = Mud bricks  
5 = Baked/burnt bricks  
6 = Concrete, cement, stones  
7 = Other (Specify) ________________ 
 
2.5. What are the main building materials used for the floor of the main dwelling?  
1 = Earth  
2 = Cement, concrete, tiles, timber  
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3 = Other (specify)  
 
2.6. How many rooms in your household are used for sleeping?  
 
3. Household Assets   
 
3.1.  Does your HH own the following? No. of items owned? Current  price in TSH?  
Asset  How many items  
owned 
Current Price  in TSH if 
you were to sell it  
Radio and Radio cassette   
TV/Video   
Bicycle   
Mobile Telephone    
Fridge or Freezer   
Electric/gas stove   
Iron (Charcoal)   
Iron (Electrical)    
Motorbike    
Car    
Tractor    
Torch    
Lantern   
Watch    
Clock    
Charcoal stove    
Kerosine stove    
Cooking pots, cups, kitchen utensils   
Hand Hoe   
Axe   
Panga   
Mosikto net   
Bed made out of ropes    
Bed with mattress    
Sewing machine   
Milling maschine   
Wheelbarrow   
Pit sawing blade   
Sheeps   
Cows   
Chicken   
Ducks   
Doves   
 
4.  Household Facilities  
 
4.1.  What is the main source of energy used for lighting in the household?  
1 = electricity 
2 = solar 
3 = gas (biogas) 
4 = paraffin  
7 = candles 
8 = firewood 
9 =others (specify)  
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4.2.  What is the main source of energy for cooking in the household?  
1 = electricity 
2 = solar 
3 = bio-gas 
4 = bottled gas  
5 = paraffin/kerosine 
6 = coals 
7 = charcoal  
8 = firewood  
9 = others (specify)  
 
4.3. Where do you usually collect firewood/charcoal?  
Name location _____________________ 
Time spent in hours to walk there (one way) 
 
 
4.4. How often do you/does your household collect firewood?  
 1= every day   
 2 = 2-3 times per week  
 3 = once per week   
 4 = others (specify……………………………………………………..) 
 
4.5. Are there any changes with regard to the firewood you use these days compared to 5 years ago?  
In terms of the time spent in hours to walk to the place of collection?  
 
 1= these days we need more time  
 2 = these days we need less time 
 3 = we need the same amount of time  
 
4.6. Do you collect dead of live firewood these days?  
1 = dead firewood 
2 = live firewood  
 
4.7. Did you collect dead or live firewood 5 years ago?   
1 = dead firewood 
2 = live firewood  
 
4.8. Which species do you collect for firewood these days? ……………………………… 
 
4.9. Which species did you collect 5 years ago? ………………………………………….. 
 
4.10. What is the main source of drinking water for your household – that is, the one used for most of the 
year?  
1 = private piped water in house 
2 = private piped water outside house   
3 = piped water on neighbour‟s house 
4 = piped water on community supply 
5 = rainwater catchment tank 
6 = public well (protected) 
7 = public well (unprotected) 
8 = private well (protected) 
9  = private well (un-protected) 
10 = spring (protected) 
11 = spring  (unprotected) 
12 = river, dam, lake 
 
H:  M: 
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13 = others (specify)  
 
4.11. How long does it take to walk to this drinking water source (one way) 
 
 
4.11. How often do you/does your household collect water?  
 1= more than once per day  
 2 = once per day  
 3 = 2-3 times per week  
 4 = others (specify………………………………………………….) 
 
4.12. Are there any changes with regard to your water use/collection these days compared to 5 years ago?  
In terms of time spend in hours walking to the main source of water collection?  
 1= these days I need more time spent in hours walking to collect water than 5 years ago  
 2 = these days I need more time spent in hours walking to collect water than 5 years ago   
 3 = no change  
 
4.14. What type of toilet does your household use? 
1 = No toilet  
2 = Flush toilet 
3 = Pit Latrine 
4 = Improved Pit Latrine  
5 = Other type (specify)  
 
4.15. What is the name of the nearest market place (gulio = informal market) ? 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
4.16.1. How to you reach there?  
1 = walking 
2 = bicycle 
3 = car 
4 = other (specify……………………………….) 
 
4.17.  How long does it take you to reach there (one way?  
 
 
4.16.2. Which health services do you use in case of illness?  
 1= none 
 2 = private hospital   
 3 = public hospital  
 4 = traditional healer against payment 
 5 = traditional healer who serves for free 
 
5.  Food consumption  
 
5.1. How many meals does your HH usually have per day (may vary across the year)?  
 
 
 
5.2. In the past 30 days has your HH ever had fewer meals than this usual number?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
3 = I do not remember   
 
5.3. In the past week how many mealtimes did your household consume meat?  
H:  M: 
 
 
H:  M: 
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5.4. What are your strategies to overcome food shortage? 
 1 = cut down food intake/number of meals   
 2 = borrow money from relatives/neighbours  
 3 = buy food on credit  
 4 = search for edible plants, fruit and animals in forest   
 5 = other (specify) 
 
5.5. How do you compare the overall economic situation of the HH with one year ago?  
1 = much worse now 
2 = a little worse now 
3 = same 
4 = a little better now 
5 = much better now 
6 = do not know  
 
5.6. How do you compare the overall economic situation of the community with one year ago?  
1 = much worse now 
2 = a little worse now 
3 = same  
4 = a little better now 
5 = much better now 
6 = do not know  
 
Enumerator, if the respondents picks number 1 ask “why”? 
……………………..………………………………………………….. 
 
6.  Land Ownership  
 
6.1. How many acres of land for farming/grazing are owned (land titles, land is not owned: clearcut issue 
in study area?) by the household?  
 
This year: Acres (None 0000) 
Last year: Acres  
 
 
6.2. Does the household use land for farming/grazing that it does not own this year?  
1 = No → Q 7  
2 = Yes, rented  
3 = Yes, sharecropped 
4 = Yes, private land provided free 
5 = Yes, open access land/communal land  
 
6.3. How many acres of land used are not owned by the HH?  
 
This year: Acres 
Last year: Acres  
 
6.4. How many acres of land owned by the HH are rented out?  
 
This year: Acres 
Last year: Acres  
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7. Forest Resource Use  
7.1. Which forest products do you use, From which forests do you obtain these forest products, and what is the use of these to your HH ?  
ID Products obtained Name of Forest  Type of land use Distance 
from 
house 
Frequency of entry Amount/Use Average 
Price or 
value 
      Consume  Sale  
 1 =  timber 
2 =  poles 
3 =  fitu  
4 =  ropes 
5 =  kuni  
6 =  mkaa  
7 =  medicines 
8 =  edible fruit, vegetables, leaves 
9 =  honey 
10 =  grass 
11=  gum and resins 
12=  bushmeat 
13 =  grazing land 
14 =  farm land 
15 =  wood for carving 
16 =  ritual 
17 =  other (specify) 
 
 1 =  public 
 lands 
 forest 
2 = village 
 govt. forest 
3 =       community 
 forest  
4 =  central 
 govt. forest 
5 =  privately 
 owned 
 forest 
6 =  home 
 garden/ 
 shamba 
In minutes 
walking  
1 =  every day 
2 =  one per week 
3 =  more than 
 once per 
 week 
4 =  less than once 
 per week  
5 =  less than once 
 per month 
6 =  never 
    
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
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8. Forest Governance  
 
8.1.  Who owns (NAME) forest reserve?  
1 = All villagers 
2 = Village Government   
3 = Central Government (FBD) 
4 = Districts 
5 = Private company  
6 = Individual  
7 = Environment/Forest Committee 
8 = Village and District jointly 
9 = Village and Central Government jointly  
10 = I do not know  
8.1a. Who are the main people who look after (NAME) forest reserve?   
1 = All villagers 
2 = Village Government   
3 = Central Government (FBD) 
4 = Districts 
5 = Private company  
6 = Individual  
7 = Environment/Forest Committee 
8 = Village Scouts  
9 = Village and District jointly 
10 = Village and Central Government jointly  
11 = I do not know  
8.2. Is there is a Committee that deals with forest issues in your village?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
3 = I don‟t know  
 
8.3. If yes, how was the Kamati selected?  
1 = through voting in village meeting 
2 = through voting in full village assembly 
3 = directly by village chairman/executive officer 
4 = directly by serikali kuu  
5 = donor programme 
6 = by others (specify) 
7 = I do not know  
8.4. In the last 12 months how many village assembly meetings have there been in your 
 village?  
 1 = 12 (every month)  
 2 =  4 (every 2-3 months)    
 3 =  2 (every 6 months)  
 4 =  they are held sporadically without specific time schedule  
 5 =  none  
 6 =  I do not know  
8.5. How often have you been present?  
 1 = every time   
 2 =  sometimes    
 3 =  never   
8.6. How are you being informed about the activities of this environment (natural 
 resources/forest) committee?  
 1 = I am not informed and I do not know what the Kamati is doing 
 2 =  Kamati ya mistu briefs villagers regularly during village assembly meetings   
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 3 =  Kamati ya mistu briefs villagers occasionally during village assembly  meetings  
 4 =  Village govt. informs villagers during village assembly meetings but the  Kamati does not 
appear  
 5 =  Villagers are not informed about Kamati ya msitu‟s activities during village  assembly but 
in other ways 
8.7. Is there a management agreement for (NAME) Forest Reserve?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
3 = I do not know  
8.8. Is (NAME) Forest Reserve patrolled?  
1 = daily 
2 = 2-3 times per week  
3 = once per month   
4 = occasionally, if there was an incident  
5 = never  
6 = I do not know 
8.9. Is there any revenue collected from (NAME) Forest Reserve?  
1 = a lot 
2 = a little 
3 = nothing 
4 = I think there is but it is never reported to us 
5 = I do not know 
8.10. If any, who collects revenue?  
 1 = Village Forest Committee  
 2 = Village government   
 3 = District  
 4 = Central government  
 5 = Private company 
 6 = individual  
 7 = I don‟t know 
8.11. Enumerator: If answer 1 or 2 is chosen ask “What happens to the revenue?”  
Record “don‟t know” if people do not know.  
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
8.12. Have you or anybody in your household taken part in making the rules restricting forest 
access and use during the last 5 years?  
 1 = yes, during village assembly meetings   
 2 = yes, during other village meetings (specify) 
 3 = no, we have not taken part at all  
 4 = I do not know 
 
8.13.  What can you say about the information you personally have about the rules of access and 
use of (NAME) forest reserve?  
 
 1 = I feel well informed, have enough information → Q 8.15 
 2 = I feel informed, have some information 
 3 = I do not feel well informed, have no information 
 
8.14. Would you like to have more information about rules of access and use of (NAME) forest 
reserve?  
 1 = Yes, I would like to have more information  
 2 = No, I do not want to know  
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8.15. If you were in charge, how would you like to see (NAME) forest reserve managed?  
1 = by serikali ya kuu 
2 = by serikali ya kijii 
3 = by camati ya mazingira/misitu 
4 = by district 
5 = by serikali ya kijiji and serikali ya juu pa moja 
  6 = private person/firm 
7 = other  (specify) 
…………………………………………………………… 
9.  Access and Utilization of (NAME) forest reserve  
9.1. Who in the village is entering (NAME) forest reserve? 
 1 = all villagers   
 2 = women and children of this village  
 3 = men of this village 
 4 = village leaders   
 5 = forest committee members  
 6 = village forest guards   
 7 = tourists 
 8 = people from district  
 9 = people from central government 
 10 = other outsiders to this village (specify) 
 11= nobody enters forest 
 12 = others (specify) 
 
9.2. For which purpose is the above group entering (NAME) forest reserve?  
 1 = take timber  
 2 = take poles 
 3 = take fitu  
 4 = make ropes 
 5 = collect firewood  
 6 = make charcoal   
 7 = take medicines  
 8 = take fruits, leaves, plants 
 9 = collect honey   
 10 = fetch grass 
 11= collect gums and resin 
 12 = hunt for bushmeat 
 13 = graze animals   
 14 = farming  
 15 = get wood for carving  
 16 = ritual purposes  
 17 = bring tourists   
 18 = patrol forest 
 19 = through passing on footpath 
 20= others (specify) 
 
9.3. Who does not enter (NAME) forest reserve and why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
9.4.  Who do you think benefits most from (NAME) forest reserve?  
 1 = all villagers   
 2 = women and children of this village  
 3 = men of this village 
 4 = village leaders   
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 5 = forest committee members  
 6 = village forest guards   
 7 = tourists 
 8 = people from district  
 9 = people from central government 
 10 = other outsiders to this village (specify) 
 11= nobody  
 12 = others (specify) 
9.5. How do these people benefit from (NAME) forest reserve?  
 1 = salary/allowances    
 2 = have ID 
 3 = gain respect from other villagers   
 4 = more power for decision making about forest 
 5 = get charcoal   
 6 = get timber  
 7 = fines collected  
 8 = bribes collected   
 9 = others (specify………………………………………………..) 
 10 = I do not know 
 
9.6. How has your access to (NAME) forest reserve changed over the last 5 years?  
 1 = I did not go 5 years ago and I do not go these days    → Q 9.8. 
 2 = I go these days more often than 5 years ago               → Q 9.8 
 3 = I go these days less often than 5 years ago  
 4 = I go these days as frequently as 5 years ago                → Q 9.8 
9.7. If you go less often these days, what has been your strategy to respond to this change?  
 1 = go more to public land forest 
 2 = use home garden 
 4 = use other forest reserve 
 5 = buy forest products on market  
 6 = make footpath to ritual site  
 7 = go early in the morning or at night 
 8 = go on days when committee members have traveled away from village 
 5 = others (specify…………………………………………….) 
 
9.8. How would you describe the overall condition of (NAME) forest reserve at present time? 
(Enumerator: Try to refer to the last 6 months so that you do not capture effect of rainy 
season)  
 1 = many big trees of value 
 2 = many big trees but of no value 
 3 = a few big trees of value  
 4 = a few big trees but of no value  
 5 = no big trees, many little trees  
 6 = no big trees, few little trees   
 7 = only shrub  
 
9.9. How would you rate the change of the overall condition of (NAME) forest reserves today 
compared to 5 years ago?  
1 = Much improved  
2 = Some improvements  
3 = Stable 
4 = a bit worse  
5 = Much worse 
6 = don‟t know 
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9.10. How has this change (improvement/worsening of forest condition) affected your livelihood?  
 1 = It has much improved my livelihood  
 2 = It has improved my livelihood a bit  
 3 = The change in forest condition did not have any effect on my livelihood → Q 10.1 
 4 = It was worsened my livelihood to some extend  
 5 = It was worsened my livelihood a lot  
 
9.11. If your livelihood has worsened or improved, how/why?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
10. Control of Forest Reserve  
10.1  Are there to your knowledge any restrictions on the way people use (NAME) forest reserve?  
Entry:  
 1 = entry and use not allowed at all 
 2 = entry allowed on certain days per week 
 3 = others (specify………………………………………….) 
 4 = I do not know 
Taking Fuel wood:  
 1 = taking fuel wood not allowed at all  
 2 = taking fuel wood is allowed all the time  
 3 = taking allowed on certain days only  
 4 = I do not know 
Do you pay for collection firewood?  
1 = yes 
2 = no  
If yes, how much and to whom? ……………………………………………… 
Cutting trees for timber/poles/fitu:  
 1 = cutting trees not allowed at all 
 2 = cutting trees is allowed    
 3 = cutting tress is allowed only with permit  
 4 = cutting trees allowed for fitu  
 5 = cutting trees allowed for poles 
 6 = others (specify………………………………………………) 
 7 = I do not know 
 
Do you pay for cutting timber/poles/fitu?  
1 = yes 
2 = no  
If yes, how much and to whom? …………………………………………. 
Others:  
 1 = agriculture and grazing not allowed   
 2 = agriculture and grazing is allowed   
 3 = I do not know  
Do you pay for grazing ?  
1 = yes 
2 = no  
If yes, how much and to whom? ……………………………………………. 
 
10.2. Do you think rules restricting forest use are necessary to maintain the forest?  
1 = yes 
2 = no  
10.3. Who makes such rules about forest access and use?  
 1 = serikali ya kuu  
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 2 = serikali ya kijiji (village assembly)  
 3 = camati ya mazingira/msitu   
 4 = village chairman  
 5 = other village leader 
 6 = village government and central government jointly 
 7 = district 
 8 = other organization (specify)  
 
10.4 Are there by-laws regulating access and use of the (NAME) Forest Reserve? 
1 = yes                            
2 = no                            (→ Q 10.8.) 
3 = I do not know         (→ Q 10.8.) 
10.5 What do these by-laws say?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
 1 = I do not know   
 
10.6 What is the status of these by-laws?  
 1 = drafted by village but not endorsed by district  
 2 = endorsed by district  
 3 = enforced    
 4 = not enforced   
 5 = I do not know  
 
10.7 Have you seen the by-laws documented?  
1 = yes, I have seen them 
2 = yes, I have read them 
3 = I have never seen or read them  
 
10.8. Who is in charge of dealing with offenders against forest rules?  
 1 = serikali ya kuu (FBD) 
 2 = serikali ya kijiji  
 3 = camati ya mazingira/msitu   
 4 = village chairman  
 5 = other village leader 
 6 = the police 
 7 = district 
 8 = other (specify)  
 
10.9. Have you or anybody from your HH during the last 12 months seen or heard of a person with 
a permit to enter the forest and cut trees or make charcoal?   
1 = yes 
2 = no (→ Q 10.11) 
 
10.10. If yes, who issued the permit? 
 1 = serikali ya kuu (FBD) 
 2 = serikali ya kijiji  
 3 = camati ya mazingira/msitu   
 4 = village chairman  
 5 = other village leader 
 6 = the District  
 7 = Catchment office Morogoro  
 8 = other (specify)  
10.11. Have you or anybody in your HH seen a person violating forest rules during the past 12 
months? 
1 = yes 
2 = no (→ Q 10.16) 
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10.12. What did the person do? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 
 
10.13. Did you or the HH member report this person? 
1 = yes 
2 = no  
 
10.14. To whom did you report the person?  
 1 = serikali ya kuu 
 2 = serikali ya kijiji (village assembly) 
 3 = Kamati ya mazingira/msitu  
 4 = village chairman /executive officer 
 5 = district  
 6 = other person/organization (specify)  
 
10.15. What was the effect of the reporting?  
 1 = offender was warned without further action   
 2 = offender was fined   
 3 = offender was taken to police   
 4 = offender was beaten up 
 5 = offender was put in jail 
 6 = no action was taken  
 7 = do not know as villagers are not informed  
 8 = do not want to know  
 
10.16. During the PRA conducted in this village, participants made the following statements, about 
why no action is taken following an offense. Which statement do you agree or disagree 
with ?  
 Statement Strongly 
agree 
agree Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Don‟t 
know 
1 People in charge of dealing with offenders are 
not serious and do not follow through 
     
2 People in charge of dealing with offender are 
involved themselves and are not trustworthy 
     
3 In most cases offenders ran away and there is 
no follow-up 
     
4 Rules in this village are in general not 
important 
     
5 People in charge of dealing with offenders 
want to avoid conflict 
     
6 People in charge do not patrol or take action 
against offenders because of the danger of 
being hurt 
     
 
11.  Income and Savings  
 
11.1. What is the household‟s main source of cash income? (Rank by importance!) 
 1 = sale of food crops   
 2 = sale of livestock   
 3 = sale of livestock products   
 4 = sale of cash crops  
 5 = sale of forest products   
 6 = business income   
 7  = wages or salaries in cash 
 8  = other casual cash earnings 
 9 = income from land rent 
 10  = cash remittances 
 11 = fishing 
 12= others (specify) 
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If 6 is most important source of income, specify which business?__________________ 
 
11.2.  Which crops has your HH grown over the last 12 months, how is it used and which income is 
obtained?  
Name of Crop  Amount of 
harvest/ 
Unit 
Quantity 
consumed 
 
Quantity sold 
 
Ave price 
 
     
     
     
11.3. Which agricultural inputs did you use over the last 12 months?   
Type of input   Amount  Cost  
 
Employ field labour    
Purchase of fertilizer    
Seeds    
Transport    
11.4. From which other livestock or non-farm outputs did you earn income over the past 12 
months? 
Enumerator: These can be from fishing, mining, handicrafts, beer brewing, brick making …  
Name of Output/Activity  Amount/ 
Unit 
Quantity 
consumed 
Quantity sold Ave price 
 
     
     
     
     
 
11.5. Did you HH receive income from renting out land during the past 12 months?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
11.6. If yes, what was the amount received over the past 12 months?  
 
(11.7. Enumerator If the HH was/is using land that it is not owning (see 6.2/6.3), 
ask now what did you have to pay to rent this land and note the amount here!)  
 
11.8. What is the income earned from other non far sources over the 12 months?  
No. Type of work Amount earned 12 months  Place of work  
  Earnings for year up to 
date of interview 
1 = nearby 
2  =district 
3 = town (name) 
4 = city (name) 
1 Occasional labour    
2  Business income    
3 Wages seasonal   
4 Wages regular   
5 Salary private sector   
6 Salary government sector    
7 Payments in kind    
8 Pension payments   
9 Interests/Dividends   
10 Remittances   
11 Other non farm    
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Appendix 3: Transect Maps 
1. Example: Map of Dindili Forest Reserve with Transect Lines 21 
 
                                                 
21
 Digitised maps/GPS data for Ngambaula and Milawilila were not available. The boundaries of the digitized maps were not 
consistent with the boundaries on the UTM gridmaps/boundary marks found in the field. Therefore some transects seem slightly out 
of the reserve boundaries on these maps below. KM 3 in Kimboza was not used for this study.   
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2. Maps of Dindili and Kitulang‟halo forest reserves with transect lines  
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3. Maps of Kimboza and Ruvu forest reserves 
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4. Overview map 
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Appendix 4: Spatial patterns of forest quality  
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Table A4.1. Descriptive statistics, forest quality variables, Kitulang‟halo versus Dindili  
 
  Kitulang‟halo  Dindili  Significance 
DBH M=18.04, SE=0.58, sd=7.55 M=21.16, SE=0.76, sd=7.03 U=4,706.50, p<.001, r=-0.25 
Height M=8.09, SE=0.28, sd=3.68 M=9.75, SE=0.40, sd=3.15 U=4,806.00, p<.001, r=-0.23 
Table A4.2. Descriptive statistics, forest quality variables, Kimboza versus Ruvu  
 
  Kimboza Ruvu Significance 
Trees M=12.67, SE=0.88, sd=6.88 M=9.39, SE=0.271, sd=6.87 U=6,216.00, p<.001, r= -0.21 
DBH M=30.34, SE=0.88, sd=6.81 M=28.83, SE=0.39, sd=6.87 Not significant 
Height M=17.03, SE=0.45, sd=3.51 M=10.96, SE=0.35, sd=3.87 U=2171.50, p<.001, r = -0.49 
Poles M=21.23, SE=1.14, sd=8.82 M=13.51, SE=0.62, sd=10.83 U=4,501.00,p< .001, r = -0.34 
Withies M=25.02, SE=1.55, sd=12.04 M=10.62, SE=0.73, sd=12.83 U=3,026.00, p< .001, r = -0.43 
Leaf litter M=3.42, SE=0.181, sd=1.41 M=1.35, SE=0.088, sd=1.54 U=3,153.5, p<.001, r=-0.44 
Seedlings M=2.63, SE=0.171, sd=1.33 M=0.93, SE=0.082, sd=1.44 U=3,164, p<.001, r=-0.45 
Grass M=0.03, SE=0.033, sd=0.26 M=2.17, SE=0.098, sd=1.73 U=2,796.5, p<.001, r=-0.47 
Canopy M=36.3, SE=3.46, sd=26.79 M=15.0, SE=1.09, sd=19.21 U=4727, p<.001, r=-0.31 
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Table A4.3. Descriptive statistics, forest quality variables, Milawilila versus Ngambaula  
 
  Milawilila  Ngambaula  Significance 
Trees M=11.85, SE=0.88, sd=3.94 M=3.65, SE=0.97, sd=4.00 U=29.00, p<.001, r=-0.74 
DBH M=37.53, SE=1.43, sd=6.41 M=22.41, SE=4.46, sd=19.95 Not significant 
Height M=15.22, SE=0.96, sd=4.28 M=7.28, SE=1.20, sd=4.16 Not significant 
Poles M=32.9, SE=2.49, sd=11.14 M=2.4, SE=0.96, sd=4.29 U=1.00, p <.001, r = 0.86 
Withies M=44.65, SE=3.68, sd=16.47 M=3.4, SE=1.39, sd=6.20 U=3.50, p <.001, r =0.85 
N.dead trees M=3.9, SE=0.57, sd=2.55 M=1.6, SE=0.34, sd=1.54 U=1,639.5, p<.001, r=-0.20 
N.dead poles M=2.7, SE=0.61, sd=2.74 M=0.25, SE=0.12, sd=0.55 U=6,699, p<.001, r=-0.18 
Leaf litter M=3.65, SE=0.357, sd=1.60 M=0.50, SE=0.21, sd=0.95 U=243, p<.001, r=-0.24 
Seedlings M=3.60, SE=0.366, sd=1.64 M=0.30, SE=0.15, sd=0.66 U=237, p<.001, r=-0.25 
Grass M=0.1, SE=0.1, sd= 0.45 M=2.15, SE=0.49, sd=2.21  U=96, p<.001, r=-0.17  
Canopy M=49.1, SE=5.26, sd=23.51 M=3.4, SE=1.63, sd=7.29 U=19.0, p<.001, r=-0.25 
Species richness M=10, SE=0.54, sd=2.43 M=6, SE=0.93, sd= 4.16 U= 76.5, p<.001, r=-0.17 
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Figure A4.1. Forest quality variables, Milawilila and Ngambaula 
 
c   
 
Figure A4.2 Percentage of poles cut across the investigated forests 
 
c  
 
Figure A4.3 Percentage of withies cut across the investigated forests 
 
c  
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Table A4.4. Total cuts, descriptive statistics, Kitulang‟halo versus Dindili   
 
  Kitulang‟halo Dindili Significance 
Trees M=2.01, SE=0.26, sd=3.33 M=6.99, SE=0.83, sd=7.46 U= 3,339.5, p<.001, r= -0.42 
Poles M=3.30, SE=0.35, sd=4.55 M=6.10, SE=0.6, sd=5.36 U= 4,061.5, p<.001, r= -0.33 
Withies M=1.59, SE=0.26, sd=3.40 M=3.62, SE=0.54, sd=4.81 Not significant 
 
 
Table A4.5. Old cuts, descriptive statistics, Kitulang‟halo versus Dindili   
 
  Kitulang‟halo Dindili Significance 
Trees M=1.88, SE=0.25, sd=3.19 M=6.68, SE=0.81, sd=7.26 U= 3,462.5, p<.001, r= -0.41 
Poles M=3.05, SE=0.33, sd=4.30 M=5.68, SE=0.58, sd=5.15 U= 4,032 p<.001, r= -0.33 
Withies M=1.30, SE=0.21, sd=2.71 M=3.29, SE=0.50, sd=4.50 U= 4,418.5, p>.001, r=-0.30 
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Table A4.6. Other forms of human use (mean values): Kitulang‟halo and Dindili  
 
  Kitulang'halo Dindili  
Burning 0.16 0.14 
Footpath 0.14 0.20 
Trap 0.04 0.01 
Sawpit* 0.11 0.29 
Charcoal pit 0.14 0.20 
Farm field 0.02 0.01 
Mining 0.00 0.00 
Grazing 0.04 0.00 
Parts taken 0.02 0.08 
Debarking 0.01 0.00 
*Statistically significant difference 
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Table A4.7. Descriptive statistics, cutting data, Kimboza versus Ruvu  
 
  Kimboza   Ruvu   Significance 
Trees, total cuts M=1.12, SE=0.18, sd=1.43 M=0.40, SE=0.06, sd=1.01 U= 5,549, p<.001, r= -0.32 
Trees, old cuts M=1.08, SE=0.18, sd=1.42 M=0.38, SE=0.05, sd=0.93 U=5,652, p<.001, r = -0.31 
Trees, new cuts M=0.03, SE=0.01, sd=0.18 M=0.03, SE=0.01, sd=0.21 Not significant 
Poles, total cuts M=5.05, SE=0.66, sd=5.15 M=2.34, SE=0.30, sd=5.22 U= 4,835.5, p<.001, r= -0.32 
Poles, old cuts M=5.03, SE=0.66, sd=5.14 M=2.30, SE=0.29, sd=5.09 U=4,812, p<.001, r = -0.32 
Poles, new cuts M=0.02, SE=0.02, sd=0.13 M=0.04, SE=0.02, sd=0.28 Not significant 
Withies, total cuts  M=6.68, SE=0.76, sd=5.85 M=2.71, SE=0.33, sd=5.86 U= 4,681.5, p>.001, r=-0.33 
Withies, old cuts M=6.65, SE=0.76, sd=5.87 M=2.50, SE=0.31, sd=5.42 U=4,578.5, p<.001, r = -0.34 
Withies, new cuts M=0.03, SE=0.03, sd=0.26 M=0.22, SE=0.09, sd=1.65 Not significant 
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Table A4.8. Other forms of human use (mean values): Kimboza and Ruvu  
 
  Kimboza Ruvu 
Burning* 0.05 0.36 
Footpath 0.07 0.06 
Trap 0.02 0.05 
Sawpit* 0.10 0.01 
Charcoal pit 0.00 0.00 
Farm field 0.00 0.00 
Mining 0.00 0.06 
Grazing 0.00 0.01 
Parts taken 0.00 0.01 
Debarking 0.00 0.00 
*statistically significant difference 
 
 
Table A4.9. Total cuts, descriptive statistics, Milawilila versus Ngambaula 
 
  Milawilila Ngambaula  Significance 
Trees M=4.40, SE=0.51, sd=2.26 M=1.60, SE=0.38, sd=1.70 U= 70.5, p<.001, r= -0.18 
Poles M=9.70, SE=1.34, sd=5.98 M=1.00, SE=0.38, sd=1.72 U= 13.50, p<.001, r= -0.26 
Withies M=6.75, SE=1.14, sd=5.08 M=1.70, SE=0.84, sd=3.74 U= 67.50, p>.001, r=-0.18 
 
 
Table A4.10. Other forms of human use: Milawilila and Ngambaula  
 
  Milawilila Ngambaula 
Burning* 0.00 0.90 
Footpath 0.15 0.05 
Trap 0.00 0.00 
Sawpit 0.30 0.05 
Charcoal pit 0.00 0.00 
Farm field* 0.15 0.35 
Mining 0.00 0.00 
Grazing 0.00 0.00 
Parts taken 0.00 0.00 
Debarking 0.05 0.00 
*statistically significant 
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Table A4.11 Villagers‟ perception of forest condition, by village and forest 
 
Village name Maseyu Fulwe Mwalazi Ngong'olo Milawilila Logo 
Forest name Kitulang'halo Dindili Kimboza Ruvu Milawilila Nagambaula 
many big trees of value 57 13 66 48 41 22 
many big trees of no value 8 11 8 1 11 16 
few big trees of value 21 32 2 6 8 3 
few big trees of no value 2 35 5 3 2 8 
no big but many little trees 2 4 3 1 21 11 
no big and few little trees 0 1 3 3 0 3 
I do not know 11 3 13 38 17 37 
In percent of respondents 
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Appendix 5: Livelihood patterns data tables  
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Table A5.1. Size distribution of land owned by households, by study village  
                  
 
    Study village     All 
 
Fulwe Maseyu 
 
Milawilila N'gongolo Mwalazi 
 Area Range % % % % % % % 
None 12.00 3.03 14.29 7.94 20.83 22.58 13.47 
Less than 1 ha. 17.33 33.33 38.10 26.98 34.72 38.71 31.17 
1.01 - 3 ha. 49.33 50.00 44.44 60.32 38.89 30.65 45.64 
3.01 - 5 ha. 8.00 7.58 1.59 4.76 4.17 8.06 5.74 
More than 5 ha. 13.33 6.06 1.59 0.00 1.39 0.00 3.99 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Data are percentages of sample households 
      
Table A5.2. Land area owned and farmed (in ha) by study village and wealth group 
 
Asset 
Per-
centile 
group 
Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi Total 
  
  owned 
% 
cultiv.  Owned 
% 
cultiv. owned 
% 
cultiv. owned 
% 
cultiv. owned 
% 
cultiv. owned 
% 
cultiv. owned 
% 
cultiv. 
1 119.38 76% 75,27 40% 31,16 49% 31,77 52% 53,62 63% 35,41 49% 346,61 59% 
2 9.71 67% 25,9 75% 23,03 81% 36,02 95% 18,62 109% 14,77 73% 128,05 86% 
3 19.22 103% 7,85 87% 14,97 89% 13,35 97% 13,76 98% 14,77 88% 83,92 95% 
4 40.27 114% 19,22 75% 1,62 356% 0,4 810% 1,62 506% 3,04 243% 66,17 128% 
Total 188.58 87% 128,24 55% 70,78 75% 81,54 82% 87,62 87% 67,99 71% 624,75 77% 
1 = asset richest, 4 = asset poorest            
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Table A5.3. Housing materials used by study village and for the entire sample 
 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi All 
Type of roof 
       grass, leaves, bamboo 38.7 62.1 50.8 54.8 47.9 48.4 50.1 
mud and grass 4.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
concrete, cement 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
metal sheets 57.3 37.9 42.6 45.2 52.1 51.6 48.1 
Type of walls 
      
 
poles, branches, grass 22.7 6.3 8.1 1.6 2.8 17.7 10.1 
poles, mud, stones 17.3 48.4 53.2 48.4 43.7 43.5 41.7 
mud only 25.3 35.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 9.7 10.9 
mud bricks 4.0 1.6 25.8 4.8 42.3 9.7 21.0 
baked/burned bricks 26.7 4.7 11.3 0.0 11.3 29.0 14.9 
concrete, cement, 
stones 
2.7 3.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.3 
other 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Type of floor 
      
 
earth 76.0 84.4 93.5 95.2 88.9 95.2 88.4 
cement, concrete, tiles, 
timber 
22.7 15.6 4.8 4.8 9.7 4.8 10.8 
other 1.3 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.8 
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Table A5.4. Housing materials and sanitary facilities by asset quartile 
 
 
Asset quartile 
  1 2 3 4 
Type of roof 
    grass, leaves, bamboo 39.0 47.0 55.1 60.2 
mud and grass 1.0 1.0 3.1 1.0 
concrete, cement 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
metal sheets 60.0 52.0 41.8 37.8 
Type of walls 
    poles, branches, grass 12.0 5.1 9.2 14.3 
poles, mud, stones 37.0 48.5 50.0 31.6 
mud only 3.0 6.1 5.1 29.6 
mud bricks 22.0 30.3 22.4 9.2 
baked/burned bricks 23.0 9.1 12.2 14.3 
concrete, cement, stones 3.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
other 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Type of floor 
    earth 82.0 88.9 91.8 91.9 
cement, concrete, tiles, timber 18.0 9.1 8.2 7.1 
other 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 
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Table A5.5. Housing material and sanitary facilities by gender of HH Head 
 
 
HH Head 
  Male Female 
Type of roof 
  grass, leaves, bamboo 48.6 61.8 
mud and grass 1.9 0.0 
concrete, cement 0.3 0.0 
metal sheets 49.2 38.2 
Type of walls 
  poles, branches, grass 10.3 12.5 
poles, mud, stones 41.1 46.4 
mud only 10.3 17.9 
mud bricks 19.4 14.3 
baked/burned bricks 17.2 7.1 
concrete, cement, stones 1.3 1.8 
other 0.3 0.0 
Type of floor 
  earth 87.5 91.1 
cement, concrete, tiles, timber 11.6 8.9 
other 0.9 0.0 
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Table A5.6. Education of HH head by study village  
 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
no formal education 20.0 17.7 26.3 25.9 20.0 26.2 
Std 1 to Std 4 14.7 8.1 28.1 14.8 23.1 19.7 
Std 5 to Std 8 53.3 64.5 38.6 55.6 53.8 54.1 
Form 1 to 3 4.0 0.0 1.8 1.9 3.1 0.0 
Form 3 to 6 5.3 1.6 1.8 1.9 0.0 0.0 
training after primary 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
university 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
adult education 1.3 4.8 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A5.7. Education of HH head by asset quartile in percent 
 
   Asset quartile group   
  
1 
(richest) 
2 3 
4 
(poorest) 
no formal education 14.1 21.5 25.0 29.0 
Std 1 to Std 4 25.3 23.7 15.9 6.5 
Std 5 to Std 8 49.5 48.4 54.5 62.4 
Form 1 to 3 3.0 3.2 1.1 0.0 
Form 3 to 6 3.0 1.1 2.3 1.1 
training after primary 1.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 
university 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
adult education 3.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
 
 
Table A5.8 Differences in education between male and female headed household 
 
 
HH Head 
  male female 
no formal education 18.5 45.5 
Std 1 to Std 4 19.4 9.1 
Std 5 to Std 8 55.2 43.6 
Form 1 to 3 2.2 0.0 
Form 3 to 6 2.2 0.0 
training after primary 0.6 0.0 
university 0.3 0.0 
adult education 1.6 1.8 
In percent of respondents 
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Table A5.9. Type of drinking water source, frequency of collection, change of frequency compared to 5 years ago, by village  
 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
Type of drinking water source 
      piped water community supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.7 9.7 
piped water on neighbour house 1.3 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
rainwater  catchment tank 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
public well (protected) 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.6 19.4 
public well (unprotected) 68.0 34.8 0.0 3.2 26.4 58.1 
private well (protected) 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
private well unprotected 2.7 1.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 
spring (unprotected) 1.3 0.0 27.0 68.3 1.4 1.6 
river, dam, lake 16.0 62.1 73.0 27.0 0.0 11.3 
others 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frequency of water collection 
      more than once per week 84.0 90.6 98.4 98.4 100.0 95.2 
once per day 6.7 7.8 1.6 1.6 0.0 4.8 
2-3 times per week 4.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
others 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
More or less time than 5 years ago  
     more time 88.0 57.8 1.6 4.8 39.4 8.1 
less time 6.7 29.7 14.3 28.6 21.1 37.1 
no change 5.3 12.5 84.1 66.7 39.4 54.8 
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Table A5.10. Time spent in minutes walking to nearest drinking water source 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
Mean 31.11 42.86 15.25 9.85 8.94 10.76 
s.d. 23.0 42.7 23.1 10.3 6.8 11.7 
Median 30.0 30.0 10.0 5.0 7.5 6.0 
 
Table A5.11. Type of health services by village in percent 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
none 27 11 98 98 100 0 
private hospital 11 0 2 0 0 93 
public hospital 43 63 0 2 0 5 
traditional healer 
against payment 
19 26 0 0 0 0 
traditional healer 
who serves for free 
0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table A5.12. Type of health services by asset group in percent 
  
1 
(richest) 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
(poorest) 
none 60 71 59 38 
private hospital 16 13 18 18 
public hospital 21 12 15 26 
traditional healer against 
payment 
2 3 7 18 
traditional healer who 
serves for free 
0 0 1 0 
Table A5.13. Type of health services by gender in percent 
  female male 
none 41.8 57.4 
private hospital 25.5 15.7 
public hospital 18.2 19.9 
traditional healer against payment 14.5 6.7 
traditional healer who serves for free 0.0 0.3 
Total 100 100 
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Table A5.14. Market access, by village 
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
Mean  48.92 56.17 145.56 79.76 159.01 130.77 
s.d. 57.79 64.22 35.79 35.59 51.65 53.43 
Median 30 30 150 60 180 120 
Table A5.15. Means of transport to reach market, by study village.   
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
walking 86.7 30.3 96.8 95.2 94.4 85.5 
bicycle 12.0 13.6 3.2 4.8 4.2 11.3 
minibus 0.0 54.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.6 
other 1.3 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Table A5.16. Comparison main activity of household head and asset wealth group 
 
richest                                  poorest Total 
  1 2 3 4   
farming 88 80 73 80 321 
government employee 1 4 2 1 8 
private sector employee 1 1 1 1 4 
self-employed with employees 5 4 4 4 17 
self employeed without employees 3 1 4 7 15 
unable to work (too old, retired, sick, disabled) 1 2 3 4 10 
others 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 100 92 87 97 376 
Table A5.17. Type of non-farm activities, total sample  
  
Count Percent 
occasional labour 39 7.1 
business income 160 29.1 
wages seasonal 43 7.8 
wages regular 32 5.8 
salary private sector 2 0.4 
salary government sector 9 1.6 
payments in kind 4 0.7 
pension payments 3 0.5 
interests, dividends 1 0.2 
Remittances 118 21.5 
other non farm 93 16.9 
Total 504 91.8 
System 45 8.2 
  549 100.0 
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Table A5.18. Non farm activities  
  
Frequency Percent 
beer brewing 5 10.9 
bicycle repair 1 2.2 
brick making 1 2.2 
carpentry 3 6.5 
casual labour 4 8.7 
charcoal burning 1 2.2 
fishing 1 2.2 
house building 3 6.5 
mechanic 1 2.2 
milling maschine 1 2.2 
mining 13 28.3 
mitafuliwa 1 2.2 
radio repairing 1 2.2 
selling local 
medicine 
2 4.3 
tailoring 2 4.3 
technician 1 2.2 
weaving 3 6.5 
welding 1 2.2 
wine making 1 2.2 
Total 46 100 
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Table A5.19. Type of non-farm activities by village  
 
Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
occasional labour 8 8.5 1 1.2 3 3.6 1 1.1 10 9.1 16 17.8 
business income 28 29.8 48 57.1 13 15.7 19 21.6 28 25.5 24 26.7 
wages seasonal 7 7.4 14 16.7 5 6.0 6 6.8 4 3.6 7 7.8 
wages regular 9 9.6 4 4.8 3 3.6 13 14.8 3 2.7 0 0.0 
salary private sector 1 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
salary government 
sector 
2 2.1 1 1.2 4 4.8 1 1.1 1 0.9 0 
0.0 
payments in kind 2 2.1 1 1.2 1 1.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
pension payments 2 2.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
interests, dividends 0 0.0 1 1.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
remittances 31 33.0 13 15.5 20 24.1 22 25.0 23 20.9 9 10.0 
other non farm 1 1.1 1 1.2 17 20.5 9 10.2 31 28.2 34 37.8 
Total 91 96.8     66 79.5 73 83.0 100 90.9 
  Missing 3 3.2     17 20.5 15 17.0 10 9.1     
Total 94 100.0 84 100.0 83 100.0 88 100.0 110 100.0 90 100.0 
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Table A5.20. Type of non-farm activities by JFM and non JFM study sites  
 
JFM Non-JFM 
 
N % N % 
occasional labour 18 6.87 21 7.32 
business income 91 34.7 69 24 
wages seasonal 27 10.3 16 5.57 
wages regular 17 6.49 15 5.23 
salary private sector 1 0.38 1 0.35 
salary government sector 2 0.76 7 2.44 
payments in kind 1 0.38 3 1.05 
pension payments 1 0.38 2 0.7 
interests, dividends 1 0.38 0 0 
remittances 44 16.8 74 25.8 
other non farm 44 16.8 49 17.1 
Total 247 94.3 257 89.5 
Missing 15 5.73 30 10.5 
Table A5.21. Mean number of crops grown by study village  
  Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
Mean  2.31 2.37 3.79 3.89 3.64 3.20 
s.d. 1.00 0.79 1.67 1.43 1.46 1.38 
Median 2 2 4 4 4 3 
Max. 4 5 7 7 8 7 
Min 1 1 1 2 1 1 
N 70 62 63 63 72 60 
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Table A5.22. Type of crops grown by study village  
 
Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
bananas 3 1.9 1 0.7 22 9.2 23 9.4 4 1.5 2 1.0 
beans 2 1.2 1 0.7 
  
1 0.4 1 0.4 
  
Cassava 3 1.9 3 2.0 32 13.4 57 23.3 10 3.8 6 3.1 
coconuts 
    
6 2.5 15 6.1 7 2.6 2 1.0 
cow peas 1 0.6 4 2.6 3 1.3 
  
3 1.1 2 1.0 
groundnuts 
  
1 0.7 1 0.4 
      
cucumber 1 0.6 
          
maize 67 41.4 60 39.7 37 15.5 11 4.5 69 25.9 56 29.0 
mangoes 
    
1 0.4 1 0.4 
    
millet 
  
10 6.6 20 8.4 5 2.0 44 16.5 23 11.9 
oranges 1 0.6 
  
16 6.7 10 4.1 1 0.4 2 1.0 
pepper 1 0.6 
  
10 4.2 11 4.5 
  
1 0.5 
pigeon 
peas 
6 3.7 15 9.9 3 1.3 
  
6 2.3 3 1.6 
pineapples 
    
8 3.3 29 11.8 
    
potatoes 
    
1 0.4 
  
1 0.4 
  
pumpkins 
      
1 0.4 
    
rice 1 0.6 
  
57 23.8 65 26.5 74 27.8 57 29.5 
sesame 44 27.2 35 23.2 19 7.9 11 4.5 43 16.2 35 18.1 
sorghum 
  
19 12.6 
  
2 0.8 
    
soya 1 0.6 
          
spice 
            
sugar cane 1 0.6 
  
1 0.4 
  
1 0.4 1 0.5 
sunflower 5 3.1 
          
tobacco 
        
1 0.4 
  
tomatoes 17 10.5 1 0.7 2 0.8 
      
vegetables 1 0.6 1 0.7 
  
1 0.4 
  
1 0.5 
yam 
      
2 0.8 
  
2 1.0 
water 
melon 
7 4.3                     
Total 162 100.0 151 100.0 239 100.0 245 100.0 266 100.0 193 100.0 
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Table A5.23. HH Primary strategies to overcome food shortage (in % of respondents) 
  Asset quartile group 
  
1 
(richest) 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
(poorest) 
cut down food intake/number of meals 15 20 19 42 
seek support from relatives/neighbours 6 10 13 8 
buy food on credit 21 26 20 8 
search for edible plant, fruit and hunt in the forest 2 2 3 6 
casual labour 19 18 28 21 
eat cassava as substitute 4 5 10 3 
eat fruit from garden 1 2 0 0 
sell chicken, livestock or other assets 5 4 1 2 
petty trade: fruit, vegetables, bites, water, beer brewing 15 9 2 4 
burn, sell charcoal  2 1 1 0 
mining 1 1 0 0 
other 1 0 1 4 
never experienced food shortage 8 2 2 2 
Table A5.24. HH secondary strategies to overcome food shortage (in % of respondents) 
  Asset quartile group 
  1   2   3   4 
cut down food intake/number of meals 50 
 
6 
 
15 
 
14 
search for edible plant, fruit and hunt in the forest 25 
 
13 
 
23 
 
17 
casual labour 25  
38 
 
31 
 
14 
seek support from relatives/neighbours 0  
6 
 
15 
 
7 
buy food on credit 0  
25 
 
0 
 
38 
petty trade: fruit, vegetables, bites, water, beer brewing 0  
13 
 
15 
 
0 
eat cassava as substitute 0  
0 
 0 
 
7 
burn, sell charcoal  0  
0 
 
0 
 
3 
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Table A5.25. Mean and Medium selected indicators by Study village 
  
            Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
Value of Assets  Mean 980,927 608,204 462,834 499,659 492,553 448,443 
(Ths.) s.d.       
  Median 252,172 424,677 374,749 411,099 399,333 314,175 
No of HH  Mean 4.93 4.61 4.62 4.90 4.93 4.10 
members s.d. 2.54 2.19 2.25 2.28 2.58 2.42 
  Median 5.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 
Land owned  Mean 2.51 1.94 1.12 1.29 1.22 1.10 
(ha.) s.d. 3.15 2.20 1.07 0.82 1.62 1.11 
  Median 1.62 1.21 0.81 1.21 0.81 0.81 
Land farmed  Mean 2.18 1.07 0.84 1.06 1.06 0.78 
(ha.) s.d. 3.08 0.76 0.44 0.55 0.73 0.55 
  Median 1.42 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
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Table A5.26. Assets owned by the sample households   
  
N Percent 
radio/cassette 249 6.1 
TV/Video 7 0.2 
bicycle 127 3.1 
mobile phone 46 1.1 
fridge/freezer 4 0.1 
iron charcoal 53 1.3 
iron electrical 3 0.1 
motorbike 1 0.0 
car 2 0.0 
tractor 5 0.1 
torch 222 5.5 
lantern 177 4.4 
watch 110 2.7 
clock 27 0.7 
charoal stove 101 2.5 
kerosine stove 49 1.2 
cooking pots 390 9.6 
hand hoe 394 9.7 
axe 264 6.5 
panga 343 8.5 
moskito net 188 4.6 
bed (ropes) 284 7.0 
bed with matress 313 7.7 
sewing machine 11 0.3 
milling machine 8 0.2 
wheelbarrow 4 0.1 
pit sawing blade 23 0.6 
goats 93 2.3 
sheep 3 0.1 
chicken 260 6.4 
duck 12 0.3 
pidgeon 3 0.1 
pigs 2 0.0 
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Table A5.27. HH size, age and gender of HH head by study village 
    Fulwe Maseyu Logo Milawilila Ngong'olo Mwalazi 
No of HH  Mean 4.93 4.61 4.62 4.90 4.93 4.10 
members s.d. 2.54 2.19 2.25 2.28 2.58 2.42 
  Median 5.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 
Age of HH Mean 52.51 46.65 49.45 46.71 48.52 45.08 
head  s.d. 15.98 14.20 14.98 17.32 16.23 16.14 
  Median 51.00 44.00 48.00 43.00 45.00 41.00 
Gender of  % male 85.3 78.8 89.5 87.3 93.9 77.0 
HH head % female 14.7 21.2 10.5 12.,7 6.1 23.0 
 
Table A5.28. HH size, age and gender of HH head by asset quartile  
  
  Asset quartile group   
  1 2 3 4 
No of HH Mean 5.44 5.14 4.19 4.05 
members s.d. 2.33 2.25 2.43 2.28 
  Median 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 
Age of HH Mean 51.29 48.43 46.44 46.53 
head s.d. 14.34 15.79 15.77 17.22 
  Median 48.00 45.00 43.50 43.00 
Gender of  % male 94.0 90.4 85.2 72.2 
HH head % female 6.0 9.6 14.8 27.8 
 
Table A5.29 Asset categories, mean values in TSH, by gender of household head 
  Male Female 
non productive assets 144,873 96,645 
productive assets  125,799 8,150 
livestock assets 60,610 24,801 
land assets 486,239 343,333 
Total assets 657,385 305,043 
 
Table A5.30 Asset categories by leadership status, mean value in TSH 
  Leader  Non Leader 
non productive assets 143,682 130,283 
productive assets  59,581 126,971 
livestock assets 63,572 50,297 
land assets 511,213 424,457 
Total assets 609,992 583,652 
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Table A5.31. Types of forest resource use, by people living adjacent to JFM and non-JFM forests   
 
JFM Non JFM 
  N % N % 
timber 67 5.4 86 6.3 
poles 162 13.2 173 12.7 
fitu 153 12.4 161 11.8 
ropes 138 11.2 146 10.7 
firewood 194 15.8 188 13.8 
charcoal 33 2.7 65 4.8 
medicines 84 6.8 108 7.9 
edible fruit, vegetables, leaves 105 8.5 132 9.7 
honey 8 0.6 
  
grass 103 8.4 102 7.5 
gum and resins 1 0.1 
  
bush meat 5 0.4 2 0.1 
grazing land 32 2.6 38 2.8 
farm land 139 11.3 162 11.9 
ritual 6 0.5 3 0.2 
others 1 0.1     
Total 1,231 100.0 1,366 100.0 
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Appendix 6: Species list 
 
Table A6.1 below contains a full list of all tree species found during the transect surveys in 
the six forest reserves.  
Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
A 
   Acacia polyacantha (A.campylacantha)  Mimosoideae White thorn Mgunga, 
Acacia hockii Mimosoideae 
 
Mgunga 
Acacia indica Mimosoideae 
  Acacia kirkii Mimosoideae 
  Acacia nigrescens Mimosoideae Knobthorn Mkambala, 
Acacia nilotica (A. arabica) Mimosoideae Egyptian thorn Mgunga,  
Acacia senegal Mimosoideae  Sudan gum arabic Mkoto, 
Acacia seyal Mimosoideae White thorn 
 Acacia xanthophloea  Mimosoideae Fever tree Mgunga,  
Adansonia digitata Bombacaceae  Baobab Mbuyu, 
Afzelia quanzensis Caesalpinoiodeae Pod mahogany Mbambakofi/Mkongo 
Albizia amara Mimosoideae  Bitter albizia mtanga 
Albizia anthelmintica Mimosoideae 
  Albizia gummifera/schimperiana Mimosoideae Long podded Albezia Mkenge 
Albizia petersiana Mimosoideae 
  Albizia versicolor Mimosoideae poison pod albizia Mchanidovu, 
Allanblackia stuhlmanii Clusiaceae 
  Allophylus congolanus Sapindaceae 
  Allophylus africana Sapindaceae 
  Annona sp.(fruits on trunk) Annonaceae 
  Annona senegalensis (A. chrysophylla) Annonaceae Wild custard apple Mchekwa/Mtomoko 
Antiaris toxicaria 
  
Mkula/Mkuzu 
Antidesma venosum Euphorbiaceae Tasselberry Mpotolo 
Alchornea cordifolia Euphorbiaceae 
  Alchornea hirtella  Euphorbiaceae 
  B 
   Balanites aegyptica Balanitaceae Desert date Mruguhu 
Barringtonia racemosa Lecythidaceae 
  Bersama abysinica Melianthaceae Winged Bersama Mwangwakwao 
Bombax rhodognaphalon (var. 
tomentosa) Bombaceae Wild Kapok Mkaranga mti 
Borassus aethiopum 
Arecaceae 
(Palmae) African fan palm Mvumo 
Brachylaena hutchinsii (b.huillensis) Compositae Silver oak Muhuhu, mkarambati 
Brachystegia longiflora Caesalpiniodeae 
  Brachystegia microphylla Caesalpiniodeae 
  Brachystegia spiciformis Caesalpiniodeae Bean-pod tree Myombo 
Breonadia microcephala (B. salocina) Rubiaceae 
 
Mgwina 
Bridelia brideliifolia Euphorbiaceae 
  Bridelia cathartica Euphorbiaceae 
  Bridelia micranthra Euphorbiaceae Bridelia Mkarati 
Boscia sp. Capparidaceae 
  Burkea africana Caesalpinioideae Wild syringa Mkalati 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Byrsocarpus orrientalis Connaraceae 
  C 
   Cadaba Farinosa Capparidaceae 
 
Ndumwashigulu 
Calotropis procera Apocynaceae Sodom apple 
 Carvalhoa campanulata Apocynaceae 
  Canthium mundianum Rubiaceae 
  Canthium oligocarpum Rubiaceae 
  Canthium schimperianum Rubiaceae 
  Canthium sylvaticum Rubiaceae 
  Carissa edulis Apocynaceae Simple-spined carrisa Mkabaku 
Cassia auriculata Caesalpinioideae 
  Cassia angustifolia  Caesalpinioideae 
  Cassia abreviata Caesalpinioideae Long-pod cassia Mulimuli 
Cassia petersiana Caesalpinioideae 
  Cassia siamea Caesalpinioideae 
  Cassia sinqueana Caesalpinioideae 
  Cassia spectabilis Caesalpinioideae 
  Catunaregam nilotica Rubiaceae 
  Catunaregam obovata Rubiaceae 
  Cedrela mexicana/odorata Meliaceae 
 
Msedrela 
Ceiba petandra Bombacaceae Kapok Msufi pori 
Citrus aurantifolia Rutaceae Lime Mdimu 
Clausena anisata oliv. Rutaceae 
  Clerodendron myricoides Verbenaceae Blue butterfly 
 Clerodendrum schweinfurthii Verbenaceae 
  Clerodendrum sp. Verbenaceae 
  Clutia abyssinica Euphorbiaceae 
  Coffea engenioides Rubiaceae Nandi coffee 
 Coffea kimbozensis Rubiaceae 
  Coffea pseudozanguebariae Rubiaceae 
  cola sp. Sterculiaceae 
  Cola clavata Sterculiaceae 
  Cola greenwayi Sterculiaceae 
  Cola microcarpa Sterculiaceae 
  Cola scheffleri Sterculiaceae 
  Cola stelacantha Sterculiaceae 
  Cola usambarensis Sterculiaceae 
  Combretum sp. Combretaceae 
  Combretum apiculatum Combretaceae 
  Combretum molle  Combretaceae Velvet bush willow Mlama 
Combretum pentagonum Combretaceae 
  Combretum schumannii (C. stulhmanni) Combretaceae Forest tree combretum Mgurure 
Combretum zeyheri Combretaceae 
  commiphora Sp. (spiny) Burseraceae 
  
Commiphora africana Burseraceae 
Poison grub 
Commiphora Mturituri 
Commiphora edulis Burseraceae 
  Commiphora eminii (subsp. 
Zimmermanii) Burseraceae 
 
Itonto 
Cremaspora triflora Rubiaceae 
  Crossopteryx febrifuga Rubiaceae 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Croton sp. Euphorbiaceae 
  Croton megalobotrys Euphorbiaceae Large fever berry 
 Croton sylvaticus Euphorbiaceae 
  Cussonia kirkii (C.aborea) Araliaceae Cabbage tree Mgagigagi 
Cussonia spicata Araliaceae Common cabbage tree 
Cussonia zimmermanii Araliaceae 
  Cylicomorpha parviflora Caricaceae 
  Cynometra alexandri Leguminosae 
  Cynometra fischeri Leguminosae 
  Cynometra schlechteri Leguminosae 
  D 
   Dalbergia boehmii Fabaceae 
 
Mzeza 
Dalbergia lactea Fabaceae 
  Dalbergia melanoxylon papilionoideae African Blackwood Mpingo 
Dalbergia nitundula papilionoideae Purplewood dalbergia Msinatemo 
Dalbergia vaccinifolia Fabaceae 
  Deinbolia borbonica Sapindaceae 
  Deinbolia kilimandscharica Sapindaceae 
  Dialium holstii Fabaceae 
  
Diospyros mespiliformis Ebenaceae 
African ebony, 
Jackalberry Mgiriti 
Diospyros usambarensis Ebenaceae 
  Diospyros abyssinica Ebenaceae 
  Diospryos verrucosa Ebenaceae 
   Diplorhynchus condylocarpon  Apocynaceae 
  Dichrostachys cinerea Mimosoideae 
 
Mkulagembe 
Dombeya burgessiae Sterculiaceae Pink wild pear 
 Dombeya rotundifolia  Sterculiaceae White dombya Mtati/Mswayu 
Dombeya shumpangae Sterculiaceae 
  Dracaena fragrans Agavaceae Corn plant 
 Dracaena steudneri Agavaceae 
  Draceana usambarensis Agavaceae Long leaved dragon tree Isare 
Drypetes gerardii Euphorbiaceae 
  Drypetes natalensis Euphorbiaceae 
  Drypetes usambarica Euphorbiaceae 
  E 
   Ehretia Amoena  Boraginaceae 
  Ehretia litoralis Boraginaceae 
  Encephalartos hildebrandtii Zamiaceae 
  Encephalartos lehmannii Zamiaceae Karoo cycad 
 Englerophytum natalense Sapotaceae 
  
Erythrina sp.(abyssinica)*(E.tomentosa) Papilionoideae 
Kaffir boom, red hot 
Poker tree Msiviti 
Erythrina sacleuxii Fabaceae 
  Erythrococea fischeri Euphorbiaceae 
  Erythrococca usambarica Euphorbiaceae 
  Erythrophleum guineensis 
(E.suaveolens) Fabaceae 
 
Bangawanga 
Euclea natalensis Ebenaceae 
  Euphorbia bussei Euphorbiaceae 
  Euphorbia candelabrum Euphorbiaceae 
  Euphorbia cooperi Euphorbiaceae 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Euphorbia tirucalli Euphorbiaceae 
Milkbush, finger 
Euphorbia Mnyara/Mgovu 
F 
   Faurea saligma Proteaceae Beachwood Mfuka 
Ficus sp. Moraceae 
  Ficus bussei Moraceae 
  Ficus capensis Moraceae 
  Ficus exasperata Moraceae 
  Ficus glumosa Moraceae 
  Ficus ingens Moraceae 
  Ficus mucuso Moraceae 
  Ficus s(c)ycomorus (F. gnaphalocarpa) Moraceae Sycomore fig Mkuyu 
Ficus thonningii Moraceae Strangler fig Mrumbapori 
Flancourtia indica Flancourtiaceae 
 
Mgola 
Flueggea virosa Euphorbiaceae Chinese waterberry, simpleleaf bushweed 
G 
   Garcinia buchananii Clusiaceae 
  Garcinia Livingstonei Clusiaceae 
 
Mpekechu 
Gardenia ternifolia subsp.jovis-tonantis Clusiaceae 
  Garcinia huillensis Clusiaceae 
  Garcinia volkensii Clusiaceae 
  Gossypium kirkii Malvaceae 
  Grewia bicolor/Grewia goetzeana Tiliaceae 
 
Mkole 
Grewia tenax Tiliaceae 
  Grewia platyclada Tiliaceae 
  Grewia similis Tiliaceae 
 
Mkole 
H 
   Hagenia abyssinica Rosaceae Hagenia Mlanga 
Harrisonia abyssinica  Hedwigiaceae 
  Hippocratea sp. Celastraceae 
  Hippocratea buchaninii Celastraceae 
  hippocratea volkensii Celastraceae 
  Holarrhena febrifuga Apocynaceae 
  Hugonia arborescens Linaceae 
  Hymenaea verrucosa Fabaceae Gum copal tree Msandaruzi/Mnangu 
I 
   J. 
   Jatropha curcus Euphorbiaceae 
  Julbernadia globiflora  Caesalpiniodeae Julbernadia Mhondolo/Mtondo 
K 
   Keetia zanzibarica Rubiaceae 
  Khaya nyasica (K. anthotheca) Meliaceae African mahogony Mkangazi 
Kigelia africana (K. aethiopum) Bignoniaceae Sausage tree Mwicha 
Kiggelaria africana Flacourtiaceae 
  L 
   Lannea fulva Anacardiaceae 
  Lannea schimperi Anacardiaceae 
  Lannea stuhlmanii Anacardiaceae 
 
Msayu 
Lannea schweinfurthii var.stuhlmannii  Anacardiaceae 
 
Mtundu 
Lasianthus pedunculatus Rubiaceae 
  Lecaniodiscus fraxinifolius Sapindaceae 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Lettowianthus stellatus Annonaceae 
  Lonchocarpus bussei Fabaceae 
  Lonchocarpus capassa Fabaceae Lilac tree, Rain tree Mvale 
M 
   Maerua angolensis Capparaceae 
  
Maerua tryphilla Capparaceae 
Maerua, Small bead 
bean Msingizi 
Maesopsis emminii Rhamnaceae 
 
Msira 
Mangifera indica Anacardiaceae Mango Muembe 
Manilkara discolor Sapotaceae Forest milkberry 
 Manilkara mochisia Sapotaceae Milkberry Msapa 
Manilkara sulcata Sapotaceae 
 
Msezi 
Manilkara zanzibarensis Sapotaceae 
 
mgambo 
Margaritaria discoidea Euphorbiaceae 
  Markhamia acuminata Bignoniaceae 
  Markhamia obtusifolia Bignoniaceae Golden bean tree Mtarawanda 
Maytenus mossambicensis Celastraceae 
  Maytenus senegalensis Celastraceae 
  Melia volkensii Meliaceae 
  Memecylon cogniaux Melastomataceae 
  Memecylon myrtilloides Melastomataceae 
  Milicia excelsa (Chlorophora e.) Moraceae Rock Elm, African Teak Mvule 
Millettia angustidentata Papilionoideae 
  Millettia dura Papilionoideae Milletia Mhavi 
Millettia oblata Papilionoideae 
  Millettia usambarensis Papilionoideae 
  Mitragyna rubrostipulata Rubiaceae 
  Monanthotaxis buchananii Annonaceae 
  Monodora grandidiera Annonaceae 
  Mussaenda monticola Rubiaceae 
  Mussaenda tenuiflora Rubiaceae 
  Myrianthus holstii Moraceae Giant yellow mulberry Mfutsa/Mkonde 
N 
   Neoboutonia macrocalys Euphorbiaceae 
  Newtonia buchananii Fabaceae 
 
Mnyaza 
O 
   Ochna sp. Ochnaceae 
  Ochna cyanophylla Ochnaceae 
  Ochna holstii Ochnaceae 
  Ochna oxyphylla Ochnaceae 
  Ochna usambarensis Ochnaceae 
  Ocotea usambarensis Lauraceae Camphor Muheti 
Olea capensis Oleaceae East african olive Ngwe 
Olea chrysophylla Oleaceae 
  Oncoba spinosa Flancourtiaceae 
  Ormocarpum trichocarpum Fabaceae 
  Oxyanthus speciosus Fabaceae 
  Oxyanthus haerdii Fabaceae 
  Ozoroa obovata Anacardiaceae 
  Ozoroa insignis (Heeria reticulata) Anacardiaceae Tropical resin tree Mwalika 
P 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Pandanus stulhmannii Pandanaceae 
  Parkia filicoidea Fabaceae African locust bean 
 Pavetta crassipes Rubiaceae 
  Pavetta holstii Rubiaceae 
  Peddiea volkensii Thymelaeaceae 
  Pericopsis angolensis (Afrormosia a.) Papiliononideae East African Afrormosia Mbanga 
Phoenix reclinata Arecaceae(Palmae) Wild date palm Bukindi 
Phyllanthus reticulatus Phyllanthaceae 
  Piliostigma thonningii (Bauhinia t.) Caesalpiniodeae Camel's foot tree Mkichikichi 
Polyceratocarpus scheffleri Annonaceae 
  Polysphaeria parvifolia Rubiaceae 
  Prunus africana Rosaceae Red stinkwood Mwiluti 
Pseudolachnostylis maprouneifolia  Euphorbiaceae Duiker berry Muguruka 
Psychotria brucei Rubiaceae 
  Psychotria eminiana Rubiaceae 
  Psychotria goetzei Rubiaceae 
  Psychotria lauracea Rubiaceae 
  Psydrax obovata Rubiaceae 
  
Pterocarpus angolensis Papiliononideae 
African Teak, 
Bloodwoood Mninga 
Pteleopsis myrtifolia Combretaceae 
 
Mwindi 
Q 
   R 
   Raphia farinfera Arecaceae 
  Raphia vinifera Arecaceae 
  Rawsonia uluguruensis Flacourtiaceae 
  Rauvolfia caffra Apocynaceae Quinine tree Mkufi 
Rhus africana Anacardiaceae 
  Rhus longispina Anacardiaceae 
  Rhus natalensis Anacardiaceae 
 
Mkumba 
Rhus vulgaris Anacardiaceae 
  Rinorea sp. 
   Ricinus communis Euphorbiaceae Castor bean Mbarika 
Ricinodendron heudelotii Euphorbiaceae African nut tree 
 Rinorea elliptica Violaceae 
  Rinorea ilicifolia Violaceae 
  S 
   Sapium ellipticum (Shirakiopsis e.) Euphorbiaceae 
  Sapindus saponaria 
 
Soapberry 
 Schrebera alata 
   Schefflera abyssinica Araliaceae 
  Schefflera goetzenii Araliaceae 
  Schefflera spicata Araliaceae 
  Sclerocarya birrea subsp.caffra Anacardiaceae 
 
Mng'ongo 
Scorodophloeus fischeri Fabaceae 
  Securidaca longipendunculata Polygalaceae Violet tree Mluka 
Schefflerodendron usambarense Fabaceae 
  Senna siamea Fabaceae Thai cassia, Kassod tree Mjohoro 
Sorindeia madagascariensis Anacardiaceae 
  Spirostachys africana  
  
Mchalaka 
Steganotaenia araliacea Apiaceae 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Sterculia africana Sterculiaceae 
African star chestnut, 
Tick tree Mluze 
Sterculia appendiculata Sterculiaceae Tall Sterculia Mfune/Mgude 
Sterculia quenquloba  Sterculiaceae Egyptian plane tree Mkweranyani 
Sterculia tragacantha Sterculiaceae 
  Stereospermum kunthianum Bignoniaceae 
 
Mtafuna panya 
Strophanthus eminii Apocynaceae 
  Strychnos sp. 
   
Strychnos cocculoides Loganiaceae 
Corky bark, Monkey 
Orange Mtonga 
Strychnos henningsii Loganiaceae 
  Strychnos potatorum 
   Suregada zanquebarica 
   
Syzygium guineense Myrtaceae Water berry 
Mzambarai,Mzambarau 
mwitu 
Syzygium owariernse Myrtaceae Water berry Mzambarau ziwa 
T 
   Tabernaemontana 
pachysiphon(T.holstii) Apocynaceae Giant pinwheel flower, Pua 
Tamarindus indica Caesalpiniodeae Tamarind Mkwaju 
Teclea nobilis Rutaceae 
 
Muzo 
Teclea simplicifolia 
   Tectona grandis Verbanaceae Teak Msaji/Mtiki 
Terminalia brownii Combretaceae 
 
Mpoke 
Terminalia sericea Combretaceae Silevr terminalia Mpululu 
Trema orientalis (T. guineensis) Ulmaceae Pigeon wood Mgendagenda 
Trichilia dregeana Meliaceae Forest mahogony 
 Trichilia emetica (T. roka) Meliaceae Cape mahogony Mkungwina 
Turraea fischerii Meliaceae 
  Turraea holstii Meliaceae Honeysuckle tree 
 Turraea robusta Meliaceae 
  U 
   Uvariastrum hexaloboides Annonaceae 
  V 
   Vangueria infausta Rubiaceae Wild medlar Mviru 
Vangueria tomentosa Rubiaceae 
  Vernonia subligera Asteraceae 
 
Tughutu 
Vernonia amygdalina Asteraceae 
  Vepris glandulosa Rutaceae 
  Vepris lanceolata Rutaceae 
  Vepris stolzii Rutaceae 
  Vitex domiana (V. cuneata, V. 
cienkowskii) Verbenaceae Black plum Mfudu 
Vitex keniensis (V. kenyansis) Verbenaceae Mero oak Mfuu 
Vitex mombassae Verbenaceae Smelly berry vitex Mfundumaji 
Voacanga africana Apocynaceae 
  W 
   X 
   Xeroderris angolensis Fabaceae 
  Xeroderris stuhlmannii Papilionoideae Wind pod Mnyinga 
Ximenia caffra (X. americana var. 
caffra) Olacaceae Large sourplum Mpingi 
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Genus Family  Eng.Name Swahili name 
   
other name 
Xylotheca tettensis Flacourtiaceae 
  Y 
   Z 
   Zanha africana Sapindaceae 
  Zanthoxylum chalybeum Rutaceae Knobwood Mjafari 
Zanthoxylum deremense Rutaceae 
  Zanthoxylum gilletii  Rutaceae 
  Ziziphus mucronata Rhamnaceae Buffalo thorn Mgugunu 
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Appendix 7: Wealth class indicators  
 
The following wealth class indicators were identified by the villagers during the PRA 
sessions in the six villages:  
Site 1 
Maseyu village (JFM) 
 
Indicator  
 
Poor person*) 
Uwezo mdogo 
Middle 
wakawaida 
Rich person 
Mwenye uwezo 
Farm size 1.5 acres  3 acres  100-200 acres 
Livestock none 2-6 chicken 20 chicken, 4-10 
goats 
Type of house Thatched   Thatched   Bricks  
Farming tools Hand Hoe Hand Hoe, Panga, 
Axe 
Traktor 
Assets None  Bicycle, moderately 
priced radio 
Bicycle, Traktor, 
milling maschine, 
Mobile phone 
Age  Old person Relatively young Relatively young 
Type of bed  Made of ropes and wood Bed with matress Bed with matress 
(more than one) 
Economic activities Provides service to others, 
e.g. burning charcoal, 
farming, i.e. cultivating 
land for somebody else. 
Charcoal Burner (10-
20 bags per month), 
does petty trading  
(vegetables, tomato, 
cassava) 
Charcoal seller 
(buys 200-600 bags), 
is a middleman, 
Petty Trading 
(simsim, cassava, 
maize). has 
employees (Bwana 
Mifugo, Bwana 
Shamba)  
Access to Health 
services 
Highly depends on 
collected traditional 
medicines; are being served 
freely by traditional 
healers. 
Buy traditional 
medicines 
Any 
Access to 
Communication  
None Able to pay others to 
use their mobile 
phone 
Mobile phone 
Recepients of 
support 
Some are offered 
medication allowance by 
their landlords   
 
Afford going to 
government hospitals 
Go to private 
hospital in Morogoro 
Fulwe village (non JFM) 
 
Criteria  Poor person*) 
Uwezo mdogo 
Middle 
wakawaida 
Rich person 
Mwenye uwezo 
Farm size < 2 acres  10-5 acres 20-50 acres 
Livestock Chicken 1-5 Chicken 10-5 Chicken 100-50 
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Goats 0 Goats 5-2 Goats 20-10 
Type of house House  made of thached 
grass 
House made of poles 
and dirt floor  
House made from 
bricks  
Farming tools Has handhow, panga, axe Renting tractor, 
handhow, labour  
Large milling 
maschine and tractor 
Assets none Bicycle, radio  Milling maschine, 
car, motorbike, tv, 
radio 
Type of bed  Bed made out of ropes  Normal Bed and 
matrass 3-4 feet  
Normal bed, matrass 
6 by 6 feet  
Economic activities  Burning charcoal  Sales person (small 
business) sells 
charcoal  
Shop, hotel, bar  
 
Health services Kleine Apotheke, 
traditional healer  
Government hospital  Private hospital  
Schooling of 
children 
Going to see only  
 
Government school  Private school  
Access to 
communication  
Pays to use phone of others  Cell phone either 
husband or wife (one 
person in family) 
Cell phone both 
husband and wife  
*) a poor person was considered lazy, often drunk and to be a thief.  
 
 
Site 2  
 
Mwalazi village (JFM) 
 
Criteria  Poor person 
Uwezo mdogo 
Middle 
wakawaida 
Rich person 
Mwenye uwezo 
Farm size Large 30 acres, outside the 
village and up to 5 acres 
inside village 
1-2 acres  Up to 0.5 acres 
Livestock 40 goats 10 goats 0 goats 
Type of house 2-3 good houses, iron sheet 
and burned bricks 
1 small good house, 
iron sheet and bricks 
House made out of 
makuti, poles and 
mud 
Assets Bicycle, mobile phone Mobile phone none 
Transport Are mobile, Bicycle Are sometimes 
mobile  
Are not mobile  
Education  Children go to secondary 
school  
Children go to 
primary school  
Children do not go to 
school  
Economic activities Big business  Kiosk  No business 
Access to 
Communication  
Buy expensive phones Buy ordinary phones Do not own phones 
Main source of 
income  
Large scale farming 
Large businesses 
Farming, 
Small businesses 
Selling labour, casual 
labourers; 
Chicken; 
Small scale farming 
Ngongolo village (non JFM) 
 
Criteria  Poor person 
Uwezo mdogo 
Middle 
wakawaida 
Rich person 
Mwenye uwezo 
Farm size 0.5 acres 2-3 acres 3-4 acres 
Simsim harvest 0.5 bags 2-3 bags 8 – 10 bags 
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Livestock Goats max. 3  
Chicken max. 5  
Goats max. 10  
Chicken 10 - 20 
Goats 20 – 50 
Chicken 50 – 100  
Type of house Poles and mud Unburned bricks 
Grass roof  
Up to 6 rooms, Iron 
sheet 
Wooden door, bricks 
Economic activities mining Kiosk, burns 
charcoal, mining 
Shop 
Milling maschine 
Health services Not able to do so Sometimes able to do 
so 
Take patients to 
hospitals far from 
village 
Schooling of 
children 
No school  Vocational training Private school 
Access to 
communication  
Uses phones of others 
against payment 
Cell phone Cell phone 
 
Site 3  
 
Milawilila village (JFM) 
 
Criteria  Poor person 
Uwezo mdogo 
Middle 
wakawaida 
Rich person 
Mwenye uwezo 
Farm size Up to  1  2 acres of cassava 4-5 acres  
Pinnapple, organges, 
pepper 
Livestock Mifugo kuku 100-50 
Mbuzi 20-10 
Mbuzi 5-2, 
Kuku 10-5 
Chicken 1-5 
Goat 0 
Type of house Thatched grass House made of poles 
and dirt floor  
House made from 
burned bricks  
Livestock   Over 50 goats 
Assets none 0 or 1 bicycle 10-20 bicycles, for 
rent 
Economic activities  Anafanya vibarua kiosk shop 
 
Health services Needs to go by foot, 
depends on traditional 
healer (mganga wa 
kienyeji) 
Can rent bicycle to 
bring his patients to 
hospital 
Takes care of 
patients easily 
Schooling of 
children 
Do not complete primary Government school  Private school  
Woodlots Under 10 trees 30-40 trees Up to 100 trees 
Logo village (non JFM) 
 
Criteria  Poor person 
Uwezo mdogo 
Middle 
wakawaida 
Rich person 
Mwenye uwezo 
Farm size 1 acre, rented Land size 3-4 acres, 
owned 
Land size 10 acres, 
owned 
Type of house Roof makuti,  
walls poles, fito and mud, 
floor mud  
Roof makuti,  
wall burned/nud 
bricks, floor mud  
Roof iron,  
wall burned bricks,  
floor cement/mud 
Livestock None  Goats 6-7 
Chicken 10 
Ducks 1  
Goats 18-20  
Chicken 30-40 
Ducks 5-6 
Rabbit 0-3 
Income  No savings, no harvest, Saves 10,000 Per year: 
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Hired labour, paid daily 
TSs 800 to 1,000  
Simsin 3 buckets 
Maize 2 buckets 
Organges 5,000 
Cassava 5 bags 
Saves 20,000  
Simsim 10 buckets 
Maize 1 sack 
Oranges 20,000 
Cassava 20 bags 
Food  1 per day and not sure of it 2 meals per day  3 meals per day and 
selective 
Bicycle 0 1 3 
Economic activities: 
small business 
brick making  
No business, casual 
labourer  
Small business,  
2,000 to 3,000 bricks 
burned 
Small business, 
shops, 4,000-5,000 
bricks burned, sells 
at 50 TShs every 2 
months 
Health services    
Schooling  Primary up to standard 4 Primary only  Primary to 
secondary, able to 
pay school fees 
Access to 
Communication 
0 0 Mobile  
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